

The American Historical Review

THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION




\$200 REWARD!

RAN off from my Furnace, in Rockbridge county, several weeks ago, two NEGRO MEN, the property of Mary Coghill, of Spotsylvania county, Virginia, named JOHN and SAM. Also a NEGRO MAN by the name of SPENCER, the property of Wm. L. Day, of the same county. It is apprehended that they are aiming to get to the State of Ohio, as they ran off without provocation, and they have probably taken the route by New River. John and Spencer are probably from 35 to 40 years of age; Sam from 20 to 25 years. They are all negroes of dark complexion, and John has had tetter worm on his neck.—Spencer is rather darker than the other two, and has very thick lips. I am authorized by Mary Coghill, to offer a reward for the apprehension of hers, if they are taken hereafter in this State, and secured so that she gets them, \$75 a piece; if taken in any other State, \$100 a piece; and if taken in a non-slaveholding State, \$200, to be delivered to her, or secured in Spotsylvania or Frederickburg jail. Mr. Day has not authorized me to say what reward he will pay for the apprehension of his man, but I doubt not he will pay a liberal reward.

FRANCIS T. ANDERSON,
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Cover Illustration. (Top) Pen and ink drawing of a runaway slave by Edward Kemble from William Loren Katz, *The Black West: A Documentary and Pictorial History*. Copyright © 1971, 1973 by William Loren Katz. Published by Doubleday & Company, Inc. (Bottom) Advertisement from the Lynchburg *Daily Virginian*, Sept. 7, 1860, for a runaway slave. Courtesy Jones Memorial Library, Lynchburg, Virginia. (See Charles B. Dew, "Disciplining Slave Ironworkers in the Antebellum South: Coercion, Conciliation, and Accommodation," pp. 393-418.)

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Disciplining Slave Ironworkers in the Antebellum South: Coercion, Conciliation, and Accommodation

CHARLES B. DEW

WHEN JOHN C. CALHOUN learned in 1845 that his son-in-law, Thomas Clemson, was planning to break up his plantation and rent out his slave force, Calhoun promptly reminded him of the probable human consequences of such a move. The hirer of the slaves would have no incentive to "take good care of them," Calhoun warned. "The object of him who hires, is generally to make the most he can out of them, without regard to their comfort or health," he continued, and Calhoun was so convinced of the evils of slave hiring that he offered to buy the slaves himself if Clemson could not find other decent masters who would purchase them.¹

Several historians of American slavery who have commented recently on slave hiring, and particularly on the hiring of slaves for industrial purposes, share Calhoun's bleak assessment of this phase of the South's peculiar institution. "The overwork of hired slaves by employers with only a temporary interest in their welfare was as notorious as the harsh practices of overseers," notes Kenneth M. Stampp. "Slaves hired to mine owners or railroad contractors were fortunate if they were not driven to the point where their health was impaired."² In the view of Stampp and a number of other scholars, slave hiring and industrial slavery were among the most brutal and exploitive aspects of the American slave system; these historians tend to see hiring out and industrial employment, like slave trading, as

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¹ J. C. Calhoun to T. G. Clemson, Oct. 27, 1845, John C. Calhoun Papers, Clemson University Library, Clemson, S. C.

² Kenneth M. Stampp, *The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South* (New York, 1956), 84.

areas where the business aspects of the institution were most highly developed and where the humanity of the slaves was most likely to be ignored.³

Other recent students of slavery, particularly Clement Eaton and Richard B. Morris, have suggested a somewhat different picture. "Court records . . . contain rather frequent references to cruel treatment, overwork, and neglect of hired slaves," writes Professor Eaton. "Yet considerable evidence . . . indicates that many of the plantation slaves of the Upper South desired to be hired in the cities and in industries to secure the privileges, social opportunities, rewards, and freedoms which they could not enjoy on the plantation."⁴ Both Eaton and Morris see slave hiring and industrial work contributing to the development of improved living conditions for slave laborers and argue, in Morris's words, that these improvements represented a "trend toward upgrading slaves into a shadowland of quasi-freedom" in the late antebellum era.⁵ Although there is considerable doubt about some of the implications of the Eaton-Morris analysis, particularly their suggestion that this trend toward greater freedom posed a threat to the continued existence of slavery itself, they would seem to be on the right track. A close examination of one phase of Southern industrial slavery that used large numbers of hired bondsmen—the manufacture of iron—reveals a complex relationship between master and slave that rested more on a subtle process of mutual compromise and accommodation than on excessive use of physical force and coercion. This is not by any means intended to suggest that force was not used, for it clearly was, or to suggest that the slave iron worker lived and labored as a free person; he or she was still a slave, and in Southern industrial slavery, as in all slave systems, the master ultimately possessed far superior weapons if a test of wills threatened to go beyond what the master considered reasonable bounds. But unless an outright threat to the master's authority or a direct challenge to the slave system itself occurred, the Southern iron men examined for this article proved, for a number of reasons, to be willing to meet their slave hands in a rather vague and nebulous middle ground where black and white could live with and work alongside each other and where the slave had considerable influence over his working conditions, his family arrangements, and the course of his everyday life.

In order to present this thesis in as clear and brief a fashion as possible, this article concentrates on the operations of William Weaver and several

³ Robert S. Starobin, *Industrial Slavery in the Old South* (New York, 1970), especially chs. 3 and 4, and his article, "Disciplining Industrial Slaves in the Old South," *Journal of Negro History*, 53 (1968): 111–28; Samuel Sydney Bradford, "The Ante-Bellum Charcoal Iron Industry of Virginia" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1958), especially chs. 4 and 5, and his article, "The Negro Ironworker in Ante Bellum Virginia," *Journal of Southern History*, 25 (1959): 194–206.

⁴ Clement Eaton, "Slave-Hiring in the Upper South: A Step toward Freedom," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 46 (1960): 668–69; Richard B. Morris, "The Measure of Bondage in the Slave States," *ibid.*, 41 (1954): 231–39.

⁵ Morris, "Measure of Bondage," 239.

other ironmasters whose furnaces and forges lay in the Valley of Virginia. More detailed evidence is available on the antebellum Virginia iron industry than for any other Southern state, but research in the surviving records of iron establishments that were located in other areas of the South indicates that Virginia's labor practices were characteristic of the industry throughout the slave states.⁶ The emphasis on a specific group of men in a specific area also reflects a conviction that only through close and detailed case studies of the ways in which slavery functioned on a day-to-day basis can we begin to understand what it meant to be a slave in any phase of the American slave system, industrial or agricultural, urban or rural. One of my purposes is to suggest that the material for studies in microcosm of this sort is available and that records generated in the daily functioning of the system can give us some insight into the slave's own reaction to his or her bondage. Perhaps an imaginative use of primary sources of this kind can free historians from an almost exclusive dependence on published fugitive accounts or the Slave Narrative Collection of the Library of Congress in our renewed efforts to get inside the most peculiar of American institutions.⁷

WILLIAM WEAVER was something of a legend in his own lifetime. Although born in Pennsylvania, he spent most of his adult life in the valley region of Virginia where he amassed, for his day, a sizable fortune from his iron, farming, and milling operations. In 1860 Weaver, then seventy-nine years old, estimated to the federal census taker that his real and personal property was worth over \$130,000, a figure that was probably reasonably accurate since Weaver owned thousands of acres of land and held sixty-six slaves in 1860—thirty-one adult men, fifteen adult women, and twenty children.⁸ Weaver's scientific farming experiments on the steep slopes of the North

⁶ The employment of slave labor at iron works outside Virginia is discussed in detail in the Louisa Furnace Account Books, which deal with the operations of a Tennessee blast furnace, in the Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.; the Shelby Iron Works Collection, which describes the operations of a major Alabama iron complex, in the University of Alabama Library, University, Ala.; and the Lucy Wortham James Collection, which contains most of the extensive records of the Maramec Iron Works of Missouri, in the Western Historical Manuscripts Collection, University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo. On the use of slave ironworkers in Georgia, see the *Augusta Daily Constitutionalist*, Oct. 29, 1859, and the material relating to the Etowah Iron Works in "Confederate Papers Relating to Citizens or Business Firms," War Department Collection of Confederate Records, Record Group 109, National Archives, Washington, D.C. See also Starobin, *Industrial Slavery*, 100-01; Lester J. Cappon, "Iron-Making—A Forgotten Industry of North Carolina," *North Carolina Historical Review*, 9 (1932): 340-41; and Ernest M. Lander, Jr., "The Iron Industry in Ante-Bellum South Carolina," *Journal of Southern History*, 20 (1954): 350-51. I wish to thank Dr. Robert H. McKenzie of the University of Alabama for kindly providing information on the slave labor practices of the Shelby Iron Works.

⁷ Two suggestive studies that rely heavily on the Slave Narrative Collection and fugitive accounts have recently appeared. See George P. Rawick, *From Sundown to Sunup: The Making of the Black Community* (Westport, Conn., 1972); and John W. Blassingame, *The Slave Community: Plantation Life in the Ante-Bellum South* (New York, 1972).

⁸ Manuscript Population and Slave Schedules, Rockbridge County, Virginia, Eighth Census of the United States, 1860, National Archives Microfilm Publications, M653.

River and Buffalo Creek in his home county of Rockbridge gained wide notoriety and earned him a reputation as an innovating and successful farmer.⁹ But it was in the iron trade that Weaver concentrated his energies, his financial resources, and the bulk of his slave labor force.

During the 1850s Weaver operated two iron manufacturing installations, both of which employed slave labor extensively and both of which were typical of the slave-manned furnaces and forges that dotted upland areas in Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky, North and South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Missouri prior to the Civil War. Weaver centered his operations at Buffalo Forge, near Lexington, Virginia, where a picked group of slave operatives worked four fires and two water-powered hammers that annually produced about one hundred tons of bar iron for the Lynchburg and Richmond markets. The pig iron to sustain the operations at Buffalo Forge came from Weaver's Etna Furnace, a charcoal blast furnace located in an adjoining county, which produced some seven hundred tons of pig iron per year. The Etna pig iron not consumed at Weaver's forge was sent by boat down the James River and Kanawah Canal and offered for sale by commission merchants in Lynchburg and Richmond.¹⁰

Iron manufacturing in the antebellum South was a labor-intensive industry. Since Weaver's Etna Furnace, like practically all Southern blast furnaces, used charcoal for fuel, dozens of workers were needed to chop wood, man charcoal pits, and haul the charcoal frequently long distances to the furnace site. At the ore banks, which might also be several miles from the furnace, miners dug iron ore, while other miners were needed to extract limestone to use as flux in the manufacturing process. When an adequate supply of what furnace men referred to as "stock"—ore, charcoal, and limestone—had been assembled, a process that often required two or three months, the furnace was "blown in" and the production of pig iron begun. Once in operation, workers fed measured amounts of iron ore, charcoal, and limestone into the blast furnace day and night until the blast was completed. Since blasts frequently lasted four to five months, and sometimes longer, and since farming operations were also conducted at most Southern iron works, including Weaver's installations, a constant interchange of slave labor between industrial and agricultural tasks took place at furnaces and forges throughout the South and allowed ironmasters to employ their extensive labor force year round.

At most Southern blast furnaces slave labor played a large role in almost all phases of pig iron production. As founders, colliers, miners, teamsters, wood choppers, and general furnace hands, slaves constituted the bulk of the laboring force. An average charcoal blast furnace required some sixty or

⁹ "Farming of Mr. William Weaver, of Rockbridge County, Virginia," *Farmers' Register*, 10 (1842): 411-13.

¹⁰ For a description of Weaver's iron properties, see J. P. Lesley, *The Iron Manufacturer's Guide to the Furnaces, Forges, and Rolling Mills of the United States* (New York, 1859), 73, 181.



Fig. 1. William Weaver (1781–1863). From a daguerreotype made in the late 1850s by an unknown photographer. Photograph courtesy the Rockbridge County Historical Society, Lexington, Virginia.

seventy slave workers, in addition to a white manager and a handful of skilled laborers, usually but not always white, who were responsible for supervising various stages of production. Since Weaver owned only thirty-one adult male slaves in 1860 and many of these worked at his forge he, like most Southern iron men, was forced to hire a considerable number of slaves each year—as many as ninety or a hundred hands—in order to sustain both of his iron-making enterprises and his farming operations.¹¹

The labor demands at Buffalo Forge were less than those at Weaver's blast furnace. At the forge a force of slave heaters and hammermen turned Weaver's pig iron into "merchant bars," the term used in the nineteenth century to describe refined iron that had been hammered or rolled into

¹¹ William Weaver to James D. Davidson, Jan. 10, 1855, James D. Davidson Papers, McCormick Collection, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.

standard-size bars. A number of slave hands at Buffalo Forge were highly skilled artisans owned by Weaver: Henry Mathews, who was proficient as a blacksmith, rough carpenter, forge hand, and farmworker; Jim Garland and a slave named Tooler who operated Weaver's chafery and refinery forges and there worked the iron prior to its being wrought into bars; two heaters, Henry Towles and Henry Hunt, Jr., the son of one of Weaver's older slaves of the same name who had evidently been brought up in the iron trade at Buffalo Forge; Sam Williams, an exceptionally skilled ironworker who apparently hammered out finished bars; and Mark, Charles, Garland, and Warder who each had responsibility for a six-mule team and wagon. Weaver's select group of forge hands and teamsters was supplemented by an additional force of slave workers hired by the year to work in less skilled forge operations, in Weaver's flour mill at Buffalo Forge, and as agricultural laborers on Weaver's extensive and scattered farm properties.¹²

The necessity for an accommodation between William Weaver and his slaves, both those he owned and those he hired, lay ultimately in Weaver's dependence on these men for the success of his operations. First of all, to carry on his various manufacturing and farming activities he needed large numbers of slave hands, not all of whom could he afford to purchase. As mentioned previously, he annually sought as many as ninety to a hundred slaves, and the process of hiring so many hands was by no means routine or automatic. A number of difficulties were involved, and these difficulties were compounded in the late antebellum period by the fact that slave labor was becoming increasingly scarce and expensive in Virginia. In the 1820s Weaver normally paid \$45 or \$50 per year to hire slave hands, with the \$50 hire representing Weaver's upper limit for superior workers.¹³ By the mid-1850s, however, the price had risen well above those levels, as Weaver's hiring agent reported to him in December 1855:

They [the owners] are asking \$135 to \$150 for good hands, no one can tell what the price will be, untill new years day. . . . you have no idea of the trouble there is in hiring hands here, at this day, there is all sorts of trickery and management, I don't expect to be able to hire more than thirty or forty hands, we may get fifty; but I can assure you, the prospect is very glomy.¹⁴

One of Weaver's nephews, James C. Davis of nearby Gibraltar Forge, seeking hands in the same neighborhood, a few days later reported similar difficulties and explained the reason for the troublesome situation. "Hands are hiring a little higher this year than last; the cause of it is the high price of

¹² See entries in *Buffalo Forge Negro Books*, 1850-58 and 1865-72, Weaver-Brady Records, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, Va.

¹³ James C. Dickinson to Weaver, Jan. 2, 1828, William Weaver Papers, *ibid.* (hereafter these papers will be cited as *Weaver Papers, Virginia*).

¹⁴ Henry A. McCormick to Weaver, Dec. 29, 1855, *ibid.*

the produce of farms & the consequent demand for their labor in that direction.”¹⁵ “There are not so many Iron & no more railroad men in the field,” he wrote two days later, “but the farmers make a formidable phalanx of opposition. Some of them are giving \$140 & \$150 for men, & \$70 to \$90 for women,” he added. “Women are higher than ever known before.”¹⁶

As these letters indicate, the competition among various industrial and agricultural groups for slave labor was stiff in Virginia in the mid-1850s, but this was by no means a novel situation. In the 1820s and 1830s canal-building and gold-mining interests had offered strong hiring competition, and bursts of railroad construction in Virginia in the 1840s and 1850s brought another major employer into the field. Throughout the late antebellum decades agents for the urban tobacco factories and the Richmond area coal mines, cotton mills, and iron works also sought large numbers of slave hands each year.¹⁷

Given the increased problems involved in hiring an adequate labor force, it was imperative that Weaver and the other ironmasters avoid the reputation that they abused slaves in their employ. If slaves returned home to their owners with stories of hard driving and excessive punishment, an iron man like Weaver could be seriously handicapped in his efforts to hire in subsequent years. That ironmasters were sensitive to any suggestion that they abused slaves and that they sought to avoid excessive physical punishment if at all possible is indicated by an exchange of correspondence in 1849 between the manager of an iron furnace in Rockbridge County and the owner of a hired slave who claimed the manager had mistreated him. First, the letter from the slaveholder to the ironmaster, Francis T. Anderson of Glenwood Furnace:

My boy Edmond that I hired to . . . you got here the eight of this month [November 1849], he says that your overseer is so cruel that he could not stand him. I have hired him out for the three last years and the Gentleman was very much pleased with him. I know he will do his work as well as any negroe unless the person that overlooks him is barbourse I write this to let you know that I have given him a pass and started him back to you, this morning, if you thrash him do not be two rough and I know he will do his work as well as any other negroe at your furnice.¹⁸

¹⁵ James C. Davis to William W. Davis, Jan. 5, 1856, William W. Davis Papers, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, Va.

¹⁶ J. C. Davis to William W. Davis, Jan. 7, 1856, Jordan & Davis Papers, McCormick Collection, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.

¹⁷ See John Chew to Weaver, Dec. 5, 1830; and James Coleman to Weaver, Feb. 5, 19, 1856, both in William Weaver Papers, Duke University Library, Durham, N.C. (hereafter these papers will be cited as Weaver Papers, Duke); Tuyman Wayt to Jordan & Irvine, Jan. 6, 1830; and Pallison Boxley to Jordan & Irvine, Jan. 13, 1831, both in Jordan & Irvine Papers, McCormick Collection, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.; see also advertisements of companies seeking to hire slave hands in *Richmond Daily Dispatch*, Jan. 5, Dec. 18, 31, 1853; Dec. 22, 1856; Jan. 1, 1857; Jan. 7, Dec. 10, 31, 1858; and Apr. 6, 1859.

¹⁸ John T. Day to Shanks, Anderson & Anderson, Nov. 9, 1849, Anderson Family Papers, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, Va.

After receiving this letter, the furnace owner had his manager draft a statement concerning the conduct of this worker and the circumstances surrounding his punishment and subsequent departure from the furnace:

Your letter under date of 9th Nov. is before me and contents noticed, in answer I must inform you that your man Edmund has behaved very badly & told you lies.

I have never struck him one lick on account of his work, the place he lived at last year Mr. Stevens is in the neighbourhood of our Furnace, where he had some 2 or 3 wives and would be there nearly every night in the week and Mr. Stevens complained to me that Edmund kept a continual uproar and fighting with other negroes, and that he could not stand it. I then told Edmund not to go there, and I also told Mr. Stevens if it hapened again to take Edmund and bring him to me which he did and I gave him a good dressing and have not seen him since, which was the early part of the summer. Since that time he has been plundering the neighbourhood & steeling & lying in peoples barns and robing their spring houses &c.

You will please inquire of the negroes which came from the same neighbourhood namely—Ben Swan, Randle Swan, Fister, Burbage, and Beverly Beasly all of them will prove the correctness of my statement.¹⁹

There are a number of significant points in this exchange, but two elements deserve special mention: first, that Edmond, the slave, knew he could get the ear of his master by pleading, in effect, “ironmaster brutality,” and although his owner sent him back to the furnace, he did so with the admonition that Edmond not be severely punished; and second, that the owner of the furnace kept a copy of his manager’s explanation in his files to protect himself and his enterprise from the charge that slaves were abused at his iron works.

A runaway incident that occurred at Weaver’s Etna Furnace in the 1850s led to a similar revealing exchange of correspondence. A hiring agent who had secured several slave wood choppers to work at the furnace had just learned some disturbing information, as he noted in a letter to Weaver dated November 11, 1857:

I received a letter from some one with no name to it saying that Robert had left you and the reason assigned was that your [furnace] manager wished him to work in the Ore Bank and it was so dangerous that all your white hands had quit on that account. if so I am surprised for I had always thought you a different man and had always represented you as being one of the safest men to hire to as regards the treatment in the Vallie and besides I have always hired Robt William & Prince as wood choppers and I have no doubt it was done without your knowledge. if Robt has left please let me hear from you immediately as I dont want the Boy to give either of us any trouble.²⁰

Weaver immediately asked his furnace managers for an explanation and received a full account of the difficulty concerning Robert:

¹⁹ T. H. Burns, agent for Shanks & Anderson, to John T. Day, Dec. 18, 1849, *ibid.*

²⁰ Thomas R. Towles to Weaver, Nov. 11, 1857, Weaver Papers, Duke.



Fig. 2. Glenwood Furnace, Rockbridge County, Virginia, as it appears today. This stack, thirty-eight feet high, was erected in 1849 and is typical of the charcoal blast furnaces built and manned largely by slave labor in Virginia during the late antebellum decades. Photograph courtesy Mr. T. T. Brady, Richmond, Virginia.

On inquiry I find there is something in relation to Bob from which a tale could be manufactured, to wit. On Tuesday a week William [W. Rex] requested Bob to go to the Bank (he picking him out on a/c of being near his wife's) William thinking all [was] right left, but afterwards finding that he did not go up, saw him again on Tuesday last at which time Bob said very imputantly that you had a letter at the forge to the effect that a particular understanding was made that he (Bob) was not to work in the Bank. If that is the case (says William) I dont expect you to work there. He William at the same time requesting him (Bob) to come [to the] Furnace stating to Bob that he would write to you & if it was not in your hands he bob might expect a punishment. That was all that was said & the last & Bob is now away. Of course there is not one word of truth in regard to white hands in [the] Bank & *no danger there either*.²¹

²¹ Charles K. Gorgas to Weaver, Nov. 17, 1857, *ibid*. William W. Rex, a nephew of Weaver's, was one of the managers at Etna Furnace.

Once again, the ironmaster's inquiry and the manager's detailed explanation of the incident indicate that employers were well aware that they could not afford to ignore charges that they neglected owners' instructions about working conditions or that they dealt too severely with slave laborers.

Although ironmasters apparently tried to avoid excessive reliance on harsh physical punishment, there is ample evidence that the whip was employed at antebellum iron works in Virginia. The point seems to have been not to overuse the lash, to employ it to the extent that the slaves became recalcitrant or demoralized and owners became apprehensive over the health and safety of their hired bondsmen. One letter in particular touches on the entire question of discipline and coercion in such a revealing way that it deserves to be quoted at some length. The letter describes the trials of James C. Davis who was attempting to rehire a specific group of slave workers in eastern Virginia for another year's labor at his Gibraltar Forge near Lexington. His problem was not only to convince the master that they should go back to the forge but also to persuade the slaves, and one slave in particular, to return. He described his difficulties with this group of hands in a detailed letter addressed to his father, William Weaver Davis, at the forge, dated January 5, 1856:

There is some difficulty about Dickinson's hands & I hardly know how to act. When they came from over the mountain they wished to go back: & under the impression that they still wished so I hired them of Dickinson at the Ct House tuesday. Shortly after I hired them he came & told me that Elick did not wish to go, that a railroad man had offered him five dollars cash in his hands to go with him & that tickled his fancy.

But the owner thought that Elick would "get over that & be willing to go with you." If the slave's reluctance to return continued, however, Dickinson said that he would not force him to go but he promised at the same time to send the other hands. "But yesterday I received a letter from him saying that his boys had come to him & avowed they would not go, & if they did go they would run off after they got there," Davis continued. "Now I believe that this is nothing but an empty threat for the purpose of scaring their master & that it only requires decisive measures to bring them straight." If the slaves actually carried out their runaway attempt, "they would be apt to run before they got there [Gibraltar Forge] & not after they crossed the blue Ridge [Mountains], for they know that they dont understand the country well enough to start when so far from home." And if they ran away before they reached the mountains, "they will come down in Dickinson's neighborhood & he will be perfectly willing to take them back & so no harm will result in that case." Davis was reasonably certain the hands would not try to flee after they reached the forge, because in addition to their "not being used to the country," they were not "skilled in the wiles of running away," and thus would be recaptured before they

could get very far. "All this is on the hypothesis that Elick goes with them," Davis noted. "If he is cooled down & kept in Jail until I choose to let him off & the others sent on I dont apprehend any difficulty whatever: because he is the ringleader and has persuaded the other's . . . who were willing to go back up to last Monday when I saw them at the Ct House." Davis could not surrender his claim to these men because "the hands through the country are hired," and, in addition, he had gotten the slaves "cheaper than I could get hands again even if I could find any for hire." He then outlined his scheme for dealing with this difficult situation:

I wrote to Mr Dickinson by this morning's mail that I could not let them off, but for him to take them to the Ct House monday morning, put Elick in Jail before the eyes of the others without saying a word as to the meaning of it, then take the others & send them on the [railroad] cars for Staunton with a pass to Gibraltar [Forge]: and after they are gone to take Elick out of Jail & hire him out there at the Ct House by the day, letting on to him that he (Dickinson) will hire him where he wishes to go when he finds a place, which he might do if I found I could make it suit to let him off; if not, I would take him over when I went. I think this plan will work.

In closing this letter the much-troubled ironmaster vented his anger and frustration with a verbal blast at Elick, the "ringleader":

This negro's perversity is but another instance of the assimilation of the negro to the dog. Inorder to make a dog like and follow you, you must whip him occasionally & be sparing of favors, or he will turn at last & bite the hand that feeds him. So with this boy. Of all those five negroes he was the only one that escaped the lash: & frequently received favors that I would have denied the others. Now he not only turns from me but tries to lead them away likewise.²²

Several things in this letter deserve comment. First, although five of the six slaves involved had been whipped by their employer, they initially expressed a willingness to return to the same man for another year's work. Since hands were scarce at this time, their master could have hired them out elsewhere with no difficulty and clearly would have done so if the men had objected earlier about going back to the forge. Even more significant, it would seem, is the psychological game the hiring agent was forced to play with Elick and the other slaves who looked to him for leadership. The ironmaster wanted and needed these hands, but he could not simply assemble them into a coffle and drive them over the mountains. Because the master did not want to force his slaves to work where they were unwilling to reside, the hirer planned a rather elaborate charade to isolate Elick, get the other men ("who are not skilled in the wiles of running away") on a train, and place them in unfamiliar country where they would probably be unable to find their way back home if Elick failed to follow them or if, after rejoining the group at the forge, he continued to create dis-

²² James C. Davis to William W. Davis, Jan. 5, 1856, Davis Papers.

satisfaction among the other hands. The entire incident suggests a rather complex give-and-take between master, slave, and employer that rested not on brute force but on a series of adjustments and accommodations in which the slaves did anything but sit passively by while their fate was decided. Four days later Davis reported that the owner had indeed hired the men to another party, and young Davis urged his father to insist that the hands be delivered up to them as originally promised or that a damage suit be brought against the slaves' master; "there being no hands for hire I cannot hire others in [their] place," Davis told his father, and "consequently we cannot prosecute our business."²³

This incident illustrates another key point: a vital factor in any industrialist's ability to hire slave labor was the willingness of the slave to reside at his work site for the year. Owners of slaves were reluctant to send their bondsmen to locations where the slaves did not want to go, as one master told Weaver in 1828:

Our agreement was, if Brandus was not willing to go to you, I should not force him and on seeing Mr. Brawly, who says the boy is anxious to remain with him therefore I cannot think of compelling him to go any where it is not his wish, as that has always been my rule.²⁴

This master expressed his position in exceptionally strong language, but the position itself was by no means exceptional, as a hiring agent in eastern Virginia informed Weaver in 1854 when Weaver asked the agent to secure slaves for his iron works. "I am willing to hire hands for you," the man replied, and added that he would also be hiring for another Rockbridge County ironmaster, "but that will make no in[ter]ference as persons let their [hands] go pretty much where they please," he assured Weaver.²⁵

In addition to any humanitarian considerations, owners worried that a dissatisfied slave might run away, and there was no guarantee that a valuable slave hand would run back to the protection of his master when he left a furnace or forge. As a result owners, like Elick's master in the long letter cited above, frequently respected the wishes of their slaves and refused to hire them to places where they feared the slaves might be dissatisfied, as one slaveowner wrote Weaver in 1830:

I am sorry to inform you that one of the men I hired you (Isaac) has expressed such an unwillingness to return to you, that I feared should I send him over he would run away, and perhaps be of little or no service to you during the year—I therefore thought it best to hire him in Amherst [County] where he is willing to stay, for the same you were to give—I return your bond for him in this letter. I am very sorry this has happened as perhaps it may put you to some in-

²³ James C. Davis to William W. Davis, Jan. 9, 1856, Cyrus H. McCormick Papers, McCormick Collection, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.

²⁴ C. Wigglesworth to Weaver, Dec. 31, 1828, Weaver Papers, Duke.

²⁵ T. R. Towles to Weaver, Nov. 27, 1854, *ibid.*

convenience, but I hope not much. When I hired him I was under the impression he would be willing to serve you,—but I find he is not.

Another slave belonging to this same owner was also reluctant to return to Weaver's employ but agreed to do so under certain circumstances:

Sam has requested me to ask the favor of you, to permit him to stay at the establishment at which you live; he says he greatly prefers it. He also was unwilling to return; but says he would have no objection, provided, he could live at your own establishment. I hope, if it will not put you to much inconvenience, you will grant his request.²⁶

The slaves' wishes obviously counted for something, and the industrial employer who was unwilling to meet the basic requests of his laboring men was risking present difficulties with his work force and future problems with his hiring.

EVEN AFTER an ironmaster secured an adequate slave force, he faced other serious problems. Key factors in the success of any manufacturing concern were the efficiency, skill, and productivity of the workers; industrialists employing slave labor on a large scale faced a formidable task in attempting to discipline and, even more important, motivate unfree labor. Weaver, of course, had the power to inflict physical punishment on any recalcitrant or troublesome slave worker, but excessive dependence on force could easily backfire and lead to even greater evils: further demoralization among his slaves, a rash of runaways, an unsavory reputation among slaveowners, slave abuse of draft animals, theft, arson, or acts of industrial sabotage carried out by skilled artisans, any of which could seriously disrupt normal furnace and forge operations. The slaves, in short, were in a position to do considerable physical and financial damage to Weaver's interests, even if they limited their activities to passive forms of resistance like work slowdowns or slipshod performance of their duties. In an effort to deal with the closely related problems of discipline and motivation, Weaver very early in his career as an iron manufacturer (at least as early as the 1820s when surviving records begin) instituted an incentive system to encourage slaves to meet and exceed their tasks. Men who did more than their required amount of work were rewarded with payment, in either cash or goods, for their extra labor, or "overwork" as it was called. In adopting this incentive system Weaver was instituting a technique that had been used in Southern iron works as early as the 1790s and that continued to be used until the end of the Civil War.²⁷ The object of the overwork system was to make

²⁶ William Staples to Weaver, Jan. 4, 1830, Weaver Papers, Virginia.

²⁷ Starobin, *Industrial Slavery*, 101; see also Charles B. Dew, "David Ross and the Oxford Iron Works: A Study of Industrial Slavery in the Early Nineteenth-Century South," scheduled for publication in the *William and Mary Quarterly*, April 1974.

the industrial slave a disciplined and productive worker without having to rely heavily on physical coercion.

Payment of wood choppers for overwork illustrates the way the system operated for almost all slaves at Weaver's installations. The normal task for a wood chopper in the Virginia iron region was $1\frac{1}{2}$ cords per day, working a six-day week—Sunday was a traditional day of rest. Both employer and slave seem to have recognized the $1\frac{1}{2}$ cord requirement as the standard task, and any ironmaster who attempted to increase the customary amount of work would be engaging in a risky enterprise that might well result in extra trouble instead of extra wood. For any wood that a slave chopped over and above his $1\frac{1}{2}$ cord task, he was given credit on the company's books at the rate of 40 cents per cord, the same rate at which white wood choppers were paid. The same general system operated for every job at Weaver's furnace and forge: skilled slave ironworkers could earn overwork payments for producing more than their required quota of iron, ore-bank hands could mine and wash extra ore, colliers could tend the charcoal pits in their time off, shoemakers could make additional shoes, and even unskilled hands could earn credit, at the rate of 50 cents per day, for working at night, on Sundays, and over the traditional Christmas holidays. Other means of earning credit included weaving coal baskets; raising hogs, chickens, and eggs; packing pork; and growing corn on individual plots. Emergency situations also provided the slaves with the opportunity to earn money: if a mine had to be emptied of water, a road needed to be repaired after a storm, or a dam had to be rebuilt after a freshet.²⁸ Finally, some slaves were credited with a small "allowance," in effect a regular wage for, evidently, assuming responsibility for various phases of the furnace or forge operation. The highest allowance paid by Weaver, \$5 a month for twelve months, went to a hired slave named Joshua Crews who worked at Etna Furnace. The exact nature of Crews's duties is unclear, but since another slave was credited for "5 Sundays at Furnace under Joshua" and since Crews's compensation was exceptionally high, \$60 for the year, it seems certain that he held an important supervisory post at the furnace, perhaps a job similar to that performed by a black driver on a large plantation.²⁹ Other slave hands who were paid allowances of lesser amounts whose duties can be determined include Washington Coleman, a collier, who probably received his \$8 "coaling allowance" in 1857 for supervising one or more charcoal pits, and Bill Jones, who was paid \$1 a month for "ore carts" and was evidently in charge of the mule-drawn ore train at Etna Furnace that brought ore to the furnace site from a bank some ten miles distant.³⁰

²⁸ See entries in *Etna Furnace Negro Books*, 1854-61 and 1857-60, and *Buffalo Forge Negro Book*, 1850-58, both in *Weaver-Brady Records*, Virginia.

²⁹ See entries for Joshua Crews and Tom Duecen, *Etna Furnace Negro Books*, 1854-61 and 1857-60.

³⁰ *Etna Furnace Negro Book*, 1857-60.

Entries in the Buffalo Forge and Etna Furnace "Negro Books," as these ledgers were called, indicate that most of the slave hands, both skilled and unskilled, used the overwork system to earn their own money. The most significant thing about these entries is the way in which they suggest how a sizable number of blacks took advantage of the system to carve out something of a private and individual life for themselves. Admittedly, in the process of earning overwork compensation the slaves were in one sense doing the ironmaster's bidding; they finished their required tasks before they began working for themselves and thus responded positively to the employer's attempt to motivate them. But on another level the slaves were, it seems fair to say, being their own men. They could do extra work if they wished, or they could take their time off as leisure. Even in the simple act of accepting or rejecting the overwork system, they were achieving, in at least one small phase of their existence, some measure of self-choice. If they did choose to do additional labor, the sums they earned were theirs to control, and they gained an even greater measure of personal initiative. An examination of several individual accounts will perhaps indicate what is being suggested here.

In 1858 one of Weaver's hiring agents secured four hands—Jack, Jim, Bill, and Dabney Willoughby—from a family in eastern Virginia to work for the year. The four men were assigned to Etna Furnace where they labored as wood choppers and miners. During the year the four built up overwork credits on Weaver's books for sums ranging from \$10.50 to \$13.50. They drew against their credit at the company store for small "luxury" items like coffee and sugar, but in June three of the men decided to use part of their money to buy themselves vacation time at home. Their request for leave was granted, and they left the furnace. While they were away they were debited at the standard overwork rate of 50 cents per day for their time off—ten days for two of the men and two weeks for the third. They returned to Etna at the end of their stay at home and served out the balance of the year. The fourth member of this group, Jim Willoughby, evidently decided not to spend his money in this fashion in order to draw as much cash as possible at the end of the year. In December, just before the four men returned home for Christmas, he drew his remaining credit in cash, which amounted to \$10.³¹

Husbanding of cash was characteristic of a number of slave hands; men like Mat Robinson, a miner, earned \$5.00 in overwork in one year, spent a carefully allotted 50 cents of it for tobacco, and then drew \$4.50 in cash in December; Elec the Collier, as he was listed in the books, earned \$13.75 for extra coaling and by raising a hog in 1857 and collected \$10.00 in cash at the Christmas break. At the other end of the spectrum was a slave like John Sims, a furnace laborer, who spent his overwork faster than he could

³¹ *Ibid.*



Fig. 3. A late nineteenth-century photograph of Buffalo Forge, Virginia, showing many of the buildings in existence during the antebellum period. In the foreground are the grist mill (center), the blacksmith shop (right), and the carpenter shop (extreme left). The harness shop is the square building in the right center, visible between the grist mill and the blacksmith shop. Immediately behind and to the left of the grist mill is the Buffalo Forge store, where slaves drew on their overwork accounts for food, tobacco, cloth, and other merchandise. The flour mill can be seen in the left background, and the mule stable stands between this building and the carpenter shop. The guest cottage and Weaver's home are on the hill overlooking these structures (right background). Photograph courtesy Mr. T. T. Brady, Richmond, Virginia.

earn it on tobacco, coffee, and clothing. Sims ended the year 1858 owing the company store \$6.84 but was able to work off his debt the following year by Sunday labor and ore washing, and he made enough additional compensation to continue his purchases of coffee and tobacco on a fairly regular basis.³²

Sims's case illustrates a second major intent of the overwork system. In addition to motivating the slaves to become efficient and productive workers, it could be used by the employer as a disciplinary tool. Sims had a taste for consumer goods that outran his ability to pay for them, and the furnace manager allowed him to indulge himself to the point where Sims was forced to do extra work in order to pay off his debt. The ledgers also show that slaves who failed to meet their normal task could have the value of their unfinished work deducted from whatever credit they had built up. Two hired slaves, Reubin and Dudley Camack, were, respectively, five and

³² *Ibid.*



Fig. 4. Black and white colliers atop a charcoal pile in the upper South during the nineteenth century (probably the 1870s). Note the chopped wood stacked and ready for coaling in the left background. Photograph courtesy Mr. William T. Turner, University of Kentucky, Hopkinsville Community College.

seven cords of wood short when a check of wood choppers was made in August 1858. As a result, they were debited for their shortages at the rate of 40 cents per cord, the same amount paid for cutting extra wood. Several other slaves suffered similar deductions for unfinished tasks as miners and wood choppers. In all of these cases, however, the slaves were able to work off their debt and build up additional credit in their favor, usually by turning to some alternative form of labor for which they received payment. The two Camack slaves, for example, removed their debt for unfinished wood chopping by Sunday labor. In fact it may be that these two men purposely came in short on their wood cutting, intending to make up their deficiency by working together on Sundays. This is suggested by the fact that most of the slave choppers met the $1\frac{1}{2}$ cords per day task with relative ease, and, in this particular case, both of the men worked the same number of Sundays, twenty. They drew on their accounts for flour, coffee, sugar, and tobacco during the year and ended their term of service in December with cash coming to them.³³ Wood choppers were not highly skilled workers in the charcoal iron industry, but they still could amass consider-

³³ *Ibid.*

able amounts of overwork credit if they chose to do so. To cite one example, over a two year period a black chopper named Daniel Henry working at Glenwood Furnace in Rockbridge County cut 248½ cords over his required task, worked 36 Sundays, and made 36 standard-size charcoal measuring baskets in his spare time. His overwork earnings for the two years totaled \$127.66, which he drew mainly in coffee and other store purchases during the year, but he had enough credit remaining at the end of each year to make fairly substantial Christmas purchases—\$22.58 in 1847 and \$13.50 in 1848.³⁴

The slaves who were generally in the best position to take advantage of the overwork system, however, were the more skilled artisans. Weaver's own forge hands regularly earned relatively large sums by heating, working, and finishing extra tonnages of iron at Buffalo Forge. Sam Williams, Henry Towles, Jim Garland, Henry Mathews, Tooler, and Henry Hunt, Jr., all slave ironworkers owned by Weaver, were paid from \$3 to \$5 per ton for their overwork, and all of these men used their exceptional position to good advantage. Henry Towles, for example, who was a heater at the forge, was credited with \$31.80 in overwork in 1852, \$36.16 in 1853, \$55.28 in 1855, and \$93.53 in 1856. In 1858, when his account was transferred to a new ledger, he carried a balance of \$102.53 in his favor to the new book. Towles drew most of his overwork in cash, but another of Weaver's forge hands, Henry Hunt, Jr., used the credit he earned primarily to buy quality clothing, like three \$6 coats and a \$4 pair of pants in 1850 and "1 fine suit (coat & pants)" valued at \$18 in 1854.³⁵ The individualism of each slave shows through clearly in these and other accounts: John White, who chopped 43¼ extra cords of wood in 1856, Allen Jackson, who devoted his off hours in 1856 to raising chickens and a hog, and Landis Cartmill, a skilled basket weaver who earned \$17.32 in 1857 by making fifty-two charcoal baskets for Etna Furnace.³⁶

The case of Sam Williams demonstrates the degree to which a skilled industrial slave could use his training and ability to live a life that probably deserves to be called quasi-free, or something like it. Williams worked molten iron into finished merchant bars at Buffalo Forge and received the highest overwork rate paid to any of Weaver's forge hands, \$5 per ton. He, like a number of Weaver's skilled slaves, also had individual plots of land at the forge that were laid off and planted in the spring by the regular force of agricultural workers. These farm hands, including the white overseer, a white agricultural laborer, and several slaves, planted the plots along with Weaver's own fields as part of the spring corn planting.³⁷ Williams and the

³⁴ Glenwood Furnace Negro Book, 1847-49, Anderson Ledgers, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, Va.

³⁵ Buffalo Forge Negro Book, 1850-58.

³⁶ Etna Furnace Negro Book, 1857-60.

³⁷ Entries for Apr. 23, 27, 1861, Daniel C. E. Brady, *Home Journal*, 1860-65, McCormick Collection, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.

other forge hands then worked their own lots during the summer, and when they brought in their crops they could either sell them to Weaver or consume them themselves. By working extra tonnages of iron, growing corn, and raising hogs, Williams earned enough cash during the 1850s to supplement his own and his wife's diet with regular purchases of sugar and coffee, buy "3 yds. cotton cloth for Nancy," his wife, to cite one 1855 entry, and, most surprising of all, open a savings account at a Lexington bank.³⁸ Williams, who was forty years of age in 1860, played an important part in establishing the high reputation that Weaver's "W" brand bar iron enjoyed among Virginia blacksmiths and commission merchants, and Williams obviously used his skills to improve materially the quality of the life he and his wife were able to lead under slavery.³⁹

One of the most significant ways in which the overwork system allowed male slaves to achieve some measure of personal dignity and pride was the opportunity it gave men like Sam Williams to provide cash or small luxuries for their wives. Tooler, a skilled slave artisan who had been raised at Buffalo Forge, drew \$5 in cash to send to his wife in 1850, and other entries in his account show that he used part of his overwork credit in 1852 to make three trips to Lynchburg, perhaps to see his wife. Other examples of men using their overwork credit to acquire items for their wives include Bill Jones, the ore cart supervisor at Etna Furnace, "1 pair Brogans for his wife," \$2, and for a slave identified as "Daniel Dumb Boy," several entries for "cash to Louisa."⁴⁰

Additional evidence of slave marriages appears elsewhere in the records of Weaver's enterprises. A number of slaves, both hired and owned by Weaver, who had wives in the vicinity regularly left Buffalo Forge after the work day ended on Saturday to visit their wives and returned in time for work on Monday morning.⁴¹ Slave men whose wives lived longer distances away sometimes tried to deal with this separation in their own way.

³⁸ Buffalo Forge Negro Book, 1850-58; John A. Rex to J. D. Davidson, Feb. 25, 1855, Davidson Papers. The text of the letter from Rex, another one of Weaver's nephews, to Davidson, a Lexington lawyer, reads as follows: "I wish to ask you one question whether Sam Williams can draw his money from the Savings Bank or if he cannot. As Sam and Henry Nash has got a bet for his watch against the said Nash[s] watch. It is my opinion that he can draw his money if he gives the Directors of the Bank 10 days notice. After he receives the money he wishes to show it to Henry Nash, and then he will return the said money back to the Bank again. As I was witness to the said bargain." Davidson noted on the rear of this letter that he had directed Rex "to confer with Wm Weaver" about the matter. Henry Nash was a free black cooper who lived in the vicinity of Buffalo Forge. Manuscript Population Schedules, Rockbridge County, Virginia, Eighth Census of the United States, 1860.

³⁹ Williams's age is given in a "Descriptive List of Negroes at Buffalo Forge, Rockbridge Co., Va.," 1865, Weaver Papers, Duke; he is described as five feet ten inches tall and his color is listed as "yellow." On the quality of Weaver's iron, see William D. Couch to Weaver, Feb. 9, 1859; McCorkle & Co. to Weaver, Feb. 22, 1859; and Thomas G. Godwin to Weaver, Mar. 2, 1859, all *ibid*.

⁴⁰ Buffalo Forge Negro Book, 1850-58, and Etna Furnace Negro Book, 1857-60; Jordan Davis & Co. to Weaver, Oct. 11, 31, 1851, Weaver Papers, Duke.

⁴¹ See entries in Brady, Home Journal.

Booker, a slave chopper at Etna in 1854, was noted in the furnace time-book as having "lost two weeks going to see his wife." Perhaps he had permission to make this trip, however, since his overwork account shows that he was docked only 50 cents, one day's pay, on April 28, 1854, as a "day lost going to see wife."⁴² Even more revealing is a letter from Weaver's manager at Etna Furnace describing his difficulties with two hands in 1862:

You ask about Griffen. I consider him a triffling hand.—He laid up here very often & for long periods—but it was only when we worked him about the Furnace[;] he laid up so often that we had finaly to take him away. Par objected to changing so often. tell him that you will put him in the wood chopping when he gets well. & I will guarentee he will soon be out—that is his object now in laying up. I found that he laid up very seldom when he could get a chance to run to his wife.⁴³

The incidence of slave resistance at Weaver's installations is difficult to judge, but if this letter is indicative, the problems of slave motivation and efficiency were not by any means completely solved by the overwork system. In order for the system to work, Weaver's slave hands had to exceed their required tasks voluntarily, and if the slave were a skilled artisan, Weaver and his managers were apparently willing to tolerate a certain amount of neglect of duty in order to avoid difficulty with key black personnel. This point can be illustrated by the work records of several of the Buffalo Forge slaves contained in a daily journal kept by Weaver's nephew-in-law and second in command, Daniel C. E. Brady, from October 1860 to June 1865. Tooler, one of Weaver's heaters, is frequently described by Brady as "loafing," but there is no indication that Tooler was disciplined, physically or otherwise, for his performance; when he was running out iron or drawing bars he regularly earned substantial overtime credit that was not docked for his slipshod work on other occasions. Edgar, a miller who worked at Weaver's flour mill, is another slave who is listed as "loafing" on numerous occasions, again with no record of punishment. Most of the Buffalo Forge slave hands, however, are regularly listed at their jobs with no indication that Weaver or Brady were dissatisfied with their performance. Sam Williams is typical of this larger group; "Sam at work" is the most consistent entry in Brady's journal, perhaps because Williams was putting something away for himself at that bank in Lexington.⁴⁴

Unskilled slave workers had much less leverage with Weaver and his managers, of course, but they did have the power to accept or reject the master's incentives and they had rights set by tradition if not by law—like a reasonable daily task, Christmas holidays, and Sundays off—that they would go considerable lengths to defend. The slaves' insistence on their

⁴² Etna Furnace Time Book, and Etna Furnace Negro Book, 1854–61, Weaver-Brady Records, Virginia.

⁴³ W. W. Rex to Brady, Mar. 22, 1862, Weaver Papers, Virginia.

⁴⁴ Entries in Brady, Home Journal.

annual Christmas vacation is demonstrated in a report Weaver's furnace managers made in November 1830 explaining why they would not be able to keep the furnace in blast during the entire month of December:

We had thought [of] blowing through the Christmas holy days and going on as long as possible, but as our white hands are few and the most part of the blacks will be going home and the few remaining not willing to be closely confined we have concluded to stop up for a short time during Christmas.⁴⁵

Similarly, a potentially explosive altercation at Etna Furnace in 1854 showed the risks one of Weaver's own slaves was willing to take in order to maintain Sunday as a day he alone controlled.

Anthony was told saterday evening to start to [Buffalo] forge this morning [Sunday]—I waited till about 10 oclock and finding that he had not started I asked him the reason[.] he said it was Sunday and that he was not going till tomorrow—with some other impudence to me I collared him and he resisted & struck me—I struck him on the head with a rock. you please will see about the matter.

The irate manager closed his letter with a significant postscript: "He said that this was Sunday and his day and that he was not going [to] take it up in going to your place."⁴⁶ Unfortunately there is no information in surviving records that reveals whether Weaver inflicted further punishment on his bondsman, but the incident shows clearly the determination of one slave to preserve his day of rest and probably speaks for a view that was universally held among Southern slaves, industrial and otherwise.

The most serious labor difficulties at Weaver's installations were caused by slaves running away, but this evidently did not become a major problem until late in the Civil War. Between 1829 and 1861 at least thirteen slaves ran off from Weaver's employ, with the bulk of these flights (ten of the thirteen) occurring during several years in the late 1820s and early 1830s when a manager at one of Weaver's iron works evidently caused a considerable amount of dissatisfaction among the slave force. All but one of these runaways were hired slaves who returned to the counties in eastern Virginia from which they had been secured and there either hid out in the vicinity of their homes until recaptured or, in several instances, came in to their owners with accounts of mistreatment by overseers, sickness, or bad food.⁴⁷ But the runaway problem did not seriously endanger Weaver's furnace and forge operations at any time during the antebellum period, and

⁴⁵ Jordan Davis & Co. to Weaver, Nov. 24, 1830, Weaver Papers, Duke.

⁴⁶ John K. Watkins to Weaver, July 30, 1854, *ibid.*

⁴⁷ William Watson for Joel W. Brown, Jailor, to Post Master, Lexington, Va., Apr. 19, 1829; W. E. Dickinson to Abraham Davis, Apr. 19, 1829; James C. Dickinson to Weaver, May 10, 1829; James Rose to Weaver, Mar. 8, 1830; Elizabeth Mathews to Weaver, Mar. 29, 1830; Lewis Rawlings to Weaver, Aug. 22, 1832; Charles Perrow to Weaver, Sept. 17, Oct. 26, 1833; and John A. Turpim to Weaver, Aug. 28, 1854, all in Weaver Papers, Duke; Henry A. McCormick to Weaver, Dec. 29, 1855, Weaver Papers, Virginia; see also entries under "Lawson," Etna Furnace Negro Book, 1857-60.

this was true of the first three years of the war as well.⁴⁸ In June 1864, however, a large scale cavalry raid by Union forces commanded by General David Hunter swept through the valley iron district and provided several of the Buffalo Forge slaves with an opportunity to gain their freedom. "I regret to inform you that your boy Beverly went off with the enemy upon that raid through this country on 12 June," Daniel Brady informed the owner of a hired slave. "I lost three of my own men at the same time," he continued, and "I was fortunate in escaping myself & sustaining no loss of other property."⁴⁹ In all, five Buffalo Forge slaves made it to freedom with Hunter's troopers; and included in the three escaped slaves who had belonged to Weaver was Warder, a skilled teamster who had hauled pig iron and supplies between Etna Furnace and the forge for a number of years. More of the Buffalo Forge hands undoubtedly would have fled had they not been moved to an isolated farm on the day the federals occupied Lexington.⁵⁰ The forge property itself escaped destruction, and Union troops did not reappear in the vicinity for the remainder of the war.

When a reasonably good chance for successful escape presented itself, black ironworkers, like the vast majority of slaves throughout the South, wasted little time in striking for freedom. In the absence of such an opportunity, however, Weaver's black artisans and laborers appear to have learned how to live with, and cope with, industrial slave conditions. Perhaps the most impressive evidence underscoring this point came in the transition from slavery to freedom at the close of the Civil War. Three brief entries in journals kept at Buffalo Forge by Daniel Brady describe events of monumental significance for the black men, women, and children working and living there:

Friday May 26, 1865 Declared free by order of the military authorities.

Saturday May 27, 1865 All hands quit work as they considered themselves free. I made a speech to them, & read the order No 2 of Genl Gregg. J G Updike, Alex Hamilton, Jno D Ewing, W W Rex & Thos Edwards present.

Monday May 29, 1865 Commenced work on free labor.⁵¹

Brady, who assumed ownership and primary direction of all of Weaver's properties when Weaver died in March 1863, did not write down what he said in his address, but subsequent events make clear that he told the newly freed blacks that he intended to keep Buffalo Forge in operation and continue farming on the Weaver lands. Those workers who wished to keep their jobs could do so, and they would be paid on a piecework or wage basis depending on the specific position they held. The general orders that Brady read to the assembled workers had been issued by General J. Irvin Gregg, the

⁴⁸ Two slaves tried to escape in 1863 but were apprehended in Lynchburg. Brady to James D. Davidson, Dec. 9, 1863, Davidson Papers.

⁴⁹ Brady to James Stewart, July 7, 1864, Weaver Papers, Virginia.

⁵⁰ Entries for June 11, 12, 14, 1864, Brady, Home Journal.

⁵¹ Buffalo Forge Journal, 1859-66, Weaver-Brady Records, Virginia; Brady, Home Journal.

federal commander of the military subdistrict of Lynchburg, on May 18, 1865, and they were published in the Lynchburg press five days later. Gregg's orders contained both a declaration of the former slaves' rights and a statement of their responsibilities:

The operation of existing laws is to make them *free*, but not to give them any claim whatever upon, or rights in connection with the property of former owners. They are at liberty to make any contract or agreement concerning themselves that a white man may, and equally bound to abide by it.

The former masters had "the right to refuse them anything that he might deny to a perfect stranger," the orders continued, "and is no more bound to feed, clothe, or protect them than if he had never been their master." The freedmen might "remain with him if he and they both desire it, and agree on the terms, in which case each party is equally bound by the contract." The orders concluded by admonishing blacks "that they must work for their support now, the same as before they were free; in some instances, perhaps, even harder" and informed them that "destitute" rations would not be issued to able-bodied laborers unless they could show they had tried but were unable to obtain work. A final paragraph read:

All colored persons living in the country, are informed that it is much better for them to remain there than to come to the already over-stocked city, and that they will not be permitted to come here for work or subsistence, unless they cannot obtain them where they are.⁵²

With Brady offering continued employment and with the military authorities in Lynchburg telling the freedmen in rather blunt language to keep their present jobs, some forty-three men and women, almost the entire black work force at Buffalo Forge when emancipation occurred, accepted labor contracts. Work resumed "on free labor," as Brady described it in his journal on May 29, 1865, three days after the slaves learned officially that they were free.⁵³

The length of time the freedmen remained at Buffalo Forge offers the only real evidence as to their motives for staying on. For some, the military's position seems to have been a deciding factor. Two men who had been hired at the beginning of 1865 left within a matter of days after signing their contracts and two of Weaver's former slaves quit in mid-July. Six men who had been hired from the same household—George, Bob, John, William, Alfred, and Stephen Glasgow—all signed three-month contracts to chop wood, served out the terms of their agreement, and then departed. Perhaps Gregg's General Orders No. 2 had some influence on them and on the remainder of those who did not work beyond 1865; eleven of the

⁵² Lynchburg *Daily Virginian*, May 23, 1865.

⁵³ Buffalo Forge Negro Book, 1865–72.

forty-three who signed initial contracts had left by August 30 and seven more departed by the end of the year. For the twenty-one who can be identified as working into 1866 and beyond, however, the decision to remain seems to have been a choice they themselves made. Included in this number were almost all of the skilled artisans who had drawn and hammered Weaver's iron during the antebellum and Civil War years.⁵⁴

For those freedmen who began working at Buffalo Forge on the morning of May 29, 1865, conversion to a wage basis presented few problems since all the laboring force was familiar with the overwork system. Now the men would be paid for all the work they did, and they would assume the responsibility of providing for themselves and their families. Sam Williams, Henry Towles, Henry Mathews, Henry Hunt, Jr., and Tooler all signed contracts to work for three months at \$4 per ton for all the iron they produced, while they furnished their food and other supplies out of their wages. Sam Williams's wife, Nancy, went to work as a dairymaid at \$4 a month. Williams and his wife were still working at Buffalo Forge in 1872, as were Towles, Mathews, and Hunt, when their accounts were transferred to a new ledger, and they can no longer be traced in surviving records; Tooler's accounts were closed in December 1868. Most of the remaining freedmen at Buffalo Forge who had once belonged to Weaver also accepted initial contracts of three months' duration for work as forge hands, wood choppers, shoemakers, carpenters, teamsters, and farmworkers. As mentioned above, employment was also offered to those men who had been hired at the beginning of 1865 for a year's labor. A number of these men had been employed by Weaver and Brady on a regular basis for a considerable length of time, some since the 1850s, and they formed the bulk of the freedmen who signed on as wood cutters, at the rate of 66 2/3 cents per cord. Generally those men who had been hired as slaves stayed for shorter periods of time than the more skilled workers who had previously been owned by Weaver. But a sizable number of the former hired slave hands served out their three-month contracts, others remained until the end of the year, and several worked for two or three years.⁵⁵

LOOKING BACK over the entire black labor experience at Weaver's iron works, the smooth and rapid conversion to a free labor situation in 1865 seems particularly significant. Both skilled and unskilled workers in appreciable numbers made the transition to a wage basis at the jobs they had held as slaves, a pattern that was repeated by slave artisans and laborers at other

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* In the case of four of the forty-three who signed contracts, it is impossible to determine from their accounts how long they remained.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

iron works not only in Virginia but elsewhere in the South.⁵⁶ Even though local military officers might not like it, those workers who did not wish to remain at Buffalo Forge could leave; some did so at once, some left after several weeks or at the expiration of their initial contracts, and some stayed for years. Those who remained for more extended periods did so not because of military compulsion or because slavery had infantilized them or rendered them incapable of making a decision without white guidance; they stayed, it seems clear, simply because they saw an opportunity to use the skills they had acquired under slavery to earn a living for themselves and, for those with wives and children, for their families. Equally important, it seems fair to say that they had not been so mistreated as industrial slaves that they could not continue to work in the same job at the same place after emancipation. This is not meant to suggest that slavery under Weaver, Brady, and their various managers was an institution that lay lightly on the shoulders of the black laborers who worked Weaver's furnace, forge, and fields. Weaver's slaves were sometimes whipped,⁵⁷ black (and white) ironworkers occasionally suffered from the poor quality or inadequate food and clothing available at the blast furnace site,⁵⁸ and Weaver was not above selling several slaves into Louisiana in the late 1850s when he thought their conduct warranted it.⁵⁹ Perhaps most important of all, the black men and women who manned Weaver's operations had to cope psychologically with the prospect that the rest of their lives would in all likelihood be spent in bondage. But at the same time, day in and day out, the central tendency at Weaver's installations was for slavery to function more through mutual accommodation than outright repression. Because Weaver had to go into a tight hiring market year after year and because the success of his various enterprises was, in many ways, controlled by the slaves he employed, measures like compensation for overwork grew into features of

⁵⁶ Records documenting the transition of a large number of black workers from slave to free labor almost identical to that which occurred at Buffalo Forge can be found in the Graham Ledgers and Papers, dealing with the operations of David Graham's iron works in Wythe County in southwestern Virginia, in the University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, Va.; see especially Ledgers "L" 1857-59, "M" 1859-64, "N" 1864-68, and "E" 1868-71. For the post-war use of a substantial force of former slave workers by the most important Richmond iron manufacturer, see Charles B. Dew, *Ironmaker to the Confederacy: Joseph R. Anderson and the Tredegar Iron Works* (New Haven, 1966), 313-14; for a similar transition of black labor from slavery to freedom at a major Alabama iron works in 1865, see Robert H. McKenzie, "The Shelby Iron Company: A Note on Slave Personality after the Civil War," *Journal of Negro History*, 58 (1973): 341-48.

⁵⁷ At least two instances of hired slaves being whipped can be documented; see Jordan Davis & Co. to Weaver, May 26, 1830; and William W. Rex to Brady, Oct. 26, 1860, both in Weaver Papers, Duke.

⁵⁸ See Jordan Davis & Co. to Weaver, Mar. 25, Aug. 11, 1830; Jordan Davis & Co. to Abraham W. Davis, Aug. 24, 1830; Charles K. Gorgas to Brady, Mar. 11, Apr. 2, 1860; William W. Rex to Brady, May 29, June 29, Sept. 6, 21, 26, Oct. 13, 1860; and Rex to Weaver, Aug. 7, 1860, all *ibid.*; Gorgas to Weaver, Mar. 29, Apr. 6, 1859; and Rex to Brady, Mar. 15, 1861, Weaver Papers, Virginia.

⁵⁹ J. E. Carson to Weaver, Mar. 12, May 30, June 27, 1859; William W. Rex to Weaver, Aug. 15, 1860; and G. W. Johnson to Weaver, Oct. 29, 1860, all in Weaver Papers, Duke.

primary importance in the functioning of his slave system. And because of things like the overwork system, black and white managed to find a way to live together at Weaver's iron works without maltreatment and excessive use of physical force permanently poisoning relations between the two groups. In this instance, industrial slavery did not totally degrade and brutalize the black workers; in fact it seems in some ways to have done something quite different, to have provided these men with an environment in which they could develop some sense of personal dignity and individual initiative in spite of the psychological and physical confines of their bondage. Or at least so it appears. If this analysis is correct, then we clearly need to take a closer look at the industrial phase of the South's peculiar institution. Such an examination may tell us a good deal about the nature of slavery in the American South.

The Lloyd George Government and the Creation of the League of Nations

GEORGE W. EGERTON

THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE of 1919 witnessed the birth of the world's first great international organization for peace, security, and cooperation. From the perspective of a half century, the creation of the League of Nations can perhaps best be comprehended as the ideological and political response of Anglo-American liberalism to the joint challenge of world war and world revolution in twentieth-century conditions. The American side of this venture, especially the dramatic role of President Wilson, has been examined extensively by historians.¹ Until recently, however, those interested in portraying the British side have had to make do with fragmentary evidence, supplemented, in the case of official participants, by personal recollection.² Not surprisingly, important uncertainties and differences of interpretation have arisen concerning the British contribution to the creation of the League.

The uncertainties relate most specifically to the role of David Lloyd George and the attitudes of the coalition government he headed. In his memoirs the prime minister quite naturally portrays himself and his government as consistent in their devotion to the league cause, and he forcefully

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¹ See particularly David Hunter Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant* (New York, 1928); Warren T. Kuehl, *Seeking World Order: The United States and International Organization to 1920* (Nashville, 1969); and N. Gordon Levin, Jr., *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution* (New York, 1968).

² Those participants who subsequently published include E. A. Robert Viscount Cecil, *All the Way* (London, 1949) and *A Great Experiment* (London, 1941); F. P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations* (London, 1952); Philip [Noel-] Baker, "The Making of the Covenant from the British Point of View," in Peter Munch, ed., *Les Origines et l'Oeuvre de la Société des Nations* (Copenhagen, 1923-24), 2: 16-67; Sir J. R. M. Butler, "The League of Nations," in H. W. V. Temperley, ed., *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (London, 1920-24), 2: 21-31; Alfred Zimmermann, *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 1918-1935* (2d ed.; London, 1939); and Lord Eustace Percy, *Some Memories* (London, 1958). Henry R. Winkler has provided the best secondary source on the British side in *The League of Nations Movement in Great Britain, 1914-1919* (New Brunswick, 1952).

rejects the notion that the major credit for the creation of the League of Nations should go to Wilson.³ On the other hand, Ray Stannard Baker grouped Lloyd George with Clemenceau in the conspiracy of the old order against Wilson, the League, and the "new diplomacy."⁴ F. P. Walters, the author of the standard history of the League and himself a British participant in 1919, argues that there were those in his government's military and diplomatic ranks who strongly opposed the project and that "Lloyd George as Prime Minister cared nothing about the idea of a League."⁵ Lord Robert Cecil, leader of the British section of the League of Nations Commission at Paris, later argued that although the prime minister officially supported the League, his approval was always "chilly" and he regarded it "as of secondary importance."⁶ From a thorough examination of the evidence available in 1952, Henry Winkler, although emphasizing the conservatism of the British government, still surmized that the Covenant, projecting a limited league, could "safely be said to have reflected the official British position in many of its most important aspects."⁷

Using the many relevant official and private sources that have been opened in Britain during the last few years, I intend in this article to describe the attitudes, policies, and role of the British government concerning the creation of an international league to promote peace, security, and cooperation; to explain the government's position by examining the factors influencing the process of the formation of policy; and to interpret the government's role by reassessing the British contribution to the creation of the League of Nations and by analyzing British objectives within the context of the international politics and diplomacy of the peacemaking. Attention will be focused on Lloyd George and those closest to the centers of policy making through the latter part of the war and at the Paris Peace Conference.

BY THE END of the war the British government and its allies were firmly committed to the establishment of some new international organization to prevent future wars. Early in the struggle the Asquith government had expressed interest in the idea of a league of nations, and Grey not only gave a strong personal endorsement to the idea but also developed it as an important bridge in Anglo-American relations. Later, under Lloyd George, government leaders publicly affirmed the government's commitment to the league idea on several occasions—most notably in the Allied reply of January 1917 to President Wilson's peace note, Lloyd George's Caxton Hall speech of January 5, 1918, and Curzon's speech in the House of Lords on June 26, 1918. In the prearmistice agreement of November 4 the government contracted to make peace on the basis of President Wilson's Fourteen

³ David Lloyd George, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties* (London, 1938), 1: 89, 274-78, 604-42.

⁴ Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* (New York, 1923), 1: 240.

⁵ Walters, *History of the League of Nations*, 19, 73.

⁶ Cecil, *All the Way*, 155-56.

⁷ Winkler, *League of Nations Movement in Great Britain*, 254.

Points and subsequent peace declarations, and Lloyd George in the Coupon Election promised Liberals that the government would be going to the Peace Conference "to guarantee that the League of Nations is a reality."⁸

Although Lloyd George and the government were firmly committed to the principle of establishing a league of nations, the specific nature of such an organization—its functions, powers, and structure—presented major problems to government policy makers. In many ways the call for a league of nations implied revolutionary changes both in traditional British strategies and in the international diplomatic system. In preparing the agenda for the first session of the Imperial War Cabinet that met early in 1917, Maurice Hankey, the influential secretary of the War Cabinet, identified the three major alternatives that had emerged during the early years of the war with regard to future international organization and that he thought should be debated by Imperial statesmen. The first alternative involved the creation of "some sort of international organization, such as a league to enforce peace." Second, there was the alternative of constructing "a league of the character of the Concert of Europe formed after 1815." A final alternative involved a simple reversion to "something in the nature of a balance of power."⁹ It will be instructive to examine each of these alternatives in some detail, relating them to the context of the government's policy-making process.

The first approach involved the establishment of an international organization with a definite peacemaking, peacekeeping, and security role—a "league to enforce peace." This approach had been identified and elaborated by a group of British radicals and liberals, together with colleagues in America, in an almost immediate response to the outbreak of war. Through the first year of the fighting the Bryce Group, the Fabians, and the League of Nations Society drew up various schemes to prevent future wars.¹⁰

Although the schemes put forward by these groups varied somewhat in their details, their essential features shared a common approach. Generally these schemes suggested that peace-loving states should contract to abide by certain benign principles and procedures of international relations. They should agree to settle disputes among themselves by peacefully sub-

⁸ Quoted in Trevor Wilson, *The Downfall of the Liberal Party, 1914–1935* (London, 1966), 145.

⁹ War Cabinet, Feb. 27, 1917, app. 1, Cab. 23/43 (records of the cabinet [Cab.] and Foreign Office [FO], all in the Public Record Office, London, are designated by their PRO classification). Hankey, in various key secretarial roles, enjoyed major influence and power in the process of policy formation. See Stephen Roskill, *Hankey: Man of Secrets* (London, 1970, 1972). A fourth alternative, real international government, although debated in 1917 by radicals and democratic socialists, was too utopian to attract Hankey's attention.

¹⁰ These schemes are analyzed by Winkler, *League of Nations Movement in Great Britain*, 6–23, 51–52. The proposals of the Bryce Group are examined intensively in Martin David Dubin, "Toward the Concept of Collective Security: The Bryce Group's 'Proposals for the Avoidance of War' 1914–1917," *International Organization*, 24 (1970): 288–318. For the approach of the Union of Democratic Control, which remained distinct from the league-of-nations movement, see Marvin Swartz, *The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics during the First World War* (London, 1970).

mitting controversies of a judicial nature to arbitration or an international court and referring all other disputes to an international council of inquiry. While a dispute was under consideration the subscribing members would agree to refrain from any hostile acts. Finally, all members should agree to act together, economically and if need be militarily, against any member or any state that refused to submit disputes to peaceful means of settlement and resorted to war against a member during the prescribed moratorium.

IT WAS IN THIS FINAL ITEM—provision for the use of collective force to compel resort to peaceful procedures and to protect peaceful members—that advocates of a league of nations consciously went beyond the prewar arbitration movement. In elaborating the theme of “enforced peace” the wartime proleague groups were sowing an idea that would take deep root in the soil of twentieth-century international theory and practice—the idea of collective security. Although the term “collective security” would not be used commonly until the mid-thirties, the integral features of a collective security system were elaborated in the early wartime planning for a league of nations.¹¹ The core ideas of enforced peace were extremely simple and attractive. The war had demonstrated that force was needed to back up international agreements. If an international police force was utopian, a potentially overwhelming force resided in the sum power of peace-loving states. But this power was fragmented and allowed aggressors to pick off victims one by one. The solution was to pool the total power of the peaceful nations in a system of potential economic and military sanctions in order to deter or punish any possible aggressor. If peace-loving states were willing to defend the peace collectively they would thereby be able to enjoy the resulting collective security. Liberal internationalists portrayed such a collective system as a viable and necessary alternative to the discredited balance-of-power system with its dangerous arms race and competing alliances.

In both Britain and America the league idea was linked inseparably in the public mind with the idea of enforced peace or collective security.¹² The program of the League of Nations Union, published in November 1918 as the combined program of the newly unified proleague groups, is perhaps most representative of the thinking of the wartime league-of-nations movement in Britain. This program called for the establishment as soon as possible of a “League of Free Peoples” in which members would agree:

¹¹ The idea of enforced peace, guarantees, and mutual-security arrangements had, of course, a long history before 1914. See Roland Stromberg, “The Idea of Collective Security,” *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 18 (1956): 250–63; Inis L. Claude, *Power and International Relations* (New York, 1964); and Joel Larus, *From Collective Security to Preventive Diplomacy: Readings in International Organization and the Maintenance of Peace* (New York, 1965).

¹² For the American side, see Ruhl J. Bartlett, *The League to Enforce Peace* (Chapel Hill, 1944).

1. To submit all disputes arising between themselves to methods of peaceful settlement.
2. To suppress jointly, by the use of all the means at their disposal, any attempt by any State to disturb the peace of the world by acts of war.
3. To create a Supreme Court, and to respect and enforce its decisions.
4. To establish a permanent council which shall provide for the development of international law, for the settlement of differences not suitable for submission to the Supreme Court, for the supervision and control of armaments, and for joint action in matters of common concern.
5. To admit to the League all peoples able and willing to give effective guarantees of their loyal intention to observe its covenants, and thus to bring about such a world organization as will guarantee the freedom of nations; act as Trustee and guardian of uncivilized races and unprotected territories; and maintain international order; and thus finally liberate mankind from the curse of war.¹³

THE PROLEAGUE GROUPS on both sides of the Atlantic did a good job of selling their programs. The massive slaughter and destruction of the war naturally created a public extremely sympathetic and receptive to plans to prevent future war, especially after mid-1917. After American entry into the war and revolution in Russia, it was President Wilson, more than anyone else, who succeeded in elevating the league idea to a front-rank position in the Allied war-aims declarations and the liberal ideological counterthrust of the "new diplomacy." In Britain the League of Nations Union, and the league idea generally, enjoyed the support of all the major opinion-forming organs—the churches, unions, political parties, and all the leading newspapers with the exception of the reactionary *Morning Post*. The Liberal and Labour sectors of the political spectrum were the most earnest supporters of the league ideal, but thanks largely to the efforts of the proleague groups, by 1918 the league idea had been christened a "good thing" by the mainstream of British politics. By the end of the war the League of Nations Union had attracted an influential membership of some 3,800, and with names like Lloyd George, Balfour, Asquith, and Grey in its list of honorary leaders, it enjoyed the highest level of patronage.¹⁴

In Britain the figure in government most sympathetic to the program of the League of Nations Union was Lord Robert Cecil, the minister for blockade and later assistant secretary of state for foreign affairs. As early as September 1916 Cecil had circulated in the Foreign Office a scheme for a

¹³ Program of the League of Nations Union, published in the *Westminster Gazette*, Nov. 18, 1918; also quoted in Winkler, *League of Nations Movement in Great Britain*, 77.

¹⁴ Figures on membership in the League of Nations Union are from the W. H. Dickinson Papers, vol. 406, Bodleian Library. Despite lower membership figures in 1918, the influence of the League of Nations Union was much greater than that of the Union of Democratic Control, given the nature of British political society at the time. For an extensive analysis of the support behind the league idea, see Winkler, *League of Nations Movement in Great Britain*, especially ch. 3.

peace league that closely followed the themes suggested by the proleague groups.¹⁵ Soon Cecil, a Conservative by family ties but a liberal and Christian humanitarian by inclination, became passionately committed to the league cause, and after the war he devoted the remainder of a long life to the furtherance of international peace. A younger son of the late Lord Salisbury, Cecil's profound commitment to liberal internationalism was always fused with a conservative's premonition of the dangers that war posed to the moral and social fabric of British and European civilization.¹⁶ From the fall of 1916 until the end of the war Cecil acted as the principal advocate of the league idea in government circles.

Although the themes put forward by Wilson, Cecil, and the proleague groups appeared extremely plausible and attracted powerful support, they presented many difficult problems to British policy makers. Balfour, for one, was skeptical of any "Peace League" based on a universal territorial guarantee or compulsory arbitration.¹⁷ Hankey, in a memorandum of May 25, 1916, that bristled with militarism, warned of the dangerous illusions that a peace league would hold for Britain.¹⁸ To trust in collective international agreements to resist aggression would lull the nation into a false sense of security and court ultimate disaster.

The first major review of war aims, initiated by Asquith at the end of August 1916, illustrated that there was little inclination in official circles to abandon the traditional patterns of British strategy in favor of seeking security through a league of nations based on collective international agreements.¹⁹ A General Staff memorandum put this most directly: the three principal bases of peace and security should remain the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe, the maintenance of a weak power in the Low Countries, and the maintenance of British maritime supremacy. Only the Foreign Office referred directly to the league idea, admitting no illusions as to its effectiveness but arguing that if the United States associated itself with such a venture the project took on a much more promising prospect.²⁰

Using Cecil's proposals of September 1916 as his point of departure, Sir Eyre Crowe, a senior member of the Foreign Office, put forward the most

¹⁵ Cabinet Paper P 18, May 1917, Cab. 29/1; Cecil, *A Great Experiment*, app. 1. For drafts of Cecil's scheme, see the Cecil Papers, Add. MSS 51102, British Museum.

¹⁶ This element in Cecil's thinking can be seen in *All the Way*, 141-44, 159.

¹⁷ Balfour, "Irresponsible Reflections on the Part Which the Pacific Nations Might Play in Discouraging Future Wars," Jan. 1916, printed for use of the cabinet, FO 899/3.

¹⁸ Hankey to Balfour, May 25, 1916, Balfour Papers, Add. MSS 49704, British Museum. Also, on Hankey's invitation, Julian Corbett, writing from the Historical Sections of the Committee of Imperial Defence, analyzed the dangers to Britain's traditional naval hegemony involved in Wilson's coupling of the league idea with a call for the "freedom of the seas." "Note on the Past History of Schemes for Securing Perpetual Peace," June 18, 1916, Cab. 17/161.

¹⁹ The documents for this review can be found in Cab. 29/1; see also V. H. Rothwell, *British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy: 1914-1918* (Oxford, 1971), 38-58.

²⁰ [Ralph Paget and William Tyrrell], "Suggested Basis for a Territorial Settlement in Europe," Sept. 29, 1916, Cab. 29/1.

systematic and perceptive official wartime analysis of the principal difficulties that the various schemes for a league of nations would have to face. Crowe's analysis was predicated on the belief that national interests and power considerations would continue to act as the principal determinants of all international behavior. No league of nations, no system of arbitration or conferences could change this. Conferences had important uses in building sentiment and power against potential aggressors, in facilitating cooperation, and in allowing time for the operation of resourceful diplomacy, and Crowe favored the development of a regularized conference system "in which all are heard and none are coerced." But a league, perhaps cumbersome and easily obstructed, offered no complete solution in itself. Crowe dealt specifically with what he saw as "the one dominating principle" of all schemes like Cecil's—the principle of the sanction, the application of collective force against aggression. In an extensive analysis of the futility of economic sanctions unsupported by military force and the major organizational and logistical problems inherent in any plans for *ad hoc* international forces, Crowe argued that only power-in-being, not potential power, would be effective as a deterrent, an enforcement mechanism, or a source of security. The conclusion of the memorandum was that peace leagues or no, "the balance of power reappears as the fundamental problem."²¹

Crowe's memorandum was perhaps characterized by an overharsh realism. Yet it made telling points and was given important circulation. Crowe himself favored the creation of some form of regular, mandatory conferences, but there were those, using the arguments identified by Crowe, who denounced the whole league idea as so much futile and dangerous nonsense. These arguments appealed especially to those in imperialist and military circles and the right wing of the Conservative party, who saw security after the war resulting from a continued Anglo-French alliance and a consolidated British Empire. The *Morning Post* repeatedly made the point that the only feasible leagues of nations were the Allies presently fighting the war and the nations that made up the British Empire. For imperialists like L. S. Amery and military leaders like Sir Henry Wilson, ideas for a league of nations were so much "moonshine" and "rubbish."²²

Powerful quarters within the British government, then, rejected the idea that a league of nations based on collective international agreements could really enforce the peace and provide an alternative path to postwar British security. Crowe's memorandum and the debate on war aims in late 1916 illustrated the attachment of British policy makers to traditional

²¹ "Notes by Sir Eyre Crowe on Lord R. Cecil's Proposals for the Maintenance of Future Peace," Oct. 12, 1916, Cabinet Paper GT 404a, Cab. 24/10; see also P 19, Cab. 29/1.

²² For Amery's views, see his *My Political Life* (London, 1953), 2: 162–65; and Keith Hancock, *Smuts: The Sanguine Years, 1870–1919* (Cambridge, 1962), 460; for Wilson, see Major General Sir C. E. Callwell, *Field Marshall Sir Henry Wilson Bart, G.C.B., D.S.O.: His Life and Times* (London, 1927), 2: 157.

strategies, strategies that could look back to a century of undoubted success. A powerful stream of official thinking therefore favored the third alternative identified by Hankey—reliance on the balance of power, together with continued naval hegemony and protection of the independence of the Low Countries.

A simple return to the past was, however, no longer a realistic alternative after 1917. Both domestic and international pressures had induced the government to commit itself deeply to the policy of establishing a league of nations. Furthermore, if traditional British strategies showed some conflict with the league idea, still, throughout the nineteenth century British diplomacy had also attempted periodically to foster a viable international conference system. Castlereagh, Gladstone, and later Grey especially had favored this approach. It was to be expected, then, that the second alternative identified by Hankey—a league based upon the concert of Europe—would attract attention and support in government circles.

In early 1916 Balfour had suggested that provisions for reference of disputes to a “conference of the Powers” would be a more practical approach than territorial guarantees or compulsory arbitration. This approach was elaborated when a committee of the Imperial War Cabinet examined the league idea in the spring of 1917. Its report, drafted by General Smuts, concluded that, while too comprehensive or ambitious projects to ensure peace might prove impracticable and harmful, the most promising proposal seemed to lie “along the path of consultation and conference for composing differences which cannot otherwise be adjusted.” The committee recommended that the peace treaty “should provide that none of the parties who are signatories to the Treaty should resort to arms against one another without previous submission of their dispute to a Conference of the Powers.”²³

The committee’s report, however, had avoided the difficult questions of sanctions and disarmament, and when the report was debated in the Imperial War Cabinet the prime minister charged that the committee “had rather thrown cold water” on the league idea.²⁴ Subsequent debate in the Cabinet centered largely on the issue of sanctions, Cecil and Lord Milner suggesting that sanctions would be necessary but only when a nation refused to submit a dispute for consideration by a “conference of Powers.”²⁵ Debate in the Imperial War Cabinet ended, in effect, by postponing any decision on this sensitive issue.²⁶

In the war-aims debate of late 1917, which culminated in Lloyd George’s

²³ Minutes of the fourth meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet Terms of Peace Committee (Economic and Non-Territorial Desiderata), Apr. 20, 1917, app. A, Cab. 21/71.

²⁴ Imperial War Cabinet, Apr. 26, 1917, Cab. 23/40.

²⁵ Imperial War Cabinet, Apr. 26, May 1, 1917, *ibid.*

²⁶ A subsequent Foreign Office study by Cecil Hurst rejected the idea of automatic sanctions and favored a great-power conference system. “League to Enforce Peace,” July 1917, FO 800/249.

Caxton Hall speech of January 5, 1918, Smuts, Cecil, and Philip Kerr, the prime minister's private secretary (later Lord Lothian), dealt with the league idea in memorandums they had written for the prime minister.²⁷ Of these Kerr differed somewhat from the conventional "sanctionist" line in warning that "no international machinery or treaties" could "in themselves" guarantee a lasting peace. Instead he advocated that the present "great association of free peoples" should form the basis of a postwar "alliance," which he described as "a regular conference or League of Nations to watch over larger affairs of mankind, which may prove to be consistent with the effective maintenance of liberty for all." Kerr consciously eschewed references to obligatory sanctions, but Lloyd George's references to the league idea in his Caxton Hall speech followed the approach drafted by Cecil, simply calling for a great attempt "to establish by some international organization an alternative to war as a means of settling international disputes."²⁸

Hankey was primarily responsible for elaborating the nonsanctionist approach to the league question, based on the pattern of the concert of Europe. In a memorandum of January 16, 1918, circulated to the prime minister, Cecil, Balfour, and others, Hankey called for the consolidation of the existing wartime political, economic, and military organization of the Allies—ranging from the Supreme Council at Versailles down to the smaller economic and technical commissions—into "a veritable League of Nations." Such an organization could coordinate the whole economic offensive of the war, establish relationships with the neutrals, and then be used to conduct eventual peace negotiations with the enemy, after the war being converted into a peacekeeping organization. Such an organization could also play a central role in postwar economic reconstruction and in the coordination of many international activities in such fields as communications, commerce, finance, and technology. On the political level Hankey, like Kerr, shunned all reference to territorial guarantees or sanctions and instead stressed the benefits that would arise if the "Greater States" could cultivate habits of cooperation by means of a permanent conference of "Resident Ministers" at Versailles.²⁹

Hankey, no doubt, was more interested in coordinating the Allied economic offensive against the enemy than he was in laying plans for a permanent peace league. His design, if published, would have run into headlong opposition from Wilson. Hankey's suggestions, however, carried great

²⁷ "War Aims, Draft Statement by General Smuts," Jan. 1, 1918, GT 3180; "War Aims, Draft Statement by Lord Robert Cecil," Jan. 3, 1918, GT 3181; [Philip Kerr], "Statement of War Aims: Draft Statement Based on General Smuts' Draft," Jan. 3, 1918, GT 3182, all in Cab. 24/37/2.

²⁸ Caxton Hall speech, Jan. 5, 1918, in David Lloyd George, *The War Memoirs of David Lloyd George* (London, 1948), vol. 5, app. 2, pp. 2515-27.

²⁹ Hankey, "The League of Nations: Observations by the Secretary," Jan. 16, 1918, GT 3344, Cab. 24/39, also in Lloyd George Papers, F/23/2/7, Beaverbrook Library, London.

weight in the circles closest to the prime minister, and his memorandum offered a clear alternative to the collective-security type of organization advocated by most of the proleague societies and Wilson. Philip Kerr, for one, seems to have been convinced by Hankey's arguments, and subsequently the influential Round Table group publicized many of the themes suggested by Hankey.³⁰

Through 1917 British leaders had looked for an opportunity to compare and coordinate their views on the league question with the Americans, but in November these plans faltered when Colonel House revealed the president's opposition to this course.³¹ Cecil subsequently convinced Balfour to constitute a special Foreign Office committee of experts to report on the question.³²

The Phillimore Committee, reporting on March 20, 1918, provided the government with the most comprehensive official analysis of the various schemes for a peace league, and it put forward a plan of its own. The Phillimore Report left an important imprint on the final Covenant of the League of Nations, but in 1918 the committee's suggestions proved curiously unsuccessful and seemed to confront the government with more problems than solutions. In its early deliberations the committee rejected Hankey's approach and any suggestions of a world federation or superstate. Instead it adopted the "leading ideas" of the, by now, conventional approach to the league question, at the same time attempting to avoid their pitfalls. The league was to be viewed essentially as an alliance, and members would agree not to resort to war against another member without submitting the dispute to the peaceful means of settlement spelled out in the report. If a member violated these commitments, the Phillimore scheme provided that "this State will become *ipso facto* at war with all the other Allied States, and the latter agreed to take and to support each other in taking jointly and severally all such measures—military, naval, financial, and economic—as will best avail for restraining the breach of covenant." If a nonmember attacked a member, the report merely provided that "any Allied States may come to its assistance."³³

The Phillimore Committee, then, endorsed a rigorous system of auto-

³⁰ Kerr was a member of the Round Table group, which had grown out of Lord Milner's South African "kindergarten" and hoped to see a consolidated or federated British Empire in the future. Kerr was the first editor of its organ, the *Round Table*. Hankey and Kerr coordinated their thinking on the league idea in December 1917. Roskill, *Hankey*, 1: 49; see also the *Round Table*, Mar. 1918, pp. 224-27, and Sept. 1918, pp. 680-82.

³¹ "Proposed Formation of League of Nations to Secure the Maintenance of Future Peace (Copy of Minute addressed to Mr. Balfour by Sir E. Drummond)," Nov. 15, 1917, GT 2667, Cab. 24/32.

³² Cecil to Balfour, Nov. 20, 1917, FO 371/3439.

³³ The minutes and interim report of the committee are in FO 371/3439, 3483; the interim report is also reprinted in Miller, *Drafting of the Covenant*, 1: 3-10. Members of the committee were Lord Phillimore as chairman, Julian Corbett, J. H. Rose, A. F. Pollard, Eyre Crowe, William Tyrrell, and Cecil Hurst.

matic sanctions applicable to members of the league, a feature of the plan that created reservations in the minds of many British statesmen. On the other hand, the report tended to portray the league as involving only limited departures from the prewar diplomatic system. Beyond an ambassadors' conference to convene in times of crisis, no need was envisaged for the creation of new international machinery. The question of which nations, beyond the present allies, would be members of the league was not clarified. The relationship between members of the league and non-members also remained largely undefined. Clearly the proposals of the Phillimore Committee not only fell short of the type of league that by early 1918 had captured the public imagination, but the report itself left many questions harbored by government members both unexamined and unanswered.

Through 1918, as the league-of-nations movement grew in power and as British liberalism and labor increasingly embraced the ideology of the "new diplomacy," the government faced mounting pressures to elaborate publicly its attitudes on the league question. In June, Curzon reviewed the government's position before the House of Lords. He devoted most of his presentation to describing the various difficulties involved in the project, difficulties identified earlier in Crowe's memorandum. Curzon paid warm tribute to the two "leagues" already in existence—the British Empire and the "League of the Allied Nations." In outlining the government's policy on the larger project for a peace league Curzon generally endorsed the limited league suggested by the Phillimore Committee, including its system of *ipso facto* sanctions. Although assuring the Lords that the government was "in earnest in the matter," Curzon seemed more concerned with identifying problems and advising caution than with encouraging the enthusiasts.³⁴

Through the summer of 1918 both Cecil and George Barnes, the token labor member of the War Cabinet, pressed the government to undertake a more active initiative on behalf of the league cause.³⁵ When in August the War Cabinet refused to publish the Phillimore Report, Cecil expostulated that he had "pressed for months past to have this question seriously considered" and warned that the government could be faced at any time with "a violent demand from the people" to know what government policy really was. He charged that it was "only too evident that some of my colleagues do not want this scheme put forward."³⁶ Given American opposition to publication of the Phillimore scheme, Lloyd George advised caution,

³⁴ Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates* (Lords), 5th ser., 29 (1918): cols. 476–510; 30 (1918): cols. 393–429.

³⁵ Cecil to Lloyd George, June 26, 1918, Lloyd George Papers, F/6/5/34; "Lecture by the Right Hon. G. W. Barnes," Aug. 5, 1918, GT 5364, Cab. 24/60. For concern in the Foreign Office over the content of Barnes's speeches, see FO 371/3439.

³⁶ Imperial War Cabinet, Aug. 13, 1918 [shorthand notes], Cab. 23/43.

especially since dabbling with peace schemes at this time could seriously damage the public will to victory.³⁷

When Barnes brought the league question before the War Cabinet again on October 2, the cabinet decided to empower Reading, upon his return to Washington as British envoy, to exchange views with Wilson on this subject.³⁸ Before Reading returned to America, however, the Germans sued for an armistice, and Allied leaders soon found themselves absorbed in shaping the military terms of an armistice that would guarantee their hard-won victory. In addition, since the German note explicitly requested a peace based on Wilson's Fourteen Points, Allied statesmen were now faced with the immediate task of deciding upon the desirability and feasibility of Wilson's program as a basis for the ultimate peace settlement. It quickly became clear that although the British wished to cooperate with the Americans in the peacemaking, from their point of view there were serious deficiencies in the president's Fourteen Points, especially in point two, referring to freedom of the seas. Colonel House was able to convince the Allies to accept the president's program as a basis for the peacemaking only after some bitter infighting and after the British had reserved the second point and a further clarification had been entered on reparations. House believed, somewhat naively, that this agreement marked a "great diplomatic victory," especially with regard to the fourteenth point, which referred to plans for international organization.³⁹

THROUGH NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER the government and its advisers in various departments undertook examination of the many issues and problems of peacemaking in preparation for an impending peace conference. At the same time the government called an election, the results of which not only gave the Lloyd George coalition a massive victory but also provided the domestic determinants on peacemaking strategy. Generally, as with the earlier American congressional elections, the British election illustrated that the tides of idealism were receding and the electorate was most interested in extracting huge reparations from the enemy, hanging the Kaiser, and generally wreaking vengeance on the Germans. The public saw no irony,

³⁷ On the American factor and Cecil's concern, see Wiseman to Reading, Aug. 16, 1918, in Charles Seymour, *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House* (Boston, 1926-28), 4: 52-54; Cecil to Wiseman, Aug. 19, 1918, in Cecil, *All the Way*, 141; Reading to Lloyd George, Aug. 19, 1918, Lloyd George Papers, F/43/1/14; and Lloyd George to Bonar Law, Aug. 20, 1918, *ibid.*, F/30/2/41.

³⁸ War Cabinet, Oct. 2, 1918, Cab. 23/8.

³⁹ House to Wilson, Nov. 5, 1918, in Seymour, *Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, 4: 188; see also Lloyd George Papers, F/60/1/8. Later Lloyd George pointed out to the reluctant Australian prime minister that almost anything could be read into the president's declarations, and Kerr advised Hughes that Wilson's points were "mostly verbiage." War Cabinet, Nov. 5, 1918, Cab. 23/8; Kerr to Hankey, Nov. 13, 1918, Lord Lothian Papers, GD 40/17/57, Scottish Record Office, Edinburgh.

however, in demanding a harsh peace and at the same time offering continued allegiance to the idea of a league of nations. The meetings of the League of Nations Union, which had recently united the two main pro-league groups, attracted mass attendance, particularly the founding meeting at Central Hall on October 10, which saw Viscount Grey, the incumbent president, give his first public address since retirement. Although the league's warmest supporters, the Asquithian Liberals and the moderate Labourites, had been decimated by the election, the league idea continued to enjoy solid support throughout most of the British political spectrum, the exceptions being the extremes of Left and Right.⁴⁰ Perhaps the league idea was the only liberal idea to come through the Coupon Election unscathed, and Lloyd George bore witness to the powerful support behind the idea when he advised the Imperial War Cabinet that any government which proved not to be in earnest about the creation of a league "would be sternly dealt with by the people, and sooner rather than later."⁴¹

Smuts, who was given responsibility for coordinating the various studies on the peacemaking, provided the first overview of the British approach to the settlement in a memorandum of December 3, 1918. Here Smuts posed the central question: "Are we going to side with France or America as a matter of large policy?" Manifesting a strong anti-French bias Smuts argued for cooperation with America and Wilson "so far as consistent with our own interests." To Smuts, language, interests, ideals, and "all fundamental considerations of policy" pointed to a new era of Anglo-American cooperation. Smuts suggested that the most effective way to signalize such cooperation was to support Wilson's policy of a league of nations and "to give form and substance to his rather nebulous ideas."⁴²

Smuts himself would soon take up the task of improving upon Wilson's ideas, but meanwhile the many vital issues involved in the league question were examined within the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office. Generally Foreign Office members favored the league project, and J. W. Headlam-Morley, the head of the Political Intelligence Department, advised that it was in British interests "to work vigorously and honestly"

⁴⁰ Northcliffe believed the league proposal would "receive a powerful backing in England from all political parties." Interview by Charles H. Grasty, Dec. 18, 1918, in David Hunter Miller Papers, box 85, file 26, Library of Congress. C. P. Scott in an interview with Wilson on December 29, 1918, advised the president "not to regard the result of the election as a demonstration against the policy of a League of Nations." Trevor Wilson, ed., *The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott, 1911-1928* (London, 1970), 336.

⁴¹ Imperial War Cabinet, Dec. 24, 1918, Cab. 23/42.

⁴² Smuts, "Our Policy at the Peace Conference," Dec. 3, 1918, Cabinet Paper P 39, Cab. 29/2. The British government already knew that the French government's plan for a league adopted an approach very different from Wilson's, and Clemenceau was currently reaffirming his commitment to the balance of power. "Textes Adoptés Par la Commission Française" along with a commentary by the Phillimore Committee are in FO 371/4365. For Clemenceau, see France, *Annales de la Chambre*, Dec. 29, 1918, p. 3328.

in cooperation with America along the lines of the Wilsonian program.⁴³ In a series of memorandums produced within the Political Intelligence Department through November and December 1918, the major concern was that the league project should be anchored to realistic and viable foundations. Foreign Office advisers suggested that the league might be linked with the existing interallied agencies under the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council in a program of postwar international economic cooperation and reconstruction.⁴⁴ When the American administration and Hoover vetoed "any programme that even looks like inter-Allied control of [American] resources after peace,"⁴⁵ the Foreign Office still favored a maximum of what would now be termed "functional" cooperation within the league.⁴⁶ Foreign Office advisers were unanimous in seeing the league's most promising role to lie in its promotion of regularized international conferences bringing together the political and diplomatic leaders of the world.⁴⁷ At the same time Foreign Office members saw major problems in those aspects of the league that emphasized automatic obligations to guarantee territorial provisions and to resort to sanctions to enforce peace and deter or punish aggression. These features of the league project were seen as cutting across traditional British strategies, and there was concern that they should be minimized. On the question of sanctions the advice of the Foreign Office was generally to follow the limited approach of the Phillimore plan, which placed sanctions in the context of buttressing a mandatory conference system rather than guaranteeing territorial integrity. While a role for the league in colonial areas of the world was favored, there was little inclination to associate the league with tasks of disarmament or tariff reform. Probably no one in the Foreign Office, with the possible exception of Philip Baker (later Noel-Baker), shared Wilson's conviction that the security promised by a league of nations could supplant traditional means of pursuing security. Headlam-Morley argued that despite current denigrations of the balance of power, this doctrine would remain "a fundamental point just as much after the establishment of a League of Nations as it had been before."⁴⁸

The thinking of the Foreign Office can perhaps best be seen in the league

⁴³ J. W. Headlam-Morley, "The Settlement," Dec. 1918, Cabinet Paper P 53, Cab. 29/2; see also FO 371/4365.

⁴⁴ FO 371/4367; see also Zimmern, *League of Nations and the Rule of Law*, 153-55.

⁴⁵ FO 371/4367; S. L. Bane and R. H. Lutz, eds. *Organization of American Relief in Europe, 1918-1919* (Stanford, 1943), 32.

⁴⁶ See especially S. P. Waterlow, "International Government under the League of Nations," Dec. 28, 1918, circulated Jan. 3, 1919, FO 371/4353. Waterlow based his memorandum largely on L. S. Woolf's *International Government* (London, 1916).

⁴⁷ Eustace Percy, "The League of Nations," Dec. 1918, Cabinet Paper P 69, Cab. 29/2; Alfred Zimmern, "The League of Nations," Dec. 20, 1918, Cabinet Paper P 68, *ibid.*; see also FO 371/4353, reprinted in Zimmern, *League of Nations and the Rule of Law*, 197-209.

⁴⁸ Headlam-Morley, "Europe," Dec. 1918, Cabinet Paper P 52, Cab. 29/2; see also FO 371/4353.

plan outlined for Cecil in a memorandum of December 17, 1918.⁴⁹ This memorandum, slightly revised, would go to the Paris Peace Conference as the "Cecil Plan." This plan saw a regular system of great-power conferences as constituting "the pivot of the League," with annual meetings of the prime ministers and foreign secretaries of the great powers and provision also for emergency sessions. Beyond this there could be quadrennial meetings of the lesser members of the league, who it was expected would "not exercise any considerable influence," and also periodic meetings of parliamentary delegations from member states. A permanent secretariat would be appointed by the great powers, and Geneva was suggested as the most suitable place for the establishment of a league-of-nations headquarters. With regard to provisions designed to resolve international disputes and the question of sanctions, the Foreign Office draft closely followed the Phillimore scheme, with the addition that now members would also agree to act collectively against any nonmember refusing to abide by the peaceful procedures of the league. Here there were misgivings, but it was known that Wilson wanted a league with "teeth," and there was general recognition that the idea of sanctions had the strong endorsement of the league-of-nations movement.

Although the Foreign Office was willing to put what was by now its diminished influence behind the Cecil Plan with its sanctions, the central issue of sanctions provided the focal point for memorandums from the War Office and the Admiralty. The Military Intelligence section of the War Office warned strongly against any attempt to safeguard the world's peace by means of a league armed with economic sanctions alone. Economic sanctions could be effective only if backed up by the spirit and machinery of an armed alliance dedicated to the cause of peace. Anything less would be "a shadow and a sham."⁵⁰ The Admiralty Office voiced strong reservations as to the wisdom of undertaking binding obligations to participate in collective military and naval actions "without regard to the wisdom of the step as a purely naval and military proposition."⁵¹ Furthermore, if the British navy were given added collective responsibility under the league, naval estimates might well have to be increased. Winston Churchill, minister of munitions and a former first lord, warned that the league of nations "was no substitute for the British fleet," and Admiral Wemyss and Admiral

⁴⁹ Cecil, "League of Nations: Memoranda by the Foreign Office," Dec. 17, 1918, Cabinet Paper P 79, Cab. 29/2; reprinted in Miller, *Drafting of the Covenant*, 2: 61-64.

⁵⁰ "Can a League of Nations Armed with the Weapon of Economic Isolation Safeguard the World's Peace?" Dec. 20, 1918, FO 371/4366. This memorandum was composed by Major-General G. K. Cockerill, subdirector of Military Intelligence, together with his colleagues in the War Office.

⁵¹ "Memorandum by Admiralty on Naval Aspects of a League of Nations and Limitation of Armaments," Dec. 1918, Cabinet Paper P 78, Cab. 29/2.

Beresford spoke publicly on the necessity of maintaining Britain's naval superiority unimpaired.⁵²

No doubt there occurred in military and naval circles much loose talk hostile to the whole league idea, but it was a South African general who, late in 1918, did more than anyone to advance the league cause in Imperial circles. Smuts's famous "Practical Suggestion," published and circulated within the government in mid-December, put forward an eloquent and persuasive plea for a league of nations that would underpin the peace settlement and provide the fabric for a true international society in the postwar world.⁵³ Smuts's plan attracted major official attention and public support with its dramatic recommendations for a far-reaching mandate system, its radical proposals for disarmament, and its detailed organizational suggestions for a league modeled upon the Imperial War Conference and the Versailles Council. Wilson was heavily influenced by Smuts's thinking, and the "Practical Suggestion" provided the principal basis for discussion when the Imperial War Cabinet debated the league question in late December. Smuts emphasized, in endorsing the Phillimore Report's provisions on peacekeeping, that sanctions presented "the most important question of all." Here Smuts asserted that "without an effective sanction for the keeping of the moratorium the league will remain a pious aspiration or a dead letter."⁵⁴

Apart from official channels the Round Table group put its considerable influence behind the type of league favored by Philip Kerr and Hankey. In a series of articles the *Round Table* argued that the league must evolve organically out of the allied wartime political and economic agencies and the experience of the Imperial War Cabinet. The emphasis should be on the creation of a great-power conference system rather than on unrealistic plans for compulsory arbitration, perpetual covenants, and the paraphernalia of sanctions. Articles by Alfred Zimmermann and the editor, Lionel Curtis, warned against attempts to bind nations in "written constitutions." The authors favored arrangements for close economic, social, intellectual, and technical cooperation in the postwar world, and Curtis put forward a system of great-power mandates, which would operate, under the league, in the former German colonies.⁵⁵ The suggestions of the *Round Table* con-

⁵² Churchill at Dundee, Nov. 25, 1918, *Times* (London), Nov. 27, 1918, p. 10; for Wemyss and Beresford, see the *Morning Post*, Dec. 2, 3, and 5, 1918.

⁵³ Smuts, "The League of Nations: A Programme for the Peace Conference," Dec. 16, 1918, Cabinet Paper P 44, Cab. 29/2, published as *The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion* (London, 1918), and reprinted in Miller, *Drafting of the Covenant*, 2: 23-60.

⁵⁴ In the Foreign Office Headlam-Morley noted skepticism on Smuts's plan, and Crowe minuted that the scheme was "crude" and bristled with difficulties. Crowe and Tyrrell believed Smuts's proposals dangerously overelaborated the whole league idea. Cecil agreed but considered Smuts's plan "useful as propaganda." Docket notes on Smuts's "Practical Suggestion," FO 371/4353.

⁵⁵ [Lionel Curtis], "Windows of Freedom," *Round Table*, Dec. 1918, pp. 1-36; [Alfred Zimmermann], "Some Principles and Problems of the Settlement," *ibid.*, 88-113. This line was also supported by Wickham Steed in the Northcliffe press and apparently had the endorsement of

cerning the league question were all very much compatible with the realization of the group's first objective—to see plans for a consolidated British Empire come to fruition in the postwar period. Through Philip Kerr the Round Table group had, of course, a direct line to the prime minister.

By DECEMBER 24, 1918, with Wilson due to arrive in London shortly, the stage was set for a full-dress debate on the league question in the Imperial War Cabinet.⁵⁶ With discussion centering on Smuts's "Practical Suggestion," it soon became apparent that there were major areas of disagreement within the Imperial War Cabinet concerning the powers to be given to a league of nations. The crux of the matter was whether the league was to be granted independent executive authority in such crucial areas as armament policy, colonial administration, and most important, collective resistance to aggression. While no one wished to see the creation of a super-state, there were those like Cecil and Barnes who believed in the collective idea and were willing to countenance automatic economic and military sanctions against aggressors, as proposed in the Phillimore Report and incorporated into the memorandums by Smuts, Cecil, and the Foreign Office. Cecil, who led discussions on behalf of the league idea, buttressed his argument with a clear warning that unless the government showed itself to be "very seriously in earnest about the league," he believed "the view would grow that the present Government machinery was not to be trusted to deal with serious questions."

On the other hand, Conservatives like Bonar Law, Curzon, Chamberlain, and Balfour, together with realists like Churchill and Hughes, who doubted the viability of any collective system, were manifestly unwilling to make the potential sacrifices of national sovereignty that such a system necessarily implied. This powerful and preponderant group had no desire to see traditional Imperial strategies abandoned and the security of the Empire entrusted to a new and totally untried system. Chamberlain doubted that the Americans "would put their forces at the disposal of an International Council," and in any event Smuts's scheme involved "more than we could effect even in our own Dominions" on the point of calling out Imperial troops. Hughes rejected Smuts's scheme as "incompatible with national sovereignty," while Balfour cautioned against allowing the league any jurisdiction over the internal matters of any state: "otherwise it would be impossible to foresee where the responsibilities of the League of Nations would end." To Churchill the proper basis for the erection of a league was "a complete and intimate understanding between France, America, and Britain," but clearly "a League of Nations could be no substitute for

Colonel House. Seymour, *Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, 4: 275-77; and H. Wickham Steed, *Through Thirty Years: 1892-1922* (London, 1924), 2: 264-65.

⁵⁶ Imperial War Cabinet, Dec. 24, 1918, Cab. 23/42.

national defenses." Reading advised against loading the league with responsibilities too great from the outset, in particular the responsibility for disarmament as suggested by Smuts. Granted the opposition within the cabinet to a league with wide-ranging authority, there was nevertheless a nearly universal realization that, given the strength of the league idea in popular opinion and the position taken by the American president, the creation of some new international organization was imperative. The solution that presented itself was a league modeled on the pattern of the Versailles Council and the Imperial War Cabinet—a league that would facilitate the closest international cooperation and exchange in political as well as economic, humanitarian, and administrative matters, but that left national sovereignty unimpaired.

This was clearly the path suggested by the prime minister in his summary of conclusions to be reached from cabinet discussions. Lloyd George argued that discussion had illustrated that generally the cabinet supported the idea of a league of nations and the framework as outlined by Cecil, but there was hesitation, if not disagreement, on the power to be given the league. He agreed with Cecil on the strong popular support behind the idea and also the necessity for disarmament, without which the league would be regarded as a "sham." With regard to the league's framework the prime minister considered that the Imperial War Cabinet and the Versailles Council provided "admirable precedents." Lloyd George clearly repudiated the idea of a league with independent executive powers: "It must not be constituted as a body with executive power. But on the basis of the Imperial War Cabinet and of the Supreme War Council you would get a body whose authority rested with the Governments."

It would seem that Lloyd George had entered cabinet debate fully conscious of public support for the league project, hopeful that it could bring about disarmament, and personally impressed by Smuts's memorandum, which he lauded as "one of the ablest State Papers he had read." It is unlikely, however, that the prime minister had studied deeply the implications of Smuts's proposal or that he held any fixed personal views on the league question other than a generally favorable predisposition. The criticisms advanced against Smuts's scheme were enough to convince him that it would be a mistake to attempt too much at the beginning. Beyond this Lloyd George foresaw that the league might provide a valuable forum for personal diplomacy; "he thought that if only the leaders of the different nations could meet it would make all the difference in international relations." The prime minister's closest adviser on the league question was Philip Kerr, and it appeared from the conclusions of the cabinet that the conception of the league preached by Hankey, Kerr, and the Round Table group had triumphed.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ In fact Hankey "vetted" the draft minutes for this meeting and "dictated P.M.'s im-

In discussions in the Imperial War Cabinet after he had been able to exchange views with President Wilson, Lloyd George argued that Wilson's ideas on the league were generally compatible with British views and that the president's total commitment to the league cause could be used as a bargaining tactic to realize British objectives in other more critical spheres. Despite another tirade by Hughes against building the peace on the league of nations and an outburst by Curzon, which questioned the whole strategy of cooperation with America as opposed to France in the peacemaking, the prime minister expressed confidence that British interests could best be served in cooperation with America. Lloyd George summarized the grand strategy which the nature of Wilson's program and British interests suggested; "he was not pessimistic about inducing President Wilson to agree ultimately, though possibly under protest, to the things to which we attached importance, providing he could secure his League of Nations, which, politically, was a matter of life and death to him."⁵⁸

IT WAS WITH THIS policy-making background that Cecil crossed over to Paris in early January 1919 to represent the government, along with Smuts, on the league question.⁵⁹ Despite the reservations that had been revealed in cabinet debate, Cecil chose the Foreign Office scheme of December 17, the Cecil Plan, as a basis of initial exchange with the Americans.⁶⁰ In Paris the League of Nations Section under Cecil worked on a much more detailed draft, which had been prepared largely by Philip Baker, and on January 20 Cecil submitted to his government for approval a "Draft Convention," which he hoped would form the British case on the question.⁶¹ Both the Cecil Plan and the Draft Convention included the compulsory obligations to uphold the covenants of the league and to resist aggression, obligations that the Imperial War Cabinet had opposed. In fact the Draft Convention went further to meet Wilson's approach in requiring that league members "undertake to respect the territorial integrity of all States members of the League, and to protect them from foreign aggression."

Cecil opened negotiations with Wilson on January 19, and soon the British and American teams were fast at work coordinating their views in a joint draft, which they intended to use as a basis to work from with their allies when the League of Nations Commission drafted the Covenant. Because the president's scheme in Cecil's view was "almost entirely Smuts

portant summing up." He was pleased that the discussion had trended "in the direction I have always advocated." Hankey, diary, Dec. 24, 1918, cited in Roskill, *Hankey*, 2: 38.

⁵⁸ Imperial War Cabinet, Dec. 30, 31, 1918, Cab. 23/42.

⁵⁹ Cecil lobbied successfully for this position in spite of his resignation from the government in November on the Welsh Church issue.

⁶⁰ Cecil told Noel-Baker that the cabinet had approved the Foreign Office memorandum of December 17. Interview with Noel-Baker, July 7, 1971.

⁶¹ FO 800/249; "The League of Nations: Draft Convention," Jan. 20, 1919, Cabinet Paper WCP 23, Cab. 29/7, reprinted in Miller, *Drafting of the Covenant*, 2: doc. 10.

and Phillimore combined, with practically no new ideas in it"⁶² and because Cecil and Wilson shared a similar approach to the question of international organization, British and American negotiators had little difficulty in reaching agreement. Cecil had tried to keep the prime minister briefed on the negotiations but soon found that Lloyd George "did not want to talk about the League of Nations at all, in which he takes no real interest."⁶³ On January 29 Cecil submitted to the prime minister a joint Anglo-American draft and asked for authority to continue negotiations with the Allies on the basis of this draft.⁶⁴

William Wiseman, who acted as an important link between American and British officials, had been closely following the course of Anglo-American negotiations and feared that Cecil's views on the league went "a good deal further than the Prime Minister" and held very serious implications for future British diplomatic strategy.⁶⁵ Colonel House, the president's right-hand man, had asked Wiseman to arrange a conference for January 31 at which Cecil and Smuts, together with Wilson and Colonel House, would thrash out the remaining difficulties on the league in preparation for the convocation of the League of Nations Commission. Wiseman was anxious that Cecil and Smuts should be briefed by the prime minister before the meeting with House and Wilson. He therefore arranged with Philip Kerr for Cecil and Smuts to meet with the prime minister on January 31, before the conference with the Americans. What transpired at this meeting was altogether remarkable.⁶⁶

Reading from a memorandum prepared by Philip Kerr, the prime minister confronted Cecil and Smuts with an attack on the very foundations of their approach to the creation of the league and sketched an alternate scheme with a very different line, the line the prime minister had put forward during debate in the Imperial War Cabinet.⁶⁷ Lloyd George argued forcefully that the league must be based upon a permanent system of voluntary great-power consultation, bringing smaller powers into the deliberations only when their interests were affected. The league should be modeled upon the procedures and institutions that had grown to service the Supreme War Council and that were now providing the basis for the

⁶² Cecil, diary, Jan. 19, 1919, Cecil Papers, Add. MSS 41131. Throughout the peace conference Cecil kept a diary that reveals much on the inner workings of the British delegation.

⁶³ Cecil, diary, Jan. 13, 26, 1919. Having an open invitation, Cecil from time to time breakfasted with Lloyd George.

⁶⁴ Lothian Papers, GD 40/17/54.

⁶⁵ William Wiseman, diary, Jan. 31, 1919, Wiseman Papers, Sterling Library, Yale University.

⁶⁶ This important meeting is reconstructed from records in the Lothian Papers and in Cecil's diary.

⁶⁷ P.H.K[err], "The League of Nations," Lothian Papers, GD 40/17/54. No date is given, but this was probably composed after Cecil's note to the prime minister of January 29, 1919, requesting authority to proceed on the basis of the Cecil-Miller draft. The Kerr memorandum follows Cecil's note in the Lothian Papers.

Peace Conference. The essence of the arrangements would be that plenipotentiary ministers should be in continuous consultation. These ministers would spend half of their time at the capital of the league and the other half in their own capitals. They would be men of great authority, and they would also supervise "all international organizations, such as relief, waterways and so forth." At stated intervals and in time of crisis the deliberations of the league would be strengthened by the prime ministers and presidents of member states. The league would operate through "a joint secretariat constituted on the same lines as the secretariat of the Supreme War Council or of the Peace Conference."

The prime minister then singled out for attack the keystone provisions of all Wilsonian-type designs for a league—the obligation to participate in collective resistance to aggression. The memorandum asserted that if the league were to be a success

it will not be because the nations enter into solemn covenants to guarantee one another's territories or to go to war with rebellious powers on certain stated conditions, but because it constitutes the machinery by which the nations of the world can remain in continual consultation with one another and through which they can arrive promptly at great decisions for dealing with all international problems as they arise.

The major arguments against the paraphernalia of sanctions were presented briefly and bluntly.

The probable effect of including in the constitution of the League of Nations obligations to go to war in certain stated conditions will be to make it impossible for any nation to join the League, for no nation will commit itself in such a vital matter except by the free decision of its own Government and of its own Parliament, and no Government and no Parliament can come to such a decision except after examination of the facts at the time when the decision has to be made. The attempt to impose obligations of this kind at the start will either end in their being nugatory or in the destruction of the league itself.

In dealing with the problem of what international obligations should be undertaken by league members, the memorandum suggested that a participating state should merely be required to guarantee negatively that it would not "initiate military or economic action against its neighbours without first having submitted the matter in dispute to the consideration of the Council of the League and given it reasonable time to negotiate or impose a settlement." Any nation violating this obligation would "become *ipso facto* an outlaw of the League and an immediate meeting of the Council of the League [would] take place in order to determine what action should be taken by the League to deal with the matter." The approach to international organization put forward in the memorandum was outlined in a final paragraph.

The conclusion then is that we should take the deliberations of the twenty-five nations that constitute the Peace Conference as a kind of preliminary meeting of the League of Nations; that we should accept the procedure and constitution which has worked today as the procedure and constitution, subject to modifications, of the League of Nations; that as soon as the Peace Conference has completed its labours, it should expand into a conference of the Nations, including the neutrals which, after the question of the representation and status of the newcomers has been settled, should proceed at once to deal with the post-war problems which will be numerous and pressing exactly as the Peace Conference is dealing with current problems. The opening of this second Conference should be made as formal and dramatic as possible, but the paper obligations to be entered into by the several nations should be reduced to the absolute minimum, for otherwise various legislatures will never accept them. If the existing Conference negotiates a settlement which is just and satisfactory it will have the authority necessary to float its own continuance as the League of Nations; if it does not succeed in doing this, no other League of Nations is likely to do better.

The prime minister then read to Cecil and Smuts a draft scheme for a league that was appended to this explanatory statement. The plan was concise and, in light of its sponsorship, merits reprinting in whole.

1. There shall be constituted a League of Nations for the purpose of securing agreement among all nations in the conduct of international affairs, and for the prevention of war.
2. The League shall consist of all powers who undertake to abide by its rules.
3. The League shall conduct its business by means of an executive Council, consisting of plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers who shall have general charge of the affairs of the League, and of a plenipotentiary of each of the other powers who may attend the Council as a member whenever matters specially affecting their nation are under consideration.
4. The function of the Executive Council shall be to secure agreement among all nations in the conduct of international affairs by means of constant consultation and deliberation together. It shall also have charge of all international services, administrative, inspectional or research, which may be initiated by the League.
5. Each power shall appoint a representative who shall be its permanent plenipotentiary on the Council and other plenipotentiaries to the number laid down on the basis of representation annexed hereto:—
6. The permanent members of the Council shall sit in continuous session, but there shall be full meetings of the Council at intervals of not less than six months, or whenever necessity requires, at which the other plenipotentiaries may attend.
7. There shall be an annual plenary Conference of the whole League.
8. The administrative organisation of the League shall be in the hands of a joint secretariat of the Great Powers and the control of the permanent members of the Council of the League.
9. Every member of the League undertakes to take no action, military or economic, against any other member, without first submitting the matter in dispute to the consideration of the Council of the League for a period of not less than three months. In the event of any power breaking this rule it immediately becomes an outlaw, forfeiting its privileges and immunities under the rules

of the League, and there shall be immediately summoned a full Council of the League to consider the action to be taken against it.

10. The first meeting of the League shall consist of the members of the Peace Conference and of all neutrals, and the first business it shall consider shall be draft constitution.

11. Every nation joining the League shall be required to stop line [?] armies, liquor and slave trades, etc. [this article was added in Philip Kerr's handwriting, probably at Lloyd George's request].

This memorandum represented, then, the most direct statement of British policy on the league question coming from the prime minister. It was, of course, the approach suggested by Kerr and Hankey. It was not one of Lloyd George's shots in the dark; rather it represented what those of greatest authority and influence in government and the Foreign Office believed was in the interests of Britain, the Empire, and the world with regard to international organization for peace, cooperation, and security.

Whatever merits the scheme presented by the prime minister possessed, its timing could not have been worse. Cecil was due in a few hours to reach agreement on a final Anglo-American draft. To have reversed policy at this point would have involved an immediate and explosive confrontation with Wilson. Cecil was not the man to strike out in this direction. Instead, in a remarkable if understandable display of independence, he chose to disregard the advice proffered by the prime minister. Cecil believed that Lloyd George had entered the meeting with no knowledge of the papers that had been submitted by the League of Nations Section but had simply read Kerr's memorandum. On reflection, he dismissed the prime minister's scheme as "a thoroughly bad one—indeed only a device for postponing the League til after the peace." He suspected it, quite wrongly, to be "a French proposal."⁶⁸ Later, when Hankey pressed Cecil to follow the lines laid down by the prime minister, Cecil argued that there were two objections to this policy. First, to Cecil the Versailles Council had been "only a very moderate success." Second, the conditions behind a peacetime league of nations and a wartime Allied Council were different. The league, "lacking the compelling power of fighting an enemy to keep it together," would need "a much more solid organisation" with provisions for much more multifarious functions and a well-organized secretariat."⁶⁹

⁶⁸ There was truth in Cecil's charge that the British and French governments for tactical reasons wished to delay consideration of the league question. On January 31 Lloyd George was probably still smarting from the dramatic confrontation with Wilson on the colonial settlement the previous day in the Council of Ten, when the president had stubbornly refused to accept as final, until the league should be drawn up, the difficult compromise on the mandate system that Lloyd George had worked out with the Dominions. There is, however, no foundation in the evidence for Ray Stannard Baker's later charge that British leaders were maneuvering at this time to relegate the league to oblivion. *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*, 1: 240-43. Lansing, who was involved in an interesting double game of his own, advised Wilson on Allied tactics. Lansing to Wilson, Jan. 31, 1919, Woodrow Wilson Papers, series 5B, box 13, Library of Congress.

⁶⁹ Cecil, diary, Feb. 5, 1919; see also Hankey, diary, Feb. 5, in Roskill, *Hankey*, 2: 56-57.

THIS MARKED THE POINT of no return for the British government concerning policy on the nature of the league of nations. Cecil later on January 31 reached agreement with Wilson on the Anglo-American draft, which then served as a basis for the deliberations of the League of Nations Commission.⁷⁰ From this point forward Cecil cooperated closely with Wilson in designing the type of league they both desired, resisting the designs of the French government for an international army and also the opposition that came from within each of their respective governments. Despite the major criticisms of the Anglo-American draft and the League of Nations Commission draft of February 14, which were submitted by the Dominions and the Admiralty in the British Empire delegation and by the prime minister, Cecil conceded only minor alterations in the draft of the Covenant and the addition of certain ambiguities. The approach and structure—based on a system of collective security—remained intact. Here Cecil exerted a remarkable degree of influence for a man who was no longer even a member of the government. But he was quite willing to take full advantage of the broad discretionary powers allowed under the lax system of controls operated by Lloyd George. Cecil, moreover, could count on the knowledge that resistance to Wilson's approach to the league would not only have endangered the whole strategy of Anglo-American cooperation in the peace-making but also have alienated the strong League of Nations Union lobby and the "forces of movement" on the Left. The scheme favored by the prime minister and the views of the British Empire delegation stood no chance, then, against the simplistic allurements of collective security as championed by Wilson and Cecil, together with France and the smaller powers.

Lloyd George and the British government tolerated the results of the League of Nations Commission so long as British and Imperial objectives in other spheres with higher priorities were not frustrated. When the new American naval program threatened British naval policies, Lloyd George froze negotiations on the league question, using the tactic identified at the meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet on December 31, until the Americans promised certain modifications. British leaders also tolerated the Covenant as it emerged from the Peace Conference in the belief that its provisions were sufficiently ambiguous to allow for definition and evolution along realistic lines, and in the hope that League responsibilities would be shared fully by the Americans.⁷¹ When this hope faded in the fall of 1919, there occurred an urgent debate within government circles as to the wisdom of proceeding with the League as constituted.⁷² At the same time, as British

⁷⁰ These deliberations can be followed in detail in Miller, *Drafting of the Covenant*, vol. 2.

⁷¹ The attempt to place a realist definition on the role of the League can be seen in the government's official "Commentary on the League of Nations Covenant," in Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers* (Commons) (Cmd. 151, misc. no. 3) June 1919.

⁷² This important debate can be followed in part from the records on Sir Edward Grey's mis-

postwar defense strategies began to be formulated, government leaders placed little or no confidence in the new League of Nations as an alternative to traditional policies in pursuing security for Britain and the Empire.⁷³

WHAT CONCLUSIONS, then, can be drawn from this study? First, for all the contribution of Phillimore, Smuts, Cecil, and British liberalism to the creation of the League of Nations, the British government found itself in fundamental disagreement with the type of organization that emerged from the Paris Peace Conference. Given the results reached at Paris, Cecil found the prime minister "inclined to curse the Covenant of the League on various grounds."⁷⁴ In many ways, however, Lloyd George was himself to blame for this result because of his rather haphazard methods of policy formation and his failure to keep a closer watch and control over the deliberations in the League of Nations Commission. I have described the type of league favored by the War Cabinet and by the prime minister and his inner circle—a league to promote peace and further international cooperation but one that did not attempt to institute the obligations and commitments of a system of collective security. They had hoped to create an improved, expanded, and institutionalized great-power concert based upon the experience of the Imperial War Cabinet and Allied wartime cooperation in the Supreme Council—a concert that would have fostered continued American participation in world politics. The government's policies can be explained as being more compatible with the interests and diplomatic-strategic traditions of Britain and the Empire, as interpreted by those of greatest authority, influence, and experience. The prime minister and his Conservative colleagues had no wish to conspire against the league idea and the "forces of movement," but they had serious doubts about the inherent viability of the international system preached by Cecil and Wilson and wished to fuse the league idea with more traditional and proven expedients. Viewed within the international ideological context of the peacemaking of 1919, the approach favored by the Lloyd George government can be interpreted as representing the politics of conservative internationalism, as contrasted with the messianic liberal internationalism of Wilson and the scorn for the League of Nations shared by the reactionary Right and the revolutionary Left.

The League of Nations Covenant embodied a great personal triumph for

sion to Washington in the fall of 1919, published in E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, eds., *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, ser. 1, vol. 5: 1919 (London, 1954). Unpublished British records give a much fuller picture.

⁷³ See for instance Hankey's important strategic paper prepared in conference with the prime minister at Criccieth, July 17, 1919, "Towards a National Policy," Cab. 21/159; see also Kenneth MacDonald, "Lloyd George and the Search for a Post-War Naval Policy, 1919," in A. J. P. Taylor, ed., *Lloyd George: Twelve Essays* (London, 1971), 191-222.

⁷⁴ Cecil, diary, May 3, 1919.

Wilson and Cecil, and few today would contest the historical achievement associated with the founding of the world's first great international organization. In many respects, however, their triumph marked a paper victory. It was a victory, moreover, that had several major adverse consequences. It led directly to the nonparticipation of the United States and the consequent near abortion of the whole League project. Lodge and the American Senate would have been quite prepared to participate in the type of league favored by the British government. The triumph of the collective-security approach in 1919 led also to the alienation of the British policy-making elite from the League of Nations. When the Americans deserted the cause late in 1919 only the strength of the league-of-nations movement, the vestigial liberalism of Lloyd George, and the sanctity of the Treaty of Versailles kept the British government on course to see the League through to its official birth in January 1920. At the same time, in the early twenties the League was by and large shunted to the periphery of European diplomacy, and the British government resorted to continued use of the Supreme Council and the Conference of Ambassadors in the troubled postwar period.

Perhaps the most significant consequence of the triumph of Wilson and Cecil at Paris in 1919 was the launching of the extremely powerful myth of collective security into the stream of twentieth-century international relations. This myth would bedevil not only the conduct of British diplomacy in the interwar years, contributing in no small measure to the confusion and paralysis of British policies, but also the history of the League of Nations and its successor the United Nations.⁷⁵ The myth of collective security as a viable system of international relations and an approach to peace has suffered by experience and neglect alike in twentieth-century history. It has, nevertheless, formed a central theme in the response of liberal internationalism to the diplomatic, political, and social upheavals of this century.

⁷⁵ In April 1936, during the Abyssinian debacle, the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy requested Hankey, the cabinet secretary, to provide a summary of the criticisms of the idea of collective security that had been advanced before the Peace Conference. Hankey's report, after summarizing many of the cogent wartime criticisms, argued that discussions in the League of Nations Commission at Paris had proceeded "with great speed and secrecy" and that it had "not been possible to trace that any reply was ever formulated to the criticisms of the principles of collective security, in which the weaknesses which have since become so evident were quite clearly forecast." "Summary of Some of the Criticisms of Proposals for a League of Nations System of Collective Security Prior to the Peace Conference, 1919," Aug. 25, 1936, CP 217 (36), Cab. 24/263.

The Politics of Technology: Stalin and Technocratic Thinking among Soviet Engineers

KENDALL E. BAILES

IN THE HISTORY of Communist societies a good deal of attention has been devoted to the recurring tension between "Expert" and "Red," that is, between the need for technical expertise and a certain unease with and distrust of technical and scientific groups by the regimes in power. This tension was an important theme in the early years of the Soviet system and has reappeared in recent years.¹ In Communist Chinese society, in a different context and a somewhat different form, this conflict has also been apparent and was a major theme during the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s.² Why has such tension developed and how has it been dealt with in Communist societies? By examining one such important episode in Soviet history, the Industrial party affair, we may obtain significant insights into the relationship between the Soviet technical intelligentsia (engineers and applied scientists) and Stalinism during the formative years of Soviet society.

In the summer of 1931 an American engineer on contract to Soviet industry took time out during a stay in Berlin to write a report for the New York firm that employed him. Regarding accounts that had reached the West about widespread arrests of technical specialists in connection with the Industrial party trial of November-December 1930, he commented, "On this question, I will state that almost all of the good Russian engineers not of the Party have been arrested. In most cases," he added, "there is no semblance of a trial; they are simply sentenced."³ Other sources indi-

I wish to acknowledge the support of the Russian Institute, Columbia University, and the University of California, Irvine, in the preparation of this study. It is part of a larger work in progress on the origins of the Soviet technical intelligentsia.

¹ See, for example, Nikolai Bukharin and Evgenii Preobrazhensky, *The ABC of Communism* (Baltimore, 1969); Loren R. Graham, *The Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Communist Party, 1927-1932* (Princeton, 1967); Albert Parry, *The New Class Divided* (New York, 1966); Zhores Medvedev, *The Medvedev Papers* (London, 1972); and Andrei Sakharov, *Progress, Co-existence and Intellectual Freedom* (New York, 1968).

² See, for example, the recent study by Stanley Karnow, *Mao and China: From Revolution to Revolution* (New York, 1972).

³ L. H. Garaux to Archer Wheeler, July 19, 1931, quoted in "Report of George S. Messersmith, American Consul in Berlin to The Secretary of State," July 22, 1931, in State Department

cate that this was no exaggeration and that the terror against Soviet engineers, especially the more experienced group with higher education, was widespread in this period. Figures on the number arrested range from two thousand to the higher estimate of seven thousand.⁴ Barring access to Soviet police files, the full number is unknown, but it probably lies within this range. If so, the arrests included a high proportion of the slightly more than ten thousand Soviet engineers with higher education who were employed in large-scale industry at the time.⁵

The whole affair seems puzzling when one considers that these arrests took place during the crucial years of the First Five Year Plan, when the USSR suffered from a severe shortage of technical talent. What possible purpose could such a reign of terror serve? If viewed solely from the standpoint of economics, it makes little sense. But when seen in a wider political context a clearer explanation emerges. Previous historiography has focused largely on the Industrial party trial itself, especially the dubious evidence and reasoning of the prosecution. This article develops an alternative approach to an interpretation of the case. By focusing on the background of the men implicated, it suggests some new conclusions about the purpose of the trial itself and the wider implications of this affair for the history of Soviet society. It stresses the political rationality of the trial from Stalin's viewpoint, given the insecurity of his regime at the time and the existence of strong political passions in a country still emerging from the effects of World War I, two revolutions, and a prolonged civil war.

The Industrial party case was the high point of the terror against the old technical intelligentsia and was the most widely publicized show trial in the Soviet Union before the purges of the late thirties. It involved the trial of eight leading Soviet technologists whose positions convey some idea of their importance to the economy at the time: Leonid K. Ramzin, forty-three, director of the Thermal Technical Institute in Moscow and a professor at the Moscow Higher Technical School; N. F. Charnovsky, sixty-two, professor of metallurgy at the Moscow Higher Technical School and chairman of the Scientific-Technical Administration of the Supreme Council of the National Economy (Vesenkha, which administered most significant Soviet

Decimal File, National Archives, Washington, D.C., 861.5017/310. Similar views were expressed by several other American specialists who were employed in Soviet industry at this time. See, for example, John E. Kehl to the Secretary of State, May 8, 1931, N.A., 861.5017/248; George F. Kennan, American consul in Berlin, to the Secretary of State, July 24, 1931, 861.5017/311; and John P. Hurley, American consul in Riga, Latvia, to the Secretary of State, Nov. 28, 1930, 861.5017/200.

⁴ The first figure is the number mentioned in the transcript of the Industrial party trial itself. *Protsess "Prompartii" 25 noiabria-7 dekabria 1930 g. Stenogramma sudebnogo protsesssa i materialy priobshchennye k delu* (Moscow, 1931), 7-13. The higher estimate was given by a generally well-informed Russian emigré source, the Menshevik journal *Sotsialisticheskii vestnik*, Apr. 3, 1931, p. 19.

⁵ A survey and census of this group was reported in a Soviet academic journal in 1930. See *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i revoliutsiia prava*, 1930, nos. 5-6, p. 92; and V. A. Shmelev, *Voprosy podgotovki inzhenerno-tekhnicheskikh kadrov* (Moscow, 1931), 9.

industry at the time); I. A. Kalinnikov, fifty-six, vice-chairman of the production sector of the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) and a professor at the Military Aviation Academy; V. A. Larichev, forty-three, chairman of the fuel section of Gosplan; A. A. Fedotov, sixty-six, head of the Textile Research Institute and also an engineering professor; S. V. Kupriyakov, fifty-nine, a technical director in the textile industry; K. V. Sitnin, fifty-two, an engineer of the All-Union Textile Syndicate; and V. I. Ochkin, thirty-nine, of the scientific-research section of Vesenkha and scientific secretary of the Thermal Technical Institute under Ramzin.

The trial itself is discussed at length in the literature cited below and requires only a brief summary here.⁶ Suffice it to say that the men tried were accused of conspiring, together with some two thousand of their fellow engineers, to take over the government of the Soviet Union. They were allegedly aided by Western powers, Russian emigrés, and various dissident groups in the USSR. The guilt of the defendants, who were convicted of economic sabotage, does not stand up to careful scrutiny. The only evidence presented consisted of lengthy confessions by the defendants themselves and other arrested engineers who had been prisoners of the political police for some months prior to the trial. The testimony they offered was a bizarre mixture of fact and fiction. Some of it was truthful comment on their professional lives in the past and can be corroborated from earlier sources, although the relevance of such facts to the criminal charges was nebulous. Some of it was outright fiction, such as alleged meetings abroad with former Russian industrialists plotting a comeback. Two of the Russian emigrés named in testimony by the defendants had been buried long before the alleged meetings took place. As foreign newspapers were quick to point out, the defendants in their zeal for self-incrimination had even conjured up the shades of the dead. These facts have long been familiar to students of the trial. It is difficult not to agree with such studies that the evidence presented was contrived and at times ludicrous. A prime intention of the trial itself, judging by its emphasis on some of the actual economic problems that had developed between 1928 and 1930, was to divert the attention of an uncritical public from the mistakes of the Stalinist leadership during the First Five Year Plan and to find scapegoats among the engineers.

What has been missing from previous discussions of this affair, however, is a careful look at its background. A careful analysis of the political context of the case suggests that three other, interrelated reasons can be found

⁶ See Roy A. Medvedev, *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism* (New York, 1971), 110–39; and Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties* (New York, 1968), 549–56. Doubt on the validity of the verdict is also cast by a recent Soviet *samizdat* document, *Politicheskii dnevniki*, Apr. 1968, no. 43, p. 60, as well as by the absence of any discussion of this trial in the most recent multivolume history of the USSR published by the Academy of Sciences' Institute of History, *Istoriia SSSR s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei* (Moscow, 1967), vol. 8.

why these particular men should have been arrested. First, the more prominent engineers implicated in the case shared certain technocratic tendencies and professional ties that linked them in a common outlook. Second, this common outlook predisposed them to take strong policy stands of their own on professional issues with social implications, in opposition to the Stalinist leadership. Such policy stands included attempts on the part of some of these men in the late 1920s to oppose the Stalinist version of the First Five Year Plan and changes in Soviet higher education linked to that plan. And third, their background and opposition to Stalinist plans suggest possible links to the "Right opposition"—the last major anti-Stalin group at the end of the 1920s, who also opposed key features of the First Five Year Plan—in the Communist party.

The Industrial party affair is viewed here, then, both as an attempt to find scapegoats and also as a major effort to discredit pretensions among the technical intelligentsia for a greater political role in Soviet society. The Stalinist leadership sought to accomplish this end by a general attack on the authority and sense of community of the Soviet technical intelligentsia. This attack focused particularly on one of the dominant groups of engineers—the leaders of the organized engineering profession—in the Soviet economy at the time. These were the so-called old specialists, or bourgeois specialists, who had received their higher technical educations and begun careers before the 1917 revolutions. They were the first important social group outside the Communist party to experience the Stalinist technique of show trials, widespread arrests, and social isolation.

The terror against the "bourgeois specialists" had actually begun with the Shakhty trial of 1928 in which some fifty mining engineers, including the head of the coal industry, were accused of sabotaging that industry. In the months following the Shakhty trial the arrests spread to "old specialists" in many other sectors of the economy, culminating in the Industrial party affair. At that trial the state prosecutor, Nikolai Krylenko, portrayed the Industrial party defendants as leaders of a general conspiracy which was said to include the Shakhty engineers and so-called wreckers in the Commissariat of Agriculture (United Peasant party case), who were non-Communist agrarian specialists. The latter group was never brought to public trial, but another group of alleged "wreckers," mostly economists from Gosplan and Vesenkha, was tried shortly after the Industrial party trial, in the Menshevik party case of March 1931. All these groups were linked together by the state as part of the same general "conspiracy," but the engineers bore the brunt of the attack. The Industrial party case became the central focus of the terror against the old specialists and bears the closest attention here.⁷

⁷ *Za industrializatsiiu*, Nov. 27, 1930; for the campaign against nonconforming scientists, which corresponded in time with the terror against these other groups and was part of the

TO GAIN SOME perspective on these events it is necessary to begin by looking at the technocratic trend of thought that had developed among the group of prominent Soviet engineers prior to 1930. While the number of engineers who adhered to this trend should not be exaggerated, they were nonetheless an influential group. They had held some of the highest technical posts in Soviet planning, industrial administration, higher technical education, and research institutions. They were among the leaders of the most important professional engineering organizations in the Soviet Union. Of the engineers implicated in the Industrial party case, some of the most prominent had been involved in this trend toward professional independence.

Technocracy is a concept that has gained wide currency during the past half century. In its widest sense, of course, it projects a society ruled by engineers. The term "technocratic trend" is used here, however, to indicate any movement among technical specialists that urges them to develop a wider sense of social responsibility for the use of their technical knowledge, and particularly urges them to take an important role in policy formation. In other words, engineers should not simply be content to be the technical executors of other men's policies, but should become politicians themselves. In particular, they should try to exercise influence on social policies by banding together in self-conscious professional organizations that serve as political pressure points on the wider society. Engineers should not be satisfied with work in, and unquestioned loyalty to, organizations such as business corporations or government bureaus, which are run largely by men other than engineers.

The idea of a society in which engineers and other specialists would play an important, or even dominant, political role can be traced back at least as far as the first half of the nineteenth century, in the discussions of such utopian socialists as Saint-Simon. But the word "technocracy" and the ideas associated with it did not become common in Western social thought until the early twentieth century, with the emergence of engineering as a self-conscious profession. The trend transcends national boundaries and can be found, for example, in both the United States and Russia, following a roughly parallel development, although under vastly different social conditions. In both cases the "technocratic trend" largely failed in these years. In both cases the conflict between the political ambitions of professional engineering groups and wider organizations—such as the modern business corporation, the state, or political party—was resolved in favor of the latter by the end of the 1930s. But the way in which this trend failed was unique to the history of each country. The development and fate of the technocratic tendency in the United States between the two world wars

general process of Stalinization, see Loren R. Graham, *The Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Communist Party, 1927–1932* (Princeton, 1967).

has been documented and interpreted in several recent studies.⁸ This article is the first study of the phenomenon in early Soviet history.

In the United States the technocratic trend was associated particularly with such developments as Progressivism, the conservation movement, and scientific management, the theory of industrial efficiency begun by the engineer F. W. Taylor. It reached its height in the period just prior to and following World War I. A recent researcher has traced the origins of the word "technocracy" itself back to a group of writers who met in Greenwich Village during 1919 and 1920.⁹ The most famous member of this group, Thorstein Veblen, made the concept widely known among the educated American public through his book, *The Engineers and the Price System* (1921). Veblen proposed turning power over to "soviets of Technicians" who would administer a planned economy outside the framework of the free market mechanism, a proposal obviously influenced by the Russian Revolution but not a carbon copy of that experience. Other members of this group included the writer Stuart Chase, the mechanical engineer William H. Smyth, and Howard Scott, a prime mover in the Technical Alliance, a technocratic research group that occupied quarters on the Columbia University campus in the 1920s.¹⁰ Scott was later the founder, in 1932, of "Technocracy, Inc.," a social movement which proposed that all power be turned over to the engineers as a solution to the depression. "Technocracy, Inc." enjoyed a short-lived, if sensational, vogue during 1932. The technocratic trend among American engineers, while generally less ambitious than Scott in its aims, has a complex and interesting history, documented in Edwin Layton's important study.

The fate of the technocratic trend in early Soviet history is stormier and more significant for the history of that country, for it is closely linked with the rise of Stalinism. Its advocates in the Soviet Union did not simply fade into the relative obscurity of a Howard Scott after 1932. Some paid with their lives and others spent long years in the kind of prison so vividly described in Alexander Solzhenitsyn's novel, *The First Circle*—prisons that, Solzhenitsyn notes, were first set up for the engineers arrested in the Industrial party affair.¹¹ An equivalent for the word "technocracy" was missing from the Russian language in the 1920s, but the concept associated with it became well known in the Soviet Union during this period. This

⁸ See particularly Edwin T. Layton, Jr., *The Revolt of the Engineers: Social Responsibility and the American Engineering Profession* (Cleveland, 1971); Henry Elsner, Jr., *The Technocrats* (Syracuse, 1967); and Eugene Roger Wutke, "Technocracy: It Failed to Save the Nation" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri, Kansas City, 1964).

⁹ Wutke, "Technocracy," 14–25. The word "technocracy" was apparently first used in print by the engineer William H. Smyth in a series of articles published during 1919. "Human Instincts in Reconstruction," *Industrial Management*, 57 (1919): 81–91; "Technocracy," *ibid.*, 208–12; "Technocracy—Ways and Means to Gain Industrial Democracy," *ibid.*, 385–89.

¹⁰ Howard Scott and Stuart Chase made "technocracy" a household word by their writings and other activities. See, for instance, Chase's *Technocracy: An Interpretation* (New York, 1932).

¹¹ Solzhenitsyn, *First Circle*, trans. Thomas P. Whitney (New York, 1969), 72.

is probably no coincidence, although no evidence has been found of strong links between the trend as it developed in Russia and America.¹² The influence of World War I was probably crucial in both countries.

In the United States the machinery of government control over the economy was largely dismantled after 1918, but the idea remained and proved attractive to some as a cure for the economic ills of 1919–20 and later for the depression of the 1930s. In Russia the machinery of state economic control was not dismantled after World War I but became the basis for Bolshevik control of the economy. Many of the same “experts” who had served the tsarist state remained in prominent positions under the Bolsheviks and in the twenties played an important role in Soviet industrial institutions during the New Economic Policy.

Discussion of the First Five Year Plan and rapid, state-directed industrialization after 1926 promised to enhance the role and importance of the “technical experts” in government. The number of competent engineers with professional degrees was much smaller in Soviet Russia than in the United States. Hence their opportunities for greater political influence seemed promising. The success of rapid industrialization apparently depended to a large extent on their knowledge and rare skills. Many of the old specialists already had a distinct sense of community by 1926. The most important engineers were linked by many common ties. For example, the best known were generally graduates of the Moscow Higher Technical School or the Polytechnic Institute in Leningrad and were associated with the Technological Society in the latter city, or the Polytechnical Society in Moscow. When all these factors are considered it is not surprising, therefore, to see the growth of a technocratic trend of thought among members of this community of engineers.

The origins of the trend can be traced back at least to World War I. Attempts to develop such a movement emanated from several sources that had wide influence among the technical intelligentsia. The All-Russian Association of Engineers (VAI), a professional engineering society with more than ten thousand members in the late 1920s, was one of these. In 1915 the Technological Society and the Polytechnic Society had begun to publish a journal for Russian engineers, aimed at providing a national forum for this professional group, uniting them in a way never previously undertaken.¹³ The VAI, founded in May 1917, had grown out of the joint efforts of these two societies, and their journal, *Vestnik inzhenerov*, later became the official organ of the engineers’ association.¹⁴ Prior to this time,

¹² Russian engineers were, however, at least aware of the existence of a similar trend in the United States by 1924, although by then the Russian trend was already well developed. *Vestnik inzhenerov*, 1924, nos. 1–2, pp. 9–11.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 1915, no. 1.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 1917, no. 11, p. 26. Originally named the All-Russian Union of Engineers, the name was changed to “association” in 1919 when the Bolsheviks prohibited a separate “union” of engineers. *Ibid.*, 1919, nos. 1–3, p. 34.

Russian engineers did not have a national organization or sense of community comparable to that of scientists, who could look to such institutions as the prestigious Academy of Sciences for professional leadership. During World War I the Academy of Sciences had, however, begun to involve large numbers of engineers and technicians in the work of its newly formed Commission for the Study of Natural Productive Resources (KEPS), founded to aid in the war effort.¹⁵ The establishment of the engineers' association marked a departure from the traditional lack of cohesion and social quiescence of the small but growing group of professional engineers in Russia.

One of the prominent early leaders of the engineers' association was P. I. Pal'chinsky, later considered the founder of the Industrial party, according to the prosecution in that case. (The transcript showed that Pal'chinsky had been arrested and shot prior to the trial itself.) Pal'chinsky had earned the enmity of the Bolsheviks for a variety of reasons. For example, he had been active during 1917 as a leader of a group of industrialists who tried to restore labor discipline in factories and was a supporter of the Provisional Government. He was among the defenders of the Winter Palace in October 1917 during the Bolshevik overthrow of the Provisional Government. In the twenties he became an admirer of Herbert Hoover, who at the time was one of the leaders of the technocratic trend among American engineers. Pal'chinsky translated one of Hoover's engineering works into Russian and reported to Russian engineers on Hoover's role as the first president of the Federated American Engineering Societies in 1920.¹⁶

The early relations of the Soviet government with most professional engineers had not been happy. The large majority had been sympathetic to the Provisional Government and met the Bolshevik takeover with a strike.¹⁷ The VAI journal was forced to suspend publication during most of the civil war period, and the Bolsheviks prohibited any separate union of engineers. But in the early 1920s a *modus vivendi* was worked out with the Bolsheviks. VAI resumed publication of its journal in 1922 but forswore support of any specific political party, including the Bolsheviks. In fact, as late as 1928, only 138 professional engineers, out of some fifteen thousand

¹⁵ See V. I. Vernadsky's memoirs in *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., Inc.*, vol. 11, nos. 1-2, 31-32 (1964-68): 11-12; Vernadsky, "Ob izuchenii estestvennykh proizvoditelnykh sil Rossii," *Izvestiia Akademii nauk*, 6th ser., vol. 9, no. 8 (1915); A. Blok, *Obzor Nauchno-izdatel'skoi deiatelnosti*, KEPS, 1915-20 (Petrograd, 1920); *Kratkii obzor deiatel'nosti postoiannoi kommissii po izuchenniu estestvennykh proizvoditelnykh sil* (Petrograd, 1919).

¹⁶ *Vestnik inzhenerov*, 1924, nos. 1-2, pp. 9-11.

¹⁷ *Novaia zhizn'*, Nov. 17, 1917; *Vestnik inzhenerov*, 1918, no. 2, p. 35; for a Soviet account of early relations with the engineers see S. A. Fediukin, *Sovetskaia vlast' i burzhuaiznye spetsialisty* (Moscow, 1965), 21-25.

in the USSR, were members of the Communist party.¹⁸ The VAI journal in 1922 defined its social role in the following way:

So far as the guiding ideas and catchwords [of VAI] are concerned, the first of these is "apolitical"—being apolitical in the sense that the Association of Engineers does not adhere to the ideology or tactics of any political party. But this does not mean that the organized engineering community should not have its own opinion on political and economic questions and technical questions of wide social import. The Central Committee of VAI must have a definite opinion, a definite line of conduct and must defend it with energy, fearing neither reproaches of "counter-revolution" or of "extreme leftism."¹⁹

During most of the 1920s the association published its journal, with some five thousand subscribers, and disseminated technical knowledge, but only rarely did the pages of the journal touch on broader social issues. Yet the group of men associated with VAI were clearly suspect in the eyes of the Soviet government and Communist party. For example, the "responsible editor" of the journal during most of the twenties was Professor I. A. Kalinnikov, later one of the eight defendants in the Industrial party trial. Before 1922 Kalinnikov had been rector of the Moscow Higher Technical School. When the Soviet government changed the way in which the rectors were chosen and curbed the autonomy of higher education in 1922, Kalinnikov was replaced in that position. He then helped to lead a strike of professors there in protest. The strikers were attacked by name in the party and government press, which accused them of being active members of the outlawed Constitutional Democratic (Kadet) party, the liberals who earlier had been active in the Provisional Government.²⁰ I have not been able to confirm whether or not the strikers were active Kadets. One of those professors so attacked in 1922 published a letter in *Izvestiia*, the government newspaper, denying that he had ever been a member of any political party.²¹ But no such denial by Kalinnikov has been found in the Soviet press. That Kalinnikov was active in an outlawed political party in 1922, however, seems somewhat unlikely, whatever his former political sympathies had been. After the 1922 strike was discontinued Kalinnikov moved on to important positions as a professor at the Military Aviation Academy in Moscow and as vice-chairman of the production sector of the State Planning Commission. It seems unlikely that such responsible positions would have gone to an active member of an illegal political party. But there can be little doubt that in official eyes, especially the distrustful eyes of Stalin, who had never liked the idea of employing bourgeois specialists, men with records like

¹⁸ *Inzhenernyi trud*, 1930, no. 11, p. 321.

¹⁹ *Vestnik inzhenerov*, 1922, nos. 1-3, p. 43.

²⁰ *Izvestiia*, Feb. 24, Mar. 3, Apr. 21, 1922; *Pravda*, Feb. 17, 21, 22, 1922. The other striking professors listed in these articles were all active members in VAI. See *Vestnik inzhenerov*, 1922, nos. 1-3.

²¹ *Izvestiia*, Mar. 3, 1922.

Kalinnikov's were suspect. What we do know of Kalinnikov indicates that he was, at the very least, a man of independent mind and a non-Communist, a fact that will be made even clearer below. It is worthwhile noting in this connection that Stalin was one of three high party officials who were appointed in 1922 to investigate the academic strikes of professors in higher technical education. He was probably quite familiar, at least from this early date, with the personalities and attitudes of important engineering professors such as Kalinnikov.²²

As the "responsible editor" of the VAI journal, Kalinnikov gave sanction during the spring of 1927 to a small group of engineers who expressed a clear technocratic tendency. On May 5, 1927, a Circle on General Questions of Technology was formed, headed by the engineer, P. K. Engelmeier.²³ This group expressed as one of the reasons for its existence, "the need to work out a whole new world view, fully adapted to contemporary technical culture."²⁴ It was to begin by acquainting engineers with the history of technology and the lives of outstanding engineers and "industrialists" (*promyshlenniki*). The group would explore the relations of technology to science, art, economics, law, and ethics and would aim at working out an overall philosophy based on technology. No reference was made to the role of Marxism in this process, a fact that proved to be significant.

According to the first annual report of this group, it held twenty-one discussion sessions between May 5, 1927, and February 2, 1928. The average attendance was sixteen persons, scarcely a large following. But the members included some prominent engineers, among them the chairman of the trade-union organization for the Soviet technical intelligentsia (VMBIT), S. D. Shein. A chemical engineer by profession, who had received his education before the Revolution, Shein claimed to have taken part in the revolutionary movement prior to 1905;²⁵ but his record also showed that he had been a stockholder and manager of a capitalist-run plant before the Bolshevik Revolution. He was one of the few graduate engineers during the twenties to be a Communist party member, but he had not become a member of the party until after the 1917 revolution. As a result of this uneven record many Old Bolsheviks, as well as non-Communists, distrusted him. Also possessed of a somewhat cantankerous personality, he had made a number of powerful enemies over the years.²⁶ The engineering trade union, originally sponsored by VAI,²⁷ was a much larger organization than its parent,

²² Stalin's role in the investigation of the 1922 academic strikes is mentioned in *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, 1972, no. 8, p. 90.

²³ Engelmeier had been an active member of VAI at least since early 1922 and was a contributor to various Soviet reference books on technology. *Vestnik inzhenerov*, 1922, nos. 1-3; I. F. Masanov, *Slovar' pseudonimov*, 4 (Moscow, 1960): 541.

²⁴ *Vestnik inzhenerov*, 1928, no. 4, p. 231.

²⁵ *Inzhenernyi trud*, 1929, no. 10, p. 290.

²⁶ V. Ipat'ev, *The Life of a Chemist* (Stanford, 1946), 309-10, 383.

²⁷ *Vestnik inzhenerov*, 1923, nos. 4-6, p. 43.

representing some 150,000 engineers and technicians, the vast majority of the Soviet technical intelligentsia at the time. Shein, active in both organizations from their early days, was later cited as a major leader of the Industrial party and was frequently mentioned in the transcript of the trial. (He failed to appear as a defendant, for reasons unknown, and disappeared after his arrest in 1930. Nothing has been learned of his fate.) The Engelmeier group had large ambitions and forms an interesting chapter in the history of the Soviet technocratic tendency. The group expressed as its goal the hope of attracting large numbers of engineers in Moscow, establishing circles in other cities, and publishing reports and discussions in Soviet and foreign journals. Evidence on the extent of its success in this respect is lacking, but it was still functioning a year later.

The official journal of the engineering trade union, of which Shein was "responsible editor," published an article in January 1929 entitled "Is a Philosophy of Technology Necessary?" It was written by Engelmeier and expressed the following line of thought:

Life itself has led our engineers to the necessity of uniting, not only along trade union lines, but on the basis, so to speak, of ideology, with the purpose of throwing objective light on various problems which arise under contemporary conditions of technical work. The first attempts, the first timid steps in this direction, were made in May, 1927, in the womb of the All-Union Association of Engineers (VAI).

The Circle on General Problems of Technology, which outlined within very definite boundaries the extent of its work, occupied itself with exclusively scientific problems, which can widen the intellectual horizons of the members of the circle, and refrained from any kind of propaganda. For the near future, the circle has set itself the following tasks: to develop a program for the philosophy of technology; preliminary attempts to define the concept "technology," the principles of contemporary technology, technology as a biological phenomenon, technology as an anthropological phenomenon, the role of technology in the history of culture, technology and the economy (economics), technology and art, technology and ethics, and other social factors . . . the construction of a philosophy of technology.²⁸

This broad and intellectualized approach by a small circle of engineers may, in retrospect, seem somewhat impractical in its ambitions and rather harmless. The Engelmeier group at that stage may not even have been technocratic in the full sense of the word, since a strong interest in political questions and in a greater political role for engineers was lacking in its published program, unlike the later proposals of the Scientific-Technical Administration, discussed below. But what they were able to express in print, under conditions of censorship and their own caution, may only have been part of their full program.

At any rate, the Stalinist leadership viewed the group somewhat differently,

²⁸ *Inzhenernyi trud*, 1929, no. 2, pp. 36-40.

perhaps mindful that earlier opposition movements during the tsarist era often had their origins in similar small "circles" of thinkers. The near totality of their interests, viewing virtually all branches of knowledge from the standpoint of technology, implied a challenge to Marxism as the reigning philosophy and therefore was a potential threat to the monopoly of a Marxist-Leninist party. Engelmeier had written nothing in his article about a possible role for Marxism in the plans of his group. This fact was pointed out in a counterarticle published in the same issue by Vladimir Markov, the Stalinist writer who a few months later was to attack Bukharin and the pretensions of the technical intelligentsia. Markov did not deny the possibility of developing a philosophy of technology but insisted that it must be based on dialectical materialism.²⁹

Although the Engelmeier article said nothing about a political role for engineers and only stressed that the technical intelligentsia unite on an ideological basis, as well as on trade-union lines, Markov read between the lines and claimed to see the threat of political hegemony on the part of the engineers. He agreed that engineers should have more than just narrow technical interests. They should have a broad political conception of their work and a general world view, but he denied them the possibility of ever acquiring political hegemony. He did not consider them a class in the Marxist sense but a small intermediary stratum serving whatever large social class was in power.

Clearer evidence of the importance of this trend and the possible dangers the Stalinists may have seen in it emanated from the Scientific-Technical Administration of the Supreme Council of the National Economy (Vesenkha), which managed most Soviet industry at this time. The Scientific-Technical Administration was the central government organ charged with overseeing the industrial laboratories and research institutes under Vesenkha and helping to develop policies for the research and introduction of new techniques in industry. Originally established in 1918, one of its first goals had been to attract non-Communist specialists for service in the Soviet economy.³⁰

In October 1929, more than a year before the Industrial party trial, the Scientific-Technical Administration had approved and published a series of proposals for reforms in its area of responsibility as part of a general effort to improve the structure of Vesenkha.³¹ The governing board of the department was headed by N. F. Charnovsky, and its vice-chairman was S. D. Shein. The man in charge of its industrial research laboratories

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 40.

³⁰ S. A. Fediukin, *Sovetskaia vlast'* (Moscow, 1965), 99.

³¹ *Torgovo-promyshlennaia gazeta*, Oct. 12, 1929.

was V. I. Ochkin. These were all names later prominent in the Industrial party affair.³²

The reform proposals called for an upgrading in the powers of the Scientific-Technical Administration and insisted that science should be placed at the center of all Soviet efforts in economic development, not only the natural sciences but economic disciplines such as industrial psychology, managerial science, and so on. This group saw the country entering a period of technical revolution in which attention should be focused on methods of planning based on a correct understanding of technology and science. Accordingly, in their view, "the future belongs to managing-engineers and engineering-managers. Every active production worker (as part of a general rise in cultural levels) will more and more approximate this type."³³ They proposed raising the status of the Scientific-Technical Administration to equal that of the Planning-Economic Administration of Vesenkha. The work of Vesenkha would be divided between these two organs, administering most of Soviet industry by their close cooperation. The Scientific-Technical Administration would establish all policies regarding what technology should be used in various branches of industry. It would supervise all work in Soviet industry on inventions, standardization of parts and production methods, management science, and rationalization proposals. The Planning-Economic Administration would work out all plans and control figures for capital investment and production in industry. This proposal was doubtless very attractive to the specialists, in an economy where for several years the technically competent had steadily been losing power to the "Red Directors," Communist managers who were often technically illiterate. A survey conducted in early 1928 showed that the educational level of industrial managers varied inversely with the growth in the percentage who were Communist party members.³⁴ Such growth had been a marked trend between 1926 and 1928. In the same years those managers with higher education declined from eleven per cent to nine per cent. Over seventy per cent of the managers surveyed had only an elementary education. For years Stalin had encouraged the trend for more Communists among the industrial managers and campaigned for an increase in their powers vis-à-vis the old specialists.³⁵

The proposal to give more power to the specialists of the Scientific-Technical Administration elicited an immediate attack from the Stalinists, based in part on the *ad hominem* argument that these proposals had their source among the old specialists and the Right opposition to Stalin. In an article

³² *Izvestiia teplotekhnicheskogo instituta*, 1929, no. 3, p. 67; *Protsess "Prompartii,"* p. 43; *Inzhenernyi trud*, 1930, no. 1, p. 7.

³³ *Torgovo-promyshlennaia gazeta*, Oct. 12, 1929.

³⁴ M. Vasil'ev, "O promkadrakh," *Bolshevik*, 1928, no. 8, p. 64.

³⁵ See K. E. Bailes, "Stalin and Revolution from Above: The Formation of the Soviet Technical Intelligentsia, 1928-1934" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1971), 24-26, 58-60.

by Markov, entitled "On the Pretensions of the Technical Intelligentsia and the Theses of the Scientific-Technical Administration," the attack was made clear:

In the first place the collegium of the Scientific-Technical Administration is the mouthpiece of reactionary specialists who are almost invariably also the "old" specialists; and in the second place, [it speaks for] panic-stricken communists *who gleefully find new landmarks in the ideology of the technical intelligentsia, to whom, it seems, the future belongs.*³⁶

According to Markov, some Communists were ideological captives of the old specialists, and he included one of the leaders of the Right opposition, Bukharin, by name in this number. Such elements, he asserted, dreamed of giving the technical intelligentsia hegemony over the working class. The proposal of the Scientific-Technical Administration, with its conception that "the future belongs to the managing-engineers and the engineering-managers," was said to reveal such a tendency. "Where [in all this] is there an evaluation of the role of the proletariat and the Party in overcoming capitalism?" Markov believed that the members of the Scientific-Technical Administration had assigned the workers to some distant limbo: they would achieve an important role only in the future, when they approached the cultural level and technical competence of the engineers.

The practical conclusion of Markov's attack was that elements among the technical intelligentsia had become overweening and needed to be brought down to earth. He claimed that during the previous spring he had heard the head of the trade-union sections for engineers and technicians—the post held by Shein at this time—say in Moscow that either the engineers' or the workers' organizations must administer industry; there could be no effective dual administration by both elements. The commentator believed that these remarks revealed a common opinion among many engineers, including the newly minted specialists, to free themselves from the interference and control of various other groups: "Engineers (a very great many of them) dream of independence from factory organizations and of achieving what would amount to a hegemony in factories and elsewhere: they are the stratum whose cutting edge is the declaration of the Scientific-Technical Administration about the master of the 'future.'"³⁷

The author agreed that the engineers had some legitimate grievances. But he insisted on the positive role of social controls over the engineers and in general sniped away at what he considered the pretensions of the technical intelligentsia: "The Soviet 'managing-engineer' and 'engineering-manager' will be an element of the brilliant future, but only as one part of the working class, strenuously conducting the struggle for communism."³⁸ A month

³⁶ *Torgovo-promyshlennaia gazeta*, Oct. 26, 1929. Underlined in original.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*

later at a Central Committee plenum one of Stalin's closest associates, Lazar Kaganovich, added his name to the attack and linked Bukharin in particular to the concept of a technocratic order run by men with the dual skills of engineers and managers.³⁹ The extent to which the Right opposition leaders like Bukharin may actually have shared such ideas is discussed below.

The prosecution's star defendant at the Industrial party trial was Professor Leonid K. Ramzin. In his case, links to a technocratic trend were also strong. The Thermal Technical Institute that Ramzin headed was named for two of the men most instrumental in creating the All-Russian Association of Engineers. These men, Professors Grinevetsky and Kirsh, both teachers at the Moscow Higher Technical School before dying of typhus during the civil war, had been prominent ideological opponents of the Bolsheviks.⁴⁰ Ramzin was their student and intellectual heir. He had also been an early opponent of the Bolsheviks, a fact that was not easily forgotten in a society where one's political biography was considered public property and subject to a ritual of periodic recital and confession. Like the other defendants in the trial, Ramzin had a "record," a political history that was a source of suspicion to a Stalinist leadership which had been hardened by its experiences in a civil war between ideological opponents. On Ramzin's record, for example, was the fact that he had written a pamphlet in 1918 stating that "the Bolsheviks have ruined the fuel industry and threatened Moscow with catastrophe." Ramzin's brochure was published by the Fuel Committee, a group headed by his mentor, Professor Kirsh. The Soviet scientific-technical intelligentsia was not allowed to forget this at the time of the Industrial party trial.⁴¹ Ramzin was also an early leader of the engineers' association and was linked by ties of work and professional memberships to such men as Shein, Kalinnikov, and Osadchii.⁴² Ramzin, therefore, had a high profile among the technical intelligentsia; and his appearance in the trial was bound to command the attention of Soviet engineers. This fact, plus his obviously more cooperative attitude in testifying against himself and his colleagues, may account for his leading role in the trial itself. Ramzin seems to have acquitted himself satisfactorily in the eyes of the state. The morning following the trial, according to one memoir by a former Soviet technologist, Ramzin was seen back in his office

³⁹ L. M. Kaganovich, "Problema kadrov," *Bolshevik*, 1929, nos. 23-24, p. 64.

⁴⁰ V. Grinevetsky, who was appointed rector of the Moscow Higher Technical School under Nicholas II in 1914, published a book just before his death in 1919 in which he maintained that Russian industry could not be revived without a restoration of capitalism and the import of foreign investment. *Poslevoennnye perspektivy russkoi promyshlennosti* (Moscow, 1919); see also the obituaries of Grinevetsky and Kirsh in *Vestnik inzhenerov*, 1922, nos. 1-3.

⁴¹ See the article in *Front nauki i tekhniki*, 1930, nos. 11-12, p. 32, a journal directed at this group.

⁴² *Vestnik inzhenerov*, 1919, nos. 1-3, p. 35. Ramzin was one of the thirteen members of the governing council of VAI at this time. The board also included Professors K. V. Kirsh and I. A. Kalinnikov. Others listed in the same issue as active contributors to the journal were Engelmeier, Shein, and Charnovsky.

at the Moscow Higher Technical School, cleaning out his desk without apparent guard—scarcely the treatment one would expect for a dangerous state criminal.⁴³ He was allowed to continue his inventive work in prison, and he is the only defendant who is known to have been released later and rehabilitated. In 1943 he won a Stalin prize for his invention of a new technique in thermal technology and resumed his professorship in Moscow until his death in 1947.⁴⁴

GIVEN THEIR INDEPENDENCE of mind, it should not be surprising to find that engineers associated with the technocratic trend were prominent among the critics of the Stalinist First Five Year Plan. For example, Kalinnikov, Charnovsky, Shein, Khrennikov, and Osadchii, all engineers accused of “wrecking” in the Industrial party trial, had been members of an industrial planning group in Gosplan who had opposed as unrealistic the Five Year Plan that was officially adopted in 1929.⁴⁵

It is possible to piece together some of the reasons for their opposition from scattered bits of evidence. Kalinnikov, the chairman of the industrial sector of Gosplan, was known to have favored a large role for private economic activity and investment in the First Five Year Plan.⁴⁶ At a meeting of the presidium of Gosplan in December 1928 he doubted the capacity of industry to undertake the ambitious plans proposed for capital construction.⁴⁷ And at another meeting of Gosplan in February 1929, which was called to approve a final draft of the Five Year Plan, Kalinnikov opposed the high targets suggested, “because we lack the time, the construction materials, and the basic technical resources.”⁴⁸ Professor Osadchii, an important witness against his fellow engineers at the trial itself, was also known for similar opposition. At the 1929 meeting of Gosplan, for example, he was quoted as commenting: “Speaking as an engineer, I think that to a great degree fellow

⁴³ M. M. Samygin, “Prompartia,” n. d., Columbia University Archive of Russian History and Culture. This typed memoir, judging by internal evidence, was probably written after 1956.

⁴⁴ V. A. Ulianovskaia, *Formirovanie nauchnoi intelligentsii v SSSR 1917–1937 gg.* (Moscow, 1966), 131. The Ramzin “once-through” boiler, for which much of the experimental work was done before Ramzin’s arrest, is described extensively in Western technical literature of the late thirties and early forties. According to a recent study, this invention was one of the handful of truly original Soviet inventions made prior to 1945. See Anthony Sutton, *Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1930–1945* (Stanford, 1971), 94–96, 329.

⁴⁵ *Torgovo-promyshlennaia gazeta*, Dec. 30, 1928. Kalinnikov and Charnovsky, as noted, were defendants at the trial; Osadchii was a prominent witness; Shein and Khrennikov disappeared after their arrests but were often mentioned as fellow “conspirators” in the transcript of the trial. Khrennikov reportedly died during the investigation.

⁴⁶ See his article in *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, 1927, no. 12, pp. 80–107.

⁴⁷ *Pravda*, Dec. 30, 1928.

⁴⁸ “Stenogrammy rashirenykh zasedanii prezidiuma Gosplana,” Feb. 5–12, 1929, in *Arkhiv Gosplana SSSR*, cited in I. Gladkov, “K istorii pervogo piatiletnogo narodno-khoziaistvennogo plana,” *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, 1935, no. 4, pp. 136–37. The accuracy of Gladkov’s account cannot be vouched for, but such quotations are consistent with the earlier published views of these men and appear to be quoted directly from an archival transcript of the Gosplan discussions.

engineers share my view. I must say in all good conscience that if I were told: sign this variant as the basic one, I would refuse."⁴⁹

Several of the other defendants were known as opponents of the changes in higher technical education, promoted by the Stalinists to speed up the preparation of engineering specialists and bring higher technical schools more directly under the control of industry. Four of the eight defendants in the Industrial party trial were engineering professors, and this was probably no coincidence. Some of their critical remarks had appeared earlier in the Soviet press; these articles were referred to in the trial proceedings.⁵⁰ One of the most prominent defendants, N. F. Charnovsky, for example, was especially well known for his opposition after 1928 to the changes in higher technical education. He had expressed his views in the Soviet press and had been attacked for them prior to his arrest as a "wrecker."⁵¹ A metallurgical engineer, who was a student at this time in Moscow, published his memoirs in the Soviet monthly *Novyi mir* a few years ago and made an interesting reference to Charnovsky's views in this respect. The memoirist expressed a general skepticism concerning the guilt of those accused in Stalin's show trials and purges, including the events between 1928 and 1931.⁵² But he did recall the strong hostility among some groups, especially in education, to those with Communist connections or from working-class backgrounds.

He encountered this attitude by chance when he applied for an assistantship with Professor Charnovsky in the late twenties. The memoirist, born to the family of an oil worker in the trans-Caucasus, and a man with impeccable proletarian credentials, went to his interview with Charnovsky wearing a tsarist student uniform. It was a garment he had purchased second-hand and was in no sense a reflection of his political sympathies. But his social background was unknown to Charnovsky, and the professor mistook his appearance as an expression of his social and political views. Charnovsky confided to the youth that he hoped to fill up his group of assistants with people personally congenial to him before the local party committee sent him some "comrades." Charnovsky's social views were clearly too independent for his own good at this time of tightening party controls over science and technology.

Professor Ramzin, the prosecution's lead witness at the Industrial party trial, may also have been involved in earlier opposition to aspects of the First Five Year Plan. The Thermal Technical Institute that he headed in Moscow had been at the center of Soviet efforts for electrification through

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Protess "Prompartii," pp. 199-200; *Za industrializatsiu*, Nov. 28, 30, Dec. 2, 1930.

⁵¹ See his article in *Torgovo-promyshlennaia gazeta*, Mar. 6, 1929; and the attack in *VARNITSO*, 1929, no. 4, p. 2.

⁵² V. Emelianov, "O vremeni, o tovarishchakh, o sebe; zapiski inzhenera," *Novyi mir*, 1967, no. 1, p. 45.

the improvement and construction of steam-power plants. There is some evidence that Ramzin and his associates opposed the emphasis on gigantic hydroelectric-power plants in the First Five Year Plan, such as the huge Dnieper Dam project, and advocated instead greater reliance on a network of smaller, steam-generated plants. But the advocates of "bigger means better" generally won the arguments during the First Five Year Plan, and Ramzin's school of energeticists suffered at least a temporary eclipse.⁵³ As in the case of Lysenkoism in later years, defeat in a struggle over a scientific-technical issue was followed by arrest and imprisonment, although Ramzin did not share the bitter fate of many geneticists.

A possible link between the repression of leading engineers and the Right opposition to Stalin has already been suggested several times in this article. Stalinists like the journalist Markov, the Politburo member Kaganovich, the state prosecutor Krylenko, and eventually Stalin himself clearly sought to make a public link between engineers prominent in the Industrial party trial and the Right. Was there, in fact, such a connection? The available evidence suggests that there was, but does not make clear the full nature of that connection. One prominent Right opposition leader, A. I. Rykov, who was head of state as chairman of the USSR Council of Commissars until 1930, had been known since at least 1924 as a strong defender of those bourgeois specialists who worked loyally for the Soviet government. In 1924, at an All-Russian Congress of Engineers, he had even offered them a "bill of rights" against the attacks of Communist and worker zealots. In his speech at that congress he flatly asserted that "the specialist, the engineer, the man of science and technology must have full independence and freedom to express his opinion on matters of science and technology."⁵⁴ He went on to maintain that such specialists need not be subservient, "either to 'society' or to the 'administration.'"

Rykov also proved to be far more concerned than Stalin, at the time of the Shakhty case in 1928 and afterward, to protect those old specialists who had not already confessed to crimes, from unfounded suspicions and "specialist baiting" on the part of workers, managers, and Communist party activists.⁵⁵ The American correspondent, William Reswick, who was sympathetic to the Right opposition and close to Rykov in the 1920s, asserts that the Right viewed the attack on the old specialists after 1928 as an attempt by Stalin to discredit them.⁵⁶ The evidence tends to confirm this.

⁵³ *Front nauki i tekhniki*, 1930, nos. 11-12, pp. 34-35. Some idea of the importance of Ramzin's school can be gained from the reports of the Fourth All-Union Congress on Thermal Technology. *Izvestiia teploekhnicheskogo instituta*, 1928, no. 6, pp. 87-107. Ramzin was closely associated in this work with three other engineers implicated in the Industrial party trial—Osadchii, Ochkin, and Shein. Ochkin and Osadchii were elected vice-chairman and general secretary, respectively, of the Fourth Thermal Technical Congress.

⁵⁴ *Izvestiia*, Dec. 4, 1924, quoted in E. H. Carr, *Socialism in One Country* (Baltimore, 1970), 1: 134-35.

⁵⁵ See *Pravda*, Mar. 11, 1928; and Bailes, "Stalin and Revolution," 22-84.

⁵⁶ William Reswick, *I Dreamt Revolution* (Chicago, 1952), 246-51.

While it is not known how close Bukharin's personal ties with technocratically oriented old specialists may have been in these years, Bukharin did believe in giving a greater role in Soviet society to members of the technical intelligentsia. Not only did he oppose the Stalinist Five Year Plan in 1928 and 1929 for some of the same reasons as engineers who were later arrested, but he also took some public positions in 1929 that were very close to those of technocratically minded engineers.⁵⁷ For example, in an article published a few days after the reform proposal of the Scientific-Technical Administration Bukharin expressed a similar position in print and even used some of the phrases from the reform proposal, including the phrase that Markov had found so offensive: "The future belongs to the managing-engineers and the engineering-managers."⁵⁸ Bukharin also put great emphasis on creating new cadres of scientists and technologists and stressed the slogan of a "technical-economic revolution" as the first need of the Soviet Union, a position that echoed the Scientific-Technical Administration and one that was strongly attacked by Stalin's crony, Kaganovich.

The emphasis on encouraging original scientific and technical research was one to which Stalin's supporters took strong exception. The Stalinists at this time were playing down original research and theoretical studies generally, both in research institutes and higher technical education. In alliance with the Communist industrial managers of the Supreme Economic Council, Stalinist party officials emphasized the need to learn established techniques from the West and concentrate on work that was rapid and immediately practical. Bukharin, on the other hand, became a spokesman for those concerned with the importance of theory and scientific-technical creativity. These different positions were in character: Bukharin had been known since the civil war as a brilliant theoretician. Lenin, in his "testament" of 1922, had called Bukharin the party's "leading theoretician." Stalin and his associates, of course, had built their reputations as "practical" administrators.

Whether or not the Right, as part of their opposition to Stalin, had formed an actual alliance with the bourgeois specialists, who had so long been suspect in the eyes of party members, is another matter. No evidence of closer links along these lines has been found. The main conclusion to be drawn from the evidence discussed above is that the position of Rykov and Bukharin on certain issues dovetailed with positions expressed by leaders of the Soviet engineering profession who were later implicated in the Industrial party affair. Beyond the suggestiveness of such evidence, how-

⁵⁷ *Pravda*, Sept. 30, 1928; Robert V. Daniels, *The Conscience of the Revolution* (New York, 1969), 322-69; E. H. Carr and R. W. Davies, *Foundations of a Planned Economy*, vol. 1, pt. 2 (London, 1969), 843-97.

⁵⁸ See his appeal for more attention to scientific-technical research and expenditures in *Torgovo-promyshlennaia gazeta*, Oct. 15, 1929. See also his articles in *Pravda*, Jan. 20, and Dec. 15, 1929.

ever, the only thing we can say with certainty is that the Stalinists claimed to see an alliance between the two groups and tried very hard to discredit it in the eyes of the Soviet public.

For Stalin, the Right opposition, in league with elements of the technical intelligentsia, contained the seeds of a potentially dangerous threat. The Right opposition had resolved to unseat Stalin from the Politburo as early as July 1928, although their scheme had been frustrated.⁵⁹ Along with leading engineers they had openly opposed the variant of the First Five Year Plan that he supported in 1928 and 1929. Even if the technocratic trend did not have a large number of adherents, it had a major potential with the growth of Soviet industry and the technical intelligentsia. Linked up with the Right opposition, adherents of this trend may well have seemed threatening to the party officials and old revolutionaries around Stalin, who were not known for their theoretical or technical mastery. Acting on the analogy of the acorn and the oak, Stalin perhaps resolved to take prophylactic measures before the threat became more serious. He may have thought that some form of technocratic-Right alliance would be a viable alternative to Stalinism and would prove attractive not only to a relatively few old specialists and Right oppositionists, but also to the mass of young specialists who might fall under the influence of those so oriented.

This could happen in several ways. A high respect for engineers had been fostered among the youth since the Revolution. Fertile ground for technocratic attitudes had been prepared in both literature and education. To take one example, engineers had been the heroes of a number of novels popular among the young. These included the science fiction works of A. A. Bogdanov, *Red Star* and *Engineer Menni*, and of Alexis Tolstoy, *Aelita* and *The Hyperboloid of Engineer Garin*, which projected future societies where engineers would play crucial social and political roles.⁶⁰ Perhaps more important, institutions of higher technical education, higher organs of industrial administration and planning, such as Vesenkha and Gosplan, and important industrial research institutes might well have become focal points of technocratic opposition to Stalin. Stalinists probably feared that youth already oriented toward science and technology might fall under the influence of Stalin's opponents upon entering higher technical education and industry, so long as the bourgeois specialists held commanding positions in those areas. Such a fear was given support in the transcript of the Industrial party trial. One of the defendants, Professor Fedotov, claimed that the Industrial party had ordered engineering professors to organize student cells to support the Right opposition.⁶¹ His testimony may have

⁵⁹ Daniels, *Conscience of the Revolution*, 322-23.

⁶⁰ A. A. Bogdanov, *Krasnaia zvezda* (Moscow, 1918), and *Inzhener Menni; fantasticheskii roman* (Moscow, 1923); A. N. Tolstoy, *Aelita* (first published in *Krasnaia nov'* [Moscow, 1922-23]), and *Giperboloid Inzhenera Garina* (Moscow, 1927).

⁶¹ *Wreckers on Trial. A Record of the Trial of the Industrial Party Held in Moscow*, Nov.-Dec. 1930 (London, 1931), 95.

been fabricated, but it supported a point that the Stalinists clearly wanted to make.⁶²

THE INDUSTRIAL PARTY case marked the culmination of the Stalinist campaign against a leading segment of the old technical intelligentsia. Although only eight men appeared as defendants in the trial, some two thousand were directly implicated in the alleged conspiracy and the entire older generation of the technical intelligentsia was put under suspicion by Krylenko. He gave the reason for this in his summation of the case:

The natural mistrust of the engineers by the Soviet power, the political and social control exercised over their work, deprived the engineers of that commanding position which they had occupied until the revolution; in addition to this, after the revolution living conditions, and the material situation of the best engineers had greatly deteriorated.⁶³

He linked the alleged plot to the political factionalism within the Communist party: "The increasingly heated struggle within the Communist Party aroused hopes for more successful results from counterrevolutionary acts on the part of those who counted on the weakening of the Communist Party by internal struggles."⁶⁴

Stalin himself refrained from public comment on this affair until the summer of 1931, after the terror against the old intelligentsia had largely ceased. But then he gave some clues to what his intentions may have been. Like Krylenko, he linked the Right opposition within the Communist party to the Industrial party engineers. Stalin singled out the most qualified sector of the technical intelligentsia as the main target of the repression. But he went on to express satisfaction with the results obtained from this campaign:

The new situation had to create and did create new attitudes among the old technical intelligentsia. This explains the definite signs we have that a portion of this intelligentsia which earlier sympathized with the wreckers has now come over to the side of the Soviet government. . . . If at the height of sabotage our attitude to the old technical intelligentsia was expressed chiefly as a policy of repression, then now, when this intelligentsia is turning toward the Soviet government, our attitude toward it must be expressed chiefly in a policy of attraction and concern for it.⁶⁵

⁶² See Stalin's speech in *Pravda*, Apr. 18, 1928; and his *Sochineniia*, 11 (Moscow, 1954): 63, 216.

⁶³ *Protsess "Prompartii,"* 11.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.* The link between the Industrial party engineers and the Right opposition, which both Krylenko and later Stalin mentioned, may account for the inclusion of the three defendants in this trial who represented the textile industry: Professors Fedotov, Kuprianov, and Sitnin. The textile industry would have benefited from the emphasis that Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsy wanted to give to light industry in the First Five Year Plan. These three engineers, however, did not play as prominent a role in the trial as the leaders of the organized engineering profession discussed in this article, who were the main targets of the trial.

⁶⁵ Stalin, *Sochineniia*, 13: 70-72.

The Industrial party affair and the related arrests of engineers continued to find echoes in the following years. Periodically, the Soviet public was reminded that the proper role of the technical intelligentsia was not a concern with major policy questions but with "following orders." For example, when H. G. Wells interviewed Stalin in 1934 and spoke of the creative potential of the technical intelligentsia as a political force shaping events, Stalin spoke at length of this group and dismissed its political ambitions. In Stalin's view the technical intelligentsia was only a small stratum, not a socioeconomic class; major historical changes, he asserted, are only brought about by classes. "The engineer, the organizer of production, does not work as he would like to, but as he is ordered, in such a way as to serve the interests of his employers."⁶⁶ While acknowledging their economic function and expressing a concern for their well-being, Stalin reiterated his low regard for their political potential: "Of course, the assistance of the technical intelligentsia must be accepted and the latter, in turn, must be assisted. But it must not be thought that the technical intelligentsia can play an independent historical role."⁶⁷

Stalin's views were echoed and expanded upon the following year in a lengthy article directed specifically at the technical intelligentsia.⁶⁸ The subject of the article was the technocratic trend among engineers in the West, which had gained greater currency during the depression years. Like Stalin, the author of this article dismissed technologists as a "social stratum with no economic, political, or ideological independence." He reminded the Soviet technical intelligentsia that

technocratic ideas once circulated among us in the USSR, among a group of the old engineering profession from the so-called 'Industrial Party.' . . . The Industrial Party served as a demagogical means for drawing engineers and technicians into sabotage, into a struggle against the Soviet power, in the same way as current ideas of technocracy [attempt to do so].

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that the conflict between "Red" and "Expert" in Communist societies may result from a variety of factors and historical experiences. In addition to the unique and particular circumstances of such conflict, a more general source of tension may lie in an attitude toward specialization that is a part of Communist ideology. The ultimate goal is to eliminate occupational specialization, as a restriction on the development of human personality, even though over the short run the necessity for continued specialization may be recognized. Echoing a famous passage from Marx, even Bukharin, in a utopian vein during the early years

⁶⁶ *Wells-Stalin Talk, July 23, 1934* (London, 1934), 11.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ S. Livshits, "Reaktsionnaia utopiia tekhnokratov," *Front nauki i tekhniki*, 1935, no. 4, pp. 16-30.

of the Revolution, had written the following section in a popular textbook of Communist ideology published in 1920:

Under capitalism, if a man is a bootmaker, he spends his whole life in making boots; if he is a pastrycook, he spends all his life baking cakes; if he is the manager of a factory, he spends his days in issuing orders and in administrative work; if he is a mere labourer, his whole life is spent in obeying orders. Nothing of this sort happens in communist society. Under communism people receive a many-sided culture, today I work in an administrative capacity, I reckon up how many felt boots or how many French rolls must be produced the following months; tomorrow I shall be working in a soap factory, next month perhaps in a steam laundry, and the month after in an electric power station. This will be possible when all the members of society have been suitably educated.⁶⁹

Such words, written before Communist leaders had gained much experience with modern industry, were, of course, directed toward the future. But the development of modern industry has, in fact, been in the opposite direction, toward a deepening of specialization. The First Five Year Plan not only marked a further stage in Russia's first industrial revolution—that is, the development of railroads, metallurgy, mining, textiles, and so forth—but also marked the Soviet Union's full-scale entry into the second industrial revolution, including the development of electrification, a chemical industry, and wide application of the internal combustion engine. All these industries require well-trained and competent specialists for their proper functioning, the second cluster of industries even more than the first. Hostility toward technical specialists, as possessing a kind of “private property” in knowledge, was a strong attitude among Communist activists and workers in the 1920s. They resented the exclusiveness, high salaries, and other privileges of the technical elites. The Industrial party trial and related events could have done Stalin little political harm and may well have increased his popularity among the groups whose support he courted at this time—rank-and-file party officials and workers—whose resentment of the bourgeois specialists was legendary.⁷⁰ But Stalin and the Communist leadership had to go beyond this attitude if industrial progress was to be made. The tension between hopes for a Communist future without specialization and the immediate demands of industry for more and better specialists required some kind of resolution at the start of the First Five Year Plan.

Beyond the Marxist attitude toward specialization, perhaps an even greater source of tension arose from another ideological factor. From the Marxist point of view the engineers and scientists represented a threat more dangerous than the capitalists themselves. If control over the means of production is the key to political power, then the historical role of the capitalists would come to a predetermined end with the abolition of private

⁶⁹ Bukharin and Preobrazhensky, *ABC of Communism*, 115–16.

⁷⁰ See Bailes, “Stalin and Revolution,” 78–115; Carr and Davies, *Foundations*, 574–90.

property. But it was much more difficult to foresee the day when the technical intelligentsia might disappear as a unique and indispensable group. Did not the engineers and scientists represent a new stratum whose place in modern society seemed guaranteed indefinitely by the imperatives of industrialization? If their knowledge gave them control over the means of production, then what was to prevent the new technological elites from seizing political power in postcapitalist society? Viewed from this vantage point the Industrial party affair illuminates a real crisis in postrevolutionary Marxism. With the beginning of rapid industrialization in the Soviet Union it became all the more urgent to define the relationship of the technical intelligentsia to the means of production and, by extension, to the question of their political role in socialist society.

If specialists could not be dispensed with for a long time to come, what was to be their proper role in a society on its way to communism? Stalin attempted to answer this question by a dual policy: the repression of the old specialists, particularly those who had been associated with technocratic tendencies; and the rapid promotion in the 1930s of a new group who combined the two categories, the so-called Red Experts, whose education and experience were intended to merge technical expertise and political loyalty.⁷¹

These changes were part of a more general pattern of Stalinist behavior. During the 1930s Stalin had come to grips in a number of areas with long-range Communist hopes that seemed in conflict with the more immediate demands of modernization under Soviet conditions. Among other things, these hopes had revolved around the possibility for egalitarian wages, a withering away of the state, the abolition of the tight family unit, and the end of specialization in work roles. Stalin built his system around the antithesis of such hopes: a vast increase in the repressive machinery of the state, a tightening of family ties, a large increase in wage differentials, and a new emphasis on the need for technical specialization combined with political loyalty. The Stalinist dialectic moved in mysterious ways: Stalin postponed the realization of such hopes to the indefinite limbo of a future Communist society. In the stage of "building socialism" after 1928, such hopes were, in fact, to be replaced by their dialectical opposites.

If one of Stalin's primary aims in the Industrial party affair had been to discourage a technocratic trend among Soviet engineers and encourage political loyalty among the technical intelligentsia—as argued here—then he seems to have succeeded in one major respect. The public expression of technocratic tendencies disappeared after the Industrial party case, and the new stratum of young "Red Experts" found a ready avenue for promotion and privileges within the party itself. Autonomous professional organizations, which the technocratically minded had once favored, lost their

⁷¹ See Bailes, "Stalin and Revolution," 216–405; Carr and Davies, *Foundations*, 590–97.

autonomy. With the benefit of hindsight, the historian is left with a curious question. Did Stalin ever foresee a time when the "Red Experts" themselves might actually assert leadership within the Communist party? There is no evidence that he did, and recent Soviet trends, therefore, seem to involve a certain historical irony. Several Western studies by social scientists have indicated that a significant proportion of the post-Khrushchev political leadership began their careers during the 1930s and 1940s as technical specialists. What lawyers and businessmen are in the American political system—the major professional groups from which most politicians and policy makers are recruited—men with engineering backgrounds have become to a large extent in the Soviet Union. By the 1960s a majority of the leaders of the Soviet Communist party possessed dual skills: some higher technical education and engineering experience combined with a career in political work. By 1966, for example, some sixty-five per cent of the full members of the Central Committee had a higher technical education, a percentage that may have grown some by 1971. Brezhnev and Kosygin are the best known examples of such men, but four new members of the Politburo appointed at the 1970 Party Congress confirmed the trend. Brezhnev was trained as a metallurgical engineer and headed up a technical school in the 1930s before becoming a professional party official. Kosygin is a 1936 graduate of the Leningrad Textile Institute; he worked as a foreman and shop superintendent before becoming director of a textile mill and eventually head of Soviet light industry.⁷² It must be left to the social scientists to argue whether such men are more "Red" than "Expert." While political leaders of this type generally have worked most of their careers as party or government officials, many have also been deeply involved in questions of production. An early background in engineering seems to have been an important criterion on their way to power. It seems ironic in light of the Industrial party affair that to some extent at least men from the field of Soviet engineering have become the real successors of Lenin and Stalin.

⁷² Michael P. Gehlen and Michael McBride, "The Soviet Central Committee," *American Political Science Review*, 62 (1968): 1232–37; George Fischer, *The Soviet System and Modern Society* (New York, 1968); Robert H. Donaldson, "The 1971 Soviet Central Committee, An Assessment of the New Elite," *World Politics*, 24 (1972): 391–94; *New York Times*, Apr. 10, 1971; *Prominent Personalities in the USSR* (Methuen, New Jersey, 1968), 92, 307.

History from Slave Sources

A Review Article by C. VANN WOODWARD

GEORGE P. RAWICK, general editor. *The American Slave: A Composite Autobiography*. Volume 1, *From Sundown to Sunup: The Making of the Black Community*, pp. xxi, 208; volume 2, *South Carolina Narratives*, parts 1 and 2, pp. 348, 346; volume 3, *South Carolina Narratives* parts 3 and 4, pp. 286, 275; volume 4, *Texas Narratives*, parts 1 and 2, pp. 308, 295; volume 5, *Texas Narratives*, parts 3 and 4, pp. 279, 237; volume 6, *Alabama and Indiana Narratives*, pp. 436, 217; volume 7, *Oklahoma and Mississippi Narratives*, pp. 362, 174; volume 8, *Arkansas Narratives*, parts 1 and 2, pp. 351, 354; volume 9, *Arkansas Narratives*, parts 3 and 4, pp. 393, 310; volume 10, *Arkansas Narratives*, parts 5 and 6, pp. 368, 371; volume 11, *Arkansas Narratives*, part 7, and *Missouri Narratives*, pp. 257, 383; volume 12, *Georgia Narratives*, parts 1 and 2, pp. 352, 357; volume 13, *Georgia Narratives*, parts 3 and 4, pp. 346, 364; volume 14, *North Carolina Narratives*, part 1, pp. 460; volume 15, *North Carolina Narratives*, part 2, pp. 436; volume 16, *Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Ohio, Virginia, and Tennessee Narratives*, pp. 17, 123, 78, 116, 56, 81; volume 17, *Florida Narratives*, pp. 379; volume 18, *Unwritten History of Slavery (Fisk University)*, pp. v, 322; volume 19, *God Struck Me Dead (Fisk University)*, pp. xi, 218. (Contributions in Afro-American and African Studies, Series 2.) Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Company. 1972. Volume 1, \$10.00; volumes 2-19, \$25.00 each; volumes 1-7, \$150.00 the set; volumes 8-19, \$300.00 the set.

THE INTERVIEWS WITH EX-SLAVES contained in these recently published volumes have been available to scholars in one form or another for some thirty years. Sixteen of the volumes contain the interviews prepared by the Federal Writers Project (FWP) in 1936-38. The typescript was assembled, bound, and deposited for the use of readers in the rare book room of the Library of Congress in 1941 and later microfilmed for distribution. The two volumes that originated at Fisk University in 1929-30 have been available in mimeograph form since 1945. In the latter year, B. A. Botkin published a small book of excerpts from the FWP interviews consisting mainly of anecdotes and folklore, but containing quite enough material of historical value to alert the scholarly community to the character of the sources he sampled.¹

¹ B. A. Botkin, ed., *Lay My Burden Down: A Folk History of Slavery* (Chicago, 1945). A more extensive and valuable selection of narratives appeared later. Norman R. Yetman, ed., *Voices From Slavery* (New York, 1970).

In spite of this, historians have almost completely neglected these materials. Examining all works dealing primarily with slavery and the antebellum Negro that were reviewed in the *Journal of Negro History* during the years 1945–64, one investigator discovered that the FWP narratives had “gone virtually unexploited by serious scholars.” About one-third of them cited Botkin’s selection, but only one referred to the original collection and then only in a bibliography.² The neglect is all the more striking because it continued almost uninterrupted through the next decade and thus through the peak of activity in black history as well as the wave of productivity in the history of slavery. In this same period, one of the most frequent complaints was about the lack of existing evidence from the illiterate, inarticulate, voiceless mass of slaves. How was it that the historian could not escape his dependence on the testimony of the master class and the abolitionists about the experience of slavery—how it was to be a slave? The published narratives of former slaves were available, to be sure, but were they representative of the illiterate millions?

Why these questions did not stimulate extensive exploitation of the slave testimony under review is rather a puzzle. The existence of the material was widely known, and its comparative inaccessibility is not very helpful as an explanation of its neglect. It was more accessible than many manuscript and archive materials that were extensively used at the time. The questions Ulrich B. Phillips had raised about the authenticity and bias of old slave narratives published before and after the Civil War had inhibited their use for a generation.³ But by the 1950s a neoabolitionist mood prevailed among historians of slavery and the views of the slaves were considered at least as important to an understanding of slavery as the views of the slave-owners. Yet while the published slave narratives were increasingly used, the unpublished testimony of slaves was scarcely touched. What appears to have been the main explanation for the neglect was a prevailing suspicion of the authenticity and quality of the material itself. Grounds for some of these suspicions certainly existed. It will be one of the purposes of this essay to explore and assess the basis for these suspicions. Before doing that, however, it would be well to indicate something of the scope and character of the enterprise.

The sixteen volumes of the FWP narratives, containing about 10,000 pages and roughly 3.5 million words, are based on interviews with more than twenty-two hundred people in seventeen states. Some three hundred interviewers took part in the government financed project. Preparation of the two remaining volumes, *Unwritten History of Slavery* and

² Norman R. Yetman, “The Background of the Slave Narrative Collection,” *American Quarterly*, 19 (1967): 536n. This article provides a valuable history of the collection. One exception to the rule of neglecting these sources is Willie Lee Rose, *Rehearsal for Reconstruction: The Port Royal Experiment* (Indianapolis, 1964). Forthcoming books, one by Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman and one by Eugene D. Genovese, will be exceptions.

³ Ulrich B. Phillips, *Life and Labor in the Old South* (Boston, 1929), 219.

God Struck Me Dead, was privately financed and directed at Fisk University. They are the work of a small staff and represent the records of interviews with some one hundred people in two states, Tennessee and Kentucky. The writers and editors of both projects strove with widely varying success to record the narratives in the words and dialect of the persons interviewed. George P. Rawick, nominal editor of the present publication, says that he has "left the interviews exactly as they were recorded," merely reproducing the original typescripts by photocopy. His only editorial contribution, therefore, is a brief but helpful introduction. His own monograph, *From Sundown to Sunup: The Making of the Black Community*, published as the first volume of the series, will be examined at the end of this article.

Virtually all the significant types of slave occupations, skilled and unskilled, are represented among the people interviewed. So are all sizes of plantations and farms and all sizes of slave holdings, from one to a thousand slaves. With the exception of Louisiana, all the states and territories where slavery was still legal toward the end of the regime are represented by samples of some extent, in addition to small samples from Indiana, Kansas, and Ohio. To go beyond these few descriptive facts, however, is to begin a list of shortcomings and faults. Yet these must also be fully conceded and appreciated before any just appraisal of the merits and values of the collection can be attempted.

The claim of "a high degree of representativeness and inclusiveness"⁴ that has been made in behalf of the FWP narratives is clouded by evidence of skewed sampling of several kinds. For example, the states included are very disproportionately represented. Arkansas, which never had more than 3.5 per cent of the slave population, furnished about 33 per cent of the ex-slaves interviewed, while Mississippi, which in 1860 contained more than 10 per cent of the slaves, is represented by little more than 1 per cent of those interviewed. The border states are skimpily sampled; Louisiana did not participate, and Virginia diverted all but a small portion of her collection to another publication.⁵ While the number interviewed has been estimated to be approximately 2 per cent of the total ex-slave population surviving at the time the interviews were taken, it cannot be assumed that this was a random sample. There is too much evidence of chance or self-selection to assure randomness. Among categories of the population represented by larger than their proportional numbers are urban residents, males, and former house servants, with a consequent under-representation of rural population, females, and former field hands.

The very age of the former slaves at the time they were interviewed raises several serious questions—about two-thirds were eighty or more, and

⁴ Yetman, "The Background of the Slave Narrative Collection," 534–35.

⁵ Virginia Writers Project, *The Negro in Virginia* (New York, 1940).

15 per cent were over ninety-three, with numerous centenarians (especially in Texas for unknown reasons) among the group. Not only is the question of failing memory raised, but also the question of whether longevity may not be partly attributed to exceptionally good rather than typical treatment as slaves. Age raises other questions of typicality. The age of interviewees at the time of emancipation ranged from one to fifty. About 16 per cent were under six years of age at that time and their testimony about slavery has to be considered largely hearsay. The slave experience of the majority was, in fact, mainly that of childhood, a period before the full rigors and worst aspects of the slave discipline were typically felt and a period more likely than others to be favorably colored in the memory of the aged.⁶

Other distortions doubtless arise from skewed sampling and faulty memories, but in all probability, the most serious sources of distortion in the FWP narratives came not from the interviewees but from the interviewers—their biases, procedures, and methods—and the interracial circumstances of the interviews. The overwhelming majority of the interviewers were Southern whites. In several states they were almost exclusively so. While the direction and guiding spirit of the project in its formative stages was a white Southerner, John A. Lomax, the folklorist, his duties were editorial rather than administrative. Responsibility for drawing the color line in employment of interviewers lies elsewhere, but the line was drawn rather firmly. The typical circumstances, therefore, were those of a Southern white interviewing old-style blacks on their doorsteps in the Deep South in the late 1930s. Jim Crow etiquette and white supremacy attitudes prevailed virtually unchallenged in those years: segregation was at its fully developed height, lynchings were still numerous in spite of a decline, and peonage sustained by force and terror was still a way of life known to millions of blacks.⁷

In that climate of race relations, the white interrogators customarily adopted a patronizing or at best paternalistic tone and at worst an offensive condescension. They flouted very nearly every rule in the handbooks of interview procedure.⁸ There were exceptions, to be sure, especially among the white interviewers in Arkansas and Georgia. But as a rule, the questions were leading and sometimes insulting, the answers routine or compliant, and the insensitivity of the interrogator and the evasiveness of the interrogated were flagrantly displayed. An occasional writer brought insight, tact, and inspired sensitivity to the task. The quality of the interview

⁶ The age estimates are in Yetman, "Background of the Slave Narrative Collection," 535.

⁷ Bertram W. Doyle, *The Etiquette of Race Relations in the South* (Chicago, 1937); John Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* (New Haven, 1937); Arthur F. Rafer, *The Tragedy of Lynching* (Chapel Hill, 1933); Pete Daniel, *The Shadow of Slavery: Peonage in the South, 1901-1969* (Urbana, 1972); Charles S. Johnson, *Shadow of the Plantation* (Chicago, 1934).

⁸ See, for example, Stephen A. Richardson *et al.*, *Interviewing: Its Forms and Functions* (New York, 1965), especially 269-327.

reports varied greatly, but too often they were mechanical or routine, "quaint" or "genial." The interrogator regularly got what he asked for: "Yes, sir, Boss Man, de niggers wuz treated good in slabery times en wuz trained up right, ter wuk, en obey, en ter hab good manners." Were they punished severely? "I'spects dat dey needed all de punishment what dey got."⁹ The candor of Martin Jackson of Texas (age ninety) was rare: "Lots of old slaves closes the door before they tell the truth about their days of slavery. When the door is open, they tell how kind their masters was and how rosy it all was."¹⁰

In a few states, particularly Florida, Negro interviewers were numerous and the two volumes of Fisk narratives were entirely their work. The distinctiveness of interviews where the interviewer and the interviewed were of the same race is readily apparent. The whole atmosphere changes. The thick dialect diminishes and so do deference and evasiveness and tributes to planter benevolence. Candor and resentment surface more frequently. There is also a fuller sense of engagement and responsiveness in the joint enterprise of seeking truth about the past. The interview could become a challenge, as it did with Margaret Nickerson (age eighty-nine or ninety) of Florida:

Now jes listen. I wanna tell you all I kin, but I wants to tell it right; wait now, I don' wanna make no mistakes and I don' wanna lie on nobody—I ain' mad now and I know how taint no use to lie, I takin' my time. I done prayed an' got all de malice out o' my heart and I ain' gonna tell no lie fer um and I ain' gonna tell no lie on um.

She followed a chilling narrative with the statement, "Dis is what I know, not what somebody else say. I see dis myself."¹¹ It would be hard to find a better witness.

Even the black interviewers had their problems. "It was with difficulty," reported one of them in Florida, "that they were prevailed upon to relate some of the gruesome details recorded here."¹² On the other hand, black interviewers also reported a good deal of apparently unaffected nostalgia for "de good ole days." After all, these were old and helpless people, often living alone in the worst years of the Great Depression, sometimes admitting they were hungry and not knowing where the next meal was coming from. And they were recalling a remote childhood when few were put to field labor before the age of ten or twelve. It is not surprising that for many the memory of slavery that often returned was that of eating and eating regularly. Slavery times and depression times were frequently compared, sometimes at the expense of the latter. Or as an ex-slave of North

⁹ Henry Green (age ninety), in Rawick, *The American Slave*, 9, *Arkansas*, pt. 2: 96, 100.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 4, *Texas*, 2: 189.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 17, *Florida*, 252, 254.

¹² *Ibid.*, 131.

Carolina put it, "It's all hard, slavery and freedom, both bad when you can't eat."¹³ One can never be entirely sure, but some of the testimony of internalized values of master and mistress appear to ring true enough. Abram Harris (age ninety-three) of Arkansas, for example, "kin yit see Marse Hampton" in his dreams "en er heep er times in de day when I's by myself er hoein de cotton he talks ter me plain, so's I kin understand, en he ax me iffin I's yet en still er good nigger, en tell me ter not be discouraged."¹⁴ There *were* such people. Father figures as well as hate images were part of their heritage from slavery.

Given the mixture of sources and interpreters, interviewers and interviewees, the times and their "etiquette," the slave narratives can be mined for evidence to prove almost anything about slavery. Hester Hunter (age eighty-five) of Marion, South Carolina, actually pronounced it "a Paradise, be dat what I call it."¹⁵ A paradise and a hell on earth, food in plenty and daily starvation, no punishment at all and brutal beatings for no reason at all, tender care and gruesome tortures, loving family ties and forced breedings, gentle masters and sadistic monsters.

That being the case, is the traditional suspicion of this material justified? Shall historians discard the slave interviews as worthless? Not unless they are prepared to be consistent and discard most of the other sources they habitually use. Not while they still use newspapers as sources, or, for that matter, diaries and letters and politicians' speeches and the *Congressional Record* and all those neatly printed official documents and the solemnly sworn testimony of high officials. Full of paradox and evasions, contrasts and contradictions, lies and exaggerations, pure truth and complete fabrication as they are, such sources still remain the daily bread on which historians feed. The slave narratives have their peculiarities, as all types of historical sources do, but they are not all that different from the norm. The norm for historical sources is a mess, a confusing mess, and the task of the historian is to make sense of it.

Sharing the normal shortcomings of historical sources, the slave interviews nevertheless have an unusual character. Confusing and contradictory as they are, they represent the voices of the normally voiceless, the inarticulate masses whose silence historians are forever lamenting. What would the colonial historians give for a comparable 2 per cent sampling of the views of the white indentured servants of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, or Southern historians for similar records of the poor whites of the nineteenth century, or Indian historians for such interviews with blanket-Indian tribesmen? Would there have been a comparable neglect of such sources by a whole generation of historians in those fields?

As full of pitfalls as the narratives are, they contain evidence and answers

¹³ *Ibid.*, 14, *North Carolina*, 1: 137.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 9, *Arkansas*, 3: 7.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 2, *South Carolina*, 2: 340.

of some sort for almost any kind of question that can be asked about life under slavery—any kind, that is, save those requiring quantification. Our dauntless quantifiers will probably not be stopped by this warning. But to quantify data of this sort would be attempting to quantify the memories of childhood and the lamentations of old age. Most historians still hold, however, that not all admissible evidence has to be numerical and that there are still important historical questions that are not susceptible to quantification.

To suggest a few questions on which the narratives do shed light, there are those relating to childhood, a subject to which historians have been giving increasing attention of late. These include not only nursing and infant care, but prenatal care of the mother and responsibility for discipline and training. Who taught the child to be a “good” slave? On whom did the child look as an authority figure? Master or father, father or mother, mammy or mistress? How did father relate to family? Wife to husband? Within the slave community, what was the relative authority or status of the black overlooker compared with the white overseer? The slave preacher compared with the white minister? Voodoo and herb doctor with white pill doctor? The house slave as against the field slave? The mulatto compared with the black? How did the social structure of the slave community look from the inside? How much solidarity and how much cleavage? Were class lines emerging? Did status and privilege relate to degree of color and racial intermixture? Was the emergence of a West Indian or Jamaica-type brown class already foreshadowed in South Carolina? How did such lines of division relate to rebelliousness or accommodation in slave discipline?

The slave interview evidence requires re-examination of many old questions and assumptions. Abolitionists agreed with proslavery men about the work ethic of slaves—that they were lazy, indolent, incompetent, careless, and inefficient, and worked only under the whip. This abolitionist-slaveholder stereotype is challenged by slave testimony on the variety of crafts mastered by slave artisans, the skills developed in their practice, and the pride workers took in their work and productivity. The stereotype of laziness is challenged by the sheer amount of work they did and how much of it was devoted in off-hours to self-aggrandizement and self-purchase. The old model of planter-absolutism on and off the plantation is cracked by evidence of slave bargaining power. Especially in industrial slavery and slave hiring the lines between master-slave relations and employer-employee relations in free labor became increasingly blurred and indistinct as it becomes apparent that owners as well as employers are coping with common labor problems, sometimes in quite similar ways.

Old institutions and old assumptions about them require re-examination in light of the narratives. One instance is the old view of slave religion as an imitative parody of white evangelical Protestantism. Instead it emerges with a distinctive eschatology and theology as well as the more obviously distinctive styles of worship, preaching, hymns, and participation. A more

totally religious culture is hard to imagine. Only one black atheist turned up among the twenty-three hundred interviewees and he was the son of a white atheist father.¹⁶ “What else good for colored folks?” demanded Anne Bell of Winnsboro, South Carolina. “I ask you if dere ain’t a heaven, what’s colored folks got to look forward to? They can’t get anywhere down here.”¹⁷ It was a curiously joyful religion. “There is joy on the inside and it wells up so strong that we can’t keep still. It is fire in the bones. Any time fire touches a man, he will jump.”¹⁸

The stock image of immobilized slaves chained to cabin, quarters, field, and plantation gives way to contrasting figures of mobility and restlessness. America was on the move and so were they, sometimes in chains and sometimes without them. Millie Evans tells of walking from North Carolina to Arkansas at a pace of fifteen or twenty miles a day and burying her master and three slaves on the way.¹⁹ Rachel Fairley recounts a six-week walk from Charlottesville, Virginia to Sardis, Mississippi.²⁰ “Uncle” Dave, born in Virginia, fled to Key West, Florida, was shanghaied on a naval vessel, sailed around the world, was shipwrecked twice, and returned to Florida.²¹ Elias Mumford, after emancipation, took his family to Africa, prospered for eight years with his own construction business, and returned to America with capital for a new start.²² Back and forth they wandered (more of them than whites) as helpless fugitives during the Civil War, sometimes making it on their own to federal lines and freedom, sometimes with their masters, who were seeking to keep them out of the reach of Union armies—from Alabama to Texas, from South Carolina to Oklahoma and back again. Some went as far as Antigua or St. Thomas, some to Canada and the Northern states, but few to stay, most to return to what they had learned to call “home,” the South.

Any historian who attempts to make sense of emancipation and Reconstruction will have to bring his bucket to this well. It is one of the deepest reservoirs of ex-slave testimony on two of the most profound historical experiences of the race. Here are spelled out many of the meanings of freedom and how it was perceived. “I took my freedom by degrees,” said Robert Glenn of Raleigh, and had trouble “taking myself into my own hands and getting out of feeling I was still under obligations to ask my master and mistress when I desired to leave the premises.” He recalled vividly the first time he refused to obey an order of his former master, the first time he failed to touch his forelock on meeting him.²³ Freedom came not only

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 18, *Unwritten History*, 82.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 2, *South Carolina*, 1: 53–54.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 19, *God Struck Me Dead*, 153.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 8, *Arkansas*, 2: 247.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 260.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 17, *Florida*, 311–26.

²² *Ibid.*, 282–84.

²³ *Ibid.*, 14, *North Carolina*, 1: 335–37.

by degrees, but also as cataclysm, like a storm in a time of troubles. Freedom came many ways and by no means all at one time. Sometimes it was years coming after the war, and to some it never seemed to have come at all. Testimony on that experience is often as revealing as testimony on slavery.

Reconstruction had as many meanings as perceivers. But the common and earthy meaning was aptly summed up by Ambus Gray of Biscoe, Arkansas:

The Reconstruction time was like this. You go up to a man and tell him you and your family wants to hire for next year on his place. He say I'm broke, the war broke me. Move down there in the best empty house you find. You can get your provisions furnished at a certain little store in the closest town about. You say yesser. When the crop made bout all you got was a little money to take to give the man what run you and you have to stay on or starve or go get somebody else let you share crop wid them.²⁴

And for the mass of ex-slaves, that spelled out the whole meaning of "Reconstruction."

The history of race relations should be enriched by slave testimony, especially the paradox of formal distance and physical intimacy between the races that slavery maximized. The evidence on intimacy is ample. "I nursed on one breast while that white child . . . pulled away at the other," recalled a former slave in Oklahoma.²⁵ "Grandma raised me on a bottle so mother could nurse Walter," the master's son. "Mother had good teeth and she chewed for us both," said another from Arkansas.²⁶ "Why wouldn't I love her," asked a third slave, referring to her owner, "when I sucked titty from her breast when my mammy was working in the field."²⁷ Love was not an invariable consequence of breast feeding. "I'm going to kill you," one slave told her master's son. "These black titties sucked you an then you come here to beat me." At the end of the encounter "he wasn't able to walk."²⁸

The extended family of the planter patriarch included slaves of blood kin, and the interracial matings from which they sprang included not only casual couplings and rapes, but durable and affectionate unions. The degree of willingness partook of all the ambiguities traditionally associated with matings, and the initiative was the monopoly of neither of the races nor either of the sexes. Tempie James, white daughter of a large planter in North Carolina, was locked in her room and the head coachman sold in another state when her parents discovered she was love with him. Tempie escaped, purchased the coachman, liberated him, married him, bore him

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 9, *Arkansas*, 3: 78-79.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 7, *Oklahoma and Mississippi*, 187.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 8, *Arkansas*, 2: 41.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 1: 113.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 2: 42.

fifteen children, and lived to bless many great grandchildren.²⁹ Harriet Ann Daves of the same state said her white father and owner “never denied me to anybody,” and “would give me anything I asked for. He loved my mother and said if he could not marry [her] . . . he did not want to marry.”³⁰ Another slave daughter spurned the affection of her father-master even though he supported her after her marriage, remembered her in his will, and enjoined his white son to visit her regularly after his death, which he did even after his half-sister moved to remote Oklahoma.³¹

Slave commentary on white society provides rich insights on antebellum social history. Black observers were capable of shrewd perceptions of lower class deference or subservience that punctured the myth of *Herrenvolk* democracy—the equality of all whites. One of them was amused by the conduct of a poor white overseer when visiting the quality at the big house and “use to laugh at de way he put grease on his hair, and de way he scraped one foot back’erds on de ground or de floor when they shake hands wid him. He never say much . . . [then, but] he speak a whole lot though when he git down to de quarters where de slaves live. He wasn’t like de same man then.”³² Ex-slaves tended to identify patrollers as well as overseers as poor whites and to remember relations with them as perpetual class warfare. Their attitude was similar to that of their descendants’ toward white police. “The patrollers were for niggers just like the police and sheriffs were for white folks. They were just poor white folks,” said an Arkansas survivor of slavery.³³ “We didn’t think much of poor white men,” said Sam Stuart of North Carolina. “He was down on us. He was driven to it by the rich slave owner.”³⁴

These volumes invite attention to a relatively unexplored field of race relations—those between Negroes and Indians. Black-red relations had most of the complications of black-white relations, plus peculiarities of their own. Indian masters enjoyed the reputation of being somewhat more indulgent than white masters toward the slaves. But there were cruel and brutal Indian slave owners as well. Recalling the beating of her uncle by one of them, Sarah Wilson of Oklahoma declared that “if I could hate that old Indian any more I guess I would, but I hated him all I could already I reckon.”³⁵ The extent of black-red interbreeding and intermarriage needs serious research. The number of ex-slaves who claimed Indian blood is remarkable. One Arkansas interviewer went so far as to say he had “never talked to a Negro who did not claim to be part Indian.” An

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 15, *North Carolina*, 2: 106–08. Tempie evaded the law against interracial marriage by drinking blood from her lover’s veins and swearing she was of mixed blood.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 1: 233–35.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 7, *Oklahoma and Mississippi*, 18.

³² *Ibid.*, 2, *South Carolina*, 2: 235.

³³ *Ibid.*, 9, *Arkansas*, 3: 293.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 15, *North Carolina*, 2: 319.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 7, *Oklahoma and Mississippi*, 347.

exaggeration, to be sure, and the phenomenon is more prevalent in the Southwest than in the Southeast. There is probably also a psychological as well as a biological dimension to the claim of Indian blood or identity. At any rate, Indian blood is frequently invoked to account for cherished traits of rebelliousness, ferocity, and fortitude. "De Indian blood in me have held me up over a hundred years," said Louisa Daves of South Carolina, age 102.³⁶ White blood was never mentioned in such connections. If black-red interbreeding was anywhere as extensive as suggested by testimony of ex-slaves, then the monoracial concept of slavery in America requires revision. And if the amount of black-white interbreeding is realistically taken into account, the true description of American slavery would be multiracial rather than monoracial or biracial—white and red as well as black.

It should be clear that these interviews with ex-slaves will have to be used with caution and discrimination. The historian who does use them should be posted not only on the period with which they deal, but also familiar with the period in which they were taken down, especially with the nuances of race relations in the latter period. He should be sensitive to black speech patterns and to the marvelous ambiguities characteristic of them. And of course he should bring to bear all the skepticism his trade has taught him about the use of historical sources. The necessary precautions, however, are no more elaborate or burdensome than those required by many other types of sources he is accustomed to use. They are certainly not great enough to justify continued neglect of this valuable evidence on black history in America.

Based "largely upon these records," George P. Rawick's *From Sundown to Sunup* is an effort to exploit them and demonstrate their usefulness as historical evidence. The demonstration in this instance does not turn out to be very reassuring. The author labors under handicaps that are not overcome by his sociological training and are complicated by the abstract and theoretical character of his interest in history. Two introductory essays dealing mainly with the survival of African cultural traits among American slaves are based on secondary works. Four short essays follow, one on the religion of slaves, another on their treatment by masters, a third on their family life, and a fourth on slave resistance. They draw evidence from the slave interviews, but they treat large and complex subjects (on some of which there exists an extensive literature), which the author has evidently not mastered. Part 2 of the book, entitled "The Sociology of European and American Racism," advances an elaborate (and not entirely unfamiliar) theory of the origins and development of the capitalist ethic and its impact upon work, play, religion, community, childhood, sexuality, racial relations, and, among other things, sin. The black community, cre-

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 2, South Carolina, 1: 302.

ated under slavery, developed “life-styles” that resist these depredations, and, it seems, promise salvation to young white imitators. “Our analysis is corroborated by the slave narratives,” we are told. It is plain that these sources will, like others, be put to varied uses.

Reviews of Books

GENERAL

MURRAY G. MURPHEY. *Our Knowledge of the Historical Past*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company. 1973. Pp. vi, 209. \$8.00.

Historians may be forgiven for thinking that the philosophical debate over the so-called positivist or Hempelian or covering-law theory of historical knowledge has gone on long enough, but they should understand that although this book belongs to that history of a controversy it does so in an entirely novel way. According to the covering-law theory an adequate explanation of any event shows it to be an effect of prior causes in accordance with one or more general laws. Historical explanations are seldom explicitly of this form, either because the relevant laws are left implicit or because they are not (yet) known. Such laws are the province of psychology and the social sciences to discover and formulate; a historical explanation is merely their application to particular events whose factual aspects have been established by historical research.

Murphey takes—or rather argues, and forcefully—a position that is unprecedented in the covering-law debate. On the one hand he maintains, with the positivists, that all historical knowledge is hypothetico-deductive in form and that all explanation of events is causal and necessarily makes reference (even though implicitly) to laws or “law-like generalizations.” On the other hand, he denies that history is or should become applied social science. With respect to traditional accounts of the cognitive status of history, therefore, he agrees that history is a distinctive discipline, neither a servant nor a dependent of the social sciences, but also holds that history is a science, conformable to

the same principles of causal explanation (e.g., the logical identity of explanation and prediction), as any science. Until now those who have held the latter view—and their critics as well—have thought that if history requires laws, these must be laws of psychology and social science, since there are no specifically historical laws (or even concepts).

Two primary strategies enable Murphey to make his case for this apparent paradox. First, he coolly denies that history suffers any poverty of laws. On the contrary, there are plenty of laws, and historians themselves have discovered and confirmed them. The covering-law debate has been distracted by the philosophers’ insistence that only fully general laws suffice for explanation and that no general law may contain ineliminable reference to individuals, such as a particular society over a particular time. But, according to Murphey, law-like generalizations, such as descriptions of the typical patterns of behavior in a specific society, suffice to explain events that exemplify them. And it is the distinctive office of historians to exploit the data surviving from the past, first to discover and then to use in an explanatory way exactly such law-like statements about past societies.

In the first four chapters the argument is a modification of the classic covering-law analysis. In the last two chapters the second strategy takes over in an original discussion, often technical, of the fundamental difficulties in attempts to apply statistical inference (including sampling and measurement theory) to historical data. As Murphey illustrates, social-science methodologies have been refined for situations in which inquirers can control the form in which data are elicited and recorded (e.g., by questionnaires), but historical data

almost never satisfy the formal criteria for significance in the application of sophisticated techniques. The difficulties uncovered by Murphy pull up short any naive hope that such methodologies will expedite the confirmation of historical hypotheses, except in rare cases like the scaling of legislators by the analysis of roll call votes. A pessimist may conclude that law-like generalizations in historiography cannot in the foreseeable future go beyond being relatively unconfirmed conjectures. An optimist may conclude that historians, perhaps with the help of mathematicians, will have to develop their own techniques of quantitative or semi-quantitative inference (methods of confirmation), in directions that as yet cannot even roughly be sketched.

This small book is not an evening's romp, but it raises, for the first time, some epistemological issues on the border between history and social science to a new level of sophistication.

LOUIS O. MINK

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HANS MEDICK. *Naturzustand und Naturgeschichte der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft: Die Ursprünge der bürgerlichen Sozialtheorie als Geschichtsphilosophie und Sozialwissenschaft bei Samuel Pufendorf, John Locke und Adam Smith.* (Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft, 5.) Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 1973. Pp. 330. DM 38.

As everyone knows there are two kinds of historians in the world—the joiners and the disjoiners—and for the taxonomically minded among us the assignment of a colleague to one or the other of these classifications goes far to elucidate his work. Dr. Hans Medick, continuing in this respect the main line of the German historiographic tradition, is emphatically a joiner, and because his orientation is appropriate to his theme he has produced a bravura performance far more resonant than the usual dissertation. The associated concepts of the state of nature and of the natural history of man—the latter variously denominated as “conjectural,” “philosophical,” “theoretical,” or “anthropological” history—which compose his central theme were overt linkages, often hypothetical and always regulative, for early modern political and legal theorists in their systematic moods. As hypostatized by Medick, however,

they become a kind of all-purpose conjunctive connecting seventeenth-century natural law with eighteenth-century empirical science, history with both natural law and social science, Macpherson's sociological interpretation of political theory with the German philosophical glosses on that same theory, the method with the content of social doctrine, descriptive with normative principles of cultural analysis, and liberal individualistic thought with organic social units of political thinking. In short, Medick undertakes to use his theme as the master key to the great antinomies of early modern intellectual history, and despite some infection by the chronic academic disease we may label “perspectivitis” his results are so ingenious and so buttressed by mastery of the published sources and available literature that they will have to be taken into account.

Medick's results are most striking on the macrolevel—that is, for the relations between periods, between general principles, and among individual thinkers. The ostensive focus of this work is the origin of modern social science in the eighteenth-century Scottish version that centered on Adam Smith. It is to elucidate this origin that he goes back to follow, in prolegomenous sequence, the integrated succession of Pufendorf, Locke, and the eighteenth-century academic Scottish natural-law context highlighted by Dugald Stewart. By using the ideas of the state of nature and of the natural history of man as the joint thread through this succession—in substance, the conceptual bond between human needs and human principles—and by demonstrating the intellectual autonomy of these ideas as the appropriate articulations of an independent, early bourgeois, exchange society, Medick convincingly shows the natural-law assumptions implicit in the foundations of new social sciences (for he reveals Smith to be responsible for more than the science of political economy). Through these assumptions he demonstrates a normative component (which remained an essential aspect of the new scientific analysis as the real possibility of the system that required man's intervention to be actualized) and, at the same time, the historical dimension that was integrally built into social science through natural law and that served as the socializing matrix of both. On this scale Medick's is a most constructive achieve-

ment, and it is more in envy than in denigration that I note the comparative advantage inhering in a language that has *bürgerliche* to straddle what we mean by "civil" and "bourgeois" and thus to blend a theoretical category into a historical phase, *Handlungszusammenhang* to denote a social category that has individualism as its function, and *geschichtsphilosophische* to legitimate the philosophy of history as a modest adjectival modifier.

But on the microlevel—that is, within each of his main figures—Medick's performance is more problematical. Here, too, he employs his thematic concepts for synthetic purposes, and if they lead him to new emphases on previously underrated materials that lend support to his general thesis they also lead to a consistent holism in particular that casts suspicion upon his continuous interpretations of individual thinkers. For Pufendorf he stresses the assertion of essentiality in an occasional essay on the state of nature without remembering that Pufendorf always stressed, in turn, the priority of whatever idea he was writing about. In Locke he argues a crucial role for history by adopting what must be accounted a most tolerant definition of history. And even in Smith, where he is most knowledgeable and most cautious, he argues from Smith's abortive project of a climactic "Theory and History of Law and Government" to a systematic resolution of the Adam Smith problem that sees paradox a penultimate where others continue to adjudge it a finality.

But the fact remains that Medick has carried, further than anyone else in recent memory, a mediatory approach responsibly into early modern intellectual history against the flood tide of contemporary disjuncture and that he has contributed thereby to the resolution of problems of continuity between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, between natural law and empirical science, between prescription and description, between history and social science—problems previously unsolved or deemed to be false. He would not be the first to find limits to the claims of a universal solvent in the inability to find a vessel that could contain it.

LEONARD KRIEGER
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ALBERT C. JENSEN. *The Cod*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 1972. Pp. 182. \$7.95.

This book could well be subtitled: "What the Average Reader Does Not Know About the Cod and Codfishing and Should Know." It is written in excellent reportorial style. The spawning of the fish where it lives and the various members of the cod family are described in nontechnical language and in adequate detail for the nonscientific reader.

Albert C. Jensen is the Director of Marine and Coastal Resources for the State of New York's Department of Environmental Conservation. He speaks eloquently and with authority when he discusses how codfish have been caught throughout history and the effects on the industry that each technical change has produced. He makes a good case for international cooperation in determining how many cod should be caught—where, and when. He points out that this can become an extinct species unless conservation is practiced soon and oceanic pollution is checked by all the nations whose ships fish in the Atlantic and other northern seas.

In describing codfishing in American history the author starts with the coming of the Vikings and ends with the presence of the Soviet Russians and the Poles in Western waters. Making use of standard secondary histories he tells how cod helped to build the economy of the colonies, particularly those of New England during the halcyon days of the triangular trafficking in rum, fish, and slaves. What has happened to the fisheries from then to the present is compactly told. For the student of colonial history or of maritime commerce no new ideas or sources appear. But then, the book is not for the professional historian. It can be recommended as a generally informative account of the cod.

ROBERT E. ECKLES
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ROLAND MOUSNIER. *Social Hierarchies: 1450 to the Present*. Translated from the French by PETER EVANS. Edited by MARGARET CLARKE. New York: Schocken Books. 1973. Pp. 206. \$9.00.

Roland Mousnier, professor at the Sorbonne, may well be the most distinguished living authority on sixteenth- and seventeenth-century

France. His principal work, a study of the sale of office under Henry IV and Louis XIII, has come to be regarded as a classic, and his monograph on the assassination of Henry IV (which deals with much more than that one event) is a superb example of historical scholarship. In addition to writing numerous valuable articles, he has edited part of the correspondence of Chancellor Séguier, trained a whole generation of students, and engaged in a major controversy with the Russian scholar, Boris Porchnev, over the meaning of the peasant revolts of seventeenth-century France. It is the latter undertaking that, during recent years, has induced him to shift his interests away from his earlier concentration on the politics of the *ancien régime*. His *Peasant Uprisings in Seventeenth-Century France, Russia, and China* (1967) heralded this new direction because, although he devoted about half of the book to a typically masterful discussion of developments in France, the other half was given over to quick surveys of events in Russia and China that gave his comparative conclusions an unexpected air of superficiality and predictability. Yet it was precisely the venture into comparative social history that was capturing his attention in the 1960s. He edited and coedited two volumes (1965 and 1968) in this area, and we now have, in the book under review (published in France in 1969), his most sustained discussion of the problems that increasingly are absorbing his attention.

Reluctantly, but ineluctably, one must conclude that Mousnier would make a greater contribution to scholarship and knowledge if he were to return to his magisterial studies of early modern French politics and administration. What he has done in *Social Hierarchies* is to present briefer versions of the outlines of the social structures of early modern France, Russia around 1600, and Mandarin China that were published in *Peasant Uprisings*. To these three states he has added the Catholic League of the 1570s and 1580s, Tibet, eighteenth-century Rome, Fascist Italy and Germany, and Soviet Russia. Considering that there is also a chapter on twentieth-century technocrats and five chapters of theoretical discussion, it will be readily apparent that, in a book of less than fifty thousand words, the substantive chapters

are little more than textbook overviews. There is no room for subtlety, and although the various accounts are accurate enough, there is oversimplification at almost every step.

The purpose is seemingly to warn the world both against the rise of technocrat-controlled societies and against Marxism-Leninism. Having spent most of his time distinguishing between societies based on orders (in essence, where an adherence to ideology, such as religious purity, determines rank) and those divided into classes (separated largely by economic interests), he sees mankind facing a single choice: whether to embrace "the technocratic society of orders" (where technocratic skill determines rank) or "the society of direct, egalitarian and democratic workers' management." The latter can retain that form, however, only if it rejects "marxist-leninist planning, rapid industrialization, [and] a substantial rise in living standards" (p. 195). It is a meager diet that awaits us, in other words. Mousnier does not even acknowledge that alternatives might exist; that technocrats might not take over our lives completely, even in a postindustrial society; or that other criteria for eminence and mobility (artistic accomplishment, for example) might carry weight. Indeed, throughout the book the distinction between real and theoretical hierarchies (his chief evidence for Henry IV's France is Loiseau) remains elusive at best.

The book is thus a highly idiosyncratic attempt to expose certain common features among almost a dozen widely disparate societies, including our own. Mousnier's wish to generalize his findings and to use them for contemporary polemic, however, leads nowhere. In addition to the uncertain definitions and unclear line of argument that vitiate his case, his reasoning suffers from a total indifference to the extensive literature on social structure produced by historians and sociologists in recent decades. Sorokin, Lipset, Bendix, Baltzell, Glass, and their ilk are ignored; only Bernard Barber (but not Elinor Barber) comes briefly within his purview. Much of the fuzziness could have been avoided if Mousnier had taken no more trouble than to consider C. Wright Mills's definition of social structure as "the combination of institutions classified according to the functions each performs."

Even on its own terms *Social Hierarchies* is often unconvincing. To call the Club Jean-Moulin an example of technocracy is to mistake a political faction for an order, and to regard it as seeking "to defend the Republic against General de Gaulle" (p. 187) is to idealize a quest for power. Mousnier implies that people care about the way their societies are structured—that theoretical analyses are important—but he rarely makes the link between writers and reality. He states, for example, that Che Guevara left Cuba because of his dislike of bureaucracy, but the long quotation from Che that he prints never once mentions that issue. Too often the documentation is simply not supplied. Nor does he face up to such difficult problems as whether, according to his interpretation, merchants should be considered a class or an order. They certainly possess all the characteristics he attributes to orders (see p. 173), and yet they are obviously also united by economic interest.

In sum, this book succeeds neither as history nor as contemporary polemic. And it has not been helped by the transition to an English version. Printing errors dot the page, sometimes—for instance, when "there" appears as "their"—rendering comprehension difficult. And it is positively confusing to see a reference to an American author who has retained the two accents in Jérôme that were added for the French edition. Mousnier has been ill served by this venture from start to finish, for at best he has provided a quick summary of some aspects of the social structure of various countries at different periods. These accounts may be reasonably useful for reference or introductory purposes, but the book cannot serve his principal intention: to provide a framework either for further historical research or for present-day policy making. One must hope that he will now return to those more substantive investigations that have placed every student of early modern Europe in his debt.

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DONALD W. TREADGOLD. *The West in Russia and China: Religious and Secular Thought in Modern Times*. Volume 2, *China, 1582-1949*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1973. Pp. xxi, 251. Cloth \$11.95, paper \$4.95.

This is cultural-intellectual and comparative

history on the grand scale—Western ideas in China, their purveyors and recipients from the Jesuits to the Marxists with occasional comparative references to developments in Russia. As such it deserves the admiration of all those anxious to see history break out of monographic compartmentalization and explore the big issues of cultural interaction.

Yet, as with most books that attempt to reach both the general reader and the specialist in a given field, this one is not totally satisfactory for either. As a general survey of modern Chinese intellectual history it can easily be faulted for the disproportionate emphasis Treadgold gives those ideas (usually religious) that interest him most. No balanced survey could give ten pages to the sixteenth-century Jesuit missionary Matteo Ricci and one paragraph to the co-founder of Chinese Marxism, Ch'en Tu-hsiu. Of course, such choices of emphasis need not be considered faults in an interpretive reappraisal intended for those already familiar with the general picture. The book is probably best judged on that level, although it does contain much descriptive material unnecessary for specialists in the field.

The first weakness China scholars are likely to jump on is the paucity of Chinese sources. But if Chinese history is to become part of a larger historical dialogue it surely is necessary to encourage specialists from other fields to bring their different backgrounds and insights to its study. Treadgold does use some Chinese, mostly secondary, sources, and he has the most important primary writings available in translation. Nevertheless, more immersion in the Chinese sources might have modified some of the interpretations that historians in the China field will probably find very controversial, if not peculiar. Prominent among these would be Treadgold's sanguine appraisal of the Jesuits' chances of converting the late Ming, early Ch'ing literati to a "Chinese Christian culture" had not the papacy interfered through the rites controversy.

But the sometimes idiosyncratic boldness of the author's judgments, although they will draw the fire of specialists, may be the book's chief value. For example, this reviewer found Treadgold's characterization of Sun Yat-sen as a social-gospel-influenced "Christian modernist," in basic attitude if not in the details of his

thought, to be a particularly intriguing insight. In fact, the most stimulating parts of the book are in the first half where his interpretations of Jesuits, Protestant missionaries, Taipings, and early revolutionaries are most controversial. The later chapters, especially after the May Fourth period, seemed thinner and could have benefited from the recently published work of Charlotte Furth and Laurence Schneider.

The most substantial issue raised by the book as a whole centers on the possibility and desirability of cultural synthesis, or what Treadgold calls "syncretism." He seems to favor a syncretic solution to the confrontation between Western and other cultures for two reasons. First, is the Burckian belief in the organic quality of society and culture. Hence, the difficulty and danger of abstract schemes for transplanting institutions and values from another milieu. Second, is Treadgold's genuine concern for cultural pluralism.

One may respect the former consideration and appreciate the latter without being as negative toward most of the currents of liberal and radical thought in modern China as this book is. Moreover, one might question whether the author's concern with religious thought has not too much narrowed his view of syncretism's function in China. There were advocates of complete Westernization during and after the May Fourth period, but many thinkers of various kinds were still concerned with a synthesis that was modern (in practice mainly Western) yet still meaningfully Chinese. In some ways (again consciously and unconsciously) even the most rabid of Westernizing revolutionaries, the Communists, have been syncretists too. More attention to this paradox might have made the pre-1949 popularity of Marxism among Chinese intellectuals more intelligible.

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EDOUARD A. STACKPOLE. *Whales & Destiny: The Rivalry between America, France, and Britain for Control of the Southern Whale Fishery, 1785-1825*. [Amherst:] University of Massachusetts Press. 1972. Pp. xii, 427. \$15.00.

The subtitle of this book reflects more accurately its contents than the sweeping main title: the work focuses on the southern whale fishery, as distinct from the northern or Greenland

whale fishery; concentrates somewhat narrowly upon the Nantucket whalers who dominated this fishery by virtue of their unique seafaring skills; and deals with the struggle among three nations—the United States, France, and England—to capture control of this lucrative industry by attracting Nantucketers to command their whaling ships. Between the years 1785 to 1825 the American whale fishery grew phenomenally, and the value of its products at times may have been as great as that of the rest of the fishing industry. Thus, competition for control of the southern whale fishery was for a rich prize indeed.

The main outlines of this chapter in America's maritime history are well known, the book-jacket claim notwithstanding. What the author—now Director of the Peter Foulger Museum on Nantucket—has supplied in detail is the local history of how the island lost and regained its ascendancy over the southern whale fishery during the period. The story has a paradox, for part of the competition the Americans faced was from Nantucketers who migrated to England and France and challenged their former relatives and friends. As Julian Boyd aptly observed, "the American whale-fishery was conducted by a clannish, interrelated, resourceful people, who were single-minded in their pursuit of the whale. The Rotches, the Starbucks, the Coffins, and others, who engaged in the whalefishery, were a sort of American cartel, devoted to commerce and rising above the political storms of the day."

The book makes a contribution of adding to Starbuck's classic work, but professional historians must use it with caution. Vessels are labeled inaccurately—the *Independence* being listed as both schooner and ship (pp. 304, 320)—persons, like King Kamehameha II (p. 362), identified incorrectly, and diplomatic aspects of the Quasi-War and War of 1812 treated in textbook fashion. The background on British and French whaling efforts fails to provide an adequate context for the story Stackpole tells. Moreover, to write about the southern whale fishery without mention of the important role of Indians and Negroes is a serious oversight.

Stackpole's greatest strength is his sources; he has mined the whaleship logbooks to produce a volume that makes interesting reading. His greatest weakness is fileopietism; like the

islanders about whom he is writing, he places Nantucketers' local interests ahead of the nation's welfare.

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CARLO ZAGHI. *L'Africa nella coscienza europea e l'imperialismo italiano*. (Storia: Saggi e ricerche, 1.) Naples: Guida Editori. 1973. Pp. 576. L. 7,500.

Zaghi's laudable purpose is to expand the African vision of his Italian readers. Some of the eight articles collected here were published previously. There is a fine compressed evaluation of colonialism, published in 1958, meant to take some alarm out of the process of decolonization. There is an account, published in 1941, of Ferdinando Martini's opinions of Menelik. Martini's *Diario eritreo* covered the years between 1898 and 1907 and Zaghi shows his largely favorable view of Menelik as a possible reformer of his land. Two articles published in 1961 review the activity of the Belgians in the Congo and the policy of apartheid in South Africa, and yet another gives accounts of the Katanga secession and the resistance movement in Angola. These more or less journalistic pieces show Zaghi's theme of change in the colonial world and his approach to current events through historical perspective.

Three new studies comprise the bulk of the book. "Africa in the Knowledge and Conscience of the West" is an interpretive survey of pre-partition thought, with sections on travelers' tales, the slave traffic, assumptions about black men and African civilization, and theories of European racial and cultural superiority. The imperialism of Crispi and of Mussolini is examined critically in separate pieces, with attention to the cost each laid to Italy. The exploitation of Ethiopia is shown against standards and practices prevailing in colonies elsewhere. Comparisons and contrasts are useful, although Zaghi's sometime stray from the topic at hand. All the articles are in fresh and fluent style, suffused by moderate, liberal sympathies. There is not much new, but they are recommendable introductions to their several subjects.

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GORONWY REES. *The Great Slump: Capitalism in Crisis, 1929-1933*. New York: Harper and Row. 1970. Pp. 310. \$8.95.

The Great Depression's traumatic effect on consequent political and economic developments in the modern world is a well-accepted fact. The economic crisis created domestic and international stresses that vastly accelerated trends that had been proceeding very slowly until that point. It necessitated governmental action and economic planning, especially in areas of finance and employment, to an extent that formerly would never have been contemplated seriously by mainstream politicians. Its political repercussions included most importantly Japan's aggressions in East Asia, numerous autarchic policies that exacerbated international conflicts, a further entrenchment of the Russian regime, which hailed the West's difficulties as the culminating crisis of capitalism itself, and the end of a weakly established German democracy. Capitalism survived the "slump" and even managed to endure the special conditions of the Second World War. But, it is hoped, depression and war forced the Western countries to create national and semiglobal policies and institutions to avoid both in the future. Thus 1929-45 is the real period of capitalism's crisis.

Goronwy Rees, a British educator and writer, has written an informative and lively, but scarcely scholarly or novel, interpretation of the 1929-33 years. He focuses on the interaction between economics and politics within and among England, Germany, and the United States. It is a minor theme of the volume that the distorted conditions of post-Versailles Europe were beyond more effective amelioration by the great powers. More important, in Rees's view, was the inadequacy of accepted economic teachings for both business and government once the weak seams of the world's postwar economy began to rend. Then, faced with the multifarious demands that unemployment and industrial-financial collapse placed on insecure political institutions, Germany fell into totalitarianism and the better-established Western democracies were more pragmatic in the use of governmental power to alleviate suffering and preserve their institutions.

Rees's synthesis and analysis are interesting and readable. However, he adds nothing to our understanding of the depression, in part, be-

cause he has borrowed heavily and without specific citation from well-known secondary historical works and, in part, because he conducted no primary research. Regrettably, he has not even surveyed some of the most important recent literature on the subject, such as that of Milton Friedman and Herbert Stein. In addition, while typographical errors are only minor, if annoying, some substantive errors may be more significant. For example, the United States did not leave the gold standard during the First World War and thus did not return to it in 1919 as Rees states twice within the first chapter. Rees's talents as a man of letters are certainly appreciated and one may expect well-turned phrases when he turns his hand to history, but let no one mistake this book as other than a nicely done memoir based on the research and judgments of others.

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ANCIENT

ABRAHAM SCHALIT, editor. *The World History of the Jewish People*. First Series: *Ancient Times*. Volume 6, *The Hellenistic Age: Political History of Jewish Palestine from 332 B.C.E. to 67 B.C.E.* New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 1972. Pp. xxii, 360. \$20.00.

This volume, like its predecessors, has been in preparation for many years. As a consequence of the delay the two main contributors, Victor Tcherikover and Joseph Klausner, did not live to see the publication of their work. Abraham Schalit, the editor, and Michael Avi-Yonah wrote one chapter each.

The book, while focusing on the Hasmonaean (or Maccabean) state, is written against the background of Alexander, the Diadochi, and the Hellenistic kingdoms. The text and the illustrations, which include monuments, art, coins, inscriptions, and maps are felicitous.

During the Hellenistic Age the Jews of Palestine came to grips with a strong, alien culture. This split the community into opposing camps: the Hellenizers and the conservatives. The social elite, led by the Sadducean priests, were worldly and inclined toward Hellenism; the Pharisaic rabbis, who had a large following among the masses, combated Hellenism and

advocated strict adherence to traditional Jewish values.

One of the most interesting parts of the Hasmonaean period was the reign of King Jannaeus Alexander (103–76 B.C.). He was a vigorous conqueror, exerted considerable influence abroad, and built up Jewish sea power. As a Sadducee he suppressed and even persecuted the rabbis, alienated the common people, and brought on a bitter civil war. Oddly enough his wife Salome Alexandra was a Pharisee and the sister of the renowned Rabbi Simeon ben Shetah. In accordance with the will of Jannaeus, she became the ruling queen when he died in 76 B.C., and she occupied the throne until her death in 67 B.C. Following the advice of her late husband to conciliate the Pharisees (p. 296), she placed religious and internal affairs in the hands of the rabbis while reserving for herself control over diplomacy, the army, and the fortification of the borders. Through her brother Simeon, rabbinic legislation to protect women was introduced with the addition of new clauses in marriage contracts (p. 252).

The Hasmonaean state has striking parallels with the state of Israel today. Both required a divided Levant and the absence of a single world empire; both felt the tension between the religious and secular forces; both saw the emergence of women (although detailed comparisons between Salome Alexandra and Golda Meir would be of dubious value).

As Rome became a world empire in full control of the eastern Mediterranean, the external requirement for an independent Jewish Palestine disappeared. Internally the breach between the secular nationalists and the messianically oriented rabbis was too wide to close.

The acceptability of the Hasmonaean as the official Jewish dynasty was ruled out by more than one factor. As priests they were not of the Tribe of Judah or of the Judean line of David. Though priests they were not of the official high priestly line of Zadok. Accordingly they were usurpers as to both kingship and high priesthood. Yet on the modern scene they have been rehabilitated and embraced by the Jewish people as freedom fighters and heroic predecessors of the state of Israel.

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T. P. WISEMAN. *New Men in the Roman Senate 139 B.C.–A.D. 14*. (Oxford Classical and Philological Monographs.) New York: Oxford University Press. 1971. Pp. x, 325. \$16.00.

During the Roman Republic, political power, social status, and personal prestige were monopolized by an aristocracy of birth, which in turn was dominated by a more narrowly defined oligarchy of office holders—the *nobiles*. Those without ancestral prerequisites not only lamented the passing of the highest magistracy from hand to hand among the nobles, but complained, as Cicero did, that those born to the purple obtained office in their sleep, while Cicero was advised to remember always that he was a *novus homo*. Wiseman focuses on those *novi* who became senators between the passage of the law providing secret ballots for elections in 139 B.C. and the introduction of senatorial cooptation in A.D. 14. Background information is imperfect for many individuals, particularly those who held lower offices, but Wiseman correctly identifies as new men only those equestrians, often of municipal origin, who did not have senatorial forefathers. These new men developed their own ideology, founded upon claims of hard work, dedication, and merit, propounded as the very qualifications exhibited by the ancestors of aristocrats themselves.

Wiseman demonstrates how territorial expansion and the extension of the franchise contributed to mobility, as did the Second Punic War and the social and civil wars. Similarly, the development of classes of pseudo-professions—for example, military and legal—contributed to the means whereby new men might advance. Here a reference to Keith Hopkins, "Structural differentiations in Rome (200–31 B.C.)" (*History and Social Anthropology* [1968]), would have been in order. It is not surprising to read that new men frequently spent years in state service building the reputations and acquiring the support aristocrats traditionally enjoyed and that the lower the office the more accessible it was to *novi*. For example, only eight new men reached the consulship between 139 and 48 B.C., while in the same period the number of *novi* who obtained a praetorship, considered the ultimate reward for most new men, rose from seventeen to twenty-five per cent of those who held the office. On the other hand, it was almost unheard of

for a new man to be elected censor or to acquire membership in one of the important priestly colleges.

The majority of new senators came from areas that had enjoyed citizenship for some time, from prosperous urban communities, and from regions near or with easy access to Rome; however, the most important factor in a new man's advancement was "contact and familiarity with influential Roman politicians, whether as clients, as neighbours and social intimates, or as relatives by marriage or adoption. . . ." With this in mind, I question Wiseman's assumption that the secret ballot law of 139 B.C. greatly weakened the power of patronage. Patronage existed because it was mutually advantageous, and few men associated with established families would change their vote as a result of the secret ballot, although the law did make it difficult for an aristocrat to determine whether or not he got what he paid for. The ever-increasing size and complexity of the electorate was the greatest problem facing the aristocracy, and Wiseman is probably correct to see the office of moneyer as a convenient position employed for advertising purposes. Furthermore, while the aristocracy was too small in number to monopolize all state positions, particularly the lower offices, it was important that the aristocrats control those who did acquire office for the first time, a fact that clearly explains the methods whereby mobility was achieved and factions built and maintained.

Much of Wiseman's text is merely a restatement of what is generally known, but he presents and discusses in a lucid fashion the political, social, moral, economic, and ideological barriers confronting the ambitious new man and the methods whereby they were overcome. There are several useful and informative appendixes, but the "heart" of the volume is a prosopography of 563 new men who reached the Senate during the period in question. The latter in particular is a welcome and much needed contribution to our knowledge and should find immediate use among all students of Roman history.

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ION BARNEA and ȘTEFAN ȘTEFĂNESCU. *Bizantini, Romani și Bulgari la Dinarea de jos* [Byzantines, Romans, and Bulgarians on the Lower Danube]. (Bibliotheca Historica Romaniae, 9. Din istoria Dobrogei, 3.) Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România. 1971. Pp. 439. Lei 37.

This volume represents the third installment of a new updated history of Dobruja, an area known in Roman and medieval history as Scythia Minor and located between the lower Danube River and the Black Sea. It supersedes an early monograph written by Radu Vulpe, *Histoire ancienne de la Dobroudja* (1938). The first two volumes preceding this one covered the early ancient history up to the beginning of the seventh century while this volume covers the period from the seventh century to the beginning of the fifteenth century. It is the collective product of sound erudition on the part of two distinguished Romanian scholars, Ion Barnea and Ștefan Ștefănescu. Ion Barnea of the Institute of Archeology at Bucharest is the author of the chapters on Dobruja between the years 681 and 1186, Byzantine rule in Dobruja between 971 and 1185, the culture of the territory of Dobruja from the tenth to the twelfth centuries, and the last part of chapter four, which deals with the cultural aspect of Dobruja in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Ștefan Ștefănescu, director of the Institute "Nicolaie Iorga" and president of the history and archeology section of the Academy of Social and Political Sciences at Bucharest, is the author of the part of chapter four that deals with the history of Dobruja during the period 1186-1417, including the revolt of Peter and Asen, which led to the foundation of the Vlach-Bulgarian Empire, also known as the Second Bulgarian Empire, and the temporary incorporation of Dobruja into the Principality of Wallachia during the reign of Mircea the Old (1366-1418).

The history of Dobruja cannot be isolated from its relationship with the Byzantine Empire, Bulgaria, Wallachia, and Kievan as well as Galician Russia. It forms a sort of a bridge for the two sides of the Danube River and its delta and plays an important role in the world events of the history of Eastern Europe. Both authors draw upon a variety of published and unpublished sources and offer us useful infor-

mation on subjects generally neglected until now. This book represents accurately the current work done in studies in history and archeology and indicates quite clearly the solid, productive work that is being done in these fields.

Along the lower reaches of the Danube quite a few significant archeological artifacts were recently excavated. One of the most interesting discoveries, which led the way to daring historical speculations, was the lead seals found among the buried Byzantine coins, jewelry, and pottery. Other discoveries, to mention a few, were the seal of Simon, vestis and catepan of the themes of Paristrion or Paradunavan, found in 1951 near Dinogetia; the seal of John Meleses, patrician and strategus, discovered at Silistra; the seal of Demetrius Katakalon, proconsul, patrician, and catepan of Paradunavan, found at Dinogetia; and the seal of Michael, the former metropolitan of Kiev (1130-45), discovered at Dinogetia in 1954. According to the author the seal and the cross of a high-ranking clergyman like Michael might possibly be an indication that a bishop had had his residence at one time at Dinogetia (pp. 322-25).

This book is well illustrated by numerous plates and sketches and by functional maps that are closely correlated with factual material. The extensive footnotes and general index are most helpful. In sum, this book is the fruit of scholarly erudition on the part of the two authors who, in their search for detail, have left no stone unturned in making this volume rewarding to the medievalist of Eastern Europe.

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MEDIEVAL

CARLO M. CIPOLLA, editor. *The Fontana Economic History of Europe*. Volume 1, *The Middle Ages*. [London:] Collins/Fontana Books. 1972. Pp. 389. 80p.

This volume of the *Fontana Economic History* contains, in addition to a brief introduction by the editor Carlo Cipolla, an article on population by J. C. Russell, now retired from Texas A & M University; one on towns by Jacques le Goff, Director of Studies at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes (Section 4); one on con-

sumption and demand by Richard Roehl of the University of California, Berkeley; one on technology by Lynn White, jr. of the University of California, Los Angeles; another on agriculture by Georges Duby of the University of Aix Marseilles; one on industry by Sylvia Thrupp of the University of Michigan; another on trade and finance by Jacques Bernard of the University of Bordeaux; and one on government economic policies and public finance by Edward Miller of the University of Sheffield.

As one might expect in a volume written by so many different scholars the finished product is not an entirely well balanced and comprehensive treatment of medieval economic history. In addition to the usual problems of organization and coverage caused by cutting the material up into segments, each assigned to a different author, there is the further and more serious problem caused by the subject matter itself. The term "Middle Ages" is one that covers a time period that means different things to different people. J. C. Russell and Lynn White, jr. accept the entire sweep of time between 500 and 1500 as the beginning and ending dates for their essays, while the other authors concentrate on time periods that vary between 900 and 1500, and 1200 and 1500. The result is that the volume may well leave the student in considerable confusion about certain aspects of the medieval economy, especially as pertains to the earlier part of the period.

But aside from these inevitable shortcomings this collection of essays should prove to be very useful. The several authors are in general well acquainted with recent research in their subject and the student is given not only the results of this research, much condensed of course, but also sufficient bibliographical information to lead him to the most important secondary and monographic material about any topic that he may wish to investigate further. The only exception to this provision of a useful working bibliography occurs in connection with the article on population by J. C. Russell. Professor Russell refers the reader to the very excellent bibliographies that appeared in several of his recent works on medieval population, but although the student could certainly find everything that he needs in the bibliographies of these books and articles, it will not be every

student who has easy access to these works; consequently it seems unfortunate that the decision was made to provide only a relatively short bibliography in the present volume.

It is not easy to make any comparative judgment about the quality of the work done here by each of this very imposing team of international scholars; however, several of the essays provide a more satisfactory treatment of their subjects than the others. In this category fall the essay entitled "The Town as an Agent of Civilisation 1200-1500," by Jacques le Goff, and the one on "Medieval Industry 1000-1500," by Sylvia Thrupp. Standing by itself the article on agriculture by Georges Duby might leave the reader with a curiously narrow view of the role played by agriculture in the medieval economy; however, this narrow view is considerably modified by some of the material in the essay on towns (by le Goff), on technology (by White), and on industry (by Thrupp). There is also some information on the agricultural population in Russell's essay, but since surviving materials are not so extensive for the rural population as for the urban, the rural demographic pattern is traced only in a rather general fashion. The article entitled "Patterns of Structure and Demand 1000-1500," by Richard Roehl, might also be singled out for special note since the influence of demand on the development of economic policies and practices has not heretofore received much attention in general texts.

All in all, this volume on medieval economic history stands up well in comparison with others and provides a reliable introduction to the subject for both the beginning and the advanced student.

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JOEL T. ROSENTHAL. *Angles, Angels, and Conquerors*. (The Borzoi History of England. Volume 1: 400-1154.) New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1973. Pp. xviii, 216. \$6.95.

Rosenthal attempts in his *Angles, Angels, and Conquerors* to write a new style history of early England, largely social rather than political or constitutional. Only his first chapter follows fully the pattern of the traditional political narrative, although the chapter on the Church

is partially narrative. The other three chapters, dealing with the economy, society, government, and culture are topical in arrangement. This topical approach is not the only novelty; there are two others. First, the author aims his work specifically at an American undergraduate audience, recognizing that this group has little background and perhaps little interest in medieval English history. Second, he chooses as his terminal date not the traditional 1066, but 1154, to stress the continuity of Anglo-Saxon institutions.

Most of the faults of the book are the result of the latter two choices. Rosenthal attempts to write a book that will not be too difficult for today's American students; he writes that he has "undertaken to select and emphasize, to simplify the complexity that exists" (p. xvii). Unfortunately, attempts at simplification of complexity sometimes result in distortions of reality, and one must ask whether it might not be better for a student to remain ignorant rather than to become misinformed? Rosenthal usually simplifies by limiting his discussions to England shortly before or after the Norman Conquest. His choice of 1154 as his terminal date may have had as much to do with his oversimplifications as his desire to make his material easier for students. He cannot answer adequately the many difficult questions that arise about such things as the organization of the peasant village-community, the transformation of the village-community into the manor, or the question of the changing status of the free peasant-warrior in a book of only 200 pages. Too often, the impression is left that the laws, social structure, and other aspects of English life were unchanging from the Saxon invasions to William's conquest. The revolutionary character of the Norman Conquest is not made as clear as it could be.

Admittedly, Anglo-Saxon England is far removed from the habitat of the American undergraduate. It is an alien world with its obscure terms and difficult spellings and uncertain meanings. But a world that is so far removed from the present might arouse a special fascination in today's students, many of whom do find the bizarre and the obscure exciting. It is a world that is more exciting because it is still being discovered through new techniques of archeology, aerial photography, and place-

name analysis. Somehow Rosenthal's work fails to ignite in the reader the excitement of that heroic age. His style of writing does not capture the mood of the period. Perhaps his aim of simplifying for his student audience led him to affect a style that is unpleasantly informal, for example, "it was Queen Wealtheow," Rosenthal notes, "who made out the shopping lists and arranged the feast while poor Hrothgar just sat and worried about Grendel" (p. 112). Some of the writing, however, reflects simple carelessness and haste.

RALPH V. TURNER
Florida State University

GIOSUÈ MUSCA. *Il Venerabile Beda, storico dell'Alto Medioevo*. (Storia e civiltà, 9.) [Bari:] Dedalo Libri. 1973. Pp. 482. L. 5,000.

Professor Musca sets out to provide for Italian readers an introduction to Bede as a historian, without pretending to go beyond the earlier work of W. Levison and C. W. Jones. The result is a learned and enthusiastic book that does, in fact, take issue with Jones about Bede's historical purpose. Bede's earlier writings are regarded as an apprenticeship for the historical work to come, although the exegetical works are treated only superficially. Full maturity as a historian is said to appear first in the *Historia abbatum*, a "history without miracles," where Bede "entered the realm of true historical writing." The account of the worldly careers of men at Wearmouth and Jarrow who established a community based on the Christian faith is regarded as a foreshadowing of the *Historia ecclesiastica gentis Anglorum*, which, Professor Musca holds, is sustained by a single purpose: to show, with a scrupulous use of sources, the birth of a nation embracing Roman and Christian ideals after a long development in a Germanic land.

The remainder of the book elaborates this thesis. With reference to the title, Professor Musca concludes that by *historia* Bede meant "a narrative of facts," and that the *gens Anglorum* was in effect a myth that Bede hoped might become a reality. Bede's models and sources are examined to show that his effort to delineate the progress of faith among an entire people so as to afford that people a national conscience was without precedent. A discussion

of Bede and his society leads to an analysis of the dedication to King Ceolwulf, which indicates an effort to reach a nonecclesiastical audience; and, in its reference to "the true law of history," a desire to record literal facts, since "factual truth" is used to support the "ethical truth" considered by Jones to be Bede's primary concern. A series of generous excerpts from the *Historia* in Italian, a discussion of the letter to Egbert, and an account of Bede's death and early influence lead to a vigorous discussion of Bede's essential humanity. A primary bibliography, a useful survey of secondary scholarship, and an appendix containing an attractive and learned essay on Dante and Bede conclude the volume.

D. W. ROBERTSON, JR.
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ALAN HARDING. *The Law Courts of Medieval England*. (Historical Problems: Studies and Documents, number 18.) New York: Barnes and Noble. 1973. Pp. 201. \$10.50.

This book is an excellent addition to the Historical Problems series. It presents a clear and readable discussion of medieval English judicial institutions from central law courts to the justices of the peace. It discusses the growth of chancery procedure and the introduction of the prerogative courts. It also covers the whole period from the Anglo-Saxon settlements to the accession of the Tudors.

Mr. Harding does not stop short at summarizing recent research. He goes on to present his own interpretations on some subjects. With certain of these interpretations one might take issue. For example, in emphasizing lordship in Anglo-Saxon England, he perhaps minimizes unduly kinship and communal relationships. And whether he is justified in his assertion that the jury derives naturally from oath-helping and the ordeal, is open to question. After all, the principles behind the jury and oath-helping are different, and the mere fact that both sets of testifiers were sworn and therefore called *juratores* is not perhaps enough reason to warrant the larger generalization. With his main point, that the tenth century is decisively formative, one cannot quibble.

He naturally gives most space to the period from 1066 to 1300. Justifiably, in view of his topic, he passes over the much-mooted question

of origins of military feudalism and emphasizes chiefly the importance of William I's introduction of a new system of land tenure originating in his disposition of conquered lands. There was no clear distinction in the period after the Conquest among honor courts, manor courts, and hundred courts, or between franchise and seignorial jurisdictions. Yet later he says that the hundred courts always remained the real *patria*. The main emphasis in this second chapter is the importance of the eyre, so long as it lasted, as an instrument of centralization and enforcement of the king's peace, and on the creative innovations of the Angevins. But the shire courts, he says, continued as important institutions for civil litigation throughout the thirteenth century although the sheriff's office steadily lost power. The distinction between criminal and civil offences became clear in this period despite the fact that writs of trespass took over some of the functions of criminal accusation. Bills of trespass, he thinks, are more important origins of modern procedure than Henry II's juries of presentment. The returnable writ has been overemphasized as an instrument for the development of royal justice, and individual or community complaints, formulated often in writs but also in bills, remained the basis of action in the courts. Parliament undoubtedly originated as a court. Though he naturally does not deal in detail with the grafting onto it of political functions, he asserts in the connection that the "grass roots of English politics were in the shire court."

Among the most important developments of the later Middle Ages were the breakdown of the eyre and the substitution for it of the specific commissions of assize, trailbaston, gaol delivery, and oyer and terminer, none of which were as effective as the eyre in maintaining links between local and central government. The justices of the peace, in spite of steadily expanding powers and responsibilities, were always, in the Middle Ages, weakened by involvement in local politics. The Church, though pre-eminently important in the early development of common law, later became subordinated to royal institutions. Jury trial was the most important of England's contributions to legal procedure.

This is not just institutional history, or at least not arid institutional history, presented

without awareness of the society that produced the institutions. Question might be raised about the documentary justification for some of the generalizations mentioned above, for example, about the origins of the jury, but the documents presented as illustrations, though mainly chosen from already published sources, are an illuminating collection supporting well the main generalizations of the text. The book will be useful both to students and to teachers of legal history.

MARGARET HASTINGS
Rutgers University,
New Brunswick

EDMUND KING. *Peterborough Abbey, 1086-1310: A Study in the Land Market.* (Cambridge Studies in Economic History.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1973. Pp. xiv, 208. \$17.50.

This book is essentially a series of studies on the economic and social structure of the estates of Peterborough abbey in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and especially of the land market, which the author seeks to study "as a whole," including all types of holdings and ranks of possessors. Mr. King states that "wherever possible in this study, the approach is via a family history, and looks at the family's acquisition of property and the use that was made of it. The history of the monastery is itself a family history" (p. xii).

After a brief discussion of the sources (a few unpublished documents are printed as appendixes but not, unfortunately, some important twelfth-century charters, which are cited only in translation) and an account of the growth of Peterborough's estates before 1066 and the imposition by William the Conqueror of heavy military service on the abbey, the author studies its knights. He traces in particular the fortunes of seven families and shows how the basic fees were preserved until the late twelfth century but were later absorbed by the abbey, which acquired property steadily from 1175 until about 1300. Likewise with regard to freeholds, both of sokemen and of monastic servants, he stresses the aggressive policy of the abbey in the thirteenth century, amounting at times to "sustained campaigns" (p. 67) to increase its property and concentrate its lordship.

The distinction between free and customary land was maintained, and the author argues convincingly that there was no incompatibility between the continued integrity of customary tenures well into the fourteenth century and an active land market on the village level. There are also interesting chapters on the establishment and endowment of various monastic departments and on the administration and organization of the abbey's estates, as well as sections on landclearing (which reached its peak in 1175-1225), arable land, sheep farming, and the labor supply.

Throughout this work the author looks at society as "a single entity" (p. 5), seeking common factors at work on all levels of landholding, great and small, ecclesiastical and secular, and arguing that "the basic concerns of families were the same" (p. 170). While this premise may not be true of all English society at that time, it applies to the relatively small and homogeneous world of the Peterborough estates and helps to break down the artificial distinctions sometimes drawn by historians. The author proposes interesting parallels, as between the royal and abbatial administrations and between the abbey's departments and its knightly tenants, and he draws original conclusions concerning the relation of family property and stability, suggesting in his final paragraph that the thirteenth century, in spite of the apparent anarchy of its land market, was more stable in comparison with the twelfth than is sometimes said.

GILES CONSTABLE
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BERYL SMALLEY. *The Becket Conflict and the Schools: A Study of Intellectuals in Politics.* Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield. 1973. Pp. xiv, 257. \$13.50.

Beryl Smalley's book is a revealing description of a segment of the Anglo-Norman and early Angevin clerical class and the schools and masters that educated them. But even more, her work is a major contribution to the historiography of the Becket-Henry II quarrel. It is a product of the author's able use of manuscript materials, which hold so many secrets about this significant class.

Smalley is able to forge a chain of ideological

causality from Archbishop Thomas, ultimately intransigent before the Constitutions of Clarendon, back through his clerical staff to the theological teaching of the schools. She argues convincingly that Becket's opposition to the king was largely the result of the personal influence of Thomas's chaplain, secretary, and personal theologian, Herbert of Bosham, and to a lesser degree, John of Salisbury, who taught the new archbishop what a high Gregorian interpretation of scripture expected of a bishop in his situation. With her view of Becket's adoption of this model, the author can plausibly explain the contrast in Thomas's character as chancellor and then as archbishop. Becket's initial assent to the Constitutions of Clarendon can be explained, as Herbert of Bosham said, as a vestige of the former chancellor's curial training. Becket's stance against King Henry becomes a case of role playing with more detail and definition than Z. N. Brooke could suggest. At the same time, Becket's resistance to Henry is less the effect of Thomas's maturing sanctity than Knowles believed. Coming closer to the Knowles position, however, the author carefully admits that prior to becoming archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas had demonstrated dissatisfaction with his life and thus had prepared himself for the influence of Herbert of Bosham and his colleagues. More specifically, Smalley would reject any attempt to make canon law the principal basis of Becket's convictions. Theology, not canon law, was the chief influence on the archbishop and his clerks.

In discussing Gilbert Foliot's capacity to compromise about principles (p. 179), Smalley identifies Robert, earl of Gloucester, with the earl for whom Gilbert was requesting relief from an interdict from the bishop of Hereford in 1143. The earl in question actually was Miles, earl of Hereford. Robert of Gloucester became the object of papal threats of excommunication between 1145 and 1147 over his continued occupation of estates claimed by the bishop of Bayeux.

Beryl Smalley's work is an impressive blend of intellectual, social, and political history. It shows just how painstaking searches for manuscripts can produce answers to the many unsolved problems that confront medieval historians. The English clerical class during the twelfth century has yet to receive a compre-

hensive study. Smalley's book is not this study, nor is it the last word on Thomas Becket. It has, however, furthered the cause of each considerably.

ROBERT B. PATTERSON

University of South Carolina

H. M. COLVIN. *Building Accounts of King Henry III*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1971. Pp. xvi, 472, 16 plates. \$22.50.

Whatever else may be said of King Henry III, he was one of the greatest royal patrons of architecture, sculpture, and painting in English history. The rehabilitation and expansion of Dover Castle and Winchester Castle took place during his minority. The great artistic achievement of his reign was Westminster Abbey. The work was begun in 1245 and was still in progress at the time of his death in 1272. He lived to see the body of King Edward the Confessor translated to the new shrine, and he lived to see the completion of the whole of the eastern arm, the crossing, and five of the twelve bays of the nave.

The building accounts here edited are almost unique in Western Europe. The only surviving ones of comparable antiquity are those of Charles of Anjou as king of Sicily (1266-85). Henry's accounts, except for one among the Westminster Abbey muniments, are preserved in the Public Record Office. Mr. Colvin has edited, with felicitous translations into English on the facing pages, four sets of documents for Dover Castle, five for Winchester Castle, and sixteen for Westminster. There are five figures (plans and drawings), sixteen plates, a glossary of technical terms, and a full index. There is a short introduction since, in the editor's words, "the purpose of this edition is to make these, the earliest English building accounts, available to architectural and economic historians rather than to exploit their contents in a lengthy introduction." Actually the contents have already been exploited to a considerable extent in the editor's definitive *History of the King's Works*.

The best indication of what is to be found in this volume is the editor's own summary: "These are not the only building accounts that survive from the reign of Henry III, but they are by far the most important, and between them they fully illustrate the process

of account of which they are the record. They also throw a good deal of light on the employment of labour and the economics of building in thirteenth-century England. As evidence of building technology they are less informative than could be wished: anyone who hopes to learn from them the secrets of the Gothic masons will be disappointed, for there is nothing here to tell him about the setting out of a chevet, or the construction of a high vault. But, as the index shows, many technical building terms are to be found in these pages, and whether one is interested in words as such or in the tools and processes that they represent, it is to these accounts that one must repeatedly turn for their earliest known occurrence." It may be added that the day-to-day task of medieval building comes alive in these pages. Historians of society, economics, and the arts will thank Mr. Colvin, as will the administrative historian and the merely curious.

G. P. CUTTINO
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ODETTE PONTAL, edited and translated by. *Les statuts synodaux français du XIII^e siècle, précédés de l'histoire du synode diocésain depuis ses origines*. Volume 1, *Les statuts de Paris et le synodal de l'Ouest (XIII^e siècle)*. (Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale, Comité des Travaux historiques et scientifiques, Section de Philologie et d'Histoire jusqu'à 1610. Collection de documents inédits sur l'histoire de France. Series in-8°, volume 9.) Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale. 1971. Pp. lxxvii, 289.

Long before it became fashionable in Church history to eschew general problems and to favor the grass-roots approach, much serious work had been done in various countries on the diocesan synod as an institution and on the records—*statuta*, *precepta*, *capitula*, *constitutiones* or whatever their label—that medieval diocesan synods have left. Studies and editions such as those produced by C. R. Cheney for England, or for Poland by Jakób Sawicki, have set admirable standards for research in this field where legal, social, and religious history meet. Madame Pontal's book is the first fruit of a comprehensive program for publishing the French diocesan statutes, which was the lifelong concern of the late

André Artonne. We catch a glimpse of the magnitude of this task in paging through the *Répertoire des statuts synodaux des diocèses de l'ancienne France du XIII^e à la fin du XVIII^e siècle* (1969), in which Artonne, Louis Guizard, and Mme Pontal—the latter being the only survivor of the original team—catalogued the vast number of edited and unedited materials.

Diocesan statutes fulfilled much more than the one function that the Fourth Lateran Council singled out for them—that of making known and giving execution at the local level to decisions of general and provincial councils. Of course they reflected, especially from the late twelfth century on, the common law of the Church, but they were not so much legislative as pastoral in nature. Still less should they be seen as enactments of representative bodies even though they were often formulated after the bishop had consulted with his cathedral chapter (so Mme Pontal rightly observes, p. lxiv). The statutes are essentially the bishop's acts of reform, correction, liturgical directives, catechetical guidelines, warnings on current heresies, and so forth, which he publishes in solemn assembly, surrounded by his clergy, especially by those having cure of souls—and which he publishes to this same clergy, in a form that they will keep at hand as *liber synodalis* for their parochial duties.

It is characteristic of the thirteenth century that the synodal statutes of certain bishops spread widely, being copied or imitated by other bishops, with or without additional material from other sources. Professor Cheney has traced this process for the derivatives of Richard Poore's statutes in his classic, *English Synodalia of the Thirteenth Century*. In France the fountainhead was the series of *prohibitiones et precepta observanda ab omnibus sacerdotibus* published for Paris by Bishop Odo of Sully in 1208 and transmitted in several successive recensions. Its influence reached beyond the seas and beyond the Pyrenees. It is also apparent in a new set of *precepta synodalia* originating at Angers after the Fourth Lateran Council and spreading with sundry variations to many dioceses of the West. Editing and translating these two texts is the main object of Mme Pontal's volume (the respective titles, "Statuts de Paris" and "Synodal de l'Ouest"

are of her own making); she presents the Latin originals and variant readings on the left-hand pages (pp. 52–100, 138–237), and the French version, with selective commentary in the footnotes, on the right-hand pages. Both texts are preceded by descriptions of the manuscripts (pp. 9–35, 112–131) and old editions, and by discussions of the textual tradition. They are accompanied by 17 reproductions of manuscript pages. While the editor was aware of the complexities of the transmission of such *textes vivants*, it cannot be said that she gives the reader a clear picture of these problems or of the interrelations of the manuscripts. Stringing together, at the bottom of the pages, all of the variants from each of the manuscripts does not make a critical apparatus. The commentary in the right-hand notes is useful so far as it goes: it picks its source material at random from afar or close-by (e.g., p. 157 nn. 2, 3), includes irrelevant references (pp. 79, 85), and leaves many passages unannotated that call for comment (thus on the Jews, p. 87, cc. 89, 90; or the cluster of rare words in c. 82, p. 82); it also lacks bibliographical references where needed e.g., on the elevation of the Host, pp. 83, 145, although the pertinent articles of V. L. Kennedy are given in the bibliography, p. xvii).

All this leaves the reader with the impression of a learned writer who, while she knows her synodal material very well, does not appear to be on familiar ground in many other respects and not sure of the proper methods of organizing an edition. In the description of manuscripts, for instance, entries that do not pertain to diocesan statutes and related subjects often remain unidentified (even in the basic MS Paris, Arsenal 769). The same mixture of specialized competence and lack of general historical method or perspective characterizes the partly quite useful, partly somewhat parochial introduction of 52 pages (xxv–lxxvii) on diocesan synods and statutes, mostly French, “from the beginnings” to the thirteenth century. Names, topics, and *incipits* are well indexed, but the “Index bibliographique des conciles cités” (pp. 261–79) is unacceptable. And yet, the book is not without its charm. It is full of worthwhile, often important, information. But for future volumes in this much-needed series of editions, one would wish a workmanship less

reminiscent of the antiquarians of the *ancien régime*, lovable as they were.

STEPHAN KUTTNER

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Liège et Bourgogne: Actes du colloque tenu à Liège les 28, 29 et 30 Octobre 1968. (Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Université de Liège, number 203.) Paris: Société d'Édition “Les Belles Lettres.” 1972. Pp. 258. 30 fr.

Unfortunately this volume is further evidence that papers presented orally at colloquia should seldom be published. Even if extensively revised, they often do not lend themselves to publication. Revision, moreover, takes time, and that explains why this volume, the result of colloquia held at Liège in late October of 1968 to commemorate the five hundredth anniversary of the destruction of Liège by Charles the Bold, duke of Burgundy, has appeared four years after the colloquia and why some papers were not revised or were not included. To appreciate these studies one should know that the bishopric of Liège, virtually an independent principality during the Middle Ages because of its loose ties with the Empire, was essentially the sole obstacle to the expansion of the Burgundian state southward toward Lorraine. After a series of wars between 1465 and 1468 the bishopric fell to Charles the Bold, who held it until his death in 1477, which signaled the end of the Burgundian state.

The studies vary in aim. Some only straighten out details. Paul Harsin probes the political and diplomatic relations of Liège with Burgundy, France, and the papacy. John Bartier identifies officials used by Charles the Bold for the administration of Liège. Mademoiselle M.-R. Thielemans identifies and evaluates lands and revenues of Liégeois confiscated at Poilvache, Montaigle, and Bouvignes after Dinant was sacked by Burgundian troops. Dr. Paravicini attempts to prove that Guy de Brimeu, lord of Humbercourt and Charles the Bold's governor of Liège, does not merit his bad reputation, that he was, in fact, humane and not overly greedy. Concerning the role of the Liégeois in the crusade against the Hussites in 1421, Anton Vantuch notes the value of the

Liégeois chronicler Jean de Stavelot for certain details. Colonel Charles Brusten adds little to an understanding of the Liégeois campaigns of Charles the Bold by concluding that Charles was more feudal than fifteenth century in mentality, that he was inefficient, and that he defeated Liège not because of his military ability but because of its weakness. Nor do Brusten's brief remarks about military contracts reveal any knowledge of the subject.

There are, however, four articles of more value that have perspective and relate Burgundian and Liégeois history to the broader European movements. Jean-Louis Kupper, in describing how Marc de Bade of the German family of Bade-Hochberg took advantage of the Liégeois struggle with Burgundy to have himself elected bishop of Liège in 1465, reveals that the German princes of the fifteenth century regarded the Low Countries as a region in which to advance their own political and economic fortunes. Claude Thiry argues from studying a group of poems in French on the subject of the destruction of Dinant and Liège that these mediocre literary efforts by anonymous authors in the Burgundian camp were basically propaganda, advancing the theme that resistance to the dukes of Burgundy was evil and against God's will. The poems are, he contends, an example of that medieval literary genre, the *exemplum*. Known for his work on Burgundian institutions, Pierre Gorissen describes how Charles the Bold's lieutenant Humbercourt established a regional capital at Maastricht with a *conseil* for the administration of the Meuse region around Liège and suggests that this was a part of the centralizing policy of the Burgundian dukes in their attempt to create a powerful state between France and the Empire. Finally, in an interesting study Jean Schneider examines various attempts to establish the kingdoms of Lotharingia, Burgundy, and Arles during the late Middle Ages. He notes the theories advanced to justify the creation of such middle kingdoms and the failure of these attempts doomed by geographical disunity and by the political, economic, linguistic, and cultural particularism of these middle territories extending from the Mediterranean to the North Sea.

These studies will interest only students of

Burgundian and Liégeois history during the fifteenth century.

BRYCE LYON

Brown University

H. V. LIVERMORE. *The Origins of Spain and Portugal*. London: George Allen and Unwin; distrib. by Hillary House, New York. 1971. Pp. 438. \$7.50.

There is no reliable modern work covering the long period of Iberian history (the fourth to the late ninth centuries) dealt with by Professor Livermore. Professor E. A. Thompson's *The Goths in Spain* (1969) is confined to 507–711. E. Lévi-Provençal's *Histoire de l'Espagne Musulmane* (1950) is decidedly weak on the Christian North. Existing general accounts of the North are unsatisfactory. Professor Livermore's book should therefore be welcome. He makes use of archeological studies, of Portuguese as well as Spanish monographs, and of Byzantine as well as Latin sources. His work is mainly confined to political history. On this he is detailed and readable and advances interesting hypotheses, for instance, on the identity of "Count Julian," who introduced the Muslims to Spain (p. 281).

Unfortunately, his book is unsatisfactory in several crucial ways. It cannot be used as a reliable guide because, for most statements, it fails to provide any source references. It is also uncritical in its use of primary sources. I do not allude to curiosities such as the use of a twelfth-century historical novel as a "source" for the fourth century (p. 111), or of a fourteenth-century chronicle for the seventh (p. 196), but to the treatment of a chronicle attributed to Maximus, acknowledged as a "dubious text" (it has been known for centuries to be a modern forgery), which is repeatedly drawn on for the sixth century (pp. 159, 169–71, 176, 179–80, 185), though the chronicle does not appear in the bibliography. It also seems mistaken to see (p. 248) the Chronicle of 754 (of Toledo, not Córdoba) and the late ninth-century, largely mythological, Chronicles of the Asturias as equally valid reflections of seventh-century opinion, or to accept (p. 279) the questionable early dating of the *Akhbar majmu'a*, due to Sánchez-Albornoz, but rejected by Lévi-Provençal.

The main thesis of the book is highly dubious. The division of the Iberian peninsula today is seen as due to the "resurrection of the two Germanic kingdoms, the heirs of the Suevi and the Visigoths" (pp. 394-95), which produced, respectively, Portugal and Castile. This view traces modern Spain and Portugal back to the scattered settlement of small numbers of barbarians in the peninsula in the fifth century. It ignores the undeniable accidents of later dynastic history, which account for the political union of Spain and the separation of Spain from Portugal (if fifteenth-century marriages had gone differently the present map of the Iberian peninsula might be very different). Most important, the nature of the Christian North after 711 is left out of account.

Livermore does not perceive that Asturias resisted the Muslims in exactly the same way that it had resisted the Romans and Visigoths (see M. Vigil and A. Barbero, in *Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia*, 156[1965]: 271-339). This fact shows that the Christian kingdom of the Asturias, which spread into León and Castile, was not a mere revival of Romanized Gothic Toledo but a largely opposed, far more primitive, frontier society. One should not be deceived by the myth-making chronicler of the 880s into thinking otherwise.

Catalonia hardly enters Livermore's picture. That Catalonia developed separately from Castile, under very different Frankish influence, is more important for later Spanish history than the anecdotal fact that Barcelona was once ruled by the Visigoths. The Muslim invasion and the very different reactions it aroused in primitive Asturias and Navarre, and in the Frankish empire, shaped the developing new societies of Portugal and Spain and account for Spain's underlying diversity (more significant, perhaps, than its late and largely superficial unity) down to the present day. In 1500 the propagandists of the Catholic monarchs could celebrate Spain "restored" to its Gothic past. Today a different approach seems advisable.

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Boston College

A. P. VLASTO. *The Entry of the Slavs into Christendom: An Introduction to the Medieval History of the Slavs*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1970. Pp. xii, 435. \$23.50.

Few other topics in Church history can match the drama of mission and expansion; thus the subject of this book is inherently exciting, for Mr. Vlasto, a lecturer in Slavonic studies at the University of Cambridge, has aimed at nothing less than a narrative and analysis of how the Slavs were Christianized during the period from about 500 to 1200. In addition, because Slavic civilization was so embryonic in these years, he has also fulfilled the promise of his subtitle by providing a sophisticated introduction to the medieval history of the Slavs. After a brief discussion of the Slavs in the Byzantine Empire, the author turns to Central Europe and the missions of Saints Constantine (Cyril) and Methodius, then treats seriatim each of the Western, Balkan, and Eastern Slavs. A short chapter on the beginnings of monasticism among the orthodox Slavs is followed by a stimulating set of conclusions in which Vlasto discusses his central theme: the dividing of the Slavic world into two Christian civilizations.

This is not an easy story to tell for at least two reasons. First, the data are often infuriatingly fragmentary, and as a result certain parts of the book are rather more tentative than others. Vlasto has tried scrupulously to indicate where this is the case, but in so doing the narrative sometimes becomes either dangerously general or mired in minutiae. Second, the warp of narrative and the weft of analysis is cast upon a frame that encompasses many centuries and more peoples; despite Vlasto's admirable ability to command the linguistic tools necessary to this task, the resulting material is uneven and may impress some scholars as presenting nothing new at crucial points while at the same time overwhelming some general readers with a book that is much more than a mere introduction.

Despite these problems, Vlasto's book is a worthy complement to Father Francis Dvornik's recent "Byzantine Missions Among the Slavs" (*AHR*, 77 [1972]: 500-01) and constitutes a valuable contribution to a more nearly complete picture of early Slavic civilization. The scholarship is thorough and judicious, and the author's utilization of the wealth of archaeological evidence that has accumulated in the past decade is particularly useful. In addition, some of the interpretations are highly stimulating, especially those that touch upon peoples

beyond the Byzantine sphere, those that deal with the relationship between religious development and political motivation among early Slav rulers, and those that relate to the theme mentioned above. Finally, it should be emphasized that the attempt to deal with all of the Slavic peoples and their relations with Constantinople and/or Rome is on the whole successful. Even minor groups, such as the Wends and Sorbs, are included; and Vlasto's treatment on this point provides us with both an eloquent and moving description of their fate and some provocative observations about the relationship between culture, conversion, and conquest in European history.

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BERNARD S. BACHRACH. *A History of the Alans in the West: From Their First Appearance in the Sources of Classical Antiquity through the Early Middle Ages*. (Minnesota Monographs in the Humanities, volume 7.) Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1973. Pp. xv, 161. \$11.50.

The Alans hardly seem to provide suitable material for a monograph. Their early history (to A.D. 375) is badly documented and the Alans who entered the Roman Empire never established a stable and viable state. On the contrary, they soon lost whatever national cohesion they may formerly have possessed and scattered into widely separated groups, all of which soon disappear from the surviving evidence. Professor Bachrach has accordingly approached the history of the Alans as a study of how they were assimilated into medieval society. Hence the division of the main text of the book into three chapters: "Alans beyond the Frontier" (pp. 3-25), "The Alans Come to the West" (pp. 26-73), "The Assimilation of the Alans" (pp. 74-119). Hence, too, its ambitious scope, from Seneca (p. 3) to a discussion of Norman tactics at the Battle of Hastings (pp. 89-92).

Any study that ranges so widely will inevitably contain some mistakes and inaccuracies, although they need not greatly impair its value and usefulness. But Bachrach's treatment of the Alans in the first three centuries does, however, exhibit serious errors of both comprehension and evaluation. Greek and Latin texts

are sometimes badly mistranslated (e.g., "who attack the enemy with spears" [p. 4] for Lucan's "fixo qui ludit in hospite"), and the interpretative translation of Arrian's *Acies contra Alanos* (pp. 127-32) is marred by a failure to understand Arrian's references to units of the Roman army (e.g., "some light infantry, javelin men and slingers" are in fact the *cohors III Ulpia Petraeorum* of mounted archers). As for the historical interpretation of evidence the content of a passage of Tacitus is misdated by nearly forty years (p. 124 n.3), and the account of the Alans from A.D. 180 to A.D. 375 depends largely on an uncritical acceptance of uncertain and bogus evidence (pp. 13-17). Bachrach adduces Dio without mentioning that the Alans have been introduced into the text by emendation, believes all the statements in the *Historia Augusta* about the Alans, asserts boldly that Maximinus was "the first emperor to be fully barbarian," and deduces that the Alans of Maximinus's generation "did not speak Gothic or Alan but the local Thracian patois" and sometimes learned Latin. Perhaps less grave, or at least less misleading, is Bachrach's failure to employ all the pertinent evidence, although he complains about "the paucity of available information" (p. 17).

In general the second and third chapters appear to attain a higher level of technical proficiency than the first.

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ANDREW S. EHRENKREUTZ. *Saladin*. Albany: State University of New York Press. 1972. Pp. 290. \$10.00.

SIR HAMILTON GIBB. *The Life of Saladin: From the Works of 'Imād ad-Dīn and Bahā' ad-Dīn*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1973. Pp. 76. \$5.00.

Ever since the publication of *The Talisman* by Sir Walter Scott in 1832 the name Saladin has evoked impressions of a gallant "knight errant" in the "mystic East." In a study conducted by a major oil company, Mohammed the Prophet and Saladin were the two Islamic leaders most familiar to prospective executives. In spite of Saladin's relative fame in European intellectual circles, there have been no full-

length scholarly biographies surfacing in the West in recent years. Until the publication of Professor Ehrenkreutz's history the most significant study had remained Stanley Lane-Poole's *Saladin and the Fall of the Kingdom of Jerusalem*, published in 1898. Lane-Poole's exhaustive treatment of the copious source material seemed to mesmerize his successors into echoing his paean to the Ayyubid sultan and into re-emphasizing his intensive interest in the jihad against Christendom rather than the internal policies that the sultan pursued in Egypt and Syria. It is only recently that well-known Western scholars have begun to question that noted British historian's interpretation. The need to resolve the queries arising from their monographs analyzing limited aspects of Saladin's endeavors, coupled with the desirability of re-examining his career in the light of newly uncovered literary, archeological, and numismatic sources, makes Professor Ehrenkreutz's work most welcome.

This biography opens with a brief discussion of the historical myths surrounding the sultan's life. Probing Saladin's motives and policies from a social and economic as well as a political perspective, the author outlines conditions within the "Nilocentric" Fatimid government that paved the way for intervention by the Syrian regime of Nūr-ad-Dīn. Saladin's accession to the command of the Syrian army and the vizierate of Egypt was not a simple matter, as has been previously asserted, but rather the result of complex political and economic factors as well as careful planning on the part of the young man's supporters. Chapters 6 through 10 constitute the heart of this study. The main thrust of this section, which demonstrates the debilitating effects of Saladin's Syrian foreign policy on Egyptian internal affairs, is political and economic rather than social. Combining his own research in military and economic history during the early Ayyubid period with studies by Hamilton Gibb, Claude Cahen, Nikita Elisséeff, and Bernard Lewis, to mention only a few, the author skillfully weaves a picture of Saladin mulcting Egyptian resources in order to build a united Syro-Egyptian state. His imagery depicting the forces and undercurrents in both states is clear and the thoroughness of his scholarship impressive. In the final chapters he examines Saladin's conquest

of the First Latin Kingdom and his problems combating the Third Crusade. Seeming to corroborate the thesis recently expounded by Emanuel Sivan (*L'Islam et la croisade: Idéologie et propagande dans les réactions musulmanes aux croisades* [1969]), which surprisingly is not cited, Ehrenkreutz attributes Saladin's failure at Tyre to his followers' disillusionment over his lack of pursuit of the jihad.

The book concludes with a new, more critical appraisal of Saladin as an individual: the accomplishments of his reign resulted from "his military and governmental experience . . . his ruthless persecution and execution of political opponents and dissenters . . . his vindictive belligerence and calculated opportunism, and . . . his readiness to compromise religious ideals to political expediency" (p. 238).

In contrast the late Hamilton A. R. Gibb's portrait casts Saladin in a somewhat more traditional mold, "as a man who fought for his ideals . . . not victoriously, but in a measure that fell short of his hopes and ambitions" (p. 1). This book, culled in large measure from the author's chapter in *A History of the Crusades* (vol. 1, 1955), is written in the fashion of a chronicle, from the sultan's first campaigns in Egypt (1164) until his death in 1193. Although its scope is limited to political and military considerations, the author's historiographical comments and copious notes (which were largely omitted from the earlier version) justify its republication in separate form.

Students of Middle Eastern history should acquaint themselves with both these works. Sir Hamilton Gibb's book is the final publication of a world-renowned Orientalist and contains insights that are the product of forty years of study. Professor Ehrenkreutz's work both revises our conception of Saladin and propounds a meaningful thesis concerning the sultan's role in Egyptian history. This is a highly readable portrait that should become familiar to all those interested in Middle Eastern or medieval history.

HARRIS NIERMAN
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JONATHAN RILEY-SMITH. *The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1174-1277*. [Hamden, Conn.:] Archon Books. 1973. Pp. xiv, 351. \$16.50.

Professor Jonathan Riley-Smith, already known for his work on the Knights of St. John and for articles on the Latin Levant, has presented here a fully documented analysis of the baronial movement that reached its apogee in the Latin kingdom in the mid-thirteenth century, but which had its roots in the period before the fall of Jerusalem in 1187. Much of this material has been variously treated by other scholars, especially in recent years, but Professor Riley-Smith has taken a rather different approach. He has concentrated on two facets of the thirteenth-century development—the political and the literary—that is, first, an actual political achievement culminating in the resistance to the Emperor Frederick II and his representatives, and, second, the writings of a small but remarkable group of jurists. Since, as he correctly observes, there has been thus far no “satisfactory description of the political ideas of the jurists or of the constitutional crises in which they were involved,” he has sought to explain the legal principals that underlay the writings of the great jurists partly by examining the political, economic, and social developments of the period and partly by a study of the cases recorded. For, as the author remarks, thirteenth-century legal development was “grounded in the practice of the courts,” the more so since what written law existed in the twelfth century was lost in 1187. The book is, therefore, detailed. Nevertheless, the overall result is an able portrayal of the remarkable interest in the law evinced by the Palestinian nobility and an explanation of how the great jurists of the mid-century built on and acknowledged their debt to their predecessors.

In conclusion the author acknowledges that his original contention—that the Palestinian feudatories needed to be rescued from the traditional view that they were “quarrelsome and short-sighted”—has to be modified. Though the jurists built a system of law applicable to their own day, preserved in the famous collection, the *Assises de Jerusalem*, it was based on an idealized and unhistorical conception of the early period of the kingdom. Nor were they totally immune from “donnish pedantry.” Nevertheless, as he finally maintains, their writings, especially the lawbook of John of Jaffa, rank among the monuments of thirteenth-century thought.

One final observation. As is often the case in discussions of thirteenth-century Levantine society, Antioch-Tripoli is not included. This area was, of course, not specifically part of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Moreover, the lack of comparable legal literature makes investigation of this kind difficult, if not impossible. Yet it would be instructive to know what reciprocal influences, if any, were operative. Perhaps Professor Riley-Smith may one day address himself to this problem. Meanwhile, he has made with this book a significant contribution to our understanding of Crusader society. There are four appendixes with genealogical tables and lists of regents and lieutenants in the kingdom, two maps, and a bibliography.

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ARNOLD TOYNBEE. *Constantine Porphyrogenitus and His World*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1973. Pp. xviii, 768, 5 maps. \$45.00.

When Alfred Rambaud published his *Empire grec au dixième siècle* (1870) he was in advance of his times. The same, unfortunately, cannot be said of Mr. Toynbee. In the preface he recounts that his interest in Constantine Porphyrogenitus goes back to Toynbee's last year as an undergraduate, in 1910, but that he was not then able to realize his youthful ambition; circumstances drew him to other pursuits, and it was only in 1966, when he had completed all the other items of historical writing on his agenda, that he returned to the “crowned pedant.” Any other scholar, after a lifetime devoted to the most far-flung fields of history, would rightly have hesitated to undertake at this late stage a massive book on the Byzantine Empire, the more so as Byzantine studies have witnessed a remarkable advance since 1910—an advance that Toynbee does not appear to have kept abreast of. We can only admire him for his persistence.

First, as to content. Despite its title, this book is only marginally concerned with Constantine Porphyrogenitus. The poor emperor is dismissed in the first twenty-five pages, after which we are treated to an account of various aspects of the Byzantine Empire, beginning with the economy and going on to provincial administration, the army, the navy, foreign relations, and

some miscellaneous snippets under the title of "Civilization"—an account that is not confined to Constantine's reign, but ranges from the seventh century to the eleventh, with frequent excursions to ancient Greece and Rome, Egypt, Canaan, and China. On page 575 we return to Constantine and take leave of him on page 605, but half of this space is devoted to a somewhat confused discussion of the murder of Michael III in 867 and its subsequent "cover-up." After this we are offered nearly a hundred pages of appendixes that, again, have little to do with the Porphyrogenitus.

Second, as to documentation and method. Toynbee has read widely in the Byzantine field, but he has read at random with the result that on a great many points he is not in control either of the evidence or of the modern bibliography (annex 1 of "The Record of the Years 813-959 in the Byzantine Chronicles" may serve as an example). This would not have been so serious had he written the kind of bird's-eye view historical essay that we expect from the senior practitioners of our discipline rather than a heavy tome, replete with footnotes and appendixes, that gives the impression of being a work of exact scholarship. What I found, however, more distressing than the gaps in information and bibliography was the author's casual approach to ascertaining the facts, an approach that stands in marked contrast to that of J. B. Bury, whom Toynbee so rightly admires. Bury always went right down to the evidence; Toynbee is usually content to cite a textbook. One example will have to suffice. On page 27 he makes the statement that the prosperity of the Byzantine Empire came to an end precisely in the year 963. Then on page 36 he inserts an appendix in which he says that the view put forward by him was held until recently by reputable authorities, but at the last moment he happened to have read an article by M. F. Hendy ("Byzantium, 1081-1204: An Economic Reappraisal," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 20 [1970]), who, on the basis of numismatic evidence, argued the exact opposite, namely that the Empire reached the peak of its economic development in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Coins or no coins, Toynbee tries halfheartedly to defend his position on the grounds that the peasantry was miserable in the eleventh century (When was

it not miserable?); furthermore, he says, the same opinion is endorsed in the "authoritative" *History of Byzantine Civilization* (1971) by Hans W. Haussig, which, we assume, is deemed sufficient to put Hendy in his place.

The truth of the matter, it seems to me, is that Toynbee (like Constantine Porphyrogenitus) has thrown together a pile of notes he has been taking for several decades with only a perfunctory attempt of bringing them up to date or relating them to the subject of his book. On page 601 he aptly criticizes the *De Caerimoniis* and the *De Administrando Imperio* with the words: "The miscellaneousness and the disorder of their contents make it look as if Constantine had kept them on the boil for years on end." And on the next page: "A book is—or ought to be, when finished—a unity with a structure. It should, in fact, be finite, whereas a file is, by its very nature, open-ended." Much the same judgment could be passed on this book.

The importance of Constantine lies, of course, in those fields that are least treated or completely ignored by Toynbee, namely the intellectual and the artistic. He seems, indeed, to be unaware of the artistic "renaissance" that has been associated with Constantine's reign by scholars such as Kurt Weitzmann and Hugo Buchthal. He also shows very little interest in the immense encyclopediac enterprise that was either commissioned by Constantine or carried out more or less contemporaneously—an effort that included the *Excerpta*, the *Geoponica*, the *Souda*, and the Metaphrastian *Menologium*. Of these the student will find a useful sketch in Paul Lemerle's *Le premier humanisme byzantin* (1971). One would welcome a much fuller treatment since, for better or for worse, our knowledge of the Byzantine Empire—its administration, its ceremonial and its cultural "baggage"—is to a large extent derived from Constantine's compilations.

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Oxford

MODERN EUROPE

JULIAN H. FRANKLIN. *Jean Bodin and the Rise of Absolutist Theory*. (Cambridge Studies in the History and Theory of Politics.) New York:

Cambridge University Press. 1973. Pp. viii, 124. \$8.95.

"The central thesis of this book is that Bodin's absolutism was as unprecedented as the [Huguenot justification of resistance that] it opposed" (vii). To substantiate his position, Professor Franklin first seeks to show that "from the end of the fifteenth century to 1572 . . . the dominant trend of political ideas was favorable to constitutionalism . . . and the idea of residual absolute authority was in process of gradual erosion" (p. 21). He next demonstrates that "Bodin's idea of sovereignty [as expressed in the *Methodus*, which was published in 1566] was deliberately adapted to the French tradition of limited monarchy" (p. 38). The stage is thus set for Bodin's "sudden and dramatic shift" (p. 41) after 1572 to the absolutism of the *République*, a shift that Franklin attributes to his "profound unwillingness to acknowledge legitimate resistance" (p. 50). Franklin then explains how Bodin sought to overcome arguments that coronation oaths and representative assemblies prevented kings from being absolute and how he dealt with the limitations on absolute authority imposed by fundamental and natural laws. Of special interest is Franklin's argument that Bodin's insistence on consent to taxation was consistent with his desire for a strong monarchy because he opposed using the power of the purse to control the actions of the king. The book concludes with a treatment of the question of resistance and a brief evaluation of the influence of Bodin's ideas.

Professor Franklin has a thorough knowledge of the sixteenth-century political theorist and writes with a cogent, terse prose. His interpretations are always thought-provoking and nearly always well substantiated. I am particularly doubtful about his treatment of taxation. He assumes that Bodin required consent only to new taxes, but in the *République* he required consent to all taxes except those levied in cases of urgent necessity. Bodin strengthened the sovereign in his dealings with the magnates, magistrates, and estates by giving him "the greatest power to command" and the right "to make law binding on all his subjects," but he placed him more specifically under divine and natural law (which protected property rights) than most of his contemporaries. I see no neces-

sary inconsistency in this and am doubtful whether Bodin should be considered an absolutist. He certainly defended himself vigorously in the preface to the third edition of the *République* against charges that he had given too much power to the king, as Franklin himself shows (p. 102).

RUSSELL MAJOR
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JACOB KATZ. *Out of the Ghetto: The Social Background of Jewish Emancipation, 1770-1870*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1973. Pp. vi, 271. \$12.00.

This important study deals with the political, social, and ideological factors that produced in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries a radically new evaluation of the place of Jews in Central and Western Europe. Professor Katz examines the changing attitudes of both the Jewish and non-Jewish world in the Enlightenment that led many Jewish leaders to seek integration into the national political and cultural communities in which they lived and that led many non-Jewish thinkers to see the assimilation and absorption of the isolated Jewish communities as a major Enlightenment goal. Starting from the concept of the Jewish communities as constituting a "republic apart," dispersed in strange lands as temporary, and often unwanted residents awaiting their return to Israel when the Messiah finally arrived, Professor Katz shows that neither the Jews nor their neighbors originally thought of making the Jewish communities part of the larger society around them. Then, in the eighteenth century pressure developed for the national states to control and regulate the Jewish communities. The rationalistic ideas of the Enlightenment eroded the Christian basis for separating the Jews and led to the secularization of the state in which religious differences theoretically would play no role. And, on the Jewish side, there was pressure for shedding many traditional views and practices and for adopting the mores of the surrounding world.

Professor Katz studies in fascinating detail the way both tolerant Enlightenment leaders, primarily in France, Germany, and Austria, and Jewish thinkers such as Mendelssohn, Wessely, and De Pinto, developed an image of the future in which Jews and Christians would

be coequal citizens and partners in modern states. Professor Katz also analyzes the objections to this liberalizing process presented by gentiles and Orthodox Jews. This transformation, which led to the breakup of the ghettos and to many Jews emerging from their age-old isolation, was accelerated by the effects of the French Revolution and Napoleon's conquests.

The Jewish emancipation movement was far from a complete success. The dialectical opposition of Judaism and Christianity became transformed into a new secular anti-Semitism, a nationalistic romantic ideology that still found the Jews aliens in modern nonreligious states.

The transformation came to its climax when Napoleon called the Sanhedrin into session for the first time since Titus conquered Jerusalem. Only the Sanhedrin can change Jewish law. This episode is usually considered a joke or is interpreted in terms of Napoleon's economic policies. Professor Katz shows that the Sanhedrin's meeting grew partly out of Enlightenment Jewish desires to modernize Jewish law and partly from a desire to eliminate those Jewish practices inimical to modern secular, national life. The members of the Sanhedrin were willing to go along with Napoleon's assimilation policy, except for the rabbinical refusal to sanctify intermarriage. In 1808 Napoleon issued his so-called Infamous Decrees, trying to integrate the Alsatian Jews into normal French life. Jews then and since have regarded these decrees as a betrayal since they represent an attempt at assimilation in gentile terms rather than Jewish ones. What is at issue is the core of the problem; namely, what each side would consider an acceptable incorporation of the Jewish people as coequal members of modern society. Liberal non-Jews would like to see all differences disappear—that is, Jews cease being Jews in any meaningful sense and become Frenchmen, Germans, etc. The modern Jews want to be French Jews, English Jews, etc. Anti-Semitic gentiles have insisted the first option either cannot be achieved or should not be attempted and that the second amounts to creating citizens whose loyalties transcend national boundaries and who are thereby dangerous.

Out of the Ghetto is an excellent presenta-

tion of the development of Jewish emancipation. It concentrates mainly on German and Austrian developments with less emphasis on the French ones. The only criticisms I would raise are (1) that the work purports to cover the period between 1770 and 1870, but actually only deals in detail with events up to around 1830; (2) Professor Katz's interpretation of the significance of the meetings of the Napoleonic Sanhedrin and the Infamous Decrees is still heavily imbued with the usual Jewish interpretations. Professor Katz does treat the Sanhedrin's deliberations seriously, and not as a joke, but tries to put them into traditional Jewish molds. He does not consider their relation to either Napoleon's messianic pretensions or the Abbé Grégoire's millenarian views. Recently discovered materials of Grégoire's about the Sanhedrin give a quite different picture (which I am dealing with in a forthcoming study). Grégoire was the adviser to some of the major participants at the meetings. The Infamous Decrees are actually an attempt to put into practice, maybe somewhat brutally, Grégoire's humanistic proposals dating from even before the Revolution; (3) the effect of Jewish life in the United States on the European scene is not mentioned. The United States, the first purely secular state, is the first Western state to have Jewish citizens. The situation in the United States and the possibility of immigrating there must have affected the persecuted Jews of Europe from 1789 onward.

Out of the Ghetto is the culmination of a lifetime of study by Professor Katz. This work, plus his many previous books and articles, constitutes a most important presentation of the way Jewish-Christian relations became transformed in the Enlightenment and the way this transformation created new tensions and problems that provided the roots of what was to become the holocaust.

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FRIDA KNIGHT. *Beethoven and the Age of Revolution*. [New York:] International Publishers. 1973. Pp. 206. \$7.50.

Knight "sets out to look at Beethoven and his work *specifically* in the context of the social

and political events of the very stirring times in which he lived." She evokes the character of the people and regions known to Beethoven by giving quotations from the writings of contemporary or near-contemporary travelers, such as Madame de Staël (*De l'Allemagne* [London, 1813]) and "A Musical Professor" (*A Ramble in Germany* [London, 1828]). For the sequence of events in Beethoven's life she relies chiefly on *Thayer's Life of Beethoven* (ed. E. Forbes [1964]), and into the episodes she pours rather dramatic sketches of battles, sieges, occupations, inflation, and the rest. No one chief source is evident, but she does cite some recent publications such as E. J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution* (1962) and D. E. Emerson, *Mettetr-nich and the Political Police* (1968).

Compositions come in their chronological order and are made to fit the private or public actions and atmosphere of the time; instead of musical analysis (not required by her objectives) Knight tells us sometimes why Beethoven wrote what he did and what he meant by it, as in the following passage: "But towards the end of 1817 Beethoven summoned all his will power and creative energy to utter a cry of revolt and express his anger and grief and his supreme confidence in life. The 'Hammerklavier' Sonata is an assertion of the human spirit triumphant. It embodied the artist's will to overcome his own troubles, and his knowledge that in spite of present hardship the forces of progress would win in the end. The 'Hammerklavier' Sonata is the voice of 'the Inspired Man'" (p. 110).

Although Knight does not attempt to give us a new interpretation of the period from the French Revolution to the 1820s, some of her broad statements arouse apprehension, as, for example, when the "sudden springtime" in Italy in 1797 is compared to the "flowering of popular culture" in the former Habsburg dominions that were "starved of culture throughout the nineteenth century and till the end of World War II" (p. 191).

Knight acknowledges that the "book was begun in 1970, Beethoven's bicentenary year, in a rash moment of enthusiasm over the discovery of the Conversation Books of 1817 to 1823" (p. 6). It is doubtful that it adds appreciably, if at all, to what older books have revealed about

Beethoven, or anything to knowledge of his age in general. Perhaps she wrote it more to satisfy her own needs than those of others.

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JEAN SIGMANN. *1848: The Romantic and Democratic Revolutions in Europe*. Translated from the French by LOVETT F. EDWARDS. (Great Revolutions.) New York: Harper and Row. 1973. Pp. 352. \$10.00.

The years 1848 and 1849 remain unique in European history. Even in our stormy and uncertain times it is hard to envisage half a dozen major revolutions and several lesser ones crowding one upon the other, having some aspirations in common, but also many disparate interests and aims, leading in the concluding months to reaction and military repression.

So important were these unexpected and spectacular events that historians of many nations have written exhaustive treatises upon them and have produced mountains of monographic studies on individual aspects or particular failures. Few indeed, however, have had the courage to attack the entire problem, to trace the innumerable, often conflicting currents and to analyze the constant interactions.

This is what Jean Sigmann has undertaken to do, with perhaps as great a degree of success as possible, at least in the few hundred pages he has allotted himself. His book has the virtue not only of a synthesis, but of sound knowledge and balanced judgment. So conscientious is he that no country, no movement however insignificant, is overlooked. Furthermore, feeling the need of reviewing the background of the various upheavals, he gets so involved that only about a third of his book remains for the treatment of the actual revolutions; he has even traced the forces at work in such countries as Portugal, Sweden, Norway, and even the Serbia of Prince Milosh.

In a word, the book defeats its own purpose. A student coming new to the subject will find the text so congested and the narrative so breathless as to leave him completely at sea. Places and proper names (both not infrequently misspelled) becloud the discussion of

key issues. Of the author's competence and understanding there can be no doubt, but it is clear that an adequate treatment of so vast and complicated a subject and its background in hardly more than three hundred pages is simply an impossibility. Perhaps the task could be accomplished in three times the number of pages, but even then it would be difficult to integrate and make sense of so much recalcitrant material.

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PIERRE BLET *et al.*, editors. *Le Saint Siège et les victimes de la guerre, mars 1939-décembre 1940.* (Secrétairerie d'État de Sa Sainteté. Actes et documents du Saint Siège relatifs à la seconde guerre mondiale, number 6.) Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana. 1972. Pp. xxviii, 557.

PIERRE BLET *et al.*, editors. *Le Saint Siège et la guerre mondiale, novembre 1942-décembre 1943.* (Secrétairerie d'État de Sa Sainteté. Actes et documents du Saint Siège relatifs à la seconde guerre mondiale, number 7.) Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana. 1973. Pp. xxvii, 765.

These two volumes—on victims of the war (dating from March 1939 to December 1940) and attempts toward peace (between November, 1942 and December 1943)—are the latest in the series of Vatican documents pertaining to the Second World War. When the first volume was published in December 1965 the Vatican's secretariat for foreign affairs announced three major topics for the series: Vatican activities in the service of peace; the Vatican's relationship with local hierarchies caught up in the war; and Vatican efforts on behalf of the victims of the war.

Several volumes on Vatican peace efforts have been published previously and volume 7, under review here, is a continuation on this subject. Volume 6, however, is the first volume on Vatican aid to the victims of the war. The delay in publishing these books, as the editors explain in their introduction, was in large part due to the necessity of sifting through the entire documentary collection for the war years to select the pertinent documents on each topic. This topical arrangement has another disadvantage, namely, the reader is never quite certain

in which volume a particular subject will be found.

Looking first at volume 6 and Vatican efforts on behalf of war victims, we find the editors acknowledging that Vatican relief efforts were costly and time-consuming and the results meager and disappointing. The precedents of World War I, as in so many other fields, were a poor guide for papal relief efforts in World War II. During the earlier war the Russian and Ottoman empires cooperated, albeit reluctantly, with Vatican relief efforts, while a relatively primitive technology of war made it possible to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants, and there were few political or racial refugees. In the recent war, Germany and Russia refused any effective cooperation, the advanced state of aerial warfare made entire populations victims of the war, and racial and ideological fanaticism created thousands of refugees. Thus, the Vatican's relief task not only increased enormously in scope, but became nearly impossible to implement.

The Vatican had to rely on the cooperation of the national Catholic hierarchies to carry out its plans and could only hope that the moral authority of the pope would carry enough weight to obtain results. That this was not always the case is amply documented in this volume. One of the major actions the Vatican undertook on behalf of German refugees (mostly Jews recently converted to Catholicism and known, in the jargon of the period, as non-Aryan Catholics), was the so-called Brazil project, which involved granting three thousand Brazilian visas to German immigrants. Despite consistent pressure by Vatican and local officials in Berlin and Rio de Janeiro, Brazilian bureaucrats and clergymen who objected to the plan for economic and racial reasons imposed numerous delays. In the end, fewer than one thousand refugees were admitted. The Vatican experienced similar disappointments when it attempted to modify pending racial legislation in Italy, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania.

In view of its limited resources the Vatican decided to concentrate its greatest efforts toward the rescue of non-Aryan Catholics. Their plight was especially grave inasmuch as the Jewish charitable organizations refused to help them and the Church felt a special responsibility toward them.

Other major sections in this volume deal with the Holy See's assistance to Poland, its cooperation with the International Red Cross, and other miscellaneous operations. Among the latter were assistance to refugees in Central Europe: Czechs and Romanians in Hungary, Hungarians and Poles in Romania, and French laborers deported to Germany. One of the more interesting and lesser-known projects was a plan to establish a volunteer peace corps in Finland during the Winter War. It was apparently never carried out, although the editors point out that the documentation on this subject is incomplete. The results of most of these assistance efforts were disappointing, but not for lack of trying; Vatican officials were not indifferent to the appeals directed to them.

Volume 7 presents Vatican diplomacy at a time when the war took a dramatic turn in favor of the Allies, a change that also affected Vatican policy. The prospect of a Communist victory was frightening to Vatican officials, who preferred a negotiated peace in place of a total victory by either Germany or Russia. Of almost equal concern to the Holy See were the problems of the bombing and occupation of Rome, and Italy's role in the war.

On the question of the bombing of Rome, the Vatican argument that the city was the capital of Christianity was countered by Allied arguments of military necessity and the military impossibility of distinguishing between the Italian people and their Fascist government. The Vatican also tried repeatedly to get the government to remove all military headquarters from Rome and declare Rome an open city.

Vatican efforts toward a negotiated peace (prompted by fears both that a Russian victory would lead to a Communist takeover in Germany and that American troops would be withdrawn from Europe at the end of the war) were labeled by Allied propaganda as pro-German. That the smaller nations of East Central Europe and Switzerland, Spain, and Portugal shared the Vatican's apprehensions was only further proof to the Allies that these nations had also fallen victim to Nazi propaganda.

A more serious dispute, which has been publicized before, arose between the Vatican and the Polish government in exile. In January 1943, Wladislas Racziewicz, president of Po-

land, asked the pope to publicly condemn Nazi atrocities against the Polish people. Some Vatican officials attributed Racziewicz's demands to antipapal influence among the president's advisers, believed that the facts regarding Nazi atrocities were exaggerated, and noted the inconsistencies between the president's reports and those from Vatican sources. Pius XII apparently agreed with this assessment; his reply to Racziewicz was noncommittal. The Vatican did, however, accredit Monsignore Godfrey, the apostolic delegate in Britain, as charge d'affairs to the Polish government-in-exile, to demonstrate the pope's concern for Poland.

Another well-publicized episode concerns the deportation of Roman Jews by the SS. The editors mention this incident only in their introduction (p. 62), citing a telegram in a footnote from the British minister assigned by the Foreign Office to Rome (this is an unpublished document from the recently opened Foreign Office archives); they promise to publish a memorandum by Cardinal Maglione, the papal secretary of state, in a subsequent volume on war victims.

The steadily deteriorating military and political situation in Italy led the Vatican, at considerable risk, to support attempts by the king and anti-Mussolini forces to get the country out of the war. While trying to avoid the appearance of meddling in domestic affairs, the pope felt that he could not let ruin and chaos overtake the country. At the same time, Vatican officials were aware that should the armistice negotiations with the Allies become known to Mussolini or the Germans, severe reprisals might be in store for the pope and the Church. In the end the Vatican's efforts did not play a decisive role in these negotiations and the armistice was effected through other channels.

Throughout this volume, Pius XII's concern for a just and lasting peace is very much in evidence; he was equally concerned, however, to appear strictly impartial and to have his motives understood. He worried lest his desire for a negotiated peace create another stab-in-the-back legend in Germany, as Benedict XV's peace proposals had done during the First World War, and he was also worried about Italian rumors that disapproved of the Vatican's role in the Italian armistice negotiations.

As in previous volumes of this series the

documents are printed in the original language and in chronological order. There is a short summary of each document in French and a fairly detailed introduction, also in French, outlining the major subjects in each volume. There are explanatory footnotes and some references to the pertinent literature. One of the most helpful features is the inclusion of various drafts, comments, and corrections of documents, indicating how the Vatican arrived at some of its decisions. There is no doubt that these volumes are a major contribution to the diplomatic history of the Second World War.

GEORGE O. KENT
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College Park

J. J. BAGLEY. *Historical Interpretation*. Volume 1, *Sources of English Medieval History, 1066–1540*; volume 2, *Sources of English History, 1540 to the Present Day*. New York: St. Martin's Press. 1973. Pp. 285; 296. \$10.00 each.

At long last a teacher has written a book to help others to teach and learn English history, and Bagley's story is admirably designed to win new converts to Clio's cause. A Reader in history at the University of Liverpool, he has aimed to tell learners, both buffs and professionals, how to have the fun of finding out for themselves what happened and why in England's past. A born storyteller and a general practitioner of the historian's craft, he has reversed the century-old practice, begun in 1871 with Stubbs's *Select Charters*, of teaching history directly from the documents. Instead, this book provides instruction on where to find the evidence, which kind of source to use for which purpose, and how to apply the material it affords. Bagley uses lengthy quotations from manifold sources to exemplify the directions he gives and to illustrate the kind of information that may be derived from a particular class of evidence. He picks an episode and then reinforces his account with source quotations. A seven-page version of Wyatt's Rebellion in 1554 includes quotations from the *State Papers*, a letter from Princess Elizabeth, and the reports of the Spanish and French ambassadors. A well-paced narrative and Bagley's feel for the past should entice readers into the web of history from which es-

cape is seldom easy. Chapter after chapter exudes the joy of teaching, the author's pleasure in the writing and in sharing with others "The Bliss that History Doth Bring Men to."

To show the variety among the records of England's past is the book's main theme. Social and economic sources predominate, but much attention is given to the people and to the role of individual persons. Letters and diaries, memoirs, biographies, and chronicles disclose the parts played by kings and warriors, statesmen and parsons, and just plain people. Bagley directs the learner to the National Portrait Gallery to see what England's personages looked like; he calls attention to medieval wall-portraits and, for recent centuries, to prints, drawings, and cartoons. Over three dozen illustrations, all of them fresh and new, show what manuscripts, maps, and indentures look like, and the pictures of brasses, town plans, buildings, and broadsides, railway cuttings and canals, advertisements and *Amusements of London* give a fair sampling of the historian's delights. The opportunities for discoveries in the regional archives of shire and borough with their fresh supplies of private manuscripts and official records are pointed out. Also explained is the use of poetry, pamphlets, and newspapers, of guidebooks, like Thomas West's *Guide to the Lakes* (1778), and travelers' tales to ascertain the common mind of England—although the big ideas of Britain's many uncommon minds seem missing. Moreover, Bagley suggests just how the kinds of surviving evidence have determined the prevailing patterns of England's history and the character of much English historiography.

When an author has chosen so much so wisely, to mention sins of omission—what he chose not to choose—may be bad taste. But surely so fervid a teacher need have no fear of "the austere territory of constitutional history." Likewise, so reflective a historian might have done more with intellectual and political history. But Bagley's game was author's choice, and his the right to select. The choices that he has made should inspire many a student to become a teacher—and a scholar, too.

WILLIAM H. DUNHAM, JR.
Yale University

DAVID H. PILL. *The English Reformation, 1529-58*. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield. 1973. Pp. 224. Cloth \$7.00, paper \$3.50.

This is a straightforward, well-organized history of the Reformation in England through the early years of the Elizabethan settlement. The author, as he notes in his introduction, has relied largely on secondary sources. Since these, both monographic and broadly interpretive, have accumulated at an alarming rate during the past two decades, to reduce them to comprehensive size and yet present a story judiciously and simply is no small achievement. The book, unlike so many dealing with ecclesiastical and religious history, is written for the layman to understand. We are given a sketch of the Church, its structure, and its offices, which for a change does not leave the reader floundering about among archidiaconal courts, rural deans, appropriations, monastic cathedrals, prebendaries, and so forth. It should prove most useful for undergraduate courses. The student who lacks the training or the experience of the ecclesiastical historian will be most grateful.

Instead of attempting the impossible task of crediting his secondary sources in footnotes, on controversial points Pill cites his authorities in the text and then at the end of the chapter provides a brief review of the major works upon which the chapter is based. And he has the courage, which authors of summary works so rarely show, to present divergent views on specific questions without feeling called upon to adjudicate authoritatively between them. His overall thesis, however, is quite clear. The Henrician reformation was a political and constitutional revolution and only incidentally religious and theological. Henry was its moving force, the royal supremacy the key to all his actions, the unity of the English state under his firm control his constant aim. It is this that distinguishes his reign from the reigns of his son and his elder daughter. From 1547 to 1558 other motives predominated and chaos resulted. The success of Elizabeth was in large part due to her return to the middle way that Henry had sought and the subordination of religious and ecclesiastical ends to the good of the state.

W. M. SOUTHGATE
Denison University

JOYCE YOUNGS. *The Dissolution of the Monasteries*. (Historical Problems: Studies and Documents, number 14.) New York: Barnes and Noble. 1971. Pp. 264. \$10.00.

When a government succeeds brilliantly in a radical stroke of policy, the historian is tempted to assume that someone must have planned the whole matter systematically, from start to finish. Henry VIII's suppression of the English monasteries went so smoothly, provoking so little resistance from monks or interested laymen, that one might easily suppose that Thomas Cromwell had it all thought out in 1535. The peculiar strength of Joyce Youings's recent work is her thorough demonstration—by following the campaign step by step, and almost day by day—that the Crown moved in a wholly tentative, cautious, opportunistic fashion, probing for weaknesses and deciding to press for wholesale surrenders only after the fragility of even the "great and solemn monasteries" was blatant and manifest in mid-1538. Dr. Youings underscores the importance of local initiative (on the part of lay landlords and their agents) in pointing out to Cromwell which houses might cave in most easily to pressure and in anticipating the wholesale secularization of monastic property by an unprecedented flurry (in 1537-38) of investment in conventual leases. And Dr. Youings stresses the care with which Cromwell assured all lay investors (and indeed the religious themselves) that they stood to lose little or nothing should the monasteries fall to the Crown. So although Cromwell evidently had no notion in 1535 that he would be able to go all the way and seize the monasteries' land *in toto*, his skillful handling at each stage made it possible for each successful stroke to precipitate the next one.

Dr. Youings's focus is a narrow one, on the step-by-step management of the campaign and on administrative techniques within the Court of Augmentations. She makes no attempt to supplement (or duplicate) the work of Professor M. D. Knowles, for instance, on the wider and more long-term questions of pre-Reformation religious life, the impact of the dissolution on the nature of English spirituality, and so on. The economic and administrative facets of the dissolution are of course Dr. Youings's forte, and she produces a terse and lucid synthesis of

recent research in 131 pages. She leaves a few questions unanswered (what really lay behind all that monastic building in 1537-38, for instance?) but little to criticize in the restricted field she has chosen.

The documents that Dr. Youings includes (forming almost half the book) are a rich and varied representation of the sources relevant to the dissolution. It may well be that this volume will appeal most to the beginning graduate student, who will find in the text and documents an open doorway into further research on the topic.

LESLIE P. FAIRFIELD
Purdue University

JOAN THIRSK and J. P. COOPER, editors. *Seventeenth-Century Economic Documents*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1972. Pp. xvii, 849. \$27.25.

Discrete documents are not commonly the object of the cogitations of economic historians of the seventeenth century. Some tracts, some governmental memorandums, and the late essays in political arithmetic stand out as singularly important documents, and they have received close, individual analysis. More commonly, however, the economic historian works cumulatively and quantitatively from whole classes of documents in series. Probably because they are of little significance when they are presented singly or in excerpts, many types of documents commonly used by economic historians are not represented in the present volume at all: conveyancing instruments, port books, financial accounts of government departments to name but a few. Most of the documents in this volume are contemporary descriptions of economic conditions and problems, documents that are often the starting point for historical analysis, but often not the sort on which conclusions rest. There is, therefore, little resemblance between the exercises that students may perform with a selection of documents such as this and the activity of economic historians.

Research, or the imitation of it, however, is only one of the purposes this collection, prepared to meet the needs of Oxford undergraduates, might be asked to serve. Dr. Thirsk states in the preface to this volume that the aim of the collection is "to illustrate as many

aspects of economic life as possible, and to indicate new paths for exploration as well as traversing old ones." The 374 documents or excerpts from documents are arranged chronologically in eight topical sections: "Economic Crises" (40 documents); "Agriculture" (44 documents); "Industries" (62 documents); "Inland and Coastal Trade and Communications" (54 documents); "Overseas Trade" (70 documents); "Finance and Coinage" (70 documents); "Aliens" (23 documents); and "Wealth, Population, and Land: Some Contemporary Statistics" (11 documents). The documents in the section on aliens, a group difficult to define in economic terms, might better have been incorporated in the other sections. Otherwise the arrangement is sensible. One hundred seventy-three of the documents have been taken directly from manuscript sources: the Public Record Office, 98 (75 from the State Papers); the Bodleian Library, 23; the British Museum, 19; the House of Lords Record Office, 6; and 27 from fifteen other collections and archives. Seventy of the excerpts are from fifty-two contemporary books, pamphlets, and broadsides. One hundred thirty-one of the documents are drawn from the printed texts of published documents or later editions of printed sources: the *Statutes of the Realm*, 11; Anchitel Grey's Commons debates, 7; W. Notestein, F. H. Relf, and H. Simpson's Commons debates of 1621, 6; *Harleian Miscellany*, 6; *Acts of the Privy Council*, 5; C. B. Robinson's edition of Henry Best's *Rural Economy in Yorkshire in 1641* (1857), 5; J. D. Marshall's edition of *The Autobiography of William Stout of Lancaster, 1665-1752* (1967), 5; and 86 from fifty-eight other works. The chronological distribution of the entire collection over the seventeenth century is fairly even. There is some imbalance within individual sections; but one can understand why there are in section 1 fifteen documents from 1521-25 and none from 1600-20, and why, given the subtitle of section 8 ("Some Contemporary Statistics"), the editors have included selections from the works of Sir Thomas Wilson at the beginning of the century, William Petty, Gregory King, and Charles Davenant at the end, and almost nothing else.

In their first aim the editors are fairly successful: the documents they have selected illustrate most aspects of seventeenth-century eco-

nomic life. Though one might complain that there are very few documents touching on household economy, the land market, the money market in the first half of the century, colonial trade and North American fisheries, the East India Company, and most wholesale trades, there are not many documents in the collection that one would wish to exclude.

The editors may be less successful in realizing their second objective, to indicate new paths for exploration, if by exploration they mean original research. Most readers are likely to find much that is fresh and stimulating in the collection; but the editors do not indicate new paths for exploration. In discerning new paths and in distinguishing between them and the well-traversed ones, students, for whom the book is intended, are left entirely to their own devices.

In this and in all other respects there is a paucity of editorial assistance given in the volume. There are a one and one-half-page preface, a table of contents, one-half of a page of acknowledgments, a one-half-page statement of "Rules of Transcription," descriptive headings of about five to twelve words to each document, references to the sources of the documents (given with many inconsistencies in form), a thirty-three-page index (excellent for personal and place names, fair for subjects), and about 207 editorial footnotes. Thirty-six of the notes are to one document, a first draft of Gregory King's "Observations," 21 simply give marginal notes and comments found in the originals, about 26 are terse notes on the form or condition of the original documents, and about 25 are cross-references to other documents in the collection. Only 50 notes, or thereabouts (other than those to Gregory King), actually elucidate points in the text by explaining their meaning or by describing the historical context, and these are mostly extremely brief and of minimal help. It may be said that the documents should be allowed to speak for themselves; but where editors, as in this case, have made a reasoned decision in each instance to include a document, the documents necessarily speak indirectly, and obscurely, for the editors. This work would be far more useful to all readers had the editors revealed the basis for their decisions more clearly in statements preceding each document, in introductions to each section, or in an ex-

tended preface, even at the expense of some documents.

R. G. LANG

University of Oregon

DAVID CHANDLER. *Marlborough as Military Commander*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1973. Pp. 368. \$14.95.

An early eighteenth-century print depicts Queen Anne and her husband drinking tea, while Godolphin and Marlborough attend them. Safely removed to a place on the wall, a portrait of William III looks down on the charming scene. These were the small change of the great king, acting out roles he had written for them and had played himself during his own lifetime. In some ways they did better than the original cast. Since they were English Anne and her ministers could put forward a great-power policy far more easily than could foreign kings like William III and George I. And they had skills of their own. Godolphin ran the War of the Spanish Succession at five per cent interest, where William III had had to pay eight per cent and Charles II ten per cent for their money. Marlborough fought the war without ever being defeated. 1688 is of course more important than Blenheim, but as a battle general Marlborough was far superior to William III. And Marlborough was more than a Patton, for in those days one could not simply telephone an order for more air support. In one sense Mr. Chandler, by concentrating on the battle general, is less than fair to his hero. Marlborough's diplomatic work was of the first importance, and if he had not been immensely successful as a diplomatist there would have been no battles.

Ultimately of course the tea party broke up. Marlborough and Godolphin were dismissed and the Dutch, who had been providing so much of the tea, left the ranks of the great powers. To this extent the second company was less successful than William III had been. But at least Marlborough was greater than Stair or Cumberland, his successors in the wars of George II, and on the day of battle Marlborough was greater than William or even Eugene of Savoy. Mr. Chandler has written a popular account that has a number of advantages over that of the late Winston S. Churchill.

It is the shorter, better written, better balanced, and more accurate of the two. Although it does not take account of the best recent work in German or French or Dutch, this book incorporates the advances of the last forty years in English-language historiography, some of them Mr. Chandler's own. The fifth chapter, "The Art of War," is a model of clear exposition and will be of particular value to students of the period.

STEPHEN B. BAXTER
University of North Carolina,
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WILLIAM C. LEHMANN. *Henry Home, Lord Kames, and the Scottish Enlightenment: A Study in National Character and in the History of Ideas.* (International Archives of the History of Ideas, 41.) The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1971. Pp. xxvi, 358. 60.15 gls.

Lord Kames was one of the more interesting secondary figures of the Scottish Enlightenment, a virtually self-taught advocate from an impoverished Berwickshire landed family who spent thirty years as a member of Scotland's highest court and wrote profusely on all sorts of subjects. He was personally and intellectually eccentric and had no literary gifts, so that his work is not much read today, and much of it is unreadable. But in his own time—he died in 1782 at the age of eighty-six—he was a very influential man. He was a leading member of the circle in Edinburgh that included Hume and Smith, and the sociologist John Millar, the subject of one of Professor Lehmann's earlier books, was his protégé. Lord Kames wrote extensively on the law; he was a well-known agricultural improver whose *Gentleman Farmer*, published in 1776, was the most influential Scottish handbook of the last quarter of the century; his *Essay on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion* led to his being charged with atheism; he even wrote a huge *Elements of Criticism* that had a substantial vogue and that prompted Boswell to call it "his worst work. They are all bad, but it is his worst" (p. 233).

Lehmann's method of dealing with the career and ideas of this many-sided man is not very successful. The first half of the book is labeled "chiefly biographical and historical," but we get no consecutive picture of Kames's

life and no systematic discussion of the Scotland of his day. In the second half, which is devoted to Kames's ideas, Lehmann compartmentalizes his subject's views in chapters on philosophy, history, jurisprudence, literary criticism, and so forth. In each of these chapters Lehmann attempts to create a construct of Kames's views—a list of propositions, for instance, numbered one to seven, summarizing Kames's philosophy of law. The fact that Lehmann is a sociologist by training may account for this profoundly unhistorical approach—Lehmann asserts the influence of Montesquieu on Kames, for instance, but he nowhere discusses how Kames's views of law changed as a result of his reading Montesquieu. In fact one is made rather uneasy about Lehmann's historical grasp when one reads sentences like this: "He was strongly tempted to accept the offer of a captaincy in Frederick the Great of Prussia's famous 'tall guards', made him by an emissary of the Emperor" (p. 21). Finally, the author's literary style is only marginally better than that of his subject.

MAURICE LEE, JR.
Rutgers University,
New Brunswick

OLIVE J. BROSE. *Frederick Denison Maurice: Rebellious Conformist.* [Athens:] Ohio University Press. 1971. Pp. xxiii, 308. \$12.50.

This scholarly survey of Maurice's beliefs—the author calls it an "interior biography"—takes its shape from the central fact of Maurice's interior life: his conversion at the age of twenty-four. Raised a Unitarian by his clergyman father, he watched as his elder sisters and then his mother deserted pallid rationalism for a harsher, yet more soul-satisfying, blend of Moravianism, Wesleyanism, and Calvinism. Upset, his father demanded that his younger children, Frederick among them, assemble "at my domestic altar till they can assign a satisfactory reason for their separation." Seven years later, Frederick had found the reason. It was much the same as his mother's and sisters' had been: the desire for a unity and certainty in life, a desire which eighteenth-century theology could no longer fulfill.

Like most of his thoughtful contemporaries, Maurice was rocked by the confusions of the

period during which he mentally came of age. Brose rightly makes a point of the fact that he was born on the Suffolk coast in 1805 when Napoleon's troops were threatening from Boulogne. The political, social, and intellectual revolutions of the time meant that contemporaries who described the spirit of the age wrote in terms both of expectation and uncertainty. The tension proved too much for Maurice. His mind fired by the Irvingites and by the apocalyptic gusto of Thomas Erskine's *The Brazen Serpent*, he endured a severe psychological crisis and emerged a dedicated and publicly apologetic Anglican.

The author argues in a generally convincing way that the labor of conversion produced far more than a theological mouse. Maurice was listened to during his lifetime, and his theology continues to command respect. At the center of his beliefs, which did not change throughout the rest of his life, lay the profoundly simple conviction that man without God is nothing. Asked, when admitted to the priesthood, what erroneous doctrines he intended to combat, he replied, first "the doctrine that there is any merit in the creature which can entitle it to God's love; or any goodness in the creature at all disunited from God." Brose shows that Maurice felt compelled to draw from this central tenet the theologically radical conclusion that man, once related to God as *imago Dei*, could have "no existence, no 'nature' of his own separate from God," and that this fact denied the possibility of an inherently sinful, fallen human race.

If Maurice was in this sense a rebel, his attachment to the Articles of the Church and thus to the Church as an institution made him a conformist. Man, related to God as image to reality, was to be ruled by Him in all things. "God governed man as His image through social institutions": the patriarchal family, the monarchical state, the universal church. Hence the inevitable disagreements between Maurice, the Christian Socialist who "saw cooperation as a principle to combat selfishness," and John Malcolm Ludlow, his fellow Christian Socialist, who saw it "as a means for reconstituting society."

In pressing her paradox—"rebellious conformist"—the author seems compelled to treat Maurice as a more special case than he is. Other

early Victorians, faced with the confusions of postrevolutionary Europe, underwent conversions not unlike Maurice's. (Brose makes a passing reference to John Stuart Mill's experiences. A fuller discussion and comparison would have been instructive.) And certainly the world of eminent Victorians contains a full complement of men and women one might call rebellious conformists—or is it conforming rebels? Maurice is nothing more or less than an intelligent, worthy, and—I should think—not untypical Victorian intellectual, who attained certainty for himself, yet continued to take doubt seriously.

STANDISH MEACHAM
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Austin

RICHARD A. REMPEL. *Unionists Divided: Arthur Balfour, Joseph Chamberlain and the Unionist Free Traders*. (Library of Politics and Society.) [Hamden, Conn.:] Archon Books. 1972. Pp. 236. \$12.00.

Richard A. Rempel's *Unionists Divided* is a straightforward account of the political activities of the Unionist free traders between 1903 and 1910. This loosely organized group of "free fooders"—comprising about eighty-three M.P.'s—opposed Joseph Chamberlain's efforts to commit the Unionists to a program of tariff reform. They may have succeeded, in 1903 to 1905, in preventing the Balfour government from enacting such a program; yet, in the end, since they enjoyed the support neither of the party machinery nor of Unionist voters, they were virtually eliminated from the Tory party by a change of views or of party, by death, or by a determined constituency-by-constituency purge carried on by their well-organized and well-financed opponents. After 1906 the Tory party in Parliament was overwhelmingly Chamberlainite.

Rempel has effectively told the story of Balfour's subtle maneuverings that contributed to the confusions of the Unionist free traders. The group included such Tories as Winston Churchill, who, convinced that protectionism would undermine British commerce and political integrity, soon, along with other free fooders, joined the Liberals. There were Liberal Unionists, such as the duke of Devonshire and

Goschen, who had deserted the Liberal party nearly two decades earlier on the issue of Home Rule, but who maintained their loyalty to free trade and their suspicions of their fellow Liberal-Unionist-turned-protectionist leader. There were Tories like Sir Michael Hicks Beach and the Cecils, Lords Hugh and Robert, determined to save the soul of Toryism from the immorality of protectionism, and unwilling to yield their party to a parvenu Chamberlain. Between the extremes of Chamberlainism and free trade stood Balfour, contemptuous of the doctrinaire Cobdenism of the free traders, yet leery of a take-over of his party by Midlands industrialists and their imperialist allies. An abortive effort at an alliance between Unionist free fooders and the Liberal party revealed that the divisions between Radicalism and Toryism were not easily bridged. The Liberal budget of 1909 broke the spirit of the tiny remnant of Unionist free traders who survived the election of 1906 to discover that they preferred Balfour's quasi-protectionist Toryism to Lloyd George's "socialism."

The author gives perhaps too much attention to the post-1905 period when the movement became a plaything of the Cecils. What a reader misses is a more systematic treatment of the ideology of the movement, perhaps centering on the Unionist free fooder, St. Loe Strachey, and his weekly *Spectator*. Nonetheless, this is a well-written and useful contribution to English political history.

BERNARD SEMMEL
State University of New York,
Stony Brook

BRADFORD A. LEE. *Britain and the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1939: A Study in the Dilemmas of British Decline*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1973. Pp. ix, 319. \$10.00.

One of the merits of Dr. Lee's book is that it constantly considers the dilemmas of Britain's Far Eastern policies in relation to simultaneous developments in Europe as war with Hitler drew near. (It is interesting, for example, to find Halifax, even in August 1939, observing that "the position in the Far East was now causing him more anxiety than the position in any other part of the world.") The best part of the work, indeed, is a conclusion in which poli-

cies toward Japan and Germany are compared and suggestions made as to why a less yielding line was pursued toward the former, despite the evident frailty of Britain's position from Singapore northward. The refusal of Chamberlain and others to consider an attempt to link up with the Soviet Union in aiding China and resisting Japan is also well brought out.

There were, of course, moments during this period when care was openly taken not to offend Japanese susceptibilities, notably over the Chinese customs in May 1938 and in the case of an announcement accepting the facts of the Sino-Japanese situation as they stood in the summer of 1939. As during the crisis of 1931-33, an attempt by London to pursue a "middle-of-the-road" policy was bound to appear inadequate to the defending Chinese, while even aside from the major factor of American passivity there were the strongest objections in parts of Whitehall (notably the Treasury and Admiralty) to any thought of seeking to check Japan by economic sanctions. Nevertheless, there was also a decided bias, especially in the Foreign Office, in favor of China, and despite the warnings of Sir Robert Craigie in Tokyo, financial help was given to the Chungking regime, and the completion of the Burma Road speeded up. While Roosevelt's wilder musings on possible future action against the aggressor were—rightly—looked on with a disbelief amounting almost to scorn, the necessity for not alienating American opinion continued to exert great influence; meanwhile the comforting belief of the earlier 1930s remained strong, that in the end Japan would find the task of subduing China too much for her, despite the long-term aggressive designs that were believed to motivate many of her policy makers.

In some ways, British policy makers were more realistic in their approach to Far Eastern matters than they were toward Hitler's Germany. And yet for all the inability of the Royal Navy to fulfill the promises of protection held out to Australia and New Zealand at the Imperial Conference of 1937, and for all the question marks hanging over India, there were many who continued to assume, as one Foreign Office official put it, that Britain was "a much greater Asiatic power than Japan." Eden, too, still thought in terms of "asserting white race authority in the Far East." It is a tangle of

motives and priorities, which Dr. Lee has explored competently and clearly. Although, as almost always in this period, one can suggest additional sources that he would have found useful (the Chatfield and China Association Papers, for example), he has read extensively. He has also tried to take account of what was happening on the other side of the hill, in Tokyo, although he tends to write of the Japanese navy in a more monolithic way than is justified, following Asada Sadao's paper on the subject for the Hakone conference of Japanese and American historians. Above all, Dr. Lee might allow himself in his next work to step back a little further and explore such underlying issues as racial conflict and concepts of the international order in the Far East, which show through here and there in this useful study.

CHRISTOPHER THORNE
University of Sussex

TERRY NICHOLS CLARK. *Prophets and Patrons: The French University and the Emergence of the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1973. Pp. x, 282. \$12.00.

This is a good book in certain important respects. One will not find in it anything original on the level of the history of ideas. For example its discussion of prophets like Saint-Simon and Comte is superficial; and its treatment of Durkheim's thought adds nothing to earlier commentaries. But the book is quite interesting in its handling of the relationship between institutions and ideas. Clark argues that Durkheimian sociology was more successful than its competitors in French social thought through its combination of intellectual superiority and adaptive response to institutional and ideological imperatives. The general argument in this book will be familiar to those who have read Max Weber and T. H. Kuhn. But Clark's application of it to social thought in France is highly illuminating. Clark is most informative in his discussion of informal processes through which men and their ideas achieved success in the French system. He develops the concept of a cluster to designate the group of disciples and protégés around an institutionally powerful patron. And he reveals the specific characteristics of the "old boy" network in the highly centralized higher

education system in France. Brief but pertinent comparisons with the more decentralized apprenticeship setup in Germany and the departmental structure in the United States provide a framework for comparative analysis. Clark is less satisfactory in his treatment of the complex developments in French social thought after the disintegration of the Durkheimian paradigm and its cluster of supporters; but he does enumerate the various currents that emerged after Durkheim's death and lists the reasons why Durkheimism failed to hold up after the First World War. On the whole Clark's book is significant as a historical and sociological investigation of the institutionalization of knowledge at a crucial juncture in the development of social thought in France. And it provides a suggestive model for comparable research elsewhere.

DOMINICK LACAPRA
Cornell University

JACQUES LAFON. *Les époux bordelais, 1450-1550: Régimes matrimoniaux et mutations sociales*. (École Pratique des Hautes Études—VI^e Section: Centre de recherches historiques. Démographie et sociétés, 16.) Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N. 1972. Pp. 345. 82 fr.

Despite the second half of its title Lafon's painstaking study of 1,269 marriage contracts in the old *sénéchaussée* of Guyenne (very nearly the modern Gironde) is legal history. With great precision he separates judicial theory, notably in the Custom of 1521, from the real arrangements for marriage recorded in 172 notarial practices. Lafon discovers that marriage partners in some social strata, notably in the rural proletariat of Médoc, had always resorted to the *société d'acquêts*, distinguishing premarital from postmarital possessions, allowing certain rights of survivorship, and protecting the legal freedom of the wife to own and dispose of goods. In other social strata, notably in the nobility and bourgeoisie of Bordeaux, brides and grooms established separate dotal regimes, often with the device of legally integrating the marriage into a familial or universal *communauté*. Over three-quarters of Lafon's examples show the latter arrangements. In the 1520s, however, the *société d'acquêts* began to attract followers among all occupational groups, save the urban retail merchants and rural laborers in the northeast. Lafon attributes the change partly to the

disappearance of the economic crisis, which had held families together longer, but mostly to the influence of the Custom of 1521. In a clumsy and unclear attempt to write down Roman law, the Custom added the dotal regime to the *société d'acquêts*, producing the almost universal arrangement of the eighteenth century. Lafon argues that the early 1520s, while a watershed in the history of marriage in Guyenne, only accelerated the end of the experimentation of the previous generation.

The limits of Lafon's work are inherent in the surviving materials of a nearly prearchival era. A handful of parliamentary decrees on marriage survive, and no court cases are extant. The author has found it convenient to leave the search for testaments and divisions of property after death to future scholars, so that the fate of all the marital arrangements is unknown. Fewer than 30 per cent of the contracts located (40.1 per cent of the 687 Bordeaux contracts) gave any information on profession or *qualité* of any of the principals or families. Lafon has wisely avoided the growing tendency among French historians to project the socioeconomic structure of a city or region from samplings of marriage contracts. Instead, we have a rare book about marriage itself, or at least about the actual legal arrangements for disposition of property during and after marriage. Lafon securely links occupational groups with different practices and effectively dispels the notion that law is a guide to behavior.

The most valuable finding for general economic and social historians is the difference in economy and marital arrangements between city and region. Historians of the family may note that, despite its narrow objectives, Lafon's *Les époux bordelais* raises more questions about attitudes toward women than recent works of greater pretention. Lafon can record a price series or average a group of dowries as well as a Labrousse or a Furet, but he is infinitely more cautious in applying his quantitative work to a single institution.

PERRY VILES

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JEAN-LOUIS BOURGEON. *Les Colbert avant Colbert: Destin d'une famille marchande*. (Publications de la Sorbonne, "N.S. Recherches"—6. Université de Paris IV—Paris-Sorbonne. Travaux du Centre de Recherches sur la Civilisa-

tion de l'Europe Moderne, number 14.) Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1973. Pp. 270, 12 tables.

This study, which revises a number of traditional assumptions about the forebears of *le Grand Colbert*, should prove valuable to those concerned. The author cites many documents both in the text and in the five appendixes, and there are twelve genealogical tables that enable the reader to straighten out the relationships of the various branches of the family.

Part 1 of the text, *Une Dynastie marchande*, illustrating the rise of the family in Reims from humble beginnings to the status of *notables* by the end of the sixteenth century, provides important information for students of French social and economic trends of the period, such as the role of Reims and Lyons in the long-distance wholesale trade (especially textiles) between Italy and the north, and the close connections between those two cities (pp. 90–100, 103–04); the origins of large-scale Parisian banking (pp. 85–90); the effects of the civil wars on trade (pp. 100–01, 108, 140); and the dependence of the Crown on big capitalists (pp. 115–16). Throughout, the author stresses the Colberts' persistence as businessmen and their lack of university or legal training even when they entered the well-known competition for royal office. He also shows the extent to which the *gens de finance* could be allied by marriage to the judicial hierarchy without—at least in this case—losing their separate identity and orientation. Unfortunately, several pages toward the end of this part, including some in the brief conclusion, are blank, through a printing error (pp. 130–31, 134–35, 138–39, 142).

Part 2 is devoted to the career of Nicolas Colbert, Sieur de Vandières, 1590–1661, who became a Parisian financier and whose eldest son was to make the name Colbert a household word. It contains much detail about his business activity, both private and as *Receveur-Général et Payeur des Rentes de la ville de Paris* (pp. 181–203). The section entitled *Le Partisan* (pp. 203–14), a case history in the traffic in offices, should be very useful to students of that characteristic phenomenon of the *ancien régime*.

Two conclusions are of particular interest to the general history of France: first, even so outstanding a man as Jean-Baptiste Colbert at-

tained the position that was to prove the springboard for the final, exceptional phase of his career as the result of hard work by several generations of able and ambitious men to acquire and exploit the most advantageous connections and alliances. Second, although the Colberts clung to finance and resisted the lure of the allegedly "higher" career in the royal courts, they were no less avid than the *parlementaires* in the pursuit of noble status, at any price.

NANCY L. ROELKER
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JEAN TARRADE. *Le commerce colonial de la France à la fin de l'Ancien Régime: L'évolution du régime de "l'Exclusif" de 1763 à 1789*. In two volumes. (Publications de l'Université de Poitiers. Lettres et sciences humaines, 12.) Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1972. Pp. 491; 496-892. 130 fr. the set.

Jean Tarrade has written in two densely packed volumes what surely will be for at least a generation the definitive study of French colonial trade in the last quarter-century of the Old Regime. This brief description, like the title of the work itself, is both accurate and misleading. It is accurate in the sense that the narrative thread of Tarrade's book is simply a detailed account of the development of French colonial commercial policy and administration from 1763 to 1789. Tarrade tells the story—with an almost day-to-day concern with minutia—of the monarchy's attempt to simultaneously and officially maintain and circumvent the Colbertian principle of metropolitan monopoly of all commerce between France and its colonial markets and between those markets and the rest of the world. But the title is misleading in the sense that Tarrade tells the story within the much broader context of French national and international politics, within the context of the movement of ideas and public opinion, and within the context of changing patterns of world trade affecting three continents. At one level Tarrade is comfortable with quantitative analysis; an important lengthy chapter is devoted to a statistical study of the colonial trade. On another level he has a fine eye for and interest in the portraiture of the leading personages involved in the evolution of trade and policy during the period in question: the duc de Dubuc, Jean-Baptiste Praslin, Antoine-Ga-

briel de Sartine, and the marquis de Castries. Tarrade's work, in scope and detail, is as rich for historians as the trade in sugar, coffee and chocolate, and slaves and codfish was rich for France in the years between 1763 and 1789.

Although concerned with the trade between France and all the colonies left to her after the Treaty of Paris in 1763, Tarrade spends only a small effort on the territories "beyond the Cape of Good Hope." With Canada gone (and, in the context of mercantilist ideas shared nearly universally by all sectors of French opinion at the time, not generally regretted as Tarrade is at pains to demonstrate) the heart of the French colonies was in the sugar islands of the tropical West Indies, the windward isles of Guadeloupe and Martinique, and above all in Saint-Domingue, modern Haiti. With a social and economic structure rooted in the intensive exploitation of the land and black slave labor the French West Indies produced sugar, coffee, and chocolate, the taste for which spread, in the last quarter-century of the Old Regime, downward from the aristocracy to the middle levels of the bourgeoisie. Because the white population of these regions grew but slowly, the exportation of French manufactured goods to the islands always lagged in value the flow of the new luxuries to the metropolitan markets. But because the natural reproduction rate of barely nourished and desperately overworked black slaves could never yield enough hands to work the fields, the constant importation of fresh slaves from Africa was imperative. And because the cash crops of sugar, coffee, and cocoa were needed to pay for slaves, the islands could not provide enough food for their maintenance, hence the reliance upon codfish, salted and cheap, which came from northern waters. Mercantilist principles, embodied in the fundamental statutes of 1727 that laid down the monopolist policies of the *exclusif*, dictated that this entire trade—France to the Indies, Africa to the Indies, St. Pierre and Miquelon to the Indies, and the Indies to France—must be in French hands and in French bottoms exclusively. Economic, financial, fiscal, and political reality indicated that such a closed system was unworkable after 1763. The main theme of Tarrade's book is to chronicle the development of the policy of the *exclusif mitigé* from the wreckage of 1763, through the American War of Independence, to the out-

break of the Revolution in 1789. In the course of his discussion Tarrade analyzes the basic structure of the colonial trade, dealing with the functioning of the markets and the terms and conditions of trade; he spells out the policy-making and administrative machinery in Versailles and Paris; he considers the conflicting interests of planters and colonists, shippers and bankers, bureaucrats and ministerial officials; and he shows in detail not only how basic policy was formulated but also how it was, or was not, implemented.

It is this latter feature that I found most interesting. For Tarrade presents at least five case studies of political decision making in the central government of the monarchy, from the development of essential arguments for change in the ministries to the reception of these ideas at court, in the councils, in the salons of Paris, in the emerging organs of public opinion—the newspapers and journals—in the *chambres de commerce*, in the seaports, and in the colonies themselves. Finally the pressure of conflicting interests—of planters versus shippers, bankers versus fiscal agents, of colonists and absentee landlords, of court and countinghouse—is studied to the final issuance of new decrees, such as those of 1763 or 1784 that were designed to lay down a change in policy.

In the end it is clear that the Old Regime monarchy in the last quarter-century of its effective life was incapable of resolving the conflicts of interest and hence of speedily bringing about the needed changes clearly enough, fast enough. Disorganized at the center, subject to the contradictory influence of powerful lobbies (Tarrade uses the word!), with no systematically organized institutions capable of effecting the necessary political compromises, forever desperate for short-term fiscal gains, the monarchy could only drift, mitigating the *exclusif* with exceptions that pleased no one. In some part Tarrade's is a study in the political frailty of the Old Regime as much as it is a study of commercial and economic development. A dense, detailed work thoroughly grounded both on original research in the critical archival materials in France and in the Indies and on an understanding of the work of other scholars, Tarrade's *Le commerce colonial de la France*

à la fin de l'Ancien Régime is not an easy book to read. But it is an important study.

GEORGE T. MATTHEWS
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BERNARD PLONGERON. *Théologie et politique au siècle des Lumières (1770–1820)*. (Travaux d'histoire éthico-politique, 25.) Geneva: Librairie Droz. 1973. Pp. 405.

Father Plongeron is today the leading scholar who is both a cleric and a specialist in the French Revolution. The present book, his fourth on the subject, is very wide in scope. From the semantic discussion in his preface one judges that the title, if translated, should not be "theology and politics" in the sense of a crude confrontation, but "the theological and the political" in all the wide meanings that such abstractions would convey. The book is not merely abstract, however, its merit is to relate theological thinking both to the thought of the Enlightenment and to the actual events, issues, conflicts and crises of conscience of the Revolution. It abounds in pertinent quotations from little-known writers and is enriched by a detailed knowledge of the activities, whereabouts, and ideas of parish priests, constitutional and refractory clergy, French émigré bishops, Italian ecclesiologists, and many others. The author is skeptical of theocrats such as Bonald and of all counter-revolutionary propaganda; he sees issues much vaster than such passing political arguments.

The book is complex, but its main theme seems to be the desacralization of government and society and the adaptation to this reality by reforming theoreticians of the Church. The author finds everywhere the signs of Rousseau's idea expounded in the *Social Contract*, that legitimate authority, as distinct from sheer power or coercion, is one that is accepted voluntarily and freely. Conscience, obedience, civic obligation, the idea of just government, concepts of the natural and the supernatural, the right of revolution as set forth from Thomas Aquinas—and as rejected by Bossuet and the divine-right school—to the Jesuit theories of tyrannicide, all come into the discussion. More concrete issues such as the nature of vows, the marriage of priests, the validity of marriage

itself (whether natural, legal, or sacramental), the significance of divorce, the diverse roles of Christian and citizen, the rights of non-Catholics, the possibility of a Christian republic, and the cases of conscience provoked by the Napoleonic settlement with the Church, are also detailed. The book should remind us that even the France of the Revolution was a basically Catholic country, and it should be of importance to anyone interested in this formative period of the modern Catholic Church. Its usefulness is heightened by a long technical bibliography and a documentary appendix containing fourteen selected sources.

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JEAN JACQUES PELET. *The French Campaign in Portugal, 1810-1811*. Edited, annotated, and translated by DONALD D. HORWARD. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1973. Pp. xv, 570. \$18.50.

DONALD D. HORWARD. *The French Revolution and Napoleon Collection at Florida State University: A Bibliographical Guide*. [Tallahassee:] Friends of the Florida State University Library. 1973. Pp. xvii, 462. \$12.50.

Some eight years ago I was asked to review a monograph by Donald Horward entitled *The Battle of Bussaco, Massena vs Wellington* (1965). Because Professor Horward was a student of mine at the University of Minnesota, I have some hesitation in reviewing the present two volumes by the same author. I do so only because I know more about the work Professor Horward has done at Florida State University than most other reviewers to whom the books might be sent.

Horward is one of the few American scholars to have devoted an academic career to the study of the Napoleonic period. When a graduate student he chose to work on the French side of the Portuguese campaign that is part of the larger story of Napoleon's involvement in Spain and the Iberian Peninsula. He first produced his monograph on the Battle of Buçaco; he has now followed it with his translation of the journal of Jean Jacques Pelet, who served as a staff officer under Marshal Masséna in the ill-fated attempt to capture Lisbon in 1810-11. Most readers know well only the work

of Charles Oman and Charles Napier, both famous English historians who produced multi-volume histories of the campaigns in Spain and Portugal. There are also French accounts, but the French understandably have devoted little attention to what was an inglorious episode in the wars of Napoleon. Horward is the first American or European to exploit fully the military archives at Vincennes on the French side of the Portuguese campaign. It is not likely that any one will approach his knowledge of that subject in the near future, though some of the students he has trained will add considerably to our broad knowledge of the Napoleonic campaigns and Napoleonic institutions.

Both Horward and the University of Minnesota Press deserve special commendation for the care with which the editing and publication of Pelet's manuscript has been handled. There are virtually no errors in the over five-hundred pages of translated text, and Pelet's French has been rendered in clear, grammatical English. The extensive footnotes provided by Horward account for virtually all important personages and the often difficult to locate towns mentioned in the text. In his preface Horward explains some of the vexations he had in locating place names and finding any contemporary maps that were accurate as to location of secondary roads. I have no doubt that the maps he has provided are as accurate as he could make them, but they are not very helpful as guides to a text that is filled with references to troop locations and movements. Those who have had experience in World War II or in army reserve training know it is not difficult to produce simple sketch maps that show positions of troops and lines of advance or retreat. When done in black and white, such maps are no more expensive to print than a page of type. Almost half of the Pelet manuscript deals with the retreat of Masséna's army, and there is only one local map in that section of the book.

Although some of the day-by-day entries in Pelet's diary will interest only the military specialist, it is a fascinating firsthand account of the campaign. Much of the manuscript was intended to be read by other military men who would understand the composition and tactics of military forces of that day. In effect Pelet hoped that others would learn from the mistakes

that were made. Pelet was a staff officer whom Masséna held in special favor. If Pelet was reticent about criticizing his commander, whom he clearly admired, he was a fair and honest observer who was in a position to illumine the quarrel that raged between Masséna and the disobedient Marshal Ney, and even more on Masséna's problems with his other subordinate commanders. It is surprising that there are only sketchy details on the one major battle of the campaign, the Battle of Buçaco; by contrast one learns a great deal about the character of Wellington's defense lines at Tórres Vedras and of the long retreat from them. Above all the Pelet account helps one to understand the character of the fighting in Spain and Portugal. Everyone is aware there were logistical problems arising out of the wretched roads and mountainous terrain; one needs the rich detail of his manuscript to appreciate all the frustrations of gathering and moving supplies and of dealing with the local inhabitants. Pelet argues that the French army was more humane than Wellington in the treatment of the Portuguese people, and he finds hard to believe their continued adherence to the British—which is only to say that Pelet, for all his willingness to lay bare the mistakes of his countrymen, was a fervid French nationalist.

Horward's bibliography of the French Revolution and the Napoleon collection at Florida State University, like the Pelet manuscript, is a model of careful editing. Although no separation of titles is made for the Revolutionary and Napoleonic years, there is a detailed index that permits quick reference to authors and special topics. There are other libraries in the United States with far more extensive holdings, particularly for the Revolution, and Horward's approximately five thousand titles are dwarfed by the coverage in the classic bibliographies on the period. On the other hand most of the guides used by scholars are dated. What Horward can provide is a highly useful checklist of recent publications. Above all, what this bibliography demonstrates is what an energetic, resourceful professor and a cooperating librarian can accomplish in a relatively short period of time. Horward has not only attracted a score of graduate students into his field of study, but thanks to his efforts his university may soon have a Napoleonic collection that will rank

with the best in this country. Napoleonic studies have been neglected in recent years. It is a pity because there is more research material available in university libraries on the Revolutionary and Napoleonic years than on any period one could choose.

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VILJO RASILA. *Torpparikysymyksen ratkaisuvaihe: Suomen torpparikysymys vuosina 1909–1918. Yhteiskuntahistoriallinen tutkimus* [The Solution of the Crofter Problem: The Crofter Problem in Finland, 1909–1918]. Historiallisia tutkimuksia, number 81.) Helsinki: Kirjayhtymä. 1970. Pp. 414.

Rasila's book gives a good deal more than the title indicates, which even alone is a topic of fundamental importance to Finnish history and politics. It primarily discusses the political dimensions of problems of land rental and land ownership in a largely agrarian country at a period when Finland was experiencing crucial economic, political, and social changes and transformations. Focusing on the problem of tenant farmers, on which much of the attention, agitation, and debate was centered at the time, Rasila unravels with skill the stands of both the various Finnish political parties and the Russians on the issue and the ways they sought to solve or exploit it. The crofter question became closely tied with the Russification policies and parliamentary reform in Finland. The foot-dragging and indecisiveness of the Finnish bourgeoisie in regard to reform plans gave opportunities to both the Finnish Socialists and the Russian authorities to put themselves forward as the champions of the crofters. The Socialists used the crofter question to spread their support in the rural areas, and with the outbreak of the First World War the tsarist government grasped the chance to both seize the initiative on the issue and to bypass and embarrass the Finnish Parliament.

Rasila's discussion of the revolutionary years of 1917 and 1918 is interesting and from it emerges the picture of the Socialists and later the Red revolutionary government as being, in part, victims of their own propaganda on the crofter issue; they assumed that they enjoyed more solid and enthusiastic support among the

crofters than they actually did. But the final liberation of the crofters was not brought about by the Red revolutionary government, but by the Whites who emerged as victors in the Finnish civil war of 1918. It was their Rump Parliament, from which almost all the Socialists were excluded, that passed the laws enabling the crofters to redeem the lands they had rented. This outcome was rather remarkable in view of the passions and bitterness that the civil war had brought forth and in view of the general opinion among the Whites that the crofters had basically sympathized with the Reds. The result would have been even more remarkable if the members of the Parliament had realized at the time how good a deal the crofters were actually getting in financial terms. But it was not foreseen that rapid postwar inflation would wipe out most of the monetary value of the compensation the landowners were to receive and the former crofters were supposedly to be burdened with.

Rasila's work is good, and this book complements well his earlier publications on the topic. He has successfully combined a traditional historical method with some amount of basic statistical analysis and makes some pertinent comparative observations with conditions in Sweden. Displaying commendable intellectual integrity and candor in regard to his topic, he puts the crofter problem in its proper dimension. For example, he notes that it involved directly a relatively small number of people in comparison to the masses of the landless laborers. Rasila is working with an issue that has been much discussed and he is generally cautious about making conclusions in the form of definite statements about his views, but they emerge from the evidence that he presents. But he is quite specific when arguing, contrary to many writers, that the crofter problem was not a significant cause of the Finnish civil war, and he presents a barrage of figures to support his view. It is in this connection that one wonders most whether Rasila's study would have benefited from a thorough consideration of the propagandistic and psychological dimensions of his topic. How important was the crofter question not only because of its own merits or because of objective material factors, which Rasila has studied thoroughly, but because of the propagandistic and agitational use to which it was put? But

such an approach would perhaps require a whole new study of its own, and, within the approach and framework that he has adopted, Rasila has performed very well indeed. He has written an important and solid book on a significant topic.

PEKKA KALEVI HAMALAINEN
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DIETER GROH. *Negative Integration und revolutionärer Attentismus: Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges.* [Frankfurt am Main:] Propyläen. 1973. Pp. 783.

This massive volume is one of the most imposing studies of German social democracy to appear in the past decade, but it is also one of the most exacerbating. Groh's achievement rests on an admirable ability to assimilate the work and ideas of other scholars and a commitment to extensive archival research. Although this is a detailed monograph focusing on only the last six years before the outbreak of World War I, it is also an interpretive and analytical work that places developments in historical and historiographical perspective. Groh's weakness stems from an inexplicable urge to employ an excessively complex organization that detracts seriously from the book's readability and gives it a fragmented rather than an integrated quality. Not only are there some 335 headings and subheadings within slightly less than 712 pages of text, which in turn are weighted with long footnotes, but each heading also has its own serial number as part of an intricate numerical outline. Even a devoted student of social democracy must struggle to get beyond the obtrusive scaffolding that Groh's fondness for order has imposed upon an otherwise fine book.

The key ideas are announced directly in the title. Seeking to explain the failure of the Social Democratic movement to effect fundamental changes in the structure of Imperial Germany, Groh elaborates on an interplay between the impact of negative integration, a concept first applied to German social democracy by Guenther Roth, and what Groh terms "revolutionary *Attentismus*" (meaning approximately a doctrine and policy of waiting for revolution), an idea suggested in varying forms by other scholars. In Groh's analysis

these two factors were the essential ingredients in the dominance of the party centrism that transformed the popular formula of either reform or revolution into the political reality of neither reform nor revolution. Just as the radical Left failed to make active revolutionaries out of Social Democrats, so Groh is certainly correct in observing that even the party's most articulate reformists did not fully comprehend what was involved in effective parliamentary politics. In probing the implications of negative integration, Groh makes a special contribution by examining in depth how political leaders and interest groups treated the socialist party as an object of politics rather than as a participant in the political process. Almost without exception they sought to isolate, deceive, manipulate, and destroy the socialist movement and its affiliates. How this process worked in detail comes through best as Groh scrutinizes those events that linked together the policies of Bethmann-Hollweg, the threat of a European war, and the sense of inner crisis in the labor movement following the election of 1912. Without condemning or exonerating the socialists, Groh's account nonetheless lays bare the painful nature of their dilemma, created on the one hand by the party's inability to cast off obsolete traditions and on the other hand by powerful but threatened elites whose resistance to change meant that the system they controlled was not amenable to reform through constitutional means. Aiming for a comprehensive explanation of the controversial socialist decision to support war credits, Groh examines at great length the crisis in 1914 and shows how adeptly Bethmann-Hollweg manipulated the Social Democrats by exploiting their Russophobia and how unprepared they were to deal critically with matters of military strategy and high politics. Throughout the book Groh has sought to investigate all of the economic, psychological, military, and other factors that affected the policies of social democracy. Except for some superficialities in social analysis and the cumbersome framework, he has been successful and has made a significant contribution to the growing literature devoted to analyzing Wilhelmian Germany.

VERNON L. LIDTKE
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GERHARD RITTER. *Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk: Das Problem des 'Militarismus' in Deutschland*. Volume 4, *Die Herrschaft des deutschen Militarismus und die Katastrophe von 1918*. Munich: Verlag R. Oldenbourg. 1968. Pp. 586. DM 48.

GERHARD RITTER. *The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany*. Volume 4, *The Reign of German Militarism and the Disaster of 1918*. Translated from the German by HEINZ NORDEN. Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press. 1973. Pp. viii, 496. \$18.00.

When Gerhard Ritter died in 1967 the fourth volume of his masterful study of the relationship between civil and military authority in Germany was virtually finished. He had intended to add two long essays, one dealing with the forms that the problem assumed during the Weimar period, the other with the reversal of roles that took place during the Third Reich, when, in his words, "it was the soldiers who had to oppose the blind militarism of the civilian political leadership." It is a pity that we have been deprived of these, but the fact that they were not written in no way weakens this volume, which is complete in itself.

Ritter's third volume described how the military subversion of civilian control over policy, which had been balked by Bismarck and opposed, although less effectively, by his successors, was finally successful when Hindenburg and Ludendorff, backed by public adulation, drove Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg from office in July 1917. The present volume deals with the last sixteen months of the war and describes the soldiers' misuse of the power they had won and the political obtuseness that magnified the extent of their defeat in 1918.

If Bethmann-Hollweg was the central figure in the third volume, it is Ludendorff who dominates this one. Hindenburg and the emperor are reduced to mere shadows in the background, and the civilians are obedient, if often fretful, executors of his commands. Ritter, who was a young front line officer when the general launched his last great offensive, was clearly fascinated by Ludendorff and sees him here as a demonic embodiment of the will to power, who was nevertheless doomed to defeat by his imperviousness to doubt and his indifference to intractable realities. At one point Ritter

hints that the general's mind may already have been touched by the delusions that, in the postwar period, darkened it and led to his complete isolation; at others, Ritter seems to suggest similarities between Ludendorff in 1918 and Hitler in his last year: the irrational refusal, for instance, to allow troops who were in hopeless situations to retreat to stronger defensive positions and the persistence in elaborating grandiose schemes of territorial expansion at a time when defeat was palpable and imminent. Some of the most fascinating pages in this volume describe Ludendorff's dreams of creating a great southeastern Russian state under German influence that would extend all the way to the Caucasus, of making a German Riviera on the Crimea, and building a bridge to Central Asia to threaten the British position in India—all this at a time when the offensive in the west was falling into disarray. Indeed, the Caucasian chimera—"this ghostly game" as Ritter calls it—was not abandoned until October 1918.

It is still remarkable that Ludendorff's heedless course should have been allowed to continue so long. There were Germans, after all, who were aware in the last months of 1917 that the country's resources were running out and that the war could not be won by military means alone, and in 1918 this was the constant refrain of Emperor Charles and his minister Burián, who knew how close Austria was to collapse. Yet every suggestion of political overtures to the Allies was compromised or defeated out of hand by the army high command, which persistently refused to allow the government to do the one thing that might have interested the Allies, namely, to pledge complete withdrawal from France and Belgium at the end of hostilities.

It is perhaps understandable that this was tolerated as long as it seemed possible that the spring offensive might break the enemy's will (although an independent observer, looking at Germany's reserve situation at the beginning of 1918, would have had little confidence in that possibility); but why did it continue after Ludendorff had been soundly beaten in the field? The reason seems to be (and here the parallel with Hitler comes to mind again) that no one really dared face up to the general and overrule his demands. This was true equally—

Ritter gives the details—of Hertling, Foreign Minister Kuhlmann, Hintze, who succeeded Kuhlmann after Ludendorff had insisted on his dismissal, and the kaiser himself, who put up with temper tantrums on Ludendorff's part that would have led William I to dismiss the general on the spot. It was principally because of this lack of *Zivilcourage*, Ritter believes, that, although it had become clear on August 8 that the strength the German army was definitively broken, almost two months were frittered away before a plea for an armistice went out to the Allies.

One cannot put this volume aside without a grudging respect for Ludendorff's energy. Even while planning and then directing the great spring offensive he found time to participate directly and decisively in every other policy activity and in all pending problems: in the complications of the Polish question, in the discussions of the strategy to be followed at Brest Litovsk, in the establishment of the Skoropadsky regime in the Ukraine, in the negotiations that led to the Treaty of Bucharest (during which Ludendorff's spies collected data on Kuhlmann's private life), and in the attempts to head off a precipitate Austrian appeal for peace. Ritter's circumstantial description of these activities makes a fitting finale for his great work on the baleful effects of German militarism.

GORDON A. CRAIG
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DIETRICH ORLOW. *The History of the Nazi Party: 1933-1945*. [Pittsburgh:] University of Pittsburgh Press. 1973. Pp. xiv, 538. \$14.95.

This is not an easy book to read, and it must have been a difficult one to write. While the author's earlier volume, *The History of the Nazi Party: 1919-1933* (1969), was a story of ultimate success, this sequel is a tale of dismal failure. Despite the tireless efforts of men like Rudolf Hess, Robert Ley, Martin Bormann, and countless lesser figures who hoped to "partify" the German state and nation, the Nazi party never became the all-pervasive instrument of power that its leaders intended it to be. The causes for this failure are here spelled out with patient attention to infinite detail.

Some of these causes have already been described elsewhere. The Nazi party, far from being the monolithic body we once imagined it to be, was split into numerous factions, each warring against the others and all of them held together only by common allegiance to Hitler. Until 1941 the main struggle was between the Führer's deputy, Rudolf Hess, and the head of the party organization, Robert Ley. After Hess's flight to England his assistant, Martin Bormann, continued the fight, first against Ley and then increasingly against Heinrich Himmler and the SS. Aside from seeking to control the party the contestants had differing views concerning the nature of the party and its function within the state. Was it to be a vehicle of revolutionary change or a guardian of Nazi orthodoxy? Was it to be highly centralized or were such local forces as the *Gauleiter* to maintain their autonomy? Was it to be an elitist or a mass organization? These were some of the issues underlying what primarily, however, was a power struggle. The only neutral factor was the Führer himself. By backing now one, now another of the various factions, he maintained his role as supreme arbiter and thus the basis of his absolute power.

Except for Bormann's ascendancy at the very end, neither side won any clear victory. The main reasons for this inconclusive outcome were, on the one hand, Hitler's aversion to any change that might create a revolutionary situation, especially in time of war, and, on the other, the lack of sufficient trained personnel to carry out the "partification" of the state. Only within the party's financial sector, ably administered by Franz Xaver Schwarz, was there any clear sense of direction. Far from being bankrupt, the party at the end still had a cash balance of one billion marks!

The most interesting and original sections of the book deal with the regions Germany conquered before and during the war, where the party was able to do some of the things that were impossible at home. Professor Orlow has done a prodigious amount of research in unpublished German sources and has opened up leads that will be of great help to future scholars. The book has an admirably comprehensive bibliographical note, a useful checklist of names, and a much-needed (though incomplete) list of abbreviations. About the latter,

there are so many of them that they are a hindrance rather than a help in digging one's way through this fact-packed book. Finally, one also wishes that the author had been able to do without that ugly nonword, "partification."

HANS W. GATZKE
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WILHELM MEIER-DÖRNBERG. *Die Ölversorgung der Kriegsmarine 1935 bis 1945*. (Einzelschriften zur militärischen Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges, 11.) Freiburg: Verlag Rombach. 1973. Pp. 111. DM 9.

So important was an adequate petroleum reserve, especially of fuel oil and diesel oil, to the German war economy that the navy, the subject of this book, had, like its sister organizations the army and air force, to be kept on what one might properly call a subsistence diet. How to build up an oil reserve in anticipation of a war and how to keep the navy afloat, both upon and under the sea, during the war were two of the navy's constant and biggest problems. These problems entered into practically all of Germany's decision making regarding naval operations against enemy commerce and in support of overseas military operations in Crete, Africa, and so forth.

Not only was the oil reserve a problem; its distribution was another, for with the rapid upswing of the German economy soon after 1933 a competition developed among the three services and between the services and the civilian economy, which was undergoing a conversion from coal to oil. This rivalry burned, to use the author's phrase, more and more fiercely with every month that passed.

Of special interest to American readers, if only as a reminder but also as part of a fuller understanding of American wartime behavior prior to Pearl Harbor, is the author's discussion of the large quantities of American and Mexican oil that found their way into Germany via neutrals such as Japan, the Soviet Union, Sweden, and Switzerland, to mention just a few. The Soviet Union's oil purchasing agency bought for Germany stocks of American and Mexican oil, had it shipped to Vladivostok and from there to Germany. A fictitious German oil purchasing agency was under consideration for buying American oil with Russian bills of

exchange for direct shipment to Murmansk, thence to Germany.

That the decade after 1935 was one of the great historic decades of our time goes without saying since it saw both Germany's near-successful change of much of the world's political, social, and cultural complex and its complete failure, a failure attributable in no small part to a lack of resources, rather than will power, of which oil was one—and a very important one at that. By late 1944 the loss of the Romanian oil fields, upon which Germany was relying more and more after she had invaded the Soviet Union and Japan had attacked Pearl Harbor, thus ending America's supplying Germany with oil, deprived the Germans of forty-five per cent of their diesel oil. Unlike World War I, during which most of Germany's warships burned coal, of which Germany had plenty, in World War II the warships used mostly oil, of which Germany had little. The superiority of oil-burning over coal-burning ships, revealed by World War I, put Germany at a disadvantage. Viewed in this light the temptation is great to ask why the Germans did not shift back from oil to coal in order to keep their excellent navy in greater combat effectiveness.

From the summer of 1941 to the end of the war Germany's naval oil reserves were either just above or just below the minimum allowable annual reserve of 100,000 tons for diesel oil. The decline was precipitous from the 750,000 tons of reserve at the beginning of 1940. The story with respect to naval fuel oil was somewhat better, and it improved even more after mid-1943 when Italy left the war and relieved the German navy of having to share its fuel oil reserves with the Italian navy.

Briefly, insofar as its structure is concerned, this work is divided into two periodic parts: the years from 1935 to 1939 and from 1939 to 1945. Fourteen short chapters highlight the Germans' strategic failures and failings, a good example of which is their failure to gain a foothold in the 1930s in Iraqi oil production in the face of opposition of both Shell and Standard Oil.

From the literary point of view this book is a fine piece of work. It does not use a complicated professional vernacular or a ponderous rationale. The sources used are primarily unpublished archival materials, supplemented with several specialized works. A few appendixes of

correspondence (Blomberg to Göring, Raeder to Hitler, and so on) conclude the book. Missing, however, is an index.

ALBERT NORMAN

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KARL A. ROIDER, JR. *The Reluctant Ally: Austria's Policy in the Austro-Turkish War, 1737-1739*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1972. Pp. vi, 198. \$7.50.

In 1717, in the words of the popular song, "Prince Eugene, the noble knight, wanted to restore the City and Fortress of Belgrade to the emperor." In the Treaty of Passarowitz that followed, Austria also acquired the Banat of Temesvár, Northern Serbia, and Little Wallachia. Karl A. Roider's *The Reluctant Ally* is the melancholy story of how, with the exception of the Banat, it was all lost again.

Austria entered the Russo-Turkish War of 1735-39, which was prompted by Russia's desire for access to the Black Sea, for a variety of reasons: to compensate herself for the loss of Naples and Sicily in the War of the Polish Succession, to be faithful to the Russian Alliance of 1726, to have some control over Russia's war aims, and to make sure that the Russians did not occupy too much territory in the Balkans. It was in this war, according to the author, that the European powers first thought of the Ottoman Empire as the "sick man of Europe." The Austrians, however, overestimated the weakness of the Turkish army, which had been reorganized by that romantic renegade, Count Alexandre Bonneval. The Turks had the further good fortune of facing an Austrian army so spectacularly incompetent that of its three commanders—Seckendorff, Königsegg, and Wallis—the first ended up under house arrest and the last on trial for treason.

Austrian diplomacy, conducted mainly by the privy conference, was equally unsure and indecisive. In the end, Count Reinhard Neipperg, the Austrian peace negotiator, snatched defeat from the jaws of possible victory by ceding Belgrade just when, with the Austrian capture of Borsha and the Russian approach to Khotin, the military tide seemed to be turning.

Dr. Roider's detailed study, based on material from the Austrian Hans Hof und Staatsarchiv and the Kriegsarchiv, thoroughly documents,

though it does not always analyze, this military and diplomatic debility. It also stresses the long-range importance of the preservation of the Russian alliance and, with it, of Russia's entry into the European state system as a major power. In general the book seems to confirm the commonly held view that the results of the war were less disastrous in themselves than as an indication of incompetence and confusion within the Austrian government. Perhaps no one was more aware of this weakness than the young crown prince of Prussia, who was watching events from Rheinsberg and who, within little more than a year, as Frederick II, would be marching into Austrian Silesia.

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NARCISO NADA, editor. *Le relazioni diplomatiche fra l'Austria e il Regno di Sardegna*. Second Series: 1830-1848. Volume 1 (5 agosto 1830-28 giugno 1833). (Fonti per la storia d'Italia. Documenti per la storia delle relazioni diplomatiche fra le grandi potenze europee e gli Stati italiani, 1814-1860. Part 2, Documenti esteri.) Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano per l'Età Moderna e Contemporanea. 1972. Pp. xiv, 523. L. 8,000.

These documents from the Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv and from the Kriegsarchiv in Vienna are of particular value in delineating Austrian reactions to Charles Albert's accession to the Sardinian throne in the spring of 1831. As prince of Carignano he had deliberately requested the privilege of serving in the Austrian army should war with France eventuate, and Francis I ultimately conferred on his nephew the command of a regiment of hussars. Moreover, the Austro-Sard military convention of July 25, 1831, provided that the Piedmontese king would command the combined forces against the French.

The Austrian plenipotentiary, Henri de Bombelles, often seemed baffled in his attempts to assess the new ruler's personality for Metternich. Bombelles was relieved that Sallier de La Tour remained in charge of foreign affairs, though he lamented that minister's lethargy. By January 1833, however, Metternich was sure that some advisers were pushing Charles Albert toward the "Anglo-French alliance," and the king, polite but nettled, asked Bombelles to

justify the Austrian suspicions. In a frank exchange the ruler dismissed rumors that he would dispense with his more conservative ministers and promised that he would proceed more swiftly in preparing his army for action. Despite formal disclaimers, the Austrian envoy on Metternich's orders constantly exerted pressure upon the regime in Turin, though it is not always easy to agree with the editor that Metternich's primary concern was to restrain Charles Albert's bellicosity toward the Orléans monarchy.

The documents also demonstrate the chancellor's fear of Mazzini and Young Italy, his anger that the Sardinian censorship allowed the circulation of Silvio Pellico's *Le Mie Prigioni* (1832), and his assumption that Louis Philippe's government was an implicit threat to the settlement of 1815. Bombelles wrote sparingly of internal developments, apart from army reorganization and talk of abolishing feudal tenures. The editor promises that the next volume will trace Charles Albert's growing irritation with Metternich's attempts to dampen his enthusiasm for a reckoning with France.

WILLIAM A. JENKS
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ROSEMARY DEVONSHIRE JONES. *Francesco Vettori: Florentine Citizen and Medici Servant*. (University of London Historical Studies, 34.) [London:] University of London, Athlone Press; distrib. by Humanities Press, New York. 1972. Pp. viii, 319. \$18.25.

Sixty years ago the French historian F. Passy published a biography of *un ami de Machiavel*, Francesco Vettori. This recent study by an English scholar is richer in documentation and detail than the Passy book, though it does not mark any significant advance in method and conceptualization. The author traces Vettori's career chronologically; each chapter forms a slice of his, and Florence's, experience during the transition from republic to principate. That career began with Vettori's mission to Germany (1507-09), which marked the beginning of his association with Machiavelli. There followed his involvement in republican politics to 1512, his ambiguous role in Soderni's expulsion and in the return of the Medici, and his gradual move into the Medici orbit. By 1516 Vettori

was a committed partisan of the Medici, and despite an occasional twinge of nostalgia for a republican regime, he remained loyal to them throughout the 1520s. Though he stayed in Florence after the 1527 revolution, and even served as the republic's ambassador to Pope Clement VII, his associations with the Medici compromised him and eventually resulted in his condemnation and exile. He then returned to Medici service and occupied a key position in their regime, which succeeded the fallen republic in 1530. Through the political vicissitudes of the 1530s—the death of Clement VII, the assassination of Alessandro, the establishment of the principate under Duke Cosimo—Vettori served his masters faithfully until his death in 1539.

Though her assiduous combing of the archives has yielded an abundant harvest of new information on Vettori's political career and its Florentine and Italian context, particularly during the 1520s and 1530s, the author's researches do not substantially change our understanding of this age. Vettori is not an ideal subject for biography. His personality is elusive and ambiguous, his temperament bland, his intellect undistinguished. The author judges his career—"a pattern . . . [of] detached judgment, caution and well-timed action" (p. 291)—rather more positively than have other historians, but alongside his contemporaries Machiavelli and Guicciardini, Vettori is a colorless figure, a quite ordinary Florentine. This book's main flaw is its old-fashioned format: a combination of personal biography and political narrative. The author does not formulate new problems or suggest new perspectives for the investigation of Florentine and Italian history in the early Cinquecento. This is *histoire événementielle* in its purest form.

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EMANUELE PES DI VILLAMARINA. *La révolution Piémontaise de 1821 ed altri scritti*. Edited by NARCISO NADA. (Collana storica "Piemonte 1748-1848," number 1.) Turin: Centro Studi Piemontesi. 1972. Pp. ciii, 268.

These excellently edited writings are valuable records of the life and ideals of a Sardinian

nobleman who enjoyed success and high honors from his young days as an officer in the Napoleonic Wars until his death as a senator under the Statuto of 1848. He ranks now as a liberal Italian hero, but he was conservative by conviction and ever a loyal subject of the House of Savoy. Far from being a *codino*, however, he always firmly pressed for, and often obtained, the sort of economic, administrative, and military reforms that would strengthen his country if attacked by either of its powerful neighbors and also prepare it to profit by conflicts between them. His main text, first published here, centers on the dilemma faced in March 1821 when, as minister of war and marine, he was morally committed to the regent Charles Albert's pledge to accede to the will of the people (that is, the revolutionaries) while seeking a means to prevent or circumvent that prince's actual concession of the Spanish constitution of 1812. At a crucial meeting of dignitaries held in the few hours between the pledge and the concession, Villamarina (our only recorded witness) failed to be either clear or convincing in putting his arguments against the constitution. For this failure he is full of self-recrimination, but the crux is whether his indecision or weakness of expression made any difference. He was full of affection for the prince, and the prince was not a man of firm decision; but we are still left with the question of the prince's legal right to change the form of government and the problem of how best to forestall the assault on Lombardy that was so passionately and insanely desired by the constitutionalists. In his account, carefully analyzed by Professor Nada for its total credibility, Villamarina confesses to having been taken in (willingly?) by the regent's lie that he had received some secret and most improbable communication from the new king, Charles Felix, then in Modena, that more or less condoned the granting of the constitution. Villamarina countersigned the document in his official capacity, though with stated reservations, and, having done so, beat a good general's retreat by securing his own dismissal and obtaining the appointment of Santa Rosa in his place. The rest was a shambles, but our loyal hero was to have the sour satisfaction a generation later of the catastrophes of Cus-

tozza and Novara. He had known all along that Italy could not go it alone.

GEORGE T. ROMANI
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FLORIN CONSTANTINIU. *Relațiile agrare din Țara Românească în secolul al XVIII-lea* [Agrarian Relations in Wallachia in the 18th Century]. (Academia de Științe Sociale și Politice a Republicii Socialiste România. Institutul de Istorie "N. Iorga." Biblioteca istorică, 30.) Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România. 1972. Pp. 210. Lei 16.

The most significant work done by Romanian historians in recent years has been in the history of the eighteenth century. Florin Constantiniu's study on agrarian relations in Wallachia is an important contribution to Romanian economic and social history in that century.

Constantiniu addresses himself primarily to questions related to the commercial revolution in agriculture focusing on the agrarian reform of Constantin Mavrocordat and its impact on Wallachian society. The author's account of the transitional character of agrarian relations prior to the abolition of serfdom by Mavrocordat stresses the economic rationale for the obsolescence of agrarian servitude in contrast to the more traditional views expounded by Nicolae Iorga and his disciples whereby the social ideas of the Enlightenment paved the way to the boyars' acceptance of agrarian reform. The abolition of serfdom is also viewed as an economically inspired act of a pragmatic ruler aware of the changing conditions resulting from the growth of capitalist relations in southeastern Europe.

The author is judicious in his appraisal of the degree of acceptance of the spirit and letter of reform by both landowners and peasants, and he rightly differentiates between economic necessity and advantage and adherence to traditional patriarchal relationships characteristic of the waning age of manorial self-sufficiency. His attempt, albeit too superficial, to place the agrarian problems of Wallachia within the broader comparative framework of contemporary developments in southeastern Europe, Russia, Poland, and Hungary is innovative and provides the extra dimensions required for understanding the significance of the Wallachian phenomenon as such.

Further work in comparative economic and social history is planned by members of the Historical Institute "N. Iorga" and by the Institute of Southeast European Studies of the Romanian Academy. Constantiniu's contribution augurs well for the realization of those plans.

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JOSHUA ROTHENBERG. *The Jewish Religion in the Soviet Union*. (The Philip W. Lown Graduate Center for Contemporary Jewish Studies, Institute for East European Jewish Studies, Brandeis University.) New York: Ktav Publishing House. 1971. Pp. viii, 242. \$10.00.

There exists in English a whole library on the situation of the Jews in the USSR. To mention only a couple, there is the now almost classic volume by the late Solomon M. Schwarz, *The Jews in the Soviet Union* (1951) and the yearly surveys by Leon Shapiro published regularly in the *American Jewish Year Book*. Nevertheless, the book under review represents a welcome addition to the body of our knowledge regarding the policy of the Soviet authorities as far as Jews are concerned.

The author dwells on the intolerable position of the Jewish religion in Soviet Russia. Of course, he is cognizant of the fact that the worship of God, disregarding denomination, is, to put it mildly, not encouraged by the Kremlin rulers. He rightly points out that "in a situation where suppression of the Jewish religion is not balanced by the simultaneous existence and support of a meaningful secular Jewish culture, such oppression inevitably takes the form of a gradual destruction of the only existing form of Jewishness in the Soviet Union" (p. 2). As a result, under the given circumstances, many religiously indifferent but nationally conscious Jews have actually only one form of Jewish identification left to them; namely, adherence, if only outwardly, to the tenets of the Mosaic faith. According to the author, persons who otherwise would not dream of attending services gather on holiday in and near synagogues to listen to the traditional prayers and to sing and dance on Simchas Torah ("the rejoicing in the Torah") and Passover, thus testifying

to their union with the "eternal people" (pp. 79-81).

The book is divided into several chapters, each one discussing Jewish holidays, traditions and customs, and describing the never-ceasing attempts on the part of the believers to make use of the constitutionally guaranteed right to practice one's religion. It also registers obstacles put up by the authorities, which the believers have to surmount to be able to meet the requirements of the Jewish faith. One is amazed by the ingenuity of the Soviet hierarchy that spares no efforts to make regular functioning of the Jewish religious institutions very difficult or even impossible. On the other hand, one is touched by the stubbornness of the Jewish clergy and lay persons who employ all means accessible to them to keep their religious communities alive.

Indirectly this book contributes toward the understanding of the origin of the Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union and also provides some insight into the motivation of relatively substantial groups of Russian Jews who look for a new home in the state of Israel.

All in all, a well written, instructive, and interesting book.

BORIS SAPIR

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CHARLES E. TIMBERLAKE, edited, with an introduction, by. *Essays on Russian Liberalism*. [Columbia:] University of Missouri Press. 1972. Pp. xii, 192. \$9.00.

In this collection Professors D. A. Davies, K. E. McKenzie, R. Pipes, and C. E. Timberlake each offer an essay on one prominent individual in the Russian liberal movement, treating, respectively, V. A. Maklakov, F. I. Rodichev, P. B. Struve, and I. I. Petrunkevich. Professor W. R. Copeland examines the relations existing at the turn of the century between Russian liberals and Finnish opponents to the tsarist policies pertaining to nationalities. Professors J. E. Zimmerman and W. G. Rosenberg analyze Kadet politics during the Duma period, and Professor T. H. von Laue presents a commentary on the general prospects of liberal democracy in Russia. These essays are an outgrowth of a conference on Russian liberalism held in Columbia, Missouri, in 1969.

As often is the case with collectively authored works, this one has its share of frost heaves. Although Struve is the subject of Pipe's brief essay, for example, there is too much in it on Aksakov and not enough on Struve. In Copeland's lengthy essay, on the other hand, one must scatter a great deal of factual chaff to uncover kernels of underlying ideas. The work as a whole, nonetheless, provides some interesting particulars on Russian liberalism, and one of its essays—that by Von Laue—presents some novel interpretations on the subject.

Until recently there were two predominant assumptions in the West pertaining to Russian liberalism. One of these assumptions rested upon certain aspects that characterized the behavior of some Kadet participants in the First Duma. It held that the chief factor responsible for the failure of Russian liberals was their own political radicalism. The other assumption was based largely on certain aspects that characterized the behavior of the liberal spokesmen, such men as Miliukov, active during the period of the Provincial Government. Under this assumption it was held that Russian liberals failed primarily because of their conservatism.

This collection of essays tends to revise both of these assumptions. Most of the authors agree that Russian liberalism was distinct from both radicalism and conservatism and that, indeed, it was a bona fide Western-type liberalism. To be sure, some Russian liberals, such as Struve, based their ideas on Russian nationalism. Most of them, nonetheless, believed in the Western concept of a parliamentary democracy attained gradually and without violence. Von Laue, for one, goes as far as to argue that it was precisely because of its faithfulness to Western liberal concepts that the Russian liberal movement found itself alienated at home.

Von Laue purports that Russia lacked a tradition of respect for law, which had made liberalism a workable system in the West. "Given the basic atomism of Russian society, its tensions and lack of civic experience, individualism inevitably produced anarchy and political disintegration. . . ." Russian liberals' democratic bias, he goes on to say, led them to favor the peasant majority and, therefore, the agrarian way of life. Yet, that was the time when the trend toward urbanization was beginning to overtake Russia. Applied to Russia,

the liberal movement was self-defeating in its very essence. By "encouraging self-expression," Von Laue points out, "it boosted not only the infant transplants of Western ideas and practices but also the most illiberal and antiliberal—autochthonous—tendencies in Russian life. On balance, the latter were by far the more numerous and well entrenched. In the free-for-all of liberal democratic politics the former were bound to be routed, as indeed they were."

Undoubtedly, the most provocative generalization of all in Von Laue's essay is the one purporting that freedom in Russia "encouraged self-determination among the subject nationalities, which in turn endangered the security of the Empire still further." What he seems to suggest is that the imperial heterogeneity of Russia dictates a paradoxical choice of its rulers, be they tsarist or Soviet: either an empire without freedom or freedom without an empire.

PAUL CALL

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S. L. PESHTICH *et al.*, editors. *Problemy istorii feodal'noi Rossii: Sbornik statei k 60-letiiu Prof. V. V. Mavrodina* [Problems in the History of Feudal Russia: Collected Articles for the 60th Birthday of Prof. V. V. Mavrodin]. (Leningradskii Ordena Lenina i Ordena Trudovogo Krasnogo Znameni Gosudarstvennyi Universitet imeni A. A. Zhdanova.) [Leningrad:] Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo Universiteta. 1971. Pp. 271.

A. P. NOVOSEL'TSEV *et al.* *Puti razvitiia feodilizma (Zakavkaz'e, Sredniaia Aziia, Rus', Pribaltika)* [Ways of the Development of Feudalism (The Caucasus, Middle Asia, Rus', the Baltic States)]. (Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Institut Istorii SSSR.) Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka." 1972. Pp. 337.

An accelerating practice in Soviet historical scholarship, presenting minor bibliographic and access nightmares, is the publication of articles in *Festschrifts*. *Problemy*, dedicated to V. V. Mavrodin, professor at Leningrad University, author of 212 printed works (among them 25 monographs), and director of 50 Ph.D. dissertations, contains Mavrodin's biography, a list of his works, and 28 articles spanning the entire Russian "feudal period" from its beginning in the second half of the first millennium to the mid-nineteenth century and reflecting the gambit of current research interests: 2 on archeology, 7 on textology and the chronicles, 4 on agriculture and the economy, 7 on social history and

peasant uprisings, 3 on foreign relations, and 1 each in the areas of education, law, taxation, biography, military, and intellectual history. Space limitations permit mentioning only a few of them.

The distinguished Turkologist, M. I. Artamonov, argues (particularly with another Turkologist, L. N. Gumilev) that an archeological people's ethnos should be determined by social and cultural, not biological, criteria. The late I. I. Liapushkin, the authority on the eighth- and ninth-century Slavic migrations into Russia and the Ukraine, claims that the extraordinary ninth- and tenth-century burial site of four thousand graves at Gnezdovo (comparable to Swedish Birka) was possibly a settlement in its own right, not just nearby Smolensk's graveyard. I. Ia. Froianov convincingly demonstrates that Rus' princes between the tenth and twelfth centuries had little interest in land for agricultural pursuits, but only as a source for trading commodities such as honey and furs. My own current interests are served by V. M. Paneiakh's piece on a 1558 decree limiting the enslavement of cavalry servicemen, part of the process of changing the institution of slavery. A. I. Kopanev shows that the total tax bill of Northern Russian, nonseignorial, *Chernyi* ("black") peasants in the 1550s was only one-eighth to one-quarter of their grain harvest income. A. G. Man'kov discusses Peter the Great's futile attempt to codify the laws between the years 1720 and 1725.

Puti aims to present a typology and model of feudalism based on four regions now within the USSR. Rather than using solely legal criteria, these scholars determine whether feudalism existed by studying landownership (the means of production), the degree of freedom (dependency) of the agricultural masses (serfdom), and the property and administrative rights of the state and its privileged groups and their suzerain-vassal relationships. Novosel'tsev, studying the Caucasus (Albania, Georgia, Armenia) and Middle Asia (The Iranian states of Sogd, Khorezm, Fergana) between the third and seventh centuries, sorts out the ethnic groups and tries to prove that, in spite of the presence of slaves, that period was not a Marxian slavery epoch. However, classic feudalism did not develop either (except in Georgia), because of the later destruction, land redistributions, and

ethnic mixing by conquering Arabs, Turkic nomads, and the Mongols. Pashuto's primary concern is to refute claims that Teutonic and Polish influence were prerequisites for feudalism in the Baltic region, although feudalism did progress further after German hegemony was established over Estonia and Latvia, while Lithuania developed a Balto-Slavic form of "feudalism."

Cherepnin's discussion is essentially an elaborated, refined, often petulant and scholastic refutation of critics (Iu. G. Alekseev, G. E. Kochin, and the late I. I. Smirnov—the Leningrad school) of his earlier works in which he tries to prove feudalism developed in eleventh-century Rus' and was consolidated in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. As does my 1971 *Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy*, Cherepnin presents the Soviet historiography of feudalism, the development of serfdom, and interpretations of "black" peasants' relationship to their land (some say they owned it; Cherepnin claims the state owned it, the peasants merely possessed it, paid taxes [rent], and thus were dependent on the state). Always erudite and current, Cherepnin tries to refute Froianov's views on the character of Kievan-era princely landholding. More positively, he has adopted many of Liapushkin's findings about the early Eastern Slavs and the view that perhaps rudiments of capitalism were present in sixteenth-century Muscovy.

The *Puti* endeavor would have been more valuable were it not so a priori tendentious and were not Western feudal terminology so frequently inappropriate. The Muscovites' generalizing is balanced by the Leningraders' particularizing.

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PAUL AVRICH. *Russian Rebels, 1600–1800*. New York: Schocken Books. 1972. Pp. 309. \$10.00.

This ambitious work surveys the four great popular rebellions of early modern Russia (Bolotnikov 1606–07, Razin 1670–71, Bulavin 1707–08, Pugachev 1773–74) and in a concluding section relates them to the modern upheavals of 1905 and 1917. Since its scope and very readable presentation could easily make this study a regular offering in Russian history

courses, it is unfortunate that more care was not taken in its preparation. Despite scholarly pretensions the work is based largely on secondary sources, often many years out of date. For example, the explanation of the appearance of the massive revolts focuses on the *oprichnina*, the treatment of which, when not simply erroneous—like the implication that areas north of Moscow lay outside the *oprichnina*—ignores seventy-five years of reinterpretation. As for the effects of the Bolotnikov Rebellion, Avrich casually concludes that despite the upheaval "the development of serfdom proceeded apace." The contrary Soviet view, based on evidence of stable peasant obligations in the subsequent period, holds that the rebellion retarded the growth of serfdom for several decades. While points can be raised against the Soviet position, it seems cavalier indeed to pass over it in silence.

This offhand manner characterizes the author's handling of facts large and small. Numerous mistranslations and misdatings mar the text, such as "execution block" for *lobnoe mesto*, or placing the *Slobodskaiia Ukraina* in 1606 and the Moscow foreign quarter in 1648. Fairly typical is Avrich's misreading of his own source, Kotoshikhim (mistakenly called a nobleman), who, in speaking of the Moscow Copper Riot of 1662, refers not to seven thousand persons killed "in the disorder" but to counterfeiters executed during several years preceding it. And it is hard to see how Razin could be upset by the news of atrocities that occurred a month after his death. More important, as they bear on central interpretative points, are misleading explanations of the penalties for harboring runaways and the quantity and quality of armed forces, not to mention the description of the long-settled and place-bound *posad* people of the seventeenth century as "a kind of preindustrial Lumpenproletariat."

As this last comment indicates, Avrich tends to view his subject through the prism of 1905 and 1917. While this method permits a number of suggestive comparisons, the main effect is to blur our vision of the earlier upheavals. Too little attention is paid to the very significant differences in social and technological development, the points of stress and collapse, and the revolutionary symbolism. These disparities cannot be bridged by assertions that

"the urban and rural poor continued to play a revolutionary role" or the assurances of terrified ministers that Pugachev was again on the rampage.

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ROBERT E. JONES. *The Emancipation of the Russian Nobility, 1762-1785*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1973. Pp. xii, 326. \$12.50.

Dr. Jones's monograph, a reworking of his dissertation, offers a mildly revisionist analysis of Catherine II's policies toward the Russian nobility. He argues that the evolution of those policies is better understood in the light of administrative imperatives than as the result of a political competition. Following the lead of Marc Raeff and others, Jones downgrades the political significance of the nobility while emphasizing the state's near monopoly of administrative talent and initiative. He also stresses Catherine's rapid consolidation of authority after 1762, criticizing interpretations that portray the empress as favoring the nobility because of her own insecurity. He sees most of Catherine's legislative activity concerning the nobility up to 1775, then, as a response to the problems stemming from the state's "emancipation" of the noble servitor. This period witnessed a vigorous expansion of bureaucratic absolutism, which was dictated by reasons of state and which threatened the provincial nobility with social decline and political impotence. But the Pugachev revolt of 1773-74 proved that the autocracy could not govern the empire without the active assistance of the provincial nobility; so in 1775 Catherine formulated and instituted a comprehensive reform of provincial administration. The new institutions reintegrated the provincial nobility into state service and reflected the renewed alliance between the autocracy and the nobility, the political price of which was serfdom for half the population.

Jones makes valuable contributions in detailing the administrative considerations behind many of Catherine's reforms and her evolving policies vis-à-vis the nobility. Perhaps the most original section of the study is its discussion of the implementation of the 1775 reforms, par-

ticularly the role of Jacob Sievers. Yet his general interpretation sheds scant light on the provincial nobility as such, just as it exaggerates the influence of the Pugachev revolt in cementing an alliance between monarch and nobility. Such an alliance was implicit from the start of Catherine's reign, and problems of internal security had gained her attention well before Pugachev dramatized them. Jones likewise overrates the security of Catherine's position.

While the author merits praise for consulting Soviet archives, he too often follows their method of citation without specifying the date or nature of the document in question. His research in printed and secondary sources appears uneven; he overlooked several relevant dissertations (both Soviet and American), neglected some studies of Catherine's general reform activities such as Kizevetter and Klokman on urban policies and uncritically utilized the deficient translated version of Catherine's so-called memoirs. Less important is his sloppy use of my own monograph. On pages 198-204, for instance, I counted some eight errors of fact, chronology, or implication. Although this book's thesis is not novel, it is ably argued in attractive prose.

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PETER K. CHRISTOFF. *An Introduction to Nineteenth-Century Russian Slavophilism*. Volume 2, *I. V. Kireevskij*. (Slavistic Printings and Reprints, 23/2.) The Hague: Mouton. 1972. Pp. x, 406. 68 gls.

In no small measure Russian intellectual history is the creation of authors that were neither original thinkers nor significant writers. Rather, they were original and attractive individuals whose personalities cast them into the role of transmitters and catalysts of Western ideas and Russian sentiments. Their strong emotional relationships to contemporaries in circles, salons, or friendship groups enabled them to spread new ideas, aspirations, and attitudes. Like Prince Myshkin in the *Idiot* they created the magnetic field for the interaction of ideas and emotions. Best defined negatively (they were not creative writers, original philosophers, men of action, etc.) their intellectual role is hard

to reconstruct with the passing of the existential matrix in which their lives were spent. Not surprisingly, therefore, the life and works of these men are very difficult subjects for historical and intellectual analysis, for the intangible personal dimension cannot be easily recaptured. Such a figure was Ivan Kireevskij (1806–56) who is credited with developing the philosophic and theological stance of Slavophilism.

In spite of the difficulty in recapturing such personalities, perhaps because of it, goaded by the contemporaries' emotionally charged judgments of them, these men have fascinated biographers and historians. With the recent revival of interest in Slavophilism it was to be expected that Ivan Kireevskij, one of its luminous and formative personalities, would become the subject of monographical treatment. Not counting many pages devoted to him in general histories of Slavophilism and nineteenth-century Russian intellectual developments, three full-scale biographical studies have been published in recent years. Is it not too much of a good thing perhaps? First came the very learned and philosophically sophisticated monograph of Eberhard Müller, *Russischer Intellekt in europäischer Krise: Ivan V. Kireevskij 1806–1856* (1966), which had the great merit of placing the spiritual seekings of Ivan Kireevskij and his fellow Slavophiles into their all-European context. But Dr. Müller's work suffered from the disadvantage of being written in German. Last year appeared Abbott Gleason's very readable and handily compact study, *European and Muscovite: Ivan Kireevsky and the Origins of Slavophilism* (1972), which also paid attention to the sociopolitical stances of Slavophilism and tried to analyze them in the framework of modern sociology of knowledge.

More recent still (though it may in fact have appeared simultaneously with Gleason's book) is the second volume of Professor Peter K. Christoff's massive *Introduction to 19th-Century Russian Slavophilism* devoted to Ivan Kireevskij. In this volume Professor Christoff follows the same organization as he did in the first volume dealing with A. Khomiakov. The first part (about one-third) provides a full biographic account within the context of contemporary Russian society (and it is a mine of

useful information on personal connections, publishing ventures, public opinion manifestations, etc.). In the second part we find a topical and systematic exposition of the major ideas of Ivan Kireevskij, the focus being on his philosophical, religious, and historiosophical beliefs. Kireevskij's ideas and opinions are fairly summarized and their genetic background briefly sketched in. Extensive quotations and references to the original sources result in a reliable abstract of Kireevskij's not very voluminous writings. The critical and analytical comments, however, leave something to be desired as they do not do justice to the complexity, subtleness, and outright superficiality of Kireevskij's thought. Unfortunately, too, because of the extraordinarily long delay in publication, recent relevant literature was not adequately exploited. In the appendix we are given the translation of Kireevskij's last and philosophically most interesting, albeit incomplete, article (which Professor Christoff generously allowed to be published first in J. M. Edie *et al.*, eds. *Russian Philosophy* [1965]). A very complete bibliography and index of names complete the volume, enhancing its reference value.

The serious and diligent student who commands neither Russian nor German now has at his disposal a full and reliable introduction to Ivan Kireevskij's thought and world. I suspect though that the undergraduate and the candidate for graduate oral examination will prefer Gleason's readable monograph.

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I. S. DOSTIAN. *Rossii i balkanskii vopros: Iz istorii russko-balkanskikh politicheskikh svyazei v pervoi treti XIX v.* [Russia and the Balkan Question: On the History of Russian-Balkan Political Relations in the First Third of the 19th Century]. (Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Institut Slavianovedeniia i Balkanistiki.) Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka." 1972. Pp. 367.

The Eastern Question continues to fascinate Soviet historians. Building upon several monographs published in Russian in recent years, drawing upon a few selected works of Western scholars, and introducing some new archival materials, Irina Dostian presents a detailed examination of Russian policy in the Balkans during the first third of the nineteenth cen-

ture. The organization of the book is basically chronological with geographical subdivisions. Primary subdivisions deal with the development of autonomy in Serbia, Greece, and the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia.

Dostian's treatment is biased toward national and Marxist perspectives, especially toward the former. The Turks are represented as oppressive and backward while the Russians are the well-intentioned saviors of the Balkan peoples, though frequently restricted in their aims by military capability and international obligations. The other great powers, especially Britain and Austria, act to preserve the Ottoman Empire to the detriment of the cause of national liberation in the Balkans. The author does recognize, however, that conflicts in the leadership of Russian foreign affairs after 1815, between the peaceful inclinations of Nesselrode and Alexander I—their first concern being the Holy Alliance—and the aspirations of Capodistrias and several diplomats and generals in the field—who favored a hard line toward the Ottoman Porte—resulted in indecision and confusion in policy.

To the credit of the book are the discussions of interpretations of Soviet scholars (some of which the author takes issue with) and those of Western historians, particularly Patricia Grimsted and Barbara Jelavich. Relying heavily upon the work of G. L. Arsh on the Greek revolutionary movement, Dostian's examination of the 1812–20 period is both interesting and informative, and her comparative analysis of Russian policy toward Serbia and the principalities after the Treaty of Bucharest (1812) provides additional insights into the complexities of the Eastern Question in the nineteenth century.

Unfortunately, the period before 1812 is much more sketchily treated with practically no reference to Napoleonic influences in the Balkans. There is also little indication of the existence of parties in the Balkans representing varying, anti-Russian positions and there is too little supporting evidence for the broader claims that Russian policies alone made possible the evolution of Balkan peoples from Ottoman subjection to an autonomous, protected status.

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ARTHUR LEHNING, introduction and annotations by. *Michel Bakounine et ses relations avec Sergej Nečëv, 1870–1872: Écrits et matériaux.* (Archives Bakounine, number 4.) Leiden: E. J. Brill, for the Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam. 1971. Pp. lxxviii, 492. 152 gls.

MICHAEL CONFINO. *Violence dans la violence: Le débat Bakounine-Nečëv.* (Bibliothèque socialiste, 24.) Paris: François Maspero. 1973. Pp. 212. 28 fr.

Both of these books illuminate what Franco Venturi has described as “the complex and obscure” relationship between the celebrated Russian anarchist Bakunin and his unscrupulous young disciple Nechaev. After their first meeting in Switzerland Bakunin praised Nechaev as “one of those young fanatics who know no doubts, who fear nothing . . . believers without God, heroes without rhetoric”; and during the spring and summer of 1869 the two men issued a series of pamphlets and manifestoes calling for a popular upheaval in Russia. It was during this period that the notorious *Catechism of the Revolutionary* was written, depicting the rebel as a complete immoralist, bound to commit any crime, any treachery, any baseness or deception to bring about the destruction of the existing order. The revolutionist, the *Catechism* declared, “despises and hates present-day social morality in all its forms. He regards everything as moral that favors the triumph of the revolution. . . . All soft and enervating feelings of friendship, love, gratitude, even honor must be stifled in him by a cold passion for the revolutionary cause. . . . Day and night he must have one thought, one aim—merciless destruction.”

The authorship of the *Catechism* has been a subject of prolonged and bitter dispute. In the absence of conclusive evidence scholars hostile to the anarchists have usually attributed it to Bakunin, while others have attributed it to Nechaev, and still others to both men as a product of their close collaboration during 1869. Important new evidence on this question is contained in a letter from Bakunin to Nechaev of June 2–9, 1870, located in the Natalie Herzen Archives of the Bibliothèque Nationale and first published by Professor Confino in 1966. It is the longest and most interesting letter Bakunin ever wrote, requiring eight days to complete

and occupying more than thirty pages of closely printed text, and it forms the centerpiece of both volumes under review. In it Bakunin repudiates what he calls "your catechism," along with Nechaev's whole "Jesuitical system." On the basis of this statement the *Catechism* must now be attributed to Nechaev, although it is far from certain that Bakunin had no role in its composition. Beyond this, the letter clarifies the reasons for Bakunin's break with Nechaev and helps us understand their differing views on secret organizations. Above all, it illuminates the question of revolutionary ethics, of the relationship between means and ends, with which revolutionists have continued to grapple to this day.

Arthur Lehning's volume presents a careful documentary record of the relations between Bakunin and Nechaev from 1870 to 1872, as well as of Nechaev's pursuit by the Swiss and tsarist police and his ultimate extradition to Russia. An installment in the monumental Archives Bakounine series, it is distinguished by its lavish production and meticulous editing, with a solid introduction and copious notes by Lehning, the foremost authority on Bakunin. With the forthcoming publication of a companion volume covering 1869, it will constitute the fullest and most reliable source on the subject, indispensable for libraries and specialists alike.

Professor Confino's smaller volume is intended for a wider audience, though it contains nearly all the most important documents (among them a fascinating letter from German Lopatin to Natalie Herzen that is not included in the present Lehning volume) as well as a brilliant analytical introduction. Its somewhat melodramatic title *Violence dans la violence* was inspired by Camus's observation that with Nechaev the revolutionary movement was "explicitly separated from love and friendship" and that for the first time violence was justified against one's own comrades. The title, however, also carries echoes of *Revolution in the Revolution* (1967), a manual of insurrection by Régis Debray, who has himself, interestingly enough, been described as a "Nechaev in the Andes."

Neither volume, surprisingly, contains the diary of Natalie Herzen, with its revealing portrait of Nechaev, which was first published

by Confino in 1969 in the *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* with a subsequent English translation in *Encounter*. One hopes that it will be included in the English edition of Confino's book that is now in preparation.

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ERWIN OBERLÄNDER *et al.*, editors. *Russia Enters the Twentieth Century, 1894-1917*. New York: Schocken Books. 1971. Pp. 352. \$12.00.

BORIS MEISSNER, editor. *Social Change in the Soviet Union: Russia's Path toward an Industrial Society*. Translated by DONALD P. KOMMERS. (International Studies of the Committee on International Relations, University of Notre Dame.) Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press. 1972. Pp. xiv, 247. \$9.95.

Russia Enters the Twentieth Century offers a collection of essays on the quarter century preceding the collapse of the Russian Empire. Although the book qualifies as an international effort, with articles by such eminent British scholars as George Katkov, Violet Conolly, and Harry Willetts, as well as one each from Canada and the United States, it is primarily a product of German scholarship, and particularly of the Bundesinstitut für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien in Cologne.

The editors' stated intention is "to provide the reader with an accurate account of this important period of Russian history," and they further note that "it would, of course, also be highly desirable if this volume were to lead to further research into this period." Accordingly, the book attempts a broad survey of the principal aspects of prerevolutionary life, with essays on such varied subjects as foreign policy, constitutional law, political parties, economic development, the agrarian and nationalities problems, the role of the Church, literary developments, and educational policies as well as more specialized topics such as the growth of Siberia, the Muslim revival, and "The Outlook for Philosophy and the Fate of the Slavophile Utopia." There are, however, some surprising omissions. There is no essay on the labor question—surely of major concern in prerevolutionary Russia—and Violet Conolly's otherwise

excellent survey of the nationalities problem makes no mention of the Jewish minority.

The aim of presenting an accurate account may well be irreconcilable with the controversial nature of the period itself and with the many facets of its history that are still awaiting scholarly illumination. The problem is compounded by the tendency of some of the essayists to assume notably strong positions on highly debatable topics. Thus Lothar Schultz's essay on constitutional law is also a defense of the constitutional order introduced by the reforms of 1905 and 1906 against charges of "sham constitutionalism." Although the author concedes that changes in the electoral law on June 3, 1907, constituted a "breach of the constitution," he does not regard that action as signifying the end of constitutional government. Problems, moreover, arising out of misuse of Article 87, the perpetuation of an outdated class system, and continuing limitations on civil liberties receive scant attention. Similarly, Edwin Oberländer, in his essay on political parties, aims to rectify what he considers to be the Soviet view of the Social Democratic party as "the only really important political group in Russia"—an assumption, he avers, which has "also been espoused by the majority of western observers." It is perhaps in order to counteract this impression that the role of the Social Democrats in the concatenation of events leading to the dissolution of the Second State Duma is completely ignored. That event, it seems, stemmed entirely from the determination of a majority in the Duma, notwithstanding a liberal policy speech by Stolypin, to "demonstrate [its] lack of confidence" in the government. One may question, moreover, Oberländer's judgment that the Kadet program was "more radical than liberal to the western observer," while the Octobrists, who mainly represented the large landowners and the *haute bourgeoisie* of the towns, were "a genuine centre party." But whether or not one agrees with these assessments, one cannot disagree with his assertion that the tsar and tsarina "had only one political goal: to preserve for their heir a completely autocratic regime." Nor can one fault his conclusion that "the tsarist regime was not overthrown, it succumbed to its own inertia."

George Katkov and Michael Futrell present

an interesting essay on the character and mechanism of political initiative and decision making in foreign policy. This is a field greatly in need of exploration. Of particular interest are the influences of M. N. Katkov, Pobedonostsev, and, indirectly, Dostoyevsky on the policies of Alexander III and the young Nicholas II. It is Witte, however, who emerges as the villain of the piece—the principal agent of Russian economic expansion in the Far East, the player of a doubtful role in the Björko affair, and the perpetrator of "dubious and in the end treasonable" contacts with the German government on the eve of World War I. This, indeed, calls for further examination. Regrettably, the article stops short of exploring the causes of Russia's entrance into the world war or its consequences for subsequent Russian diplomacy.

Karl Thalheim recounts Russia's rapid rise to the position, by 1913, of fifth among the world's greatest industrial powers. The origins of this development he traces to the policies of Vyshnegradskii and Witte, who, he believes, were motivated primarily by a need to compensate for agrarian overpopulation. No doubt a variety of considerations entered into the early decision to pursue a policy of promoting industrialization, but to this reviewer, at least, the desire to advance the power of the state in world affairs was overwhelmingly predominant. Thalheim attributes successes in modernization almost entirely to governmental assistance and to the contributions of foreigners and their capital. Yet native enterprise also played a significant and increasingly important role, particularly in the central industrial region. In the ongoing debate between those who see Russian industrial policies, and particularly those of Witte, as leading in the direction of a planned economy and those who judge them to be directed in the spirit of economic liberalism, Thalheim steers a noncommittal course.

It is not entirely clear whom this volume is intended to serve since some of its contributors deal with limited aspects of their subjects and draw on primary source materials, while others offer broad surveys based largely on secondary sources written in West European languages. Yet this in itself is a useful and welcome contribution, both for the nonspecialist and for the general reader. To the extent that

the volume contains new material or presents controversial viewpoints it may indeed justify its editors' hope that it will spark much needed research in this critical period of Russia's history.

Social Change in the Soviet Union has little in common with the preceding book except for its authors and their academic connections. Karl Thalheim and Oskar Anweiler are contributors to both. Boris Meissner, Thalheim, and Karl-Heinz Ruffmann are directors or committee members of the Seminar for Eastern Studies in Cologne. The book, originally published in German in 1966, is the product of the first sociological conference to be held in Germany by the Society for East European Affairs. The principal essay is by Boris Meissner, who traces the rise of the new intelligentsia to a position of dominance in Soviet society—a process attended by the solidification of social stratification based on education, income, and bureaucratic status. Soviet society, in his view, is divided into three classes: a ruling class or power elite, whose primary objective is the “consolidation and expansion of [its] base of power”; a prestige elite, including the true intelligentsia as well as managerial elements, which seeks to impose limits on the power of the state; and the rest of the population. Meissner emphasizes the highly antagonistic tensions that divide the two upper classes, in contrast with the largely nonantagonistic tension between the rulers and the masses, and offers the prediction that the outcome of this conflict will determine the future of Soviet society. Unfortunately, Meissner makes little attempt to define “class.” Does it represent no more than a difference in status between achievers and nonachievers, or does it reflect in some measure inherited wealth and position? He does point out the high degree of correlation between education and social standing in Soviet society, but the extent to which educational opportunity is freely available is not discussed. The value of the pages of statistical material which are included is considerably reduced by a lack of adequate definition of categories and terms and by occasional inconsistencies in the data.

Anweiler attempts in his essay on educational policy and social change to answer some of the questions raised in the Meissner article. The

problem, as he sees it, is the dilemma that confronts the Soviet leadership, forced to choose between an egalitarian educational policy “oriented toward the ideal of a classless society” and an elitist policy “dictated by the imperatives of a planned economy.” Essentially, although not explicitly, Anweiler's discussion complements Meissner's position by highlighting elements of mobility in Soviet society that are based on ability and training in the interests of industrial development.

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DIMITRY POSPIELOVSKY. *Russian Police Trade Unionism: Experiment or Provocation?* (L. S. E. Research Monographs, London School of Economics and Political Science.) London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson. 1971. Pp. x, 189. £2.50.

A peculiar form of police socialism, owing something to historical precedents set by Louis Bonaparte and Bismarck, appeared in Russia around the turn of the century. The chief of the Moscow security police, Sergei Zubatov, organized labor unions and societies and won a few minor concessions from factory owners (chiefly foreign owners). In so doing, he seemed to be defusing working-class revolutionism. Both Lenin and the capitalists considered him a threat. The latter got rid of him in 1903 and rejoiced; Lenin shared their delight.

Now comes a book on the Zubatov movement that Leonard Schapiro, in a foreword, calls the “authoritative source.” Let us see. To begin with, Pospelovsky cites (p. 24) an 1882 book for statistics bearing upon 1895 and 1902. Apparently he meant a 1906 work by the same author, but one turns there to find that Pospelovsky has changed and misrepresented the tables. He gives annual statistics (p. 27) demonstrating the inefficacy of some official measures against strikes, but he stopped with 1899, because, one is forced to conclude, the figures for the next three years would have destroyed his argument. Later (on page 38) he quotes Morskoy to the effect that “‘probably 80% of all industrial workers were members of clandestine workers' organizations under the leadership of the s.d. *Union of Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class.*’” Nothing after “organisations” appears in the source. Pospelovsky has gratuitously inserted mention

of Lenin's "Union" and has furthermore attributed the comment to Zubatov. A better source than Morskoy, Ozerov's *Politika po rabochemu voprosu* (pp. 236–37), indicates that the director of police, Zvoliansky, issued the warning—without Pospelovsky's extra flourish. We note also that Pospelovsky contrasts (p. 58) the views of Morskoy and Shtein, but as major library catalogs indicate, the "two" were the same person.

Much of the book is simply incomprehensible: the author professes to understand (p. 91) a police informer's observation that "an honest person can be a traitor only if he betrays others into the hands of another honest person; that is why your [Zubatov's] moral integrity is more important to me than anything else in the world"; he insists (p. 56) that the last tsar's policies were not anti-Semitic but merely "anti-Judaic"; and he sees clues (p. 13) to the development of the labor movement in "the Russian national temperament, in its tendency towards radicalism and extremism." Other inadequacies include his "discovery" (p. 138n) of the Plekhanov pseudonym "S. T. Arkomed" that, as Masanov's *Slovar' pseudonimov* indicates, belonged to Georg Karadzhian, and his failure to mention the Prechistensk Workers' Courses—one of Zubatov's most successful creations.

Leonard Schapiro claims that Pospelovsky has "scrupulously assembled all the material that was to be found." Not so. He did not use V. E. Varzar's compilation of official statistics, a work every serious writer has found indispensable. He has ignored S. Schwarz's book on the 1905 revolution, A. P. Korelin's October 1968 article in *Voprosy Istorii*, and two important dissertations, Jeremiah Schneiderman's on Zubatov and Walter Sablinsky's on Gapon.

Pospelovsky concludes that the Zubatov movement might have saved the tsarist regime, and his mentor, Schapiro, agrees. As a mere academic exercise, nothing more, that thesis might conceivably have some merit. But in the concrete case presented in this book, the argument is so weak as to be absurd.

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HOWARD D. MEHLINGER and JOHN M. THOMPSON.
Count Witte and the Tsarist Government in

the 1905 Revolution. (Indiana University International Studies.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1972. Pp. xiv, 434. \$17.50.

This study focuses on the hopes, achievements, and failures of Sergei Iulevich Witte during his brief six-month stewardship of the Russian government, between October 17, 1905, and April 15, 1906. Its joint authors, Howard D. Mehlinger and John M. Thompson, have made effective use of both Soviet archival and extensive published materials concerning the Russian 1905 revolution. They show very well how difficult it was for the government to gain needed public support for a moderate program of reform at the same time that it continued to use army, police, and political repression to restore social order. However, for Witte, as Mehlinger and Thompson point out, social order was not an end in itself, but rather, a prerequisite to stabilizing the economy and modernizing and rationalizing state and society in Russia. Without such stabilization and reform, Witte believed, the government would be unable to defend Russia's interests abroad and to promote the welfare of the tsar's subjects at home. The coauthors of this study do not idealize or attempt to rehabilitate Witte. Although they make clear that the odds were against his succeeding, they also show that his role as a policeman as well as his arrogance (*amour-propre*) and emotionalism while under stress undeniably hindered his work of reform.

This careful and critical examination of Witte's policy and the difficulties he faced while in office will oblige both Soviet and Western historians to re-examine existing interpretations of official policy during the 1905 revolution. Above all, it should now be difficult to accept oversimplified explanations of the government's actions during this period. And it is important to note that Mehlinger and Thompson are the first scholars who have undertaken to provide a systematic and detailed study of the revolutionary crisis of 1905–06 from the vantage point of the government.

Mehlinger and Thompson discuss Witte almost exclusively in terms of the 1905 crisis and the problems connected with the establishment of parliamentary government and a constitutional regime in Russia. It is unfortunate that they make so little effort to see Witte's policy in a broader historical perspective. After all,

Russian rulers and their officials worked throughout the nineteenth century to establish what George Yaney has recently referred to as uniform and "systemic legal-administrative order." Mehlinger and Thompson view Witte's vision of government "based upon law rather than tsarist caprice, [one] that protected the rights of its citizens as well as its monarch and that involved the leaders of the public in governmental affairs" as "an imaginative conception for a *chinovnik*" (p. 325). Perhaps so, but it must be observed, then, that there were many imaginative *chinovniki* before Witte (e.g., Speranskii, the Miliutin brothers, Valuev, Konstantin, Nikolaevich, and Loris-Melikov). The only serious reservations that some enlightened nineteenth-century *chinovniki* would have had about the idea of public and legal order attributed by Mehlinger and Thompson to Witte was the extent to which the public should be involved in the affairs of government. Otherwise, enlightened *chinovniki* agreed that the Russian monarchy had to be based on law and supported by a reformed and rationalized administrative apparatus. That the practice of government in Russia often fell short of this ideal is obvious. However, during the nineteenth century the government did gradually acquire practical knowledge, experience, and trained specialists, and developed bureaucratic institutions to deal with the multiple problems of Russian society. By the twentieth century Russia had the policemen and soldiers needed to restore order during the revolutionary crisis of 1905-06, a sufficient number of legal and other technical and enforcement personnel to draft the Fundamental Laws and to carry out the elections to the First Duma fairly and efficiently, financial experts with the skills and knowledge required to negotiate a two and one-quarter billion franc loan from France, and an ample number of agricultural specialists. The latter were employed mainly by the *zemstvos* and the Ministries of Agriculture and Interior, and they worked out the agricultural program championed by Witte and introduced by Stolypin and others after 1906. In other words, what Witte actually did accomplish while in office as premier was made possible by the work of several generations of *chinovniki* and by the rationalization and expansion of the bureaucracy during the preceding cen-

tury. In last analysis, Witte's belief in government by law and reform from above was not particularly surprising or unusual for a *chinovnik*.

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I. I. ASTAF'EV. *Russko-germanskie diplomaticheskie otnosheniia. 1905-1911 gg. (Ot Portsmutskogo mira do Potsdamskogo soglasheniia)* [Russian-German Diplomatic Relations, 1905-1911 (From the Peace of Portsmouth to the Potsdam Agreement)]. [Moscow:] Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo Universiteta. 1972. Pp. 302.

This book is a significant contribution in two respects: it examines Russo-German bilateral relations in the period 1905-11 in greater detail than has been done previously and, more important, it makes extensive use of Russian manuscript source materials. In fact, after the introductory chapter, Russian manuscripts constitute about one-quarter of the documentation in the book. The author also uses the familiar documentary publications of most of the other great powers. He does not, however, use any foreign archival materials and almost no Western historical literature (the single important exception being Bernadotte Schmitt's *The Annexation of Bosnia*). In spite of this unfortunate negligence, the extensive use of Russian archival materials is in itself important enough to warrant attention.

Astaf'ev argues that the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907 was by no means the point of no return in Russo-German relations. Rather, during these six years, Russia sought to maneuver (*lavirovat'*) carefully between the two camps, to stand basically outside both in order to preserve the political balance, and to play for time while dealing with the threat of revolution and while re-equipping the beaten army of 1905. It was the experience of negotiating the Potsdam agreement that prompted the Russians to shelve the policy of diplomatic independence and to come down unequivocally on the side of the Entente, and it was the German policy at Potsdam that forced their hand. For the object of the Germans in the Potsdam conversations was to engage the Russians in any kind of agreement contrary to the spirit of the Anglo-Russian Entente, to put such an

agreement on paper, and then to leak it to London in an attempt to spoil the Entente. The Russians understood this purpose in time and confined that part of the negotiations that might embarrass them in London to verbal assurances (especially the proposition that Russia would not cooperate in any English action hostile to German interests while Germany would in turn restrain Austrian expansion in the Balkans). Even so, during the negotiation of economic spheres of influence in Persia, a Russian draft project appeared in an English newspaper, and the Russians concluded that the Germans connived to place it there. Ultimately, however, the Russians avoided the trap that had been set for them and consummated their attachment to the Entente by the Franco-Russian maritime convention of 1912.

The Russian manuscripts provide refinement and nuance throughout, but the bulk of the documentation supporting the most important argument advanced by Astaf'ev, that it was the Potsdam conversations that moved Russia finally into the Entente camp, comes from *Die Grosse Politik*.

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ALEXANDER and JANET RABINOWITCH with LADIS K. D. KRISTOF, editors. *Revolution and Politics in Russia: Essays in Memory of B. I. Nicolaevsky*. (Russian and East European Series, volume 41. Russian and East European Institute, Indiana University.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press, for the International Affairs Center. 1972. Pp. xii, 416. \$12.75.

The Russian Revolution has dramatized the Marxist type of scholar-revolutionary, to whom scholarship was the continuation of revolution by other means and vice versa. B. I. Nicolaevsky had the distinction of being an energetic archivist in addition. Born into a family of priests he became a Marxist revolutionary in high school, passing thereafter his career in journalism (both legal and underground), jail, and administrative exile. An increasingly disillusioned follower of Martov, in 1917 he was the Soviet representative to the historical commission investigating the records of the *okhrana*. There he was apprenticed to the "systematic work on the questions relating to the Russian and international revolutionary move-

ments" for which he eventually became famous. Avoiding politics after the Bolshevik coup, he served for a while as director of the Historical Revolutionary Archive in Moscow, until jailed and exiled abroad. In Berlin, and later in Paris, he stayed in touch with developments in his country as a productive scholar and author, finding himself on two more occasions a revolutionary archivist in the eye of a political hurricane: in 1933 when he rescued the files of the German Social Democratic party, and again after the fall of France when he safeguarded his most valuable collections from the Nazis, himself at the end escaping to the United States. With the burgeoning interest in Soviet studies during the cold war, his enormous collections and his insider's expertise (and his kindness in sharing both) as well as his democratic idealism endeared him to a growing number of American scholars in the field. As Philip Mosely observed, Boris Ivanovich repaid the country many times over for the haven it had provided him for the last quarter century of his life. This *Festschrift*, an unusually respectable specimen of the genre, testifies to the gratitude felt by a distinguished group of scholars from several countries.

The three opening chapters outline Nicolaevsky's work and character. A. Rabinowitch's introduction gives the solid factual framework. L. K. D. Kristof's free-roaming essay on "The Formative Years," often drawing on Nicolaevsky's recollections, reconstructs the successive stages of his development: the parish priest's family at Belebei in the southern Urals; high school and revolutionary initiation in Samara, Ufa, and the Ufa jail; his early bent for historical scholarship; the revolution of 1905 in Samara; his efforts as a *primirenets* between Mensheviks and Bolsheviks; a *narodnik* in Marxist clothing on the peasant and nationalities questions; his aversion to Stalin and ambivalence about Lenin; and his explanation of the tragedy of menshevism in 1917 (the Mensheviks refused to take power because it might have to be used against a proletariat headed for a *Pugachevshchina*)—stressing at all stages his elemental humanitarianism. P. E. Mosely's brief account of the American years completes the record by noting his scholarly interests and work, his publications, and his friends' relatively unsuccessful promptings to

complete his major studies while he could—only a single collection of essays published under the title *Power and the Soviet Elite* ever emerged from these studies.

The subsequent chapters, invariably of admirable quality, deal with subjects close to Nicolaevsky's heart. Each of them deserves mention. Marc Raeff's "Russian Youth on the Eve of Romanticism: Andrei I. Turgeniev and his Circle," describes the progenitor of a long line of revolutionary *kruzhki*. J. Frankel, in his piece "Voluntarism, Maximalism, and the Group for the Emancipation of Labor," argues that Plekhanov and Vera Zasulich were not only the pioneers of Russian Marxism but also the heirs of the *narodovoltzi*. A. K. Wildman, under the title "Russian and Jewish Social Democracy," shows that the founding of the *Bund* was not consciously conceived as a break from the Russian Marxists; he stressed the *Bund's* continuing contribution, as even Lenin in 1902 acknowledged. I. Getzler's learned essay on "Marxist Revolutionaries and the Dilemma of Power" provides a refreshing breath of reflection in asking why the Mensheviks abstained from taking power in 1917. Surveying Marx's and Marxist wrestling with that problem from 1847 to 1917, he shows how inconclusive were the arguments and also how dubious Lenin's final answer. W. Sablinsky's chapter "The All-Russian Railroad Union and the Beginning of the General Strike in October, 1905," deals with the role and eventual sad fate in that revolution of a professional union with a liberal, middle-class bias. "The Social-Democratic Movement in Latvia," the next chapter, relates the history of that national branch of social democracy from the 1890s to 1917 (or even 1945) almost as a piece of family history for the author, Bruno Kalniņš. R. C. Tucker's contribution, "Stalin's Revolutionary Career before 1917," falls squarely in the mainstream of Nicolaevsky's work; it scrutinizes Stalin's rise as a Marxist from an uncertain start to his elevation to the Central Committee and Lenin's praise of him as a mature theorist. Comparison with Kristof's chapter, incidentally, reveals a discrepancy. Tucker says that Stalin did not arrive in Baku until 1907, whereas Kristof, citing Nicolaevsky, has him building himself a Mafia-like power base there in 1905-06. Whom are we to believe?

Next, A. Rabinowitch cuts to the heart of the matter in his well-documented chapter on "The Petrograd Garrison and the Bolshevik Seizure of Power," making the role of the soldiers even more crucial. S. F. Cohen offers a spirited critique of Bukharin's book *The Economics of the Transition Period*, the theoretical underpinning of war communism, while W. Sukiennicki devotes a longish chapter to the complex and futile search, which took place in 1922, for unity among the Second, the Second-and-a-half, and the Third Internationals. Jumping two decades we come next to A. Dalin's perceptive and detailed account of a minor Soviet quisling: "The Kaminsky Brigade: A Case-Study of Soviet Disaffection," clearly the most impressive contribution. R. M. Slusser's piece, "The Presidium Meeting of February, 1961: A Reconstruction," demonstrates that it is possible, up to a point, for American political scientists to trace the process of Soviet policy making despite the obvious obstacles, by simply giving close attention to official speeches, the itinerary of Soviet leaders, the Soviet press, and the calendar of important events the world over, including the United States. J. L. H. Keep performs a somewhat similar scrutiny in the context of Soviet historiography, dealing with the work and reputation of M. N. Pokrovsky. He finds that in the current softening of official directives Pokrovsky's reputation rather than his ideas are being reinstated. After an un-Nicolaevskian sociological treatise by G. Fischer, "Political Monism and Cultural Duality: A Soviet Model of Modern Society?" the volume closes in style with nineteen pages of solid documentation: "The Writings of B. I. Nicolaevsky: A Selected Bibliography," compiled by his companion Anna M. Bourguina.

Any reader should gaze at the frontispiece, a photo of Boris Ivanovich sitting at his desk. He will feel the kindly power of this man surge through the entire volume down to the conspicuously careful and devoted work of the editors.

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M. C. MORGAN. *Lenin*. [Athens:] Ohio University Press. 1971. Pp. xii, 236. \$8.75.

ROBERT CONQUEST. *V. I. Lenin*. New York: Viking Press. 1972. Pp. viii, 152. \$5.75.

ROLF H. W. THEEN. *Lenin: Genesis and Development of a Revolutionary*. (Portraits.) Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company. 1973. Pp. 194. \$6.95.

ROBERT H. MCNEAL. *Bride of the Revolution: Krupskaya and Lenin*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1972. Pp. 326. \$10.00.

On January 21, 1974, it will be fifty years since the death of Lenin, the man who has presided over the twentieth century perhaps to an even greater degree than Napoleon did over the nineteenth. At any rate the bibliography of writings on Lenin already exceeds the corresponding listing of works on Napoleon, long regarded as the leading political subject for biographical efforts. To be sure, the overwhelming bulk of the Lenin studies is confined to the Russian language, but even the present sampling of works in English can tell us something of the life and meaning of the man who "shook the world." Perhaps these four books may even offer some insight as to why the archetypal success story of our time has aspects also of archetypal tragedy.

The success part of the story is the primary concern of the biography by Morgan. For here we have in systematic fashion an account of Lenin's meteoric rise from reading Marx to ruling Russia, with sufficient excerpts from his *Collected Works* to virtually permit Lenin to present his own case. "This was Lenin's aim in a nutshell," says Morgan, "to create a saner, healthier, better world." And for all the ruthlessness and perverting tenacity which Morgan concedes (for if sometimes naive, he is not an apologist), the monumental image of Lenin emerges as "essentially a constructive, not a destructive personality." The result is an introductory text at once positive and reliable and likely also to be appreciated by college students for its effective combination of dramatic events with solid information.

Against this view stands Conquest, an old hand in the Soviet field and as negative on Lenin, in a broadly objective way, as Morgan is positive. (Actually the two books make an excellent combination.) Conquest's study, less a text than a brilliant essay, starts at the very point where Morgan leaves off. He does not ask, What great deeds were done? but, judging the deeds by their results inquires instead, What went wrong? He directs his investigation not so

much at what Lenin said as at what he actually did, not so much at questions of theory as at questions of power, not so much at the role of the masses as at the role of the elite, and not so much at revolution overall as at the *kto-kogo* ("who-whom?") of the revolutionary jungle. He agrees that the appeal of Leninism is its claim that social change can be brought about by will power and organization, but he concludes from what he has observed that "the last state of things is worse than the first." And he notes that under the Soviets executions have been fifty times as numerous as under the tsars.

If the reader now wonders how both the pro and the con can be true and what the relation might be between them, our third author, Theen, may give us some help. Theen goes back to Lenin's youth before 1900, where he has already established himself as translator and editor of Nikolai Valentinov's major study on *The Early Years of Lenin*. (Valentinov's account is more fundamental, but Theen's much shorter book is generally more lucid.) The common theme of both these writers is that Lenin was basically a Russian Jacobin in the Chernyshevsky tradition and that his adherence to Marxism was by contrast formal and ideological. Behind Lenin's conscious faith in the masses, in other words, was the greater reality of his sometimes conscious but often unconscious elitism. And the upshot of this was an insoluble contradiction, potentially disastrous, but largely unrecognized by Lenin himself, between what he thought he was doing (for the masses) and what he actually did do (as an elitist) when his big chance came in 1917.

With McNeal (whose book is the most important of our foursome) and his subject Krupskaya, who has a longer lifespan than Lenin, we are able to follow this elite-mass relationship through to its bitter end. We can even discern (though none of our writers spells it out in quite this way) a sort of model cycle for the life-career of a proper revolutionist: a journey from mass ideals to elitist power to postelitist liquidation. The first phase is "mission," the second "success," and the third "tragedy." Lenin himself lived long enough to experience the first two of them—and Morgan, for example, concludes his account on this note, with Lenin still winning. But right in those twilight months of brief recovery during his last

illness, Lenin caught a glimpse of the post-elitist third phase, which Stalin was preparing. He strove to come to grips with it or at least to understand it, struggled like a man in a strait jacket that was ideological and of his own devising, and then collapsed. The insoluble contradiction had surfaced, and even the little that Lenin saw of it probably hastened his demise.

For the full turning of the revolutionary cycle as it related to Lenin we can now, thanks to McNeal, look to his widow and alter ego, Krupskaya, who outlived him by fifteen years. In her case the cyclical pattern had already been strangely altered by a partial skipping over of the middle term of elitist power. She had been so closely associated with Lenin during the prerevolutionary period of mass ideals that for this part of her life, and despite all of McNeal's diligence, there is very little one can adduce that is new—even the Inessa Armand story has long been known. But the famous "sealed train," which in April 1917 bore Lenin and Krupskaya back to Russia, also bore, according to McNeal, the seeds of partial alienation between them. The new policy that Lenin sprung on his startled followers at the Finland station seems also to have caught Krupskaya by surprise. Because her support was delayed, Lenin refrained from installing her in her traditional post as party secretary. As a consequence 1917 was for her, as the chapter heading says, a "quiet revolution," which she spent immersed in the problems of developing better schools in the Vyborg district. Even after settling in the Kremlin with Lenin, Krupskaya continued working in the field of education, only to be thrust once more into the historical vortex by the burgeoning tragedy of Lenin's last illness.

With Lenin's death and the onset of the third phase, McNeal describes a process much less well documented than the "road to revolution" theme of the first half of his book—namely, the "road to counter-revolution" or "road to liquidation" experienced by the surviving revolutionists. Because of her special closeness to Zinoviev and Kamenev, Krupskaya was drawn into open opposition to Stalin and carried out the smuggling operation whereby Lenin's "Testament" was transmitted to the *New York Times* in October 1926. Stalin, however, let it be known in true Orwellian fashion

that "I shall make someone else Lenin's widow," meaning by that the raking up, magnifying, and broadcasting of the Inessa Armand affair. Rather than permit this, Krupskaya capitulated, to remain ever after in Stalin's thrall. "If Lenin were alive today," she is reported to have said, "he would be in jail."

Though she herself was never arrested or put on public trial, Krupskaya was now so effectively trapped that in 1936 articles could be published over her name in *Pravda* demanding that those "fascist dogs," Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev, be shot forthwith. It had to be either acquiescence to Stalin or opposition, and Stalin, besides having all the power, had also by then the inestimable advantage of totally representing the elite, as the elite already totally represented the mass. To say "mass" (or workers), therefore, also committed one to saying "elite" (or party) and ultimately "Stalin" (or leader). Thus did an elitist faith in a mass ideal keep the old Bolsheviks helpless before the post-elitist betrayal of that ideal. And thus even for Krupskaya, living in the Kremlin itself, but at the mercy of Stalin and forced to acquiesce in the liquidation of her friends, it would appear that "the last state of things" was "indeed" worse than the first. Even for the "bride of the revolution" the success of the revolution brought tragedy.

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S. S. KHESIN. *Oktiabr'skaia revoliutsiia i flot* [The October Revolution and the Navy]. (Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Nauchnyi Sovet po Kompleksnoi Probleme "Istoriia Velikoi Oktiabr'ski Sotsialisticheskoi Revoliutsii.") Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka." 1971. Pp. 487.

Based on a wide range of sources including rare memoirs, contemporary newspapers, and a wealth of previously unpublished material from naval and party archives, this book is an important contribution to historical literature on the Russian Revolution. Previous works on the role of naval forces in the 1917 revolutions have focused almost exclusively on Bolshevik activity in the Baltic Fleet and on the impact of the Baltic sailors upon political developments in Petrograd. Professor Khesin is the first to attempt a detailed, comparative analysis of the relation of naval institutions and all elements

of the fleet to the struggle for power everywhere in Russia. His study underlines once again the depth of disaffection within the military forces and their importance for the Bolshevik triumph. Yet unlike earlier works it is relatively free of generalization and exaggeration in regard to the percentage of sailors of working-class background and the process of bolshevization in the navy as a whole. Moreover, Professor Khesin delves deeply into such significant and relatively little-explored problems as conditions in the navy and the state of the fleet after the February Revolution; the social background and attitudes of the officer class; the aspirations and outlook of the sailors; government policies vis-à-vis naval forces and their effects; the composition, activity, and impact of elective committees, Soviets, and non-Bolshevik political parties in the fleet; and the ways in which naval personnel influenced political developments nationally.

If in many ways the study constitutes a major scholarly advance, such is not always the case. Professor Khesin's overall conception of the development of the revolution conforms to the official view that the months between the February Revolution and the end of the July Days constituted the peaceful period of revolutionary struggle, while the time from late July to October was the period of preparation for the seizure of power. Turning aside the still controversial question of Lenin's attitude toward the possible seizure of power in June and July, this scheme forces Professor Khesin to virtually overlook the strong predilection for immediate revolutionary action on the part of large numbers of sailors, including middle- and lower-rank Bolsheviks, particularly in Kronstadt. Khesin's explanation of the participation of naval personnel in the chaotic July uprising, when some ten thousand heavily armed Bolshevik-led sailors marched on Petrograd bent on overthrowing the government, is limited to the laconic observation that "the Baltic Fleet was pulled into the stormy events of the July crisis." In great detail Professor Khesin does describe repressions in the fleet after the July Days; however, the reasons for these harsh measures remain obscured.

Professor Khesin's account also hews to the doctrine that the Bolsheviks were essentially united behind Lenin's leadership in 1917 and

that deviationists did not significantly influence the behavior of the party or the course of the revolution. Nothing is said about the impact of such moderate Bolsheviks as Kamenev and Zinoviev in delaying preparations for an insurrection after Lenin's appeal for an immediate armed uprising in mid-September or about the views of such tactically cautious leaders as Trotsky and Stalin that decisively shaped the manner in which power was ultimately won. The several weeks immediately preceding the October Revolution are depicted as a time when, responding to Lenin's directives, followers of the party everywhere were engaged in increasingly intense preparations for an uprising. Just a few years ago it appeared Soviet historians might be able to deal more fully with such matters. Yet sad to note, neither Kamenev nor Trotsky, the latter a familiar figure in Kronstadt and one of the chief architects of the transfer of power to the Soviets, is even mentioned in the book.

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V. D. NABOKOV. *The Provisional Government*. Edited by ANDREW FIELD. With an introduction by RICHARD PIPES. (A Halsted Press Book.) New York: John Wiley and Sons. 1970. Pp. xiv, 147. \$7.75.

REINHARD WITTRAM. *Studien zum Selbstverständnis des 1. und 2. Kabinetts der russischen Provisorischen Regierung (März bis Juli 1917)*. (Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen. Philologisch-historische Klasse, Third Series, number 78.) Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1971. Pp. 158. DM 28.

S. P. MELGUNOV. *The Bolshevik Seizure of Power*. Edited and abridged by SERGEI G. PUSHKAREV, in collaboration with BORIS S. PUSHKAREV. Translated by JAMES S. BEAVER. Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO. 1972. Pp. xxv, 260. Cloth \$15.00, paper \$5.50.

ROGER PETHYBRIDGE. *The Spread of the Russian Revolution: Essays on 1917*. [New York:] St. Martin's Press. 1972. Pp. xii, 238. \$11.95.

JOHN F. O'CONOR, translation and commentary by. *The Sokolov Investigation of the Alleged Murder of the Russian Imperial Family: A Translation of Sections of Nicholas A. Sokolov's The Murder of the Imperial Family*. New York: Robert Speller and Sons. 1971. Pp. 257. \$8.95.

Western scholarship on the Russian Revolution has consistently been the adversary of Soviet mythology. Often its effect has been to suggest that the Bolsheviks should not have won at all: the Provisional Government made mistakes but the Bolsheviks did too—the Bolsheviks had no plan for an insurrection in October, they were divided and disorganized at the local level, and they had little support among either soldiers or peasants. Why then did they win? None of these five books contains a convincing answer, but taken together they help clarify the problem.

One of the difficulties encountered in trying to answer the question has been that the very rhetoric of 1917 has biased historical understanding. Lenin and Trotsky simplified their vocabulary in order to succeed; historians in the West have had to desimplify it in order to explain. In his 1918 memoirs on the Provisional Government, the Kadet leader V. D. Nabokov considered rhetoric a major failing. Substituting words for actions, men like Miliukov and Nekrasov often acquired “unregistering, hoarse voices” from constant oratory that utilized “revolutionary language” and “revolutionary demagoguery” to appeal to the “supposed feelings of the masses.” As chief of the governmental secretariat, Nabokov could observe firsthand the “duplicitous” of Nekrasov, the “irony and sarcasm” of Miliukov, and Kerensky’s “fondness for posturing.” Bound by their liberal-democratic ideals these men could neither accept their power as legitimate nor suppress those who sought to usurp it. Their downfall became inevitable when they formed a coalition cabinet with the socialists on May 5, 1917, thus uniting mutually hostile forces whose disagreements could be resolved only through “endless bargaining over isolated words and phrases.” Kerensky’s revolutionary democracy, according to Nabokov, meant only a “fanaticism for words and formulas” coupled with a “lack of any aptitude for governing.” Still, although valuable for its vivid sketches of the men of 1917, Nabokov’s memoir helps us see why liberalism failed, but not why Bolshevism succeeded.

In his “April Theses” Lenin began his relentless campaign against what he termed cooperation with the “bourgeois” Provisional Government. Yet, as Reinhard Wittram points out, Lenin’s 1917 label is misleading. The very

term “bourgeois,” he notes, was an eighteenth-century loanword that bore little relationship to Russian social realities of the *meshchanstvo* or *gosti* classes or the voting privileges of *tsentsoviki*. Wittram’s biographies of members of the Provisional Government reveal that “none of them was a representative of an interest group or a spokesman for a social class.” Rather, they formed a cross-section of a newly emerging Russia drawn from the provinces—*intelligenty* who imbibed European principles of liberal democracy laced with neo-Slavophile imagery. The economic legislation of the second cabinet, which included three socialists, helped make it the enemy, not the mouthpiece, of propertied Russia and helped force the resignation of four Kadets on the eve of the July Days. Like Marc Ferro, who has challenged Trotsky’s label of “dual power” with his discovery of continual cooperation between Provisional Government and Soviet, Wittram presents a picture of a government by the socialist center, not the propertied right. Paradoxically, its collapse therefore is harder to understand than in Nabokov’s portrait of ineptitude.

Bolshevik success was the consequence of Provisional Government failure. Yet Lenin’s call for an organized insurrection in 1917 has since given way to a picture of the Bolsheviks as a divided and unprepared political party that had power thrust upon it; Kerensky’s attempt to shut down the Bolshevik’s presses in October precipitated, rather than prevented, the coup. This view was first developed in detail by S. P. Melgunov in his *Kak bol’sheviki zakhvatili vlast’* (1953) and refined by Robert V. Daniels in his *Red October* (1967); even the work of the Soviet historian E. M. Burdzhakov supports much of this argument. Melgunov’s thesis is that “‘October’ was not the realization of ‘February.’ Only the mistakes of those who were able to prevent the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks made it ‘inevitable.’” There was no detailed plan for seizing power, only a “muddled confusion among the leading conspirators on the eve of the uprising.” The comic-opera incidents are all here: Lenin’s detention and release while on his way to Smolnyi; the inability of the Bolshevik commander of the Peter and Paul Fortress to find a red lantern to signal the attack on the Winter Palace; the failure of guns to fire and of gunners to

hit their targets. For Melgunov, the "ten days that shook the world" are a series of accidents, confusions, rumors, and poor planning for a revolt expected by all and planned by none. The book is most useful on the two weeks following the coup—when Krasnov's Cossacks were defeated at Pulkovo, when the railwaymen negotiated with Lenin to force a coalition government with the left SRs, and when most observers gave the Bolsheviks only a few more days in power. It is émigré historical debunking at its best, but it increases rather than diminishes our admiration that the Bolsheviks seized power at all. By showing that a revolution we know *did* happen should not have happened at all, it fails to explain why it did.

At first Roger Pethybridge's stimulating and original essays appear to offer a solution. His subject is not the personalities of Petrograd but the links that bound ordinary Russians together and thrust them apart in 1917: the railroad, postal system, telegraph, supply lines, press, and propaganda. He thus arranges in a new way some well-known events: the railroad and supply breakdown in February; the railwaymen's sabotage of the movements of Nicholas II, Kornilov, and Krasnov; the negotiations between the Bolsheviks and VIKZHEL (All-Russian Executive Committee of Railway Workers); and the manner by which both news and rumor sped across Russia by telegraph and newspaper. Each essay is set in the context of the history of these communications media and supplied with a wealth of anecdotes and detail. Yet the results are confusing since events often ran against the trends they suggest. The great rail center of the empire was Moscow; yet the revolution broke out in Petrograd. VIKZHEL was the most powerful anti-Bolshevik organization in Russia, consistently opposed to different political authorities in the capital; yet the Bolsheviks overcame its demands. Communications were available to any political party and often controlled by non-Bolsheviks; yet the Bolsheviks survived. Even after the coup Bolshevik newspapers had to be smuggled into the countryside because of postal sabotage; yet the revolution still spread to the provinces. If these were the significant forces dominating Russia in 1917, Pethybridge does not explain how the Bolsheviks avoided or subdued them.

John O'Connor's translation of N. A. Sokolov's

Ubiistvo tsarskoi semi (1925) is a nonscholarly attempt to demonstrate Bolshevik organizational power, which historical literature has been steadily diminishing. It should be read in the context of recent efforts to demonstrate the escape and survival of the Romanovs by Guy Hunt in his *Imperial Agent* (1966) and *The Hunt for the Tsar* (1970) and the claim by a Polish colonel, Michael Goleniewski, that he is Tsarevich Aleksei. O'Connor's purpose in translating Sokolov is to discredit his theory. In February 1919 Sokolov, an investigator for the Omsk Regional Court and occupying White Army forces, began to probe the murder of the imperial family, which took place at Ekaterinburg on the night of July 16–17, 1918. He concluded that the family had been killed by Chekhists under Yakov Yurovsky on orders of Ia. M. Sverdlov and that the Bolsheviks had tried to cover their tracks by coded telegrams and false leads. As Sokolov grudgingly concedes, the Bolsheviks "lied, I give them their due, intelligently." O'Connor speculates that the motive for lying was to conceal not murder but the family's escape to Poland (land of Goleniewski?). The few German archives consulted by O'Connor indicate only that the Germans wanted to help the Russian family and made some attempts to do so, not that they actually saved them. Yet out of the confusion of war-torn Russia, O'Connor spins a hopeful web of Romanov survival not unlike those that have appeared regularly in the West since the first "Anastasia" emerged in Germany in the early 1920s. It is not convincing.

The net effect of recent scholarship has been to suggest that the Bolsheviks had no business winning at all and that they utilized Marxist labels and rhetoric that greatly oversimplified the complexities of the time. While this has been a useful antidote to Soviet views of inevitable success by an organized party under an omniscient leader, it has also left us without a suitable explanation for what we know occurred. This may not be changing. As examples of such change one should consult recent studies by Norman Saul and Charles Duval, Jr. on second-level Bolshevik leaders such as Sverdlov and Raskolnikov and Lenin's activities in Finland in the two months prior to the coup. They suggest that there was at least a well-conceived plan to send several thousand

reliable sailors from the Baltic Fleet at Helsinki and Kronstadt into Petrograd, a plan that lay behind Lenin's well-known September letters to the Bolshevik Central Committee and that Sverdlov set in motion by his telegram to Helsinki at midnight on October 24. Raskolnikov later used many of these sailors to defend the revolution by defeating Krasnov. The confusion and recalcitrance of the Central Committee, it seems, should not be projected downward on the local party organizations any more than should an imagined unity or planning. We will need more careful scholarship than is seen here to exchange the labels of 1917 for explanations of what happened, rather than suggestions that it should not have happened at all.

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RONALD GRIGOR SUNY. *The Baku Commune, 1917-1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution*. (Studies of the Russian Institute, Columbia University.) Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1972. Pp. xxv, 412. \$15.00.

At first glance Professor Suny's study of the Revolution at Baku in 1917 and 1918 appears to describe events strikingly like those at Petrograd and Moscow during the same years. At Baku there was dual authority, with power split between a soviet and a provisional government; the Revolution after February steadily grew more radical, culminating in Bolshevik victory, and all the usual conflicts with Mensheviks, Socialist Revolutionaries, and other parties were present. But as one reads, the familiar story goes awry. The timing of events at Baku was all wrong; Bolsheviks acted like moderate socialists, workers struggled with other workers in nationalist conflict, and Bolshevik victory turned sour. One realizes quickly that Professor Suny has not merely hashed over a pale reflection of Petrograd's revolution in another region, but that, on the contrary, he has described and analyzed a unique series of events.

In Baku the emphases and influences were different. Arguments effectively used in the north provoked strange consequences here, and processes that should have evolved in accustomed ways were pulled out of shape by bizarre circumstances, much as a distorting mirror alters a familiar image. In the southern

city, class, national, and religious differences were inextricably intertwined within a peculiar economic situation. Muslem Azerbaijanis competed for work and status with Christian Armenians and Orthodox Russians, and Baku's only industry—oil—was the economic focal point of every nationalist quarrel.

By 1917 Baku Bolsheviks had long since learned to work sensitively for the economic interests of the workers rather than for political advancement. Instead of seizing control in October, they continued to labor for a peaceful transition to power, which they achieved in March 1918 in alliance with Left Socialist Revolutionaries and supported by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, Mensheviks, and even Right Socialist Revolutionaries. Ruling by parliamentary means, their government resembled the Paris Commune of 1871 rather than Lenin's dictatorship. And when they left the government in July, it was by their own decision because they did not choose to surrender the city to Turkish armies or to ask help from the British. Even the leaders of the Baku Bolsheviks were different from those at Petrograd, for Stepan Shaumian and Prokofia Dzhaparidze were moderate and reasonable men. Although they possessed a Cheka they did not use terror, and they brought their regime to an end by parliamentary action, withdrawing from government. Their ultimate reward was not victory but execution.

Professor Suny modestly calls this a local history. It is much more than that, certainly one of the most valuable of recent studies on the Russian Revolution. Suny has broadened our understanding of the roles Lenin and his party played in the north as well as in the Caucasus region, and he has deepened our comprehension of the immense importance, in all revolutions, of accident, circumstance, and the personalities of the leaders.

ARTHUR E. ADAMS
Ohio State University

RICHARD LUCKETT. *The White Generals: An Account of the White Movement and the Russian Civil War*. New York: Viking Press. 1971. Pp. xviii, 413. \$10.00.

V. P. NAUMOV. *Letopis' geroicheskoi bor'by: Sovetskaiia istoriografiia grazhdanskoi voiny i imperialisticheskoi interventsii v SSSR* [A

Chronicle of the Heroic Struggle: Soviet Historiography of the Civil War and Imperialist Intervention in the USSR]. (Akademiia Obshchestvennykh Nauk pri TsK KPSS, Kafedra Istorii SSSR.) Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl'." 1972. Pp. 471.

A. D. SKABA. *Parizhskaia mirnaia konferentsiia i inostrannaia interventsiiia v strane sovetov (Ianvar'-iiun' 1919 goda)* [The Paris Peace Conference and Foreign Intervention in the Country of the Soviets (January-June 1919)]. (Akademiia Nauk Ukrainskoi SSR, Institut Istorii.) Kiev: Izdatel'stvo "Naukova Dumka." 1971. Pp. 157.

These three books supplement different aspects of the expanding volume of literature dealing with the period of the civil war and intervention that followed the effective withdrawal of Russia from the Allied ranks during the First World War. In the first, Luckett portrays the White leaders in the civil war not only as individuals but as people who considered their cause worth dying for. The book by Naumov is a commentary on ideological and historical works, published throughout the Soviet period, depicting the civil war and intervention dating from the period 1917-22. The final volume, the book by Skaba, is the most precisely focused of the three. The author starts conceptually with the November revolution and traces the story of succeeding events up through the months of the Peace Conference to the eventual signing of the treaty with Germany in June 1919.

Luckett's book is well written and interesting in many ways. The story is largely told through the chief White officers, from Kornilov through Alexeiev, Denikin, Kappel, Mannerheim, and Kolchak to Wrangel, who are dealt with sympathetically by the author in vignettes of their careers during, and in some cases after, the civil war. The decline in these and other careers signified the waning fortunes of the White cause and, temporarily, of Russian prestige in general.

While the author deserves credit for providing so interesting an account of a neglected and significant aspect of the civil war and intervention, his narrative is apparently intended for the general reader rather than the specialist. He has, however, called attention to the need for a far more thorough examination of this far-flung effort aimed at preserving political order and a relative continuity of life

in addition to holding back the most significant revolutionary tide of the early twentieth century.

Naumov's treatment of the literature of the civil war and intervention makes his book a handy work of reference of considerable value to the student of this subject. It is partly topical, but mostly chronological in format. The first of the four chapters deals with Lenin, whose pervasive and authoritative pronouncements are noted. As a consequence of Lenin's responsibility in preparing to meet the military challenge from various quarters, in building the new Red Army, and in maneuvering to hold off the opposition to the Soviet regime, the question of the relationship of these affairs to the work of Trotsky is bound to arise. The author disposes of this problem with the observation that the contribution of the war commissar has been somewhat exaggerated.

The remaining three chapters deal with the historiography of the civil war and intervention from the 1920s to the present. The author notes the organization by the Academy of the General Staff, in October 1920, of the VNO (Military-Scientific Society) to study the organization of the Soviet armed forces, the operations of the Red Army, and other matters. One of the books discussed as part of the output of the 1930s is *The British Intervention and the Northern Counterrevolution*, a work of broader scope than the title implies, by I. I. Mints who has survived to write a recent, more extensive, and currently authoritative account dealing with the same period. Naumov's fourth and final chapter covers the period since the mid-1950s when the cult of personality gave place to greater prospects for the historian both in the accessibility of source materials and the range of topics and ideas.

The book by Skaba is a publication of the Institute of History of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. As the title hints rather than states, Skaba deals with the relations between the Paris Peace Conference and foreign intervention on the one hand and the new Soviet government on the other. By the time the conference assembled in January 1919, the author writes, foreign and domestic opposition had formed within Russia and had begun to coalesce in Paris where such views were brought to bear on the Peace Conference through the

Russian Political Conference with the support of Admiral Kolchak in Siberia, General Denikin in South Russia, Nikolai Chaikovsky in North Russia, as well as Sergei Sazonov, the former minister of foreign affairs who contributed his prestige to the project.

On the other side, the author portrays the Soviet regime struggling to surmount these obstacles. Like most Soviet writers he does not seem to appreciate the extent to which many factors less cataclysmic than the fear of revolution might also have helped to divide the ranks and undermine the determination of the Versailles powers and the White Russian forces. The book ends with the conferees having solved the "German question" by restoring peaceful relations with Germany and leaving the country intact so as to form a bulwark against communism, while leaving the "Russian question" insufficiently recognized and, as seen from the point of view of Paris, unsolved.

JOHN A. WHITE
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M. I. DAVYDOV. *Bor'ba za khleb: Prodovol'stvennaia politika Kommunisticheskoi partii i Sovetskogo gosudarstva v grazhdanskoi voiny (1917-1920)* [The Struggle for Bread: The Food Policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet State during the Time of the Civil War (1917-1920)]. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl'." 1971. Pp. 219.

I. E. ZELENIN. *Sovkhozy v pervoe desiatiletie Sovetskoi vlasti, 1917-1927* [State Farms in the First Decade of Soviet Power, 1917-1927]. (Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Institut Istorii SSSR.) Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka." 1972. Pp. 389.

PETER J. POTICHNYJ. *Soviet Agricultural Trade Unions, 1917-70*. [Toronto:] University of Toronto Press. 1972. Pp. xix, 258. \$12.50.

ARTHUR E. ADAMS and JAN S. ADAMS. *Men versus Systems: Agriculture in the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia*. New York: Free Press. 1971. Pp. viii, 327. \$12.50.

In the twentieth century, Communist states have accepted without question Marx's mistaken belief that agricultural production in general should be organized according to the same principles as large-scale industry. Even if Marx were right, recent research in the West reveals that his ideological imperatives did not clearly point to the forms of rural socialist enterprise adopted in Russia, nor did the social, economic,

and political pressures. Furthermore, the historical experience of collectivization in Russia did not prove her agricultural system to be more productive, more spiritually satisfying to the peasant, or more consistent with Marx's vision of the future than any other way of organizing agricultural production. Yet twenty years later the Stalinist model was thrust upon every East European country except Yugoslavia and Poland, and both Yugoslav and Polish Communists say that they still hope to persuade their peasants to collectivize. All of the books cited above deal with this historical paradox in one fashion or another. Davydov, Zelenin, and Potichnyj treat three different types of institutions used to bring the peasants into line, and the fourth book explores the results of these efforts in Russia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

Naturally, the two Soviet studies try to make Soviet agricultural policy seem more original, rational, and consistent than it really was. Both of them deal with the period before collectivization, though they seem to accept the unproved assumption that collectivization was the only possible solution to Russia's rural problems. Both deal with subjects that have received far too little attention in Western scholarship. In some respects they represent the best qualities of Soviet scholarship. They are well documented, they afford us a tantalizing glimpse into the archives, and they include a thorough discussion of Soviet historiography on the subjects in question. Unfortunately, they also exemplify the worst in Soviet scholarship: an excessive reliance on Lenin as a scriptural source, a blind acceptance of certain ideological presuppositions, and an apparent ignorance of relevant Western scholarship, such as the work of Jasny, Karcz, Volin, Laird, Lewin, Carr, and George Yaney.

Davydov's book is a full account of the Soviet government's quest for food during the dark years of 1917-20, which in many ways is a foreshadowing of Stalin's institutionalization of the forced collection of grain one decade later. Davydov points out, though he does not make an issue of it, that it was probably the efforts of the People's Commissariat of Food Supply (Narkomprod was the Soviet acronym) that saved the Soviet regime between October 1917 and March 1918 by successfully bringing in huge quantities of West Siberian grain to

supply European Russian cities. In the summer of 1918 Lenin encouraged strife in the Russian countryside by legalizing foraging and class warfare through such new institutions as the Committees of the Poor and the armed detachments of the Military Food Supply Bureau of the All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions (Voenprodbiuro). When the civil war became even more threatening at the end of 1918 Soviet agrarian policy entered a new phase as Lenin phased out the Committees of the Poor, tried to make peace with the middle peasant, and tried to replace arbitrary requisitioning with "assessment," based on the size of each farm's crop. Davydov attempts to describe the change as a successful one, but most Western studies indicate that the yardsticks for assessment were never sufficiently clear, and the arbitrary behavior of the collectors led inevitably to a decline in food production and ultimately to a decline in industrial production until Lenin introduced his "tax in kind." Ultimately Davydov's picture of the struggle for grain is unsatisfying because he omits the savage desperation caused by the shortage of food and the terrible price paid for Bolshevik forced collection of food in human lives and in the peasant hatred and resistance incurred.

Zelenin and Potichnyj are concerned with two different forms of control over the peasant, both of which have succeeded in accomplishing tighter regulation of him, if not in raising productivity. Zelenin, who has already published a study of the grain sovkhoz for 1933-44, treats the formative period in the history of Soviet farms. Though Zelenin repeatedly refers to the sovkhoz in Lenin's words as "the leading socialist enterprise in agriculture," the reasons for that assumption are never tested or questioned. His findings do correspond to those of Western scholars in his admission that the category Soviet farm, or sovkhoz, encompassed a wide variety of enterprises during the period in question and that there was little effort to make them model, large-scale, agricultural enterprises before the late twenties when cost accountability and other measures of profitability were introduced. In short, practice lagged far behind theory. He is also remarkably frank about the performance of the sovkhoz, pointing out that productivity on these farms trailed far behind

that of private plots except in the production of sugar beets and grain. Potichnyj provides an excellent comprehensive survey of Soviet agricultural trade unions from their inception to the present. There are few surprises for, as he points out, Soviet trade unions are intended primarily as instruments of mass mobilization, not as representatives of the interests of the workers, and their history is correspondingly far less dramatic than that of trade unions in the West.

Arthur and Jan Adams have collaborated in an interesting comparative study, which is both history and travelogue. By visiting, in 1967, farms of all types in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR, they were able to supplement their documentary evidence with field observations, and that combination of insights is what gives the book its strength. This book underscores the original question, though it does not try to answer it. Why was so unpopular and unsuccessful a form of land tenure as the *kolkhoz* and the *sovkhoz* adopted, especially in Czechoslovakia where there had been a long tradition of productive and advanced private farming? Throughout their travels the authors encountered the same contrasts. Where private farming survived, as in Poland, and surprisingly in the ubiquitous garden plots in Russia, one found workers energetically tilling the fields. Elsewhere apathy and indifference were the rule, and statistics of per capita productivity tend to bear out these visual observations. However, the authors wisely choose to provide something more than this conventional wisdom. They emphasize the variety of practices that lie behind the conventional labels and warn against easy judgments about the superiority of private over collective farming. They hasten to point out, for example, the number of ways in which private agriculture in Poland is controlled by government credit, investment policies, and delivery quotas. Moreover, they offer the sobering observation that socialist forms of land tenure may not yet have been fully tested since the Communist government until very recently has starved agriculture in order to invest in the development of heavy industry.

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B. PONOMAREV *et al.*, editors. *Histoire de la politique extérieure de l'U.R.S.S., 1917-1945*. Moscow: Éditions du Progrès, 1971. Pp. 694.

Histoire de la politique extérieure de l'U.R.S.S., 1917-1945 is an admirable attempt by a team of Soviet historians to present a readable and concise account of Soviet foreign policy from the creation of the Soviet state to the end of World War II. The authors leave few aspects of Soviet foreign policy untouched in the period examined. Relations with major and minor European and Asian powers are analyzed in depth. For the specialist there is much relevant material concerning Soviet diplomatic and economic relations with Europe's major nations: Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. Since the authors have had access to Soviet diplomatic archives of the period, the volume is of particular value to the student of Soviet foreign policy.

There is a minimum of Soviet bureaucratic polemics and Marxist jargon, though frequently the authors remind the readers of the deep-seated ideological chasm between the Soviet Union and the bourgeois, capitalist nations of Europe, which is an underlying theme of Soviet-European relations between 1917 and 1945. Of course political and economic differences did not prevent the weak Soviet state from obtaining diplomatic recognition and economic credits in post-1917 from its relatively stronger European sister states. Throughout the work the survival of the Soviet state and its peaceful foreign policy, at least to August 1939, are stressed. There are excellent interpretations of Soviet-German diplomatic and economic negotiations at Rapallo in April 1922 and of the positive roll that Litvinov took as Soviet foreign minister in stressing the importance of disarmament and subsequent collective security within the framework of the League of Nations.

The authors' interpretation of the perilous period between 1933 and 1939 is objective and accurate. The reader is constantly reminded of the appeasement policy of official France and Britain and of their failure to assist actively the Soviet Union in resisting Nazi aggression. For those who would belittle Soviet attempts to aid Czechoslovakia during the critical period of May-September 1938 there is detailed material based on archival sources that shows that the Soviet government was willing and able to

honor its pacts with Czechoslovakia and France. Had France and Britain pursued different foreign policies the course of history might well have been radically changed.

There is not much new material on the 1941-45 foreign policy of the Soviet Union. The authors interpret the Second World War from June 1941 as a period of great Soviet sacrifices and subsequent victories that made Eastern Europe "safe" for Soviet democracy. They do not hesitate to show the apparent distrust of the Anglo-Saxons on the part of the beleaguered Soviet Union and the alleged machinations of Churchill and Roosevelt in their hesitations and refusals to open a second front in France until June 1944.

Although the volume is footnoted, it contains no bibliography and no index.

HENRY S. ROBINSON
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WARREN LERNER. *Karl Radek: The Last Internationalist*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970. Pp. x, 240. \$7.95.

Mr. Lerner has dedicated his book to a friend who told him why there were such men as Karl Radek. For one reader, at least, that is still a question. Karl Radek, the man and the political actor, remains something of an enigma, although the author has presented all that is, or probably can be, known about him. It is the inaccessibility or nonexistence of materials that makes impossible the kind of probing inquiry into Radek's motives and methods that would alone yield a full-length portrait of this particular revolutionary personality. What we have, therefore, is as close as we are likely to come to a definitive biography—a scholarly, sensible, most interesting account of Radek's role in Polish, German, and Russian social democracy and communism in both the Comintern and Soviet government. In short, it is a fine piece of work. It might have been made still better if additional evidence had been available, if the author had speculated a bit more freely about Radek's character, had given a bit more space to the analysis of his ideas, or if he had let his subject speak for himself more often.

Here was a man, we are repeatedly told by Lerner and his sources, whose greatest assets to

the cause were his pen, his wit, originality, and the color and vivacity of his style. He is described as a clever journalist who had no peer among the Bolsheviks, as possessing an excellent grasp of world affairs, as the most talented of Soviet polemicists (more talented than Trotsky?). That being so, one would wish for more demonstrations or examples of his talents than are given, not simply to prove the point, but in the hope, perhaps, of learning what it was that made the often difficult and distrusted Radek one of the most famous and popular Bolsheviks, as shown by his repeated election to the Central Committee until he was finally expelled from it in 1924.

That a man of wit, of cosmopolitan tastes and background, and of independent judgment should have found it difficult to maintain himself at or near the heights of power in Stalin's Russia is not surprising. And that he should have abandoned Trotsky and made his peace with Stalin in the false hope of survival is also understandable. But I do not find entirely convincing Mr. Lerner's belief that Radek's enduring commitment to internationalism—which he describes as his only consistent value—was the cause of his undoing. "It was not so much that Radek had changed as a revolutionary internationalist as that the Soviet regime had changed as an instrument of revolution" (p. 176). Indeed, the book's subtitle overstates a case that, in my view, is not borne out by its contents. If proletarian internationalism was, in fact, Radek's only consistent value (p. 175), he was nonetheless capable of compromising it or adjusting it to practical realities.

Radek may not have viewed with equanimity Stalin's policy of socialism in one country, but he found it entirely possible, as Mr. Lerner points out, to urge Trotsky to seek a rapprochement with Stalin rather than Zinoviev. Time and again, the book gives proof of Radek's caution, his prudence, his restraint when it came to carrying revolution abroad, and his recognition that the world revolution would be slow to develop. In this respect, he did not differ greatly from many other Bolsheviks, being on one occasion less sanguine than Lenin about the revolutionary readiness of the European working class. There is no doubt where his hopes and sympathies lay, but they did not

harden into principle as "the last internationalist" suggests.

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JUDITH STORA-SANDOR. *Alexandra Kollontai: Marxisme et révolution sexuelle*. (Bibliothèque socialiste, number 25.) Paris: François Maspero. 1973. Pp. 286. 30 fr.

In studying the history of women paucity of materials plagues the historian, but the problem exists particularly in the study of European women. Scholars who wish to acquaint themselves with Russian and early Soviet history on the subject must read Russian itself to make even a superficial examination of a major phenomenon in female experience—the early Soviet experiment in women's emancipation. By making the writings of Alexandra Kollontai more accessible Stora-Sandor has helped open this important subject to wider scrutiny.

Kollontai played a central role in Soviet events as head of the Women's Bureau of the Communist party from 1920 to 1922 and as a major Russian theoretician on the woman question. By the mid-twenties, however, the Soviet leadership had condemned her as a feminist for advocating the immediate transition to communal living. Since then most of her original ideas have been rejected in the Soviet Union and misunderstood elsewhere.

Editor Stora-Sandor, with the aid of a translator, has assembled Kollontai's major writings on female emancipation, grouping them topically to deal with the origins of woman's subjugation, the position of the woman in bourgeois society, and the nature of true emancipation under communism. Several articles are produced in their entirety, as is the important book *Novaia moral' i rabochii klass* (*The New Morality and the Working Class*). Through this collection the reader can explore Kollontai's ideology in some depth.

Unfortunately Stora-Sandor's introduction does not succeed fully in providing necessary background. It attempts to outline both Kollontai's career and Soviet policy toward women in terms of their relevance to the concerns of today's feminist-socialists. It succeeds only in

providing a disorganized array of fact and opinion. In the process, however, Stora-Sandor does make a most useful addition to the collection by reprinting Kollontai's autobiographical sketch from the *Granat Encyclopedia*.

Despite the shortcomings of the introduction this book should be valuable to those who cannot read Russian but who want to explore the thought of Alexandra Kollontai and the Russian woman's movement.

BARBARA CLEMENTS
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VOLODYMYR KUBIJOVYC, editor. *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*. Volume 2. Prepared by Shevchenko Scientific Society. Foreword by ERNEST J. SIMMONS. [Toronto:] University of Toronto Press, for the Ukrainian National Association. 1971. Pp. xliii, 1394. \$60.00.

The publication of this massive volume completes the translation and revision of the general (topical, nonalphabetical) *Entsyklopediia Ukrainoznavstva* (*Encyclopedia of Ukrainian Studies*), which was originally published in 1949. Volume 1, published by the University of Toronto Press in 1963, deals with history, geography, demography, language, and literature. Volume 2, reviewed here, is the work of nearly one hundred contributors and staff members and has 1,260 pages of double-column text; its usefulness is enhanced by a 130-page index. This volume deals with Ukrainian law and jurisprudence, the churches, scholarship and education, libraries, archives, museums, architecture, sculpture, painting, the graphic arts, music, choreography, the theater, the cinema, publishing and the press and other media, the economy, health and medical services and physical culture, the armed forces, and Ukrainians in foreign lands.

All sections of the volume reflect a historical orientation, although developments in the Ukrainian S.S.R. are not neglected. The periodization naturally challenges Russian-nationalist, historiographic conceptions that in their traditional imperial formulation denied the existence of the Ukrainian nation and in their Soviet variant have dated the emergence of the Ukrainian nation arbitrarily. Thus in the discussion of the Ukrainian churches (132 pages)

there is a historiographic section; a treatment of Kievan theological writings; and accounts of Christianity in Rus'-Ukraine, Kiev as a metropolitanate of the Byzantine patriarchate, Western Ukraine's relations with Catholicism, renewal of the Ukrainian Orthodox hierarchy in 1620 (and, subsequently, under Metropolitan Peter Mohyla), the subjugation of the Kiev metropolitanate by Moscow, and resistance to Muscovite control in the twentieth century.

The division of the Ukrainian lands among different political jurisdictions prior to World War II has necessitated separate treatment of the various parts of the country with reference to particular periods. This is especially necessary, for example, in the discussion of law (117 pages) where separate treatment is given the Princely Era, the Lithuanian-Ruthenian period, the Hetman state, the period of Polish domination, incorporation into the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires, the revolutionary period of Ukrainian statehood (1917-20), the post-World War I western territories (i.e., lands located in the Polish state, in Romania, and in Czechoslovakia), and the Ukrainian S.S.R. These sections provide separate treatment of state law and political institutions, civil and criminal law, family law and the judiciary. Similar divisions, in terms of territorial treatment and periodization, are found in the discussions of scholarship and education, the military, health care, and the economy.

The lengthiest treatment accorded any subject is that given the national economy (335 pages). It includes a discussion of the history of Ukrainian economic thought and research, regional development, national income data, Soviet planning and taxation, mineral resources, industry (historically and in terms of various sectors), agriculture (historically and regionally by crops and type of farming), forestry, transportation, external trade, finance, cooperatives, welfare and living standards. The section on the armed forces deals with the various military formations especially during the Cossack and revolutionary periods and during and after World War II. A 170-page section describes Ukrainian communities in the United States, Canada, Brazil, Argentina, Western Europe, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Australia.

The volume is rich in detail and contains a vast store of information. It is generally well illustrated with more than seven hundred photographs, diagrams, and tables. It is based on a high standard of scholarship, and the extensive bibliographical listings add to the work's value. A reviewer might cavil over some issues of emphasis or the choice of a specific illustration, but these are singularly minor matters when weighed alongside the general quality and impact of the work.

Although the original Shevchenko Scientific Society was dissolved and its library confiscated when the Soviet Union annexed Western Ukraine in 1939, it was reconstituted in 1947 in Munich and now has its headquarters in Sarcelles, France. The Society can derive satisfaction from having produced such an authoritative reference work as the *Encyclopedia*. It is in various ways superior to the comparable Soviet volume, *Soviet Ukraine* (1969), which is based on volume 17 of the *Ukrains'ka Radians'ka Entsyklopediia* (*Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia*).

JOHN S. RESHETAR, JR.
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H. IA. SERHIENKO. *Suspiľ'no-politychnyi rukh na Ukraïni pislia povstannia dekabrystiv, 1826–1850* [Social-political Movements in the Ukraine after the Decembrist Uprising, 1826–1850]. (Akademiia Nauk Ukraïnskoi RSR, Instytut Istorii.) Kiev: Vydavnytstvo "Naukova Dumka." 1971. Pp. 298.

There is a general consensus among scholars that while the Decembrists failed to transform Russia's political, economic, and social institutions, they did plant seeds that over the years have produced a rich harvest. For example, they influenced the direction of the reign of Nicholas I, they inaugurated the revolutionary period of Russian history, and their daring ideas and bold action have served as a seemingly inexhaustible reservoir for scholarly research (Semevskii, Mazour, Nechkina, and others).

The stated purpose of Serhienko's work is fourfold: to study the dissemination of revolutionary propaganda in the Ukraine; to trace the activity of individuals and of clandestine groups that emerged in the Ukraine during the reign of Nicholas I; to highlight some manifestations of revolutionary struggle against the autocratic

system; and "to examine the origins of revolutionary-democratic and liberal-bourgeois tendencies" (p. 18). To achieve this complex goal he first examines briefly the atmosphere at Kharkov University, where in 1826–27 a small group of students, fascinated by the works of the Decembrists, composed and circulated statements critical of government policies. Next, Serhienko explores the situation at the Nizhyn Gymnasium—Gogol's alma mater—where from 1827 to 1830 some students and faculty voiced antiestablishment feelings during consideration of changes in the curriculum. Then, he reviews the philosophy and activity of the Union of the Polish People (which had branches in Kiev, Volyn, and Podolie gubernias), whose members worked for establishment of a free Poland and, toward that end, sought to contact all elements critical of the reign of Nicholas I. Finally, Serhienko scrutinizes the organization, objectives, activity, and arrests of members of the Brotherhood of Sts. Cyril and Methodius.

Serhienko's work contains a good many admirable as well as some disappointing features. Most impressive is his familiarity with the published material in Russian, Polish, and Ukrainian (but regrettably, not that in other languages) on the Decembrists, and his extensive use of hitherto untapped sources in the archives of Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev. His work is a refreshing new commentary on the harsh realities of political and intellectual life during the reign of Nicholas I—not only in Moscow and St. Petersburg for well-known persons, but in faraway places for many unknowns who dared to think the unthinkable. The most disappointing feature of Serhienko's work is his classification of scholars as "bourgeois liberals," "bourgeois nationalists," "revolutionary democrats," and similar stereotypes that have no place in scholarship. Other disappointments include the absence of a list of abbreviations, an index, and a bibliography.

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NEAR EAST

BARBARA JELAVICH. *The Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers, and the Straits Question, 1870–1887*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1973. Pp. xi, 209. \$6.95.

Passage of the Turkish straits by naval vessels was only one of the many elements in the nineteenth-century Eastern Question, but it was perhaps the key element in British diplomacy. This valuable addition to an extensive literature deals with a period when the regime of the straits was especially important. Most attention is given to the Black Sea Conference of 1871 and the resultant Treaty of London. There follows an account of attempts by various European powers to modify the regime of the straits during the period that began with the Bulgarian crisis in 1875 and ended with the signature of the Mediterranean Agreements and Bismarck's Reinsurance Treaty in 1887. A postscript on the Bosnian crisis of 1908-09 concludes the book.

In the first two decades of the period following the Black Sea Conference the regime of the straits was crucial to the growing Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia. England attempted to maintain an interpretation of the Treaty of London that would permit the passage of British warships while Russia insisted that the straits remain closed to non-Ottoman naval vessels. During the Bosnian crisis the Russians sought to win the right of passage for Black Sea states and to maintain closure to all other powers, while the British, though in principle not opposed to granting the Russian wish, for reasons of internal politics as well as diplomacy succeeded in postponing any change. In addition to the standard published sources, the author had made extensive use of the Turkish as well as the British and Austrian archives. The relationship between the various episodes in the Eastern Question and the general foreign policy problems and internal politics of the European powers is especially well delineated. The author's sympathies appear to be with the Ottomans, and her remarks concerning the attitude of nineteenth-century European liberals and the hypocrisies of the powers are certainly to the point. It may be, though, that Jelavich underestimates the extent to which the European powers by counterbalancing each other preserved the Ottoman Empire, which would surely have been largely absorbed by its powerful neighbor if the decision had been left entirely to Turkey and Russia. Similarly the author's contrast of Ottoman use of pan-Islam with Russian use of Orthodoxy and Slavism misses

the point that pan-Islam was a remarkably successful ideological movement that failed probably because it, unlike pan-Slavism, lacked the military resources of Russia. These considerations perhaps arise outside the subject of the book, which the author has handled with thorough and penetrating scholarship. The book increases and deepens our understanding of Ottoman-European relations in the latter part of the nineteenth century.

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EDWARD WEISBAND. *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics*. (Prepared under the auspices of the Center for International Studies, New York University.) Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1973. Pp. xiii, 377. \$14.50.

This study presents an account of Turkish diplomacy from 1943 to 1945 and describes Turkish efforts to maintain neutrality in World War II. The author asserts that Turkish foreign policy was based on two major principles: first, peace had priority over intervention; second, Russia, not Germany, was the major threat to Turkish security. After demonstrating the ideological and historical basis for this diplomatic code he concludes that it had an inherent contradiction. The pursuit of peace was non-interventionist, but with Russia a belligerent, intervention was necessary to protect Turkish sovereignty.

The book consists of two parts. The first contains an analysis of the policy-making process. Turkish President İsmet İnönü's formulation of foreign policy was governed by fear of Russian intentions toward Turkey. His anti-Soviet attitude was shared by Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioglu, echoed in the Turkish Assembly, and reflected in the Turkish press. Turkish neutrality was necessary, for participation in the conflict could lead to Russian assistance that might result in Russian occupation and an end to Turkish national integrity. It was against this Russophobic attitude that Britain sought to bring Turkey into the war.

The second portion of the work treats Turkish diplomatic efforts to preserve neutrality. Aware of American and British commitment to Russia, Turkish diplomats did little more than

give veiled warnings of the expansionist Russian activity that they anticipated would follow the war. As a price for belligerence, however, Turkey demanded that the British and Americans mount a campaign in the Balkans that Turkey would join to contain Russian expansion. Turkish belligerence came only in February 1945 when Russian intentions in the Balkans became real.

Weisband demonstrates that Winston Churchill's predilection for a Balkan strategy which would strike at the "soft underbelly" of Europe was based largely on Turkish pressure. The author suggests that the Turkish estimate of Russian ambitions in the Balkans amounted to the initial vision of the turn of events in the cold war. He illumines the Anglo-American split over strategy, one that saw the Americans adamantly oppose a Balkan operation.

The author accomplishes the purpose of his book with a readable narrative that contains a lucid introduction setting forth his central thesis and a summary of concluding remarks. A large number of explanatory footnotes adds to, but does not hinder, the flow of a well-edited work.

Weisband's list of sources is impressive. His interviews with Turkish diplomatic officials, his research in German, British, American, Turkish, and Russian diplomatic documents, and his use of adequate secondary sources enables him to present a comprehensive study of a small nation's efforts to steer a diplomatic course between conflicting big powers.

THOMAS A. BRYSON
West Georgia College

S. D. GOITEIN. *A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza*. Volume 2, *The Community*. (Published under the auspices of the Near Eastern Center, University of California, Los Angeles.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1971. Pp. xvi, 633. \$20.00.

To write his three-volume *A Mediterranean Society* Professor S. D. Goitein of the Princeton Institute for Advanced Studies examined thousands upon thousands of the unclassified documents of the Cairo genizah (the "store-house" in which damaged Hebrew writings, containing the name of God, had been placed for

several centuries and which were rediscovered in the 1890s). For much of the period between 1000 and 1300—the golden age of the genizah materials—Cairo was one of the centers of a vibrating Muslim world that reached from Spain to India and that had economic and family ties to "Rum," Christian Europe, both Byzantine and Catholic.

A letter, sent in 1016–17 from Qurawān (Tunisia) to Cairo told of a Jewish merchant from Baghdad who had died in Morocco. For the proper disposition of his goods left behind in Morocco and Tunisia the Jewish authorities were to appoint qualified legal representatives. Months of travel separated these communities, frontiers of mutually hostile countries had to be traversed: as a matter of fact the disposal of the estate is treated here as an internal Jewish affair without reference to any state authorities (pp. 402–03). This incident, one of many, illustrates the author's thesis that the non-Muslim communities (Christian and Jewish) formed a state, not only within the Fatimid and Ayyubid empires, but also beyond its confines. Or, for example, there is an appeal from the head of a Babylonian Yeshivah (academy) for funds from Jewish communities and individuals in Africa or Europe, an appeal "as natural a social phenomena as a president or vice-chancellor doing the same in the United States or in England in our day" (p. 11).

The book describes this very much alive Jewish community—its organization, institutions, educational system, social services, worship, courts and legal procedures, interfaith relations, and, what I found to be an outstanding contribution, a discussion of the various professional classes, teachers, judges, and above all physicians (pp. 211–72). The towering figures of Moses Maimonides and his son Abraham are mentioned on 101 of the 407 pages of the actual text. The four extensive appendixes paraphrase and annotate the genizah documents, which are arranged in approximate chronological order: appendix A, documents regarding charitable foundations; appendix B, documents listing the beneficiaries of the community chest; appendix C, documents of appeal and lists of contributors; and appendix D, Jewish judges in Old (and New) Cairo, 965–1265.

Like the first volume in this series, the second volume reflects the author's remarkable scholarship, human empathy, and psychological understanding. It thus constitutes a significant contribution to our knowledge of the private and communal life of medieval Near Eastern Jews as well as of Christians and Muslims with whom they lived in the closest proximity.

FRANK ROSENTHAL
East Los Angeles College

AFRICA

FRANK WILLETT. *African Art: An Introduction*. New York: Praeger Publishers. 1971. Pp. 288. Cloth \$8.50, paper \$4.95.

Professor Frank Willett is already well known to African historians for his monumental study *Ife and the History of West African Sculpture* (1967). Now he has written a general survey of African art that is a logical follow on from his earlier work. *African Art* attempts a synthesis of the subject on a wider canvas for an undergraduate and public audience.

Most books on African art are heavily illustrated compendiums of art objects that deal with styles and outstanding pieces rather than the historical phenomenon of African art. Willett has gone off on another tack. He studies the historical implications and artistic significance of African sculpture and architecture. He begins with a brief introduction to Africa and the study of African art, then discusses the history of African art as revealed by excavations, rock paintings, and early European sources. This chapter relies to a great extent on Willett's own work at Ife in Nigeria as well as on rock painting researches in the depths of the Sahara, and elsewhere. The art itself is described under the general headings of architecture and sculpture, while the book ends with an appraisal of African art today and a useful bibliography. The book is well referenced and lavishly illustrated to the usual high standard of this series.

African art has long been recognized as being an important historical phenomenon in some parts of the subcontinent. But few scholars have ventured into the earlier periods of African art history except in the most super-

ficial way. Willett approaches the art from an archeological perspective, which is both realistic and refreshing. He shows how much potential awaits systematic investigations, especially from later sites where archeological materials can be combined with evidence from oral traditions, historical records, and ethnographic sources to build up a background for the art objects. It is a tragedy that many art objects were created in wood, which survives but rarely in the archeological record. For this reason, our knowledge of the earlier centuries of African art is bound to remain scanty.

African Art is a thoroughly workmanlike account of the subject. It is the best synthesis available for both serious student and layman. The book is bound to sell well among the general public as well as at colleges and universities, and it deserves the success it is already enjoying in the market place.

BRIAN M. FAGAN
University of California,
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ASIA AND THE EAST

LEONID N. KUTAKOV. *Japanese Foreign Policy on the Eve of the Pacific War: A Soviet View*. Edited with a foreword by GEORGE ALEXANDER LENSEN. Tallahassee, Fla.: Diplomatic Press. [1972]. Pp. xiii, 241. \$15.00.

GEORGE ALEXANDER LENSEN. *The Strange Neutrality: Soviet-Japanese Relations during the Second World War, 1941-1945*. Tallahassee, Fla.: Diplomatic Press. [1972]. Pp. x, 332. \$15.00.

The veil of mystery surrounding Soviet-Japanese relations before and during World War II has been removed partially by these two contributions toward understanding aspects of the diplomacy of Japanese imperialism and the tortuous course of wartime neutrality. Elucidating those remaining areas of obscurity will depend considerably on the availability of Soviet documents.

Leonid N. Kutakov, a Russian diplomat and historian specializing in his country's relations with Japan, is no Soviet heretic. His theme of Japanese aggression and Allied appeasement in East Asia is expressed in the first sentence of the study and developed in four substantive chapters focused on Japan's policies toward Germany, Great Britain, the Soviet Union,

and the United States. He maintains that "the formation of the German-Japanese military-political alliance, which hastened the outbreak of the Second World War, was facilitated by the anti-Soviet policy of the United States, Great Britain and France, which were loath to accept Soviet proposals for collective security and hoped that Germany and Japan might be turned against the USSR and the national liberation movement of the people of Asia" (p. 1). Kutakov regards this as a reprehensible Far Eastern version of the Munich appeasement and as capitalist duplicity, evidenced by the Arita-Craigie Agreement and the readiness of the United States to negotiate with Japan at China's expense. Conversely, the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact is construed as a victory of unfailing Soviet diplomacy that restrained Japan's militarists, diminished the threat of a two-front war for the USSR, and contributed to peace.

George A. Lensen holds no brief for revisionist histories of Soviet-Japanese-American relations. Although he considers "differences of opinion concerning the history . . . less over the facts than over motivations" (p. 198), his goal is "to reconstruct the story of Soviet-Japanese relations . . . as it actually unfolded . . . to tread a factual path" (p. vii). Accordingly he traces through many vicissitudes the history of this strained neutrality from its surprising inception to its sudden demise. In the final three chapters Lensen projects beyond considerations of the neutrality question to discuss the Soviet entry into the war and re-cremations at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, and he offers some of his own reflections on the broad issues of Japanese expectations vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in 1945 and the developing cold war. Lensen treats the invasion of Manchuria and the sudden Soviet denouncement of the neutrality pact as a case of mutual culpability; the Soviet Union's for attacking Japan before the legal expiration of the pact, the United States' for urging Stalin to enter the war, and even Japan's, the victim of the attack, for a wartime history lacking those moral scruples necessary to forbear her from breaking the pact.

It should be noted that the availability of Japanese historical documents and the paucity of such Soviet resources tend to emphasize

the obscurity of that world of wartime Soviet leaders and their motives and political considerations regarding this strange neutrality. In particular, Lensen's special access to secret papers in the Japanese Foreign Office Archives has produced a boon for appreciating the forces and personalities at work in Japan. That such an accessibility of Soviet sources would prove even more edifying goes almost without saying. In the meantime, for readers who prefer their history to reflect conviction borne of a political morality, the Soviet view of Leonid N. Kutakov should be very satisfying.

G. RALPH FALCONERI
University of Oregon

ALLAN E. GOODMAN. *Politics in War: The Bases of Political Community in South Vietnam*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1973. Pp. xv, 313. \$12.50.

Allan Goodman's commendable thesis in this well-researched study is that political mobilization rather than military repression provides the only effective way to bring peace to tortured South Vietnam. It is based on a detailed examination of the potentially fruitful efforts of various members of the House of Deputies elected in 1967 to function legislatively and to establish rapport with their harassed constituencies. Factional diversity and governmental suppression of political opponents proliferated during the turbulent postwar period, and especially so after 1968. Concerned deputies undertook with limited success to bridge the chasm separating the disdainful and autocratic executive arm of the government from the elected legislators on the one hand and from local populations on the other. Even conservative deputies who were prepared to cooperate with the Thieu government encountered outright rejection from his military dictatorship. The author makes no attempt to assess American policy since 1954, including the successive crises with Diem, Khanh, and Ky, but is concerned more specifically with developments on the legislative front from 1967 through 1969.

The deputies whose work Goodman describes are intelligent and concerned men, aware of the essential problems of operating a constitutional government and endeavoring

under difficult circumstances to cope with constituency relations. They lacked both political organization and freedom to maneuver. Their own political futures were involved, along with the preservation of the legislature itself and the survival of the nation. The move conservatively oriented senators, mainly urban, were less inclined to respond to popular grievances than they were to tangible pressures exerted on them by the executive authority and the army. Suppression of political opposition was nothing new in South Vietnam, but an unlimited abuse of government power emerged following the near-disastrous Tet offensive of 1968 under the infamous Phoenix program, initiated in part as the result of American urging. Civilian officials in the several provinces were assigned monthly arrest quotas to fill, and the army everywhere exercised blanket authority to detain and punish thousands of captured suspects. Armed resistance subsided, but at the cost of alienating virtually the entire nonurban population. Due process of law was denied to the accused, violating all constitutional guarantees. Victims numbering in the scores of thousands had three choices: bribe their accusers, side with the Vietcong, or register their grievances with locally elected members of the House of Deputies. Legislators were occasionally able to obtain redress of grievances, but they were powerless to initiate policy changes mainly because the American-supported executive and military agencies were impervious to popular protests.

The author carefully avoids any explicit assessment of Washington's responsibility for the tragic fiasco, and he affirms repeatedly the dubious official contention that the essential political issue was nationalism versus communism. Elsewhere he concedes that the Vietcong maintained far better relations with the population as a whole than did the civil servants and the military. The Vietcong also included disillusioned nationalists and peasants as well as convinced communists, and as southerners their declared objectives differed in a number of respects from statements issued from Hanoi. American reforming efforts prior to 1968 designed to reverse the deteriorating people-government relations were largely abortive because Washington refused to deal with the basic problem of an irresponsible executive. Good-

man cites the opinion of deputies decrying the effects of the American presence, but nowhere does he attempt a frank evaluation of the American role. His presentation also suffers from a plethora of technical verbiage and from his labored effort to treat the atypical situation in South Vietnam as a basis for worldwide generalization. This book therefore falls considerably short of a definitive assessment of the situation portrayed.

JOHN F. CADY
Ohio University

F. K. CROWLEY. *Forrest, 1847-1918*. Volume 1, 1847-91: *Apprenticeship to Premiership*. [St. Lucia:] University of Queensland Press; distrib. by International Scholarly Book Services, Portland, Ore. 1971. Pp. 323. \$16.25.

This is Professor Crowley's first of a three-volume biography of Sir John Forrest, the famous Western Australian explorer, surveyor, public servant, and statesman, who became the first premier when responsible government was granted the colony in 1890. Private and public correspondence has been exhaustively utilized together with parliamentary papers and newspapers. Compression would have improved this volume. Quotations are often far too lengthy. With greater selectivity only one more volume should suffice to cover Forrest's career in Western Australia to 1901 and his great work in the federal government to the time of his death in 1918. In pages 266-70 Professor Crowley perceptively describes and analyzes Forrest as a born leader who was "a big man, titanic in energy, and large in physique," and whose greatest assets "were probably his optimism and far-sightedness as a planner." He had an uncomplicated character.

Colonial-born, the third of nine sons of a hard-working, prosperous, but modest Scottish emigrant miller, Forrest was educated at the exclusive Bishop Hale's school in Perth, which "profoundly influenced his mind and character" and where he made firm friends among the tightly knit establishment. Fortune touched his career at every point. At an early age he successfully led three expeditions (1869, 1870, and 1874) into the great, lone land—the desert heart of Australia. Consequently famous he made a trip in 1875 to London, where he widened his important acquaintances and ar-

ranged for the publication as a book of an account of his three explorations. He was first deputy surveyor-general, then surveyor-general (1883), which automatically made him a member of the executive council. His sterling honesty and his administrative efficiency enhanced his reputation and, combined with a well-balanced but driving ambition, made him the obvious choice as first premier in 1891.

Professor Crowley has illuminated the period, placing the man in the proper perspective. The author gives either new or fresh insights into many of the events: for example, the technical details of how a surveyor actually works and how this slow and often thankless work contributed to the agricultural and grazing expansion of the colony and to the booming mining industry; the role played by Forrest in the protection of the aborigines; the intricacies of government, particularly the often petty infighting and vituperative disputes between Governor Broome and his council; the broadening experience of Forrest's trip to London in 1887 when he was a representative at the imperial conference; the tangled movements that made up the struggle for responsible government (1888-90); and Forrest's somewhat obstructive role as head of the Western Australian delegation to the federation conference in Sydney (1891).

Professor Crowley is a sound scholar whose judgments are cautious, clear, and unambiguous, and he is well aware of the determining influence a small population played all these years in "Australia's western third." In 1885 the thirty thousand people in the colony lived in a very small fraction of the 640,000,000 acres!

SAMUEL CLYDE MCCULLOCH
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ROBIN KAY, editor. *The Australian-New Zealand Agreement, 1944*. (Documents on New Zealand External Relations, volume 1. Historical Publications Branch, Department of Internal Affairs.) Wellington: A. R. Shearer, Government Printer. 1972. Pp. xxxvi, 297. \$7.50.

These documents deal with New Zealand-Australian affairs, before and during World War II, relating to defense and Allied cooperation. The editor opens the volume with a help-

ful fourteen-page introduction, followed by a selection of 116 documents, 12 of which are in the appendixes. In a twelve-page register of the contents each document is identified, dated, and annotated, making a useful addition to the field.

Historically, diplomatic intercourse between Wellington and Canberra has been overshadowed by the Commonwealth concept. Yet the two South Pacific nations had long insisted that the United Kingdom consult with them on Pacific Ocean and global aspects of imperial policy.

Systematic defense communications between the ANZAC nations began in September 1938, and the documents in this collection begin at this point (documents 1-3). With the outbreak of war ANZAC troops went to Britain and the Middle East. Japan's entry into the war, however, forced Australian withdrawal from those areas. With the South Pacific a war zone American help became indispensable. But American dominance in operational and strategic decisions led to conflicts of policy (documents 4-13). New Zealand's demands were found to carry little weight, and even Australia, with a substantial force, was unable to exert the influence Canberra desired (documents 14-35).

On the initiative of H. V. Evatt (Australian minister of external affairs) the ANZAC nations agreed to hold a conference to discuss the war and the coming peace planning. This decision, apparently mirroring the exclusion of the ANZAC nations by the great powers from the Cairo Conference, was not communicated to the United States or the United Kingdom prior to the actual sessions (documents 36-41).

The Canberra Conference produced not a treaty (initially Australia's objective) but a pact, spelling out joint aims. The Canberra Pact (January 21, 1944) restated the rights of the signatories to influence decisions affecting their region, both during and after the war. It seemed to be an effort to counterbalance American dominance, containing plans for a South Pacific Conference to settle postwar problems and urging the establishment of a permanent South Seas Regional Commission (documents 42-53).

Great power reactions were unenthusiastic. The United States urged that no conference

meet until a general international system be developed. Whitehall wished to delay action until after the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference. Similar criticism came from opposition benches in Canberra and Wellington and from some Australian newspapers. A misunderstanding embroiled Secretary of State Cordell Hull (who was hostile to Evatt) with New Zealand's prime minister, Peter Fraser (documents 54-100, and see also appendixes).

The pact signatories failed to gain a greater role in operations and strategic decisions of the war. Neither New Zealand nor Australia were privy to the Yalta and Potsdam Declarations, though they did sign the Japanese surrender. If the pact failed of its wartime objectives, however, its regional proposals did emerge as the South Pacific Commission, and a New Zealand statesman, Sir Walter Nash, observed that the pact was a step toward ANZUS and improved relations with the powers (see p. 274 n. 1).

CHARLES S. BLACKTON
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UNITED STATES

KENNETH M. LUDMERER. *Genetics and American Society: A Historical Appraisal*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972. Pp. xi, 222. \$10.00.

"Perhaps no science in modern times has had so great a social impact and has been so enmeshed in diverse social issues as genetics." This is the opening sentence, with which this reviewer is in accord, of the book under review. To most geneticists the relevance of their science to man is gratifying, but so conspicuous a visibility entails dangers as well as advantages. Political reactionaries are trying to prostitute genetics as a bogus warrant for their preconceptions. One of their successes has been convincing some liberals that genetics is a handmaiden of race and class bigotry. Genetics of behavior, especially of human behavior and human abilities, is in a particularly tight spot! Because the work in this field is oftentimes exploited by racists, some misguided leftists insist that it be abandoned. Has it ever occurred to them that if scientists were to discontinue their work the field would be at the mercy of racists?

Ludmerer traces the origins of the above witless situation. As the title of the book indicates, the American scene is the center of his attention. The roots of Social Darwinism and of the eugenical movement are, however, in England, and the grossest abuses of genetics come to pass in Hitler's Germany. Their effects on public opinion in America are properly assayed. Until about 1930 eugenicists had little opposition to their claims that their race and class biases were based on the findings of the then nascent and rapidly growing science of genetics. The inglorious Immigration Restriction Act of 1924 (Johnson Act) had its ideology concocted at the Eugenics Record Office, in Cold Spring Harbor, Long Island. At the time the office was directed mainly by H. H. Laughlin and C. B. Davenport. This reviewer knew both men beginning at a somewhat later date. Their sincerity and blind prejudices were equally manifest. What Ludmerer calls "repudiation of eugenics" occurred when most Americans recoiled from Hitler's ideology and, even more, from Nazi misdeeds, both inspired allegedly by eugenic ideas. The tardiness of some American eugenicists to dissociate themselves from these perversions helped the repudiation. The "reconstruction of human genetics" began after World War II. Rather oddly, the analysis of this most recent history seems to me the relatively weakest part of an otherwise fair and judicious book. It is hardly true "that studies in human heredity were merely a sideline for eugenics," and that research in human genetics ever came to a standstill. The author himself points out that "the period between 1917 and 1932 witnessed the rise of statistical and population genetics, much of which was developed through the use of human populations as examples." This was no less true in subsequent decades. The work of human geneticists and psychologists on genetic variables of behavior, and particularly of learning, receives inadequate attention. After all, clinical genetics is unquestionably important, but it is not the only kind of human genetics worth studying, and not the whole of human genetics belongs to the realm of medical sciences.

The above cavils notwithstanding (which are of more moment to geneticists than to historians or sociologists), the book demonstrates

that genetics is relevant to human affairs and that it is on the side of the angels and not of the devils. No humanistic Weltanschauung can shrug off its findings. Moreover, genetics is not just an academic exercise, for it has practical applications. Whether these go under the name of eugenics or of medical genetics may be important now, because "eugenics" evokes some obnoxious associations, but it is immaterial in the long run.

THEODOSIUS DOBZHANSKY
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HENRY-RUSSELL HITCHCOCK *et al.* *The Rise of an American Architecture*. Edited with an introduction and exhibition notes by EDGAR KAUFMANN, JR. New York: Praeger Publishers in association with the Metropolitan Museum of Art. 1970. Pp. x, 241. \$10.00.

In 1970, as part of its centennial celebration, the Metropolitan Museum of Art, in cooperation with the National Trust for Historic Preservation, sponsored and mounted a superb exhibition: "The Rise of an American Architecture," which focused on the nation's architectural achievements and contributions from around 1815 to 1915, the century of America's greatest architectural ferment. The genres emphasized were those that constituted the country's and the century's most significant architectural developments: the individual house, the urban park, and buildings for commerce, especially the skyscraper. Edgar Kaufmann, Jr. directed the project, wrote the exhibition texts, and edited this catalog, which includes his texts and four supportive, individual essays, developing and further exploring the show's major themes.

Henry-Russell Hitchcock's "American Influence Abroad" assesses the international impact of American architecture and architects from the early nineteenth century to the present, setting the stage for the successive essays on their American origins and subsequent development. Though, as always, Hitchcock makes useful observations, his rather thin sketch does not reflect him at the top of his form. The title of Albert Fein's "The American City: The Ideal and the Real" seems a bit overstated since his study is chiefly concerned with the development of the American urban park, but

his essay is an otherwise balanced and well-integrated synthesis of the work of Olmstead and his nineteenth-century predecessors and contemporaries.

It is hard to distinguish much that is new in Winston Weisman's "A New View of Skyscraper History" except its reluctance to give Chicago developments the primacy they usually receive and deserve. Weisman's insistence that skyscraper history be viewed as a whole from the first elevator buildings to the present slabs of steel and glass (rather than stopping with Sullivan and the first Chicago school) seems uncontroversial, but one could question his suggestion that previous skyscraper history has been preoccupied with structural developments to the exclusion of social, economic, and esthetic concerns. Most studies, while favoring one of those emphases, have generally considered the others, even if not in the detail one would ideally want. Despite, however, its questionable "newness" of view, Weisman's survey provides another useful synthesis of an important American architectural development.

Vincent Scully completes the quartet with an eloquent, if elliptical, discussion of "American Houses: Thomas Jefferson to Frank Lloyd Wright," a variation on a theme he has treated in other contexts. His skillful integration of swift, subtle analysis with lyrical evocation of time and place is probably unsurpassed in current historical writing. In treating, for example, Wright's clients' perceptions of their experience and their environment, he speaks with typical verve and insight: "They saw peace, surely, and utter calm and dim quietness and warmth, and marvellous functional flexibility despite the general order, and plenty of unexpected discoveries, and even a few witty asides. These things probably induced them to put up with some feeling of oppression and the occasional real darkness, and the sense of an 'utterly competent leader' directing it all. They must have realized how masterfully Wright organized the suburban building 'lot'. . . . The street out there beyond the American lawn is respected, used, enhanced. Wright's people seemed actually to want it as they sat in the protected green darkness of their porches, watching the white dresses come up the sidewalk in the failing light."

Though most architectural historians will

find little that is startlingly new in these synthetic overviews, the larger public of non-specialists in architecture for whom the exhibition and catalog were primarily intended, should find them to be helpful and stimulating guides to the national landscape. Yet even more important than the impact of the essays, both for laymen and for specialists, was the exhibition itself, which followed its New York opening with visits to Chicago and other cities. (It should be maintained somewhere in a permanent form for continued viewing.) Brilliantly designed by James Polshek and Arnold Saks, featuring giant color photographs by Elliott Erwitt, it was defined and brought together by Kaufmann's instructive texts. As one wandered through the deftly mounted maze of images—from rural cottages to monumental skyscrapers—one was struck with a new sense of the importance of place, of texture, and of historical continuity, a buoyant new awareness that was dramatically shaken by a sequence of film strips at the end of the installation—of wrecking apparatus demolishing old buildings.

Indeed the major theme of the exhibition and of this catalog-book is the need to conserve the nation's architectural legacies. Pictorially and verbally, both adumbrate the long history of conflict in America between conservationists on the one hand and developers and "planners" on the other, the latter frequently condoning architectural demolition in the delusive quest for instant utopias and in the allegedly advanced belief that new structures, whatever their quality, are inherently better than those of the old order. Yet it may be significant to note in this regard that some of the most sensitive and ambitious recent preservation projects—attempts to integrate new environments with old—have occurred in the revolutionary socialist state of Poland. There have also been problems among American conservationists themselves in their concern with isolated structures to the exclusion of larger environments and their failure to realize the functional and esthetic desirability of stylistic eclecticism. Frequently, restorationists, in a misguided quest for uniformity, have demolished a Victorian or Art Deco storefront because it did not seem to "fit" with the older Federalist or Greek revival bank next door—destroying in the process all sense of texture

and historical development and continuity. Many well-meaning, if naive, historicists have also felt that "faithful reproduction" would do just about as well, with a resulting plethora of bogus Williamsburgs. Finally, preservationists have been far too preoccupied with famous monuments to the exclusion of lesser and more modest vernacular legacies, the buildings that, in aggregate, contribute most substantially to the coveted quality of atmospheric patina. Almost no one would argue that Monticello should give way to a parking lot or trailer camp, but there should be more commitment to less obvious buildings—to structures that will never make it to the back of the nickle.

In their foreword to this volume, Thomas Hoving of the Metropolitan Museum and James Biddle of the National Trust assert their belief that the "disfigurement of cities—the neglect or destruction of old buildings—impairs the total environment as much as the pollution of air and water or the thoughtless extermination of wildlife. . . . Their preservation and use can counteract—and prevent—the rootlessness and spiritual alienation that result from living in degrading circumstances and among amorphous structures to which one cannot possibly relate." As a book and an exhibition, *The Rise of an American Architecture* makes that case forcefully—and issues a challenge that sticks in the mind.

THOMAS S. HINES
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RAY ALLEN BILLINGTON, editor, with the assistance of VERN CARNER. *People of the Plains and Mountains: Essays in the History of the West Dedicated to Everett Dick*. (Contributions in American History, number 25.) Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1973. Pp. xi, 227. \$12.50.

Festschriften have traditionally honored university scholars who have trained legions of graduate students. This book is different. It is a tribute to a historian who has been a superb influence at a small denominational college, who has given notable service to his church and the nation and in between these demands has found time to write one very well known book, *The Sod-House Frontier*, and several other good though less famous studies. Everett Dick has had

the kind of career that usually wins far less recognition than is deserved. His former undergraduates at Union College, a Seventh-Day Adventist institution in Nebraska, determined to correct that. They persuaded Ray Billington of the Huntington Library to assemble and edit a volume of essays in honor of Dick. Billington successfully solicited papers from a former teacher of Dick's, John D. Hicks, a former student, James B. Rhoads, and seven scholars who have met and liked Dick, chiefly during the latter's visits to the Huntington Library.

The resultant essays are, inevitably, uneven in quality, and there has been no attempt to achieve a common focus on any one aspect of Western history. One of the best articles is also one of the most unexpected. Rhoads, who has risen to be archivist of the United States since his student days with Dick, has contributed a well-conceived analysis of the rich resources for Western history of all kinds that can be found in that most neglected of collections, the military archives. Rhoads uses the military archives to illustrate his belief that because of the federal government's key role in developing the West, the records of federal activity, as preserved in the National Archives, constitute the most important single source for Western history.

Another important essay is Francis Paul Prucha's merciless exposure of the complacent insensitivity with which Protestant missionaries of the late Victorian era set out to "improve" the Indians. Prucha warns that the missionaries were not simply a minority of zealots but rather represented the thinking of "late nineteenth-century American society" as a whole.

Paul Wallace Gates has contributed a vigorous exposé of the way in which recent agricultural legislation and administration have richly favored the big farmer at the expense of the taxpayer and the small farmer. Still another interesting essay is Thomas D. Clark's demonstration of the importance of a few famous families in providing continuity of pioneering experience on every successive frontier from the Appalachians to the Pacific.

RODMAN W. PAUL

California Institute of Technology

JOHN LEE EIGHMY. *Churches in Cultural Captivity: A History of the Social Attitudes of*

Southern Baptists. With an introduction and epilogue by SAMUEL S. HILL, JR. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. 1972. Pp. xvii, 249. \$11.50.

Recounting their efforts to regulate private morality and to maintain separation of Church and state, the late Professor Eighthmy contends that Southern Baptists have been hampered in their response to social problems by the democracy of their congregational government and by the individualism of their evangelical theology. His detailed research evinces a commitment to this work's integrity and endurance, which is his best posthumous testimonial. By using denominational papers and tracts he has tapped a rich lode of public opinion and made this book valuable in fields beyond the limits of Church history. Supplementing Rufus Spain's *At Ease in Zion: Social History of Southern Baptists, 1865-1900* (1967), his study should help scholars better comprehend the institutional mechanisms through which American religious thought has been channeled and sometimes controlled.

The lessons to be learned from it, however, are not necessarily those the author wished to teach. When he describes the Social Gospel movement—and by implication its continuing legacy of churchly, if not religious, reform—as the theological analogue to Progressivism, he neglects the revisionist historiography that sees in at least some Progressives a displaced and resentful elite. That view might be applied as well to the crusading churchmen who sometimes displayed as much *hubris* as prophetic vision. Similarly, Eighthmy's account of the way the Southern Convention was maneuvered toward greater social involvement demonstrates to him the stubbornness of cultural conformity, while to others it might reveal how a dedicated minority within an undisciplined democratic institution can assume leadership.

Many paragraphs, especially in the deplorable epilogue, read like a declaration of the National Council of Churches. This may be good or bad within a sermon but is entirely inappropriate in a historical monograph. An example: "Many Southern Christians in various communions perceive that the churches have a staggering responsibility to empower lives with strength, liberation, and optimal development, and to assist in constructing a healthy

public order." The writer of the epilogue rightly observes that "'churches in cultural captivity' is a strong accusation." That charge is applicable to this book, for it judges the past by the unquestioned standards of contemporary liberalism. The adamant Bryan, Scripture in hand, censuring the world for disagreeing with him, was no more narrow in vision than this concerned tract for our times.

WILLIAM J. GRIBBIN
Virginia Union University

WILLIAM M. WIECEK. *The Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution*. (Cornell Studies in Civil Liberty.) Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1972. Pp. 324. \$12.50.

The fourth section of Article IV of the United States Constitution provides that "the United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government." As Professor Wiecek, who teaches history at the University of Missouri, Columbia, points out in this first full-length historical treatment of what Senator Sumner once called "a sleeping giant in the Constitution," this clause has never acquired any serious meaning as a basis for the exercise of federal judicial power ever since the Court backed away from using it in *Luther v. Borden* (1849), which was a by-product of Dorr's Rebellion in Rhode Island.

The author describes the origins of the guarantee clause and its uses in connection with the quarrel over the suffrage in Rhode Island, the debates over slavery and Reconstruction (where both sides invoked the authority of the clause), the attempts to challenge the initiative and referendum in the Progressive Era in terms of their congruence with republicanism (the leading case was *Pacific States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Oregon* [1912]), and the revived interest in the subject in *Baker v. Carr* (1962). The author believes that Justice William J. Brennan's opinion in this case has opened the door to a possible utilization of the guarantee clause in future litigation.

This is an excellent book that explores an interesting segment of American constitutional history. It is thoroughly researched and very well written. I have only two small bones to pick. It is unfortunate that the author lumped together mandamus, injunction, and declara-

tory judgments under the heading of "equitable" relief (p. 272), and he failed to do full justice (at p. 274) to Justice Wiley Rutledge's concurrence in *Colegrove v. Green* (1946), which was mainly based on the argument that there was not enough time left for the Court to provide effective relief. But these are minor matters; on the whole this is a splendid book that will long be referred to as an authoritative and accurate history of an open-ended and rather neglected provision of the Constitution. Whether the clause, in the light of *Baker v. Carr*, will now lead to meaningful litigation in the courts remains to be seen, but I must confess that I do not share the author's optimism. It is quite true, however, as Professor Wiecek makes clear, that no one can really predict just how the guarantee clause will be used in some future crisis situation, the nature of which is as yet unknown to us. It is, indeed, a "sleeping giant," and this scholarly study may well contribute to the process of awakening.

DAVID FELLMAN
University of Wisconsin,
Madison

MARY FRANCES BERRY. *Black Resistance/White Law: A History of Constitutional Racism in America*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 1971. Pp. xi, 268. \$6.95.

The basic theme of this study is that American federalism historically has been a nice device for maintaining white supremacy and racist oppression of blacks. Before the Civil War, the author points out, both the federal character of the Union and the Constitution's open recognition of slavery enabled the national government to pursue a hands-off policy toward slavery within the states, even while allowing that same government to assist in the recovery of runaways and on occasion even to use military force to effect such recovery, as in the Anthony Burns case.

Nor did the outcome of the Civil War and adoption of the Reconstruction amendments, the author argues, alter greatly the discriminatory employment—or nonemployment—of federal power against blacks. On the one hand the doctrine of national supremacy permitted Washington, when it wished, to intervene directly in labor disputes, as in the Pullman

strike and the Debs case, while on the other hand the government invoked the limitations that the federal system imposed upon its sovereignty to avoid intervention, either by legislation or by judicial action, in the South's blatant violation of the Constitution's new guarantees of racial equality. Only since 1945, the author observes, has the situation been modified to some degree, so that federal power, by means of court decisions, congressional legislation, and even direct military intervention now is employed to implement the elder Justice Harlan's "color-blind" theory of the Constitution.

All this adds up to a basically sound argument. Unfortunately the author damages her case somewhat by a consistent tendency to dramatic overstatement, self-interested distortion, and flamboyant inaccuracy. It will come as a considerable surprise to most constitutional historians, for example, to learn that President Jackson "vacillated" when confronted with South Carolina's 1832 nullification of the tariff, because his "sympathy for slaveholders clashed with his nationalistic tendencies." Equally surprising is the author's assertion that "federal troops were consistently used to suppress the increasingly active abolitionist movement." Again, responsibility for the rendition of fugitive slaves did not, except in the most generalized and ultimate constitutional sense, "fall on the President." Nor does section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in any peculiar sense allow "Congress to provide military aid, if necessary, to enforce its provisions." And it is doubtful in the extreme that conservatives during the 1919 Red Scare were "as frightened of black rebellion as they were of strikes" or Bolshevik conspiracy. "Law office history" of this kind makes the reader heartily regret that the editor did not employ a cool-headed and competent critic to clean up the author's manuscript and tone it down.

ALFRED H. KELLY
Wayne State University

C. W. CERAM. *The First American: A Story of North American Archaeology*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 1971. Pp. xxi, 357. \$9.95.

Several of the books authored by C. W. Ceram (the late Kurt W. Marek) reflect his deep

interest in the history of archeology. Ceram's contributions to this field include the widely read *Gods, Graves and Scholars* (1951) and *The March of Archaeology* (1958). In *The First American*, he examines the development of prehistoric research in North America. The coverage of this book is broad. Ceram endeavors to explain basic archeological concepts and discusses the role of North American archeology within the general discipline of anthropology. Most of the volume is devoted to a review of the history of archeology and the current status of archeological knowledge within various regions of North America, with particular emphasis on the American Southwest. As in other books by Ceram there are numerous interesting illustrations and several color plates.

The book seems well researched, with abundant annotations and a bibliography of over three hundred entries. There are a few factual errors, but these, along with superficial treatment of certain controversial topics, are minor flaws. For instance, Ceram relates the story of Thomas Jefferson's pioneering archeological endeavors in Virginia in the 1780s, but he neglects to consider the formidable accomplishments of a contemporary of Jefferson's, Benjamin Smith Barton. Barton, a scientist at the University of Pennsylvania, disputed the fanciful interpretations of that day which purported to interpret the history and function of earthworks in the Eastern United States; he further proposed, on the basis of linguistic evidence, that man had been in North America considerably longer than then imagined. Ceram also repeats popular archeological folklore relating to the activities of Aleš Hrdlička, the foremost American physical anthropologist of the early twentieth century, declaring that Hrdlička "blocked all research into the remote past." An alternative view of Hrdlička recognizes that he was at times overzealous, but that he performed a valuable service by forcing a rigorous methodology on the emerging science of archeological research in North America. Time has also shown that Hrdlička was generally accurate in his evaluations, these leading to the just demise of some claims of very early human occupation in the New World.

A major error is to be found in the discussion of Gypsum Cave, Nevada (pp. 260, 261). This site was once thought to contain evidence of early man (8000 B.C.) and this interpretation has been perpetuated in the archeological literature. However, radiocarbon analyses conducted in 1970 (a year before the publication of *The First American*) clearly proved that man occupied Gypsum Cave no earlier than 950 B.C.

Ceram cogently summarizes the unspeakable destruction of the California Indians in the mid-nineteenth century. Historians interested in this aspect of the American frontier should consult the thoroughly documented volume by R. Heizer and A. Almquist, *The Other Californians* (1971).

The First American is well written and easily read. Given these qualities and the generally sound archeological content, this book should be quite useful to the layman and the beginning student. It is far superior to similar "popular" studies of North American archeology that have been published to date.

THOMAS R. HESTER
University of Texas,
San Antonio

WARREN L. COOK. *Flood Tide of Empire: Spain and the Pacific Northwest, 1543-1819*. (Yale Western Americana Series, 24.) New Haven: Yale University Press. 1973. Pp. xiv, 620. \$17.50.

Professor Cook, an admitted anthropologist as well as a historian, aims to put some healthy flesh on the dry, old bones of Henry R. Wagner's monographs on early Northwest coast explorations and William R. Manning's works on the Nootka Sound dispute. Latin Americanists of the old, pre-ethnic studies stamp, of course, have long lived in unconscious acceptance of this approach, as their much recommended William H. Prescott histories will testify. Yet it is hard to reconcile the following cultural episode taken from chapter 5, "The Clash at Nootka, 1789," as possibly determining, as Cook claims, the outcome of the Nootka crisis: "Macuina ate the little boys among his enemies who had the misfortune to fall prisoner. For this purpose he tried to fatten them up first, and then when they were ready, got them all together in a circle (he did this some

eight days before our people left that waterway), put himself in the middle with an instrument in hand and, looking at all the miserales with furious visage, decided which one was to serve as dish for his inhumane meal. Then, advancing upon the unhappy victim of his voracious appetite, he opened its abdomen at one blow, cut off the arms, and commenced devouring that innocent's raw flesh, bloodying himself as he satiated his barbarous appetite." Cook's placing this graphic account of Indian cannibalism in the text itself, rather than as a footnote, does, however, illustrate, as the author himself concedes, the chief obstacle to attempting such an overview; namely, "the sheer volume of pertinent sources."

Cook, seeking new perspectives and data on this critical decade, takes on a formidable challenge in arguing with Samuel Flagg Bemis's thesis that Spain wholly relinquished her territorial claims with rival European powers with the settlement in 1790 of the spectacular Nootka Sound controversy. While Cook makes ample use of primary sources and such basic secondary works as Arthur P. Whitaker's *Mississippi Question, 1795-1803: A Study in Trade, Politics, and Diplomacy* (2d ed.), it is hard to accept his main point that a serious effort was made by the Spanish royal forces to save either the Pacific Northwest or Louisiana and the Floridas from the grasp of the British, French, and Americans. Here the burden is definitely carried by Cook to show that Spain was not waging a losing defensive action from 1790 on. That Spain would legally allow trade by English merchants in Louisiana and Florida, immigrants from the United States—including Protestants!—reveals the absolute incapability of stemming the inevitable invasion in that part of her Empire. Even the infamous Inquisition that was about to open office in New Orleans was squelched with lightning-like speed for fear it would upset the immigration policy. And Spanish governor after Spanish governor at New Orleans confessed to the viceroy of New Spain that he was incapable of defending the province against even a flotilla of Western Yankees in flatboats whenever it suited their fancy to float down the Mississippi River for that purpose. This traditional perspective, which Cook tries to reshape by adding his own anthropological and diplo-

matic insights, still seems quite healthy in spite of his concentrated assault.

C. RICHARD ARENA
Whittier College

ROBERT EMMET WALL, JR. *Massachusetts Bay: The Crucial Decade, 1640-1650*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1972. Pp. x, 292. \$9.75.

Professor Wall has made a good case for the 1640s as a crucial decade in early Massachusetts history. The events that disturbed the peace of the Puritan colony are familiar ones: the fight over the magistrates' right to veto actions taken by the deputies, the Hingham militia imbroglio, the scandalous behavior of Samuel Gorton and his followers, and the Child remonstrance. But Wall has put them all against a significant background—the fight of the lesser gentry, particularly those remote from the Boston area, to whittle down the power of the aristocratic magistrates. External threats from England forced cooperation between the two sides ultimately, and the outcome was greater inflexibility in Massachusetts public policy, which paved the way for the later downfall of the Puritan state.

Two preliminary chapters set the stage. The first recounts the well-known story of the freemen's insistence upon playing their charter role in government and of their attack upon the arbitrary ways of the magistrates, who created a Standing Council and resisted the establishment of a written code of laws. With some quantification, Wall then describes the emergence of a lesser gentry in the local communities, who rose to be deputies in the General Court, and defines them as not only socially and economically inferior to their betters, but also as dwelling in remote Essex and old Norfolk counties, areas jealous of the superiority of the counties of Suffolk and Middlesex.

Wall has read widely and deeply in the sources and puts a different construction from the usual one on some of the happenings in the 1640s. Opposition to the Standing Council, for example, was largely regional in nature, even after it was reformed to include only sitting magistrates, because only magistrates handy to Boston were likely to be consulted when the General Court was not in session. Wall illuminates the magistrates' attitude toward deputies as merely spokesmen for the freemen; the depu-

ties were not thought of as magistrates in any sense, nor were they significant except as they sat in the court. Even that old chestnut, the story of Goody Sherman's sow, gets expert treatment. Wall's demonstration that threats from England caused the deputies and the magistrates to work together to preserve the independence of Massachusetts is convincing. And his reinterpretation of the law of 1647, which permitted nonfreemen to vote in local elections, is original. Instead of a concession to demands for a more liberal franchise, Wall sees a law carefully structured to check illegal voting and to put the voting of the nonfreeman within the discretion of his freeman neighbor.

Despite detailed analysis and perhaps some needless repetition, this book keeps the reader's interest. It provides excellent insight into the workings of Puritan politics and the role that ministers played as arbitrators in Massachusetts Bay.

ROBERT J. TAYLOR
Tufts University

ARTHUR R. M. LOWER. *Great Britain's Woodyard: British America and the Timber Trade, 1763-1867*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. 1973. Pp. xiv, 271. \$16.50.

This long-awaited volume is a sequel to the author's *The North American Assault on the Canadian Forest* (1938). From the Canadian standpoint, that work was "internal," dealing with the drastic diminution of the bush, as they call the forest. This present work, on the other hand, is "external," based on the protective British timber duties, those "silent partners of the Corn Laws."

Before the American Revolution the British had not been interested in American timber except for great pines for naval masts. Danzig, Riga, Memel, and other Baltic ports had long furnished timber of good quality at reasonable freight rates. The real crisis came with Napoleon's Continental System, which for a while shut off the ports of the Baltic and much of the rest of Europe—in 1809 the British timber exports from the Baltic were not enough to plank a frigate or build a house. It was in that situation that Parliament took steps to build up and protect a substantial timber supply from British North America, giving sufficient induce-

ment to attract capital and enterprise. With the coming of peace in 1815 and with the Baltic ports once again open, that protection was continued for another thirty years at a high level, ensuring the colonial monopoly. Though the protectionist measures did not get the wide publicity of the Corn Laws, they were a major target of the free-trade agitators and received their heaviest blow in 1846, the year of the Corn Law repeal; they were not completely removed until 1860.

The free-trade movement is scarcely a virgin subject, but the last hundred pages ("The Anatomy of the Trade," which includes sixteen pages of illustrations) make a valuable, original contribution to the timber record. The timber exports fell into two main categories, huge "square" sticks, wasteful and clumsy, and "deals" of planks. The men at the head of the industry were known as timbermakers. The physical work was done by the shantymen or lumbermen and by the raftmen. The Ottawa River was an important source of wood. The wood was moved to the rivers, where it was floated down in rafts that could even navigate the Lachine Rapids above Montreal. The rafts were finally assembled in the "coves" at Quebec where the awkward cargo was put aboard ship for the Atlantic crossing. The vessels had often brought over immigrants. The timber ships, often worn-out and marginal veterans of other trades, succumbed so often to the gales that they became known as "sailors' coffins"; and they were an important reason for Samuel Plimsoll's legislation for safety at sea.

This study is both interesting and important as part of the "wooden interpretation of history."

ROBERT G. ALBION
Harvard University

ERNA GUNTHER. *Indian Life on the Northwest Coast of North America: As Seen by the Early Explorers and Fur Traders during the Last Decades of the Eighteenth Century*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1972. Pp. xiv, 277. \$15.00.

History and anthropology should not be so compartmentalized as to prevent the insight that each can offer the other in many areas of human experience. A positive example is this handsomely published work, ethnohistory at a high

level of attainment. A lifetime of teaching, museum curatorship, and anthropological research in Washington, British Columbia, and Alaska underlies Dr. Erna Gunther's authoritative description of the native cultures of the Northwest coast, as seen through the early Russian, Spanish, British, American, and French sources. She points out that "in an area where archaeology has not been extensive and where its results have not reached such intangibles as ceremonials and family life, the descriptions of songs and dances, the keen observations of the explorers, and the day-to-day contacts of trading add a century to the culture history of one of the most highly developed Indian cultures of America." She perceives the eighteenth-century sources as contemporaneous records of flourishing societies, "not the fading memory of the old men from whom anthropologists in the twentieth century and even the nineteenth century have had to pry their information."

Especially valuable is her endeavor to catalog the Northwest coast artifacts extant in the world's museums known to have been gathered in the eighteenth century and to discuss them in the context of their being collected and as related to native practices. Successive chapters cover the earliest history of each group, south to north, from its initial contact with whites. While the narrative will fascinate the general reader, the specialist will profit from leads to the sources themselves, which no single work could hope to mine in their entirety.

The finest artifacts of each general type are pictured. Many of the original drawings, especially the Spanish ones, are reproduced and their ethnographic content analyzed. The absence of picture credits will frustrate those wanting to locate the originals. While accurate, the index could have usefully included all tribal and place names, and even source names, since footnotes were not provided.

Dr. Gunther dares to contradict anthropological orthodoxy by acknowledging the evidence for cannibalism and portrays several of the ceremonial axes traditionally called "slave killers."

Imperfections here and there with regard to Spanish names and accomplishments (pp. 13-14, 54, 67, 96) reflect not so much on the author as upon the current state of knowledge on the subject when she concluded her research. This meritorious book is original in concept, in-

teresting and useful in content, and will very likely never be surpassed in its area.

WARREN L. COOK
Castleton State College

LAWRENCE H. LEDER, editor. *The Colonial Legacy*. Volume 1, *Loyalist Historians*; volume 2, *Some Eighteenth-Century Commentators*. (Torchbook Library Edition.) New York: Harper and Row. 1971. Pp. 206; 228. Cloth \$8.50; \$9.50, paper \$2.75; \$2.95.

The major theme uniting these volumes on the historiography of eighteenth-century America is the destiny of the British Empire, which was either defended or interpreted as a political entity by the majority of historians under discussion in these books. The two volumes comprise a balanced collection of informative essays. They are written by fourteen different contributors and are devoted to fifteen significant works of history and their authors. Each essay presents a short biography of the historian being treated followed by a searching analysis of his major ideas, nearly always revealing significant connections between life and ideology. One essay is by the dean of American historians on the subject of empire, Lawrence Henry Gipson.

In these days of quantification and preoccupation with social and economic forces, an attempt to interpret such major political movements as the American Revolution and the collapse of the British Empire through the impressions and opinions of participants and observers may seem somewhat outdated. As one of the contributors observes, however, "whatever the larger forces working on an individual, his perception and conception of social reality must be used by the historian to understand any historical phenomenon" (vol. 2, p. 188). The theories of contemporaries have a legitimate role in the interpretation of the historical process, if for no other reason than that these contemporaries are witnesses to the events they describe or theorize about.

The loyalist historians treated in the first volume include George Chalmers, Joseph Galloway, Jonathan Boucher, Israel Maudit, Alexander Hewat, Robert Proud, and William Smith, Jr. The miscellaneous commentators in the second volume, who consist of loyalists, advocates of independence, and older historians who

died before the Revolution, include Thomas Clap, William Douglass, Archibald Kennedy, William Livingston, Thomas Jefferys, Samuel Smith, John Adams, Daniel Leonard, and Mercy Otis Warren. The members of this group obviously have fewer common ties than the loyalists. Thomas Clap is notable for antiquarianism, William Douglass for a Sterne-like prose style, and Mercy Warren for an ideological emphasis comparable to that of her French contemporary, Condorcet. Whatever their faults or prejudices, none of these historians attempted willfully to distort history except Clap and Chalmers.

The fiery loyalist Jonathan Boucher called the Empire "rotten at the Core"; the moderate John Dickinson saw the seeds of its destruction "in the want of civil Discipline and an almost total Relaxation in the administration of the Laws"; and John Adams, at the other extreme, maintained that Britain was not an empire at all, that the concept was "not the language of the common law, but the language of newspapers and political pamphlets." The most radical republican in the Enlightenment sense, Mercy Warren, had the distinction of being the only English or American historian to look at the American Revolution from a world perspective.

Even in their own day most of these chroniclers would have been considered dull reading. No historian of eighteenth-century English America rose to the level of the Mexican Clavigero, whose *Historia Antigua de México* achieved international renown. Indeed the most interesting of the historians discussed in either volume is the Frenchman Pierre Charlevoix, from whose works on Canada the English cartographer Jefferys cribbed the best of his history of that region. It is precisely because these histories are little read and relatively inaccessible, however, that the articles in these books about them are important. They offer, in brief and readable form, the essence of a century of historical writing on the issues central to the American Revolution.

A. OWEN ALDRIDGE
University of Illinois,
Urbana

HAROLD B. GILL, JR. *The Apothecary in Colonial Virginia*. (Williamsburg Research Studies.) Williamsburg: Colonial Williamsburg Foundation; distrib. by University Press of Virginia, Char-

lottesville. 1972. Pp. vii, 127. Cloth \$5.00, paper \$3.00.

The colonial apothecary combined the roles of physician and surgeon with those of merchant and promoter. Despite the frequent conflicts of interest, many colonial apothecaries attempted to serve both Asclepius and Mammon. The story of their successes and failures is the theme of this book.

After beginning with the training and socioeconomic status of the English apothecary before 1800, the author shifts to colonial America in chapter 3. That chapter, "The Apothecary in Colonial America," provides the background for chapter 4, "The Apothecary in Williamsburg." The book concludes with a chapter on pharmaceutical equipment and three appendixes: "Revolutionary Hospitals in Williamsburg," "A List of Williamsburg Apothecaries," and "Dr. Sequeyra's Account of Virginia Diseases, 1745-1781."

The book is pleasant to read and includes some material not easily available elsewhere; for example, shipping lists and apothecary inventories, transcribed from unpublished archival sources. Of particular interest is a list of books (pp. 79-81) belonging to the estate of Dr. Kenneth McKenzie of Williamsburg (d. 1755), though the failure to expand the abbreviated titles and to include the relevant bibliographical data is to be regretted.

Unfortunately, the book is neither profound nor scholarly. The cento of one-sentence extracts from private correspondence is unsystematic and has the appearance of a tourist's guidebook. The footnotes and bibliography are marred by misspellings and errors, and Mr. Gill has too often relied on outdated and secondary sources. As a result, he has been led into error through failure to consult original printed editions or specialized reference works. One example must suffice. The statement that balsam of Tolu was exported from Virginia (p. 41) is botanically impossible, for the simple reason that the tree producing that gum (*Myroxylon toluiferum* H.B.K.) is a native of Colombia and Venezuela (see J. von Wiesner, *Die Rohstoffe des Pflanzenreichs* 4. Aufl. [Leipzig, 1927]: 1096).

Attractively printed and reasonably priced, this book should stimulate further studies that, I hope, will avail themselves of recent research

in the history of pharmacy, medical botany, and medical bibliography.

JERRY STANNARD
University of Kansas

CECIL B. CURREY. *Code Number 72/Ben Franklin: Patriot or Spy?* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 1972. Pp. viii, 331. \$7.95.

Having dogged Franklin's subversive tracks in England in the decade prior to the American Revolution, Mr. Currey now pursues the devious career of the old Doctor in France. What he has in fact done is to draw up a bill of indictment based upon an array of circumstantial evidence that, considered by itself and out of context, seems damning on its face. The Lees could hardly have done a better job. Mr. Currey sees Franklin surrounded by spies and double agents, ever with an eye to the main chance for self and family, suspiciously talking peace with British agents or intermediaries, conversations that carry overtones of bribery, always a bridesmaid but never a bride.

Granted that Franklin was careless and indifferent, to say the least, in his choice of trusted associates, that he had a disdain for ordinary security procedures, and that he and the Lees shared a mutual antipathy, it hardly follows that he was either a traitor or a spy, as the writer implies at many points in his review of the evidence. It is absurd to charge that Franklin accepted the French post to escape from a collapsing rebellion. Considering his advanced age and the hazards of a sea voyage in wartime, his acceptance of the post was a courageous and patriotic action. Just think of what John Jay and John Adams underwent in the course of their voyages to Europe, or consider how Henry Laurens wound up in the Tower of London on a charge of high treason. Verily, Franklin would have been safer in his idyllic Vandalia than in making hydrographic observations of the Gulf Stream with British frigates in hot pursuit!

The author convicts Franklin of guilt by association. Yet the fact that he knew and trusted Bancroft and Deane could be charged against Jay, Lafayette, and numerous other stern patriots as well. For the author to assert (p. 107) that the story of Franklin's "life in France is an account of one disaster after another, debacle piled upon calamity" constitutes a rank distortion of the diplomatic history of the Amer-

ican Revolution. Who else but Franklin could have gotten the money and the aids to keep the war going? Certainly not Jay, nor John Adams, save from the Dutch and late in the war. That Franklin managed to do so even after the preliminary peace ruffled the feelings of the French court must be put down to statecraft of a high order.

With extraordinary inconsistency the author charges Franklin at one moment with a pro-British bias and at another with being pro-French. Now, there is nothing in the peace negotiations to suggest that Franklin took a soft line toward the British, save perhaps in being willing to forego the point of independence out of deference to Vergennes. On territory, on reparations, and on the debts Franklin adopted a much tougher stance than either of his tough-minded associates at the peace table. Despite their differences on French war aims and their relation to America's objectives, Jay and Franklin enjoyed a most cordial relationship both in Paris and in later years, the author to the contrary notwithstanding.

Now that Franklin has been indicted by Mr. Currey, let us hope that he will receive a fair trial at the hands of a more impartial jury.

RICHARD B. MORRIS
Columbia University

RALPH KETCHAM. *James Madison: A Biography*. New York: Macmillan Company. 1971. Pp. xiv, 753. \$17.50.

A number of eminent scholars have felt the attraction of Madison as a subject for historical analysis. During the 1890s there appeared Henry Adam's *History of the United States in the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison*. Four of its nine volumes are devoted to Jefferson's friend and successor in the presidency. Gillard Hunt's one-volume biography appeared in 1902. In 1961 appeared the sixth and last volume of Irving Brant's *James Madison*, a massive work that took twenty years in the making. In 1969 came *A Life of James Madison*, also by Brant. We now have another one-volume study of Madison, also titled *James Madison*. The author made major contributions to the first two volumes of *The Papers of James Madison*, was a leader in the field search for the manuscripts, and prepared a number of them for publication.

He has what Alphonse Aulard used to call "a taste for documents," an asset that he has used to good advantage in the preparation of this biography.

Ketcham's life of Madison is no cursory treatment. It contains 671 pages of text. This allows considerable freedom of movement in the portrayal of a career that spanned eighty-five years. It is a portrait carefully and sympathetically drawn, and to me there are places in the book where the sympathy is somewhat overdrawn. One misses some criticism, however muted, of Madison's opposition to the Great Compromise of 1787. Madison's attitude toward slavery and the slave trade is explained, but in an apologetic tone. It is true that a comparison between his attitude and that of his onetime secretary, Edward Coles, is drawn, but more might have been made of the contrast between Madison's zealous regard for human rights and his advocacy of colonization as the most logical remedy for slavery. The retreat from the nationalism of the 1780s is persuasively delineated but is not subjected to critical analysis. As for the War of 1812, Ketcham makes the rather arbitrary judgment that Madison's "only real war aim" was vindication of "the whole republican concept of government" and that his putting on of the Federalist doctrines of strong central government, protectionism, and a national bank was all right because it was done under the mild and beneficent influence of Republican principles. The author finds excuse for Madison's fumbling conduct of the war, remarking that his "careful avoidance of Cromwellism . . . can be contrasted easily and obviously with how Hamilton might have conducted the war" (p. 604).

But while the above defects may mar, they do not substantially detract from the quality of this work. Madison's personality comes alive in these pages, his strengths and weaknesses of mind and character clearly outlined. His great services in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 are graphically portrayed. The analysis of his political theory, and of the way in which he sought to apply it to the establishment of government under the Constitution, is excellent. The depiction of Jeffersonian and Madisonian foreign policy up to the outbreak of the War of 1812 is clear and succinct. This is an excellent biography. It strikes a happy balance between

the ironic strictures of Henry Adams and the sometimes over-enthusiastic eulogies of Irving Brant.

GLYNDON G. VAN DEUSEN
University of Rochester

CARL SEABURG and STANLEY PATERSON. *Merchant Prince of Boston: Colonel T. H. Perkins, 1764-1854*. (Harvard Studies in Business History, 26.) Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1971. Pp. xi, 478. \$16.00.

Maritime elites in antebellum American cities resembled the mercantile patriciates of Renaissance Venice and Elizabethan London in the scope and diversity of their activity. With the profits of overseas trade providing an economic base, they initiated ventures in other types of businesses and expanded their economic hegemony by establishing leadership in urban politics, charity, and culture. Ascendancy in civic and commercial enterprises and intermarriage among the leading families gave these enclaves the power, wealth, status, and cohesion to become urban upper classes. Among the upper orders in American ports Boston merchants were unrivaled in the varied functions and achievements of a metropolitan gentry. New York traders had larger businesses and amassed greater fortunes, but in every other respect of community leadership they were surpassed by the New Englanders.

Thomas Handasyd Perkins, the foremost merchant prince of Boston during the halcyon era of that port, is a fitting subject for historical biography. Apart from a hagiographic memoir, written shortly after Perkins's death by his son-in-law T. G. Cary, no life and times of this significant figure has been attempted. This gap has been filled by Carl Seaburg and Stanley Paterson in their lengthy and detailed study of the old "Colonel." It is fitting for a volume in the Harvard Studies in Business History that the authors excel in reconstructing his entrepreneurial activities. These ranged from conducting a worldwide shipping network to organizing an iron factory, owning hotels, and initiating the first American railroad. Apart from an absence of discussion of his role, or an explanation of his lack of role, in such capital accumulation projects as banking and insurance, which attracted other prominent merchants, his business interests have been successfully depicted.

Full treatment is also given to his accomplishments as a political figure and as a mover in or founder of such embellishments of city life as the Boston Athenaeum and the Perkins Institution for the Blind.

An excellent public biography, the private Perkins emerges as a shadowy figure in this book. Seaburg and Paterson have not resurrected his personality, and they have not sufficiently probed the motives or accounted for the traits that made him pre-eminent in commerce and noteworthy in other activities. Judging from the unhappiness of his wife and the problems of his sons, he was perhaps less successful as a family man than as a public man. But the public Perkins was more important as a historical figure, and this dimension is elegantly and comprehensively presented. Seaburg and Paterson have not challenged the group portrayal of Boston merchants in *The Maritime History of Massachusetts*, but, in focusing upon a salient individual, they have added depth and detail to Samuel Eliot Morison's interpretation.

FREDERIC COPLE JAHNER
*University of Illinois,
Urbana-Champaign*

ALEC R. GILPIN. *The Territory of Michigan [1805-1837]*. [East Lansing:] Michigan State University Press. 1970. Pp. 234. \$8.00.

Few states have had a longer or more colorful territorial period than Michigan. During the thirty-two years from 1805 to 1837 a number of notable individuals, perhaps best represented by Augustus Woodward, Father Gabriel Richard, Lewis Cass, and Stevens T. Mason, worked tirelessly to mold and shape a geographic entity in the Northwest Territory—one continually beset by a host of frontier-style problems ranging from Indian relations and boundary difficulties on the one hand to legal, political, and constitutional matters on the other—into a state. By 1837, however, largely due to the perseverance of its territorial leaders, Michigan was indeed ready to take its place in the Union.

In this brief volume, the first book-length study of Michigan's territorial history, Alec R. Gilpin, professor of humanities at Michigan State University, presents a straightforward narrative account of this period in the Wolverine State's development. In three chronological sections, dealing with the years 1805-12, 1815-30,

and 1831-36, Gilpin discusses such topics as military and political activities, Indian problems, legal questions, and settlement. An "Interlude" chapter on the War of 1812 is a condensed version of the author's earlier work on this same topic entitled *The War of 1812 in the Old Northwest*.

The book's major contribution to Michigan and Midwestern history is the vast amount of factual material that Gilpin has collected. Beyond that it leaves a great deal to be desired. The author has made no attempt to analyze or interpret this storehouse of facts; he writes in a graceless style that may leave the reader yearning for the college outline series; and he provides few transitions from one subject to another. To cite but one example of the latter, on pages 150-51, the reader is abruptly taken from a Negro slave incident, to congressional action regarding internal improvements, to St. Anne's Roman Catholic Church becoming a cathedral—in three brief, consecutive paragraphs! The book includes no maps or illustrations of any kind, a curious omission in a study that at key points focuses on boundary disputes and Cass's explorations. And, finally, the index is of little use since it contains almost nothing but proper names. Indeed, as one reviewer has already suggested, "Annals of the Territory of Michigan" would probably have been a more accurate title for this work.

C. WARREN VANDER HILL
Ball State University

HERBERT WEAVER and PAUL H. BERGERON, editors. *Correspondence of James K. Polk*. Volume 2, 1833-1834. (Sponsored by Vanderbilt University, the National Historical Publications Commission, the Tennessee Historical Commission, the Polk Memorial Association.) Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press. 1972. Pp. xxxvi, 645. \$15.00.

In this second volume of the correspondence of James K. Polk the editors have repeated the workmanlike performance that marked their first volume, and they have done it with a minimum use of the footnotes that burden recent publications of the correspondence of American statesmen.

This volume covers the lame duck session of the Twenty-second Congress, when nullification and a new tariff were of overwhelming impor-

tance; Polk's successful campaign for a fifth term in the House of Representatives; his term as chairman of the Ways and Means Committee during the "panic session," when removal of deposits from the Bank of the United States was the main issue; his unsuccessful candidacy for the speakership against John Bell during 1834; and the beginnings of the 1834-35 session of Congress.

The editors published 664 letters (512 in full) of the 850 available for the period. Unfortunately, only forty-four were written by Polk, and not many of these reveal much of the man. Most were addressed to office holders on routine problems. A few are important. Among them, one to Cave Johnson, previously published by St. George L. Sioussat, outlined the main issues in Polk's campaign for re-election, including his votes on pension bills for Revolutionary War veterans and on a measure outfitting John Randolph as minister to Russia! Another to Francis P. Blair discussed the Bank's alleged ownership of the *National Intelligencer*, a fallacy that so intrigued Polk that he used it later in his famous attack on the B.U.S. in support of Jackson's removal policy.

The scarcity of Polk's own letters does not detract from the value of the book. Polk's letters from his constituents—the majority of his correspondents—provide a good sample of the attitude of Tennessee Democrats on nullifiers ("hang 'em"); on the B.U.S. (opposed); on a state constitutional convention, to which many wished Polk to be elected; and on Tennessee politics and politicians. Letters from his overseer, Ephriam Beanland, reveal the problems of operating a plantation. Finally, the many letters of his brother-in-law, James Walker, a Columbia, Tennessee, businessman, importuning Polk's aid in securing a postal route against the opposition of John Bell and Senator John Eaton, are among the best revelations of patronage politics that have been published. Students of Jackson's administration will find the book an excellent addition to the source material of that period.

JOSEPH G. RAYBACK
Temple University

MARK L. BERGER. *The Revolution in the New York Party Systems, 1840-1860*. (National University Publications, Series in American Studies.)

Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press. 1973. Pp. 172. \$8.50.

The sad truth is that this book is relatively unimaginative, unintentionally misleading, and too frequently inaccurate. Mr. Berger does not begin in 1840 and he does not conclude in 1860; at best he covers extensively the years between 1853 and 1856. He never defines the term "revolution" and, consequently, never adequately describes any political revolution. He does not attempt any systematic analysis of voting patterns either of counties, towns, or religious or national ethnic groups. After reading this book, one would have no inkling of the new approaches to antebellum political history that have been explored by Lee Benson, Paul Kleppner, Ronald Formisano, Robert Swierenga, George Daniels, and Joel H. Silbey, to name but a few.

In citing the figures on the growth of the foreign-born population in New York State (p. 12), he mistakenly takes the figures for aliens as representing the total foreign-born, overlooking naturalized citizens. Thus, rather than the totals for 1845 (misprinted as 1854) and 1855 being 7.52% and 18.54% respectively, they were actually 13.29% and 24.17% (the figures for New York City are likewise incorrect). In addition, on page 126 (and page 98, as well) he erroneously asserts that "even during the period of factional strife from 1853-1855, the combined Hard and Soft Shell vote still constituted a majority of the ballots cast. . . ." The total per cent of Democratic votes for governor in 1854 was 40.55%, and 33.48% in 1856 (32.88% for president).

Fortunately, such technical errors are few; unfortunately, they reflect a lack of careful, considered analysis of the period. His theme concerns the interaction of temperance, nativist, and antislavery issues between 1854 and 1856 and the eventual emergence of the latter, although "in 1854 no one could have predicted with certitude which issue would emerge as the paramount concern of the nation. . . ." (p. 10). Yet he rarely discusses national politics and weakly extends his conclusions regarding state political struggles to embrace the entire country. In terms of the first two issues this is certainly stretching matters (pp. 10, 31, 68). He makes several references to German-American and Irish voters (e.g., pp. 7, 53, 64, 65, 112) but

does not explain their importance either by noting that, in 1855, of the 937,768 foreign-born people in the state, 695,102 were Irish or German (including Prussians), or that 135,577 of the 652,322 eligible voters (20%) had been naturalized, or that, besides New York City (with 51.1%), Albany, Clinton, Richmond, Westchester, Monroe, Niagara, Erie, and Kings counties each had between 33% and 49% foreign-born populations in 1855. A further illustration of the oversimplicity present concerns his explanation of the appearance of nativism upstate: in 1854 "the countryside . . . was suddenly seized with xenophobic hysteria. . . ." (p. 53, italics added).

His two chapters on the Know-Nothings and his descriptions of the infighting among political leaders are useful, but the many shortcomings (and others could be enumerated) quite overshadow those contributions.

ELLIOTT R. BARKAN
California State College,
San Bernardino

WILLIAM E. LASS. *From the Missouri to the Great Salt Lake: An Account of Overland Freighting*. (Nebraska State Historical Society Publications, volume 26.) [Lincoln:] the Society. 1972. Pp. xv, 312. \$7.95.

This book is a history of central overland freighting by wagon in the period 1848-67, when the building of the Union Pacific Railroad rendered it obsolete. The starting points were the Missouri river towns of Leavenworth, Atchison, and St. Joseph in Kansas and Brownsville, Nebraska City, Plattsmouth, and Omaha in Nebraska. The ultimate destinations were Denver and Salt Lake City. A chapter on freighting from Sidney, Nebraska, to the Black Hills of South Dakota, 1874-80, rounds out the history but is unavoidably anticlimactic given the chronological organization employed.

The rivalry of the river towns is well delineated. It may come as a surprise to some that Nebraska City and Atchison held advantages for freighting companies over the other towns. The effect of historic events upon the freighting business is skillfully developed. Among these events were the Mormon migration, the Utah War, the Pikes Peak gold rush, the Civil War, and the advent of transcontinental railroad transportation.

Readers will find the description of the methods and equipment of muleskinners and bullwhackers more interesting than business rivalries, which are given somewhat more attention. The latter form an essential part of the history of the business, but the absence of outstanding personalities deprives them of interest.

Professor Lass has worked from primary sources and writes with authority. There are a number of excellent and unusual illustrations. Several good maps are provided, but one is needed showing way stations along the trail that are mentioned in the text. There is an appendix containing short biographies of over a hundred men engaged in wagon freighting. The book provides a most reliable account of an activity, commonplace only a century ago but now seeming to belong to a much more distant past.

HARVEY L. CARTER
Colorado College

FLETCHER M. GREEN. *The Role of the Yankee in the Old South*. (Mercer University Lamar Memorial Lectures, number 11.) Athens: University of Georgia Press. 1972. Pp. x, 150. \$6.00.

Originally delivered as the Lamar Memorial Lectures at Mercer University in 1968, the material in this slender volume seems pointed more at the general reader than at the specialist in Southern history. In a series of what he calls "pen pictures of a representative group," "brief sketches of the Yankee leaders," and comparable terminology in still other places, the author provides factual information ranging from a short paragraph, or less, to two or three pages for each person mentioned. He groups those discussed according to occupation in the South and covers a wide range of activities such as government and politics, educational leaders, journalists, humorists and the theater, religious leaders, and agriculturalists and industrialists. While the total number of Yankees mentioned in the volume constitutes only a minute fraction of such people who migrated to the South, the reader will obtain a good picture of their great diversity in personalities, beliefs, and activities. Professor Green recognizes that they seem to have been influenced by the South quite as much or more than they influenced it, and he makes no startling claims for the significance of his material.

Some scholars may be disappointed with

this study, as it does fall short of the importance of some of Professor Green's earlier work. He establishes no real "role" for the Yankee unless it be simply that of diversity. His material indicates that having been born in the North or having lived there for a time prior to moving south had little significance insofar as a person's beliefs and activities in his new home were concerned. I puzzled as to why such people as Thomas Cooper and Horace Holley received only a paragraph each, whereas Frederick A. P. Barnard and Philip Lindsley rated much longer treatment, and why sketches of Augustus Baldwin Longstreet and Anna Mowat should be included. There are no footnotes, even for quotations, and the bibliography perplexes one both as to works cited or omitted. The index goes little beyond an incomplete listing of names of those discussed.

LEWIS ATHERTON
University of Missouri,
Columbia

FREDERICK MERK, with the collaboration of LOIS BANNISTER MERK. *Slavery and the Annexation of Texas*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1972. Pp. xiii, 290, x. \$8.95.

Two subjects which seem at times to rival even that perennial favorite—Abraham Lincoln—for enduring interest to students of history are Texas and slavery. Frederick Merk, distinguished emeritus professor of Harvard University, is the latest of a long line of scholars to consider the relationship between these two intriguing topics. Although, as Professor Merk realizes, the origin of this question goes back at least to the days of the Texas revolution and the presidency of Andrew Jackson, he concentrates on the crucial period between March 16, 1844, when the *National Intelligencer* accused the Tyler administration of engaging in clandestine negotiations with the Republic of Texas and March 1, 1845, when the Congress finally approved the joint resolution of annexation.

Although Professor Merk has plowed familiar ground in this study, he nonetheless provides his own interpretation of these events and adds a new twist or two to an otherwise well-known story. The author's thesis is simple and straightforward. "The Texas controversy, at its core," Merk asserts in the preface, "was political" and

not diplomatic, as Justin Smith had maintained in a more detailed study of the same topic in 1911. Merk analyzes at some length the propaganda employed by both the friends and opponents of annexation to demonstrate that "the antislavery propaganda emanating from the North was nearer the truth than that flowing from the Southern circle of slavery extremists urging annexation." The result is an interpretation that comes closer to repeating the abolitionist charge of a "slave-power conspiracy" than to providing a more balanced reconsideration of those pivotal events in the history of American sectionalism. Merk is far more willing to accept uncritically the accusations of John Quincy Adams and his allies than he is the explanations or countercharges of Tyler and other defenders of the administration.

The author is more convincing when he is delineating the deception, intrigue, and secrecy practiced by administration officials to accomplish Tyler's determination to acquire Texas before he left office. Deception in diplomacy, however, does not necessarily denote conspiracy as Merk implies. Consequently, he fails to consider alternative explanations for Tyler's clandestine course of action or to evaluate, as fully as he might, whether the president and his advisers believed the truth of their own propaganda or were merely using it to accomplish ends unobtainable by other means.

While the value of this study lies primarily in its interpretation, Merk also includes information not emphasized by previous historians. He describes in interesting fashion the hitherto obscure machinations of Duff Green while serving as a special agent, first in London and later in Galveston. His discussion of the debate between Secretary of State John C. Calhoun and his well-known critic Dr. Edward Jarvis, as well as a lesser-known black critic, James McCune Smith, over the validity of the census data of 1840 is suggestive.

By appending 34 pertinent documents to this 179-page study, Professor Merk has added appreciably to its value. For some inexplicable reason, however, Merk has detracted from an otherwise readable narrative by inserting several long quotations, a few of which exceed one page in length. Nevertheless, Professor Merk has written a provocative study of a fa-

miliar topic that no student can afford to ignore.

ROBERT V. HAYNES
University of Houston

JANE H. PEASE and WILLIAM H. PEASE. *Bound with Them in Chains: A Biographical History of the Antislavery Movement*. (Contributions in American History, number 18.) Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1972. Pp. xvii, 334. \$12.50.

The theory behind this collection of essays is that the antislavery enterprise is best viewed through representative abolitionists rather than histories of their organizations. The second-rank figures selected are varied enough. They include three Garrisonians (Maria W. Chapman, S. S. Foster, and Samuel J. May), a Kentucky maverick (Cassius M. Clay), two Negroes, one a conservative (Samuel E. Cornish) and the other a militant (H. H. Garnet), a "political gadfly" (Elizur Wright), and a "political regular" (Joshua P. Giddings). Benjamin Lundy's story is retold, and that of an acknowledged failure, Hiram Wilson, who yearned to resettle Negro fugitives in Canada, is told probably for the first and last time. "Some Reflections" (pp. 308-18) suggests that in the diversity of these figures lay the strength of the antislavery movement.

The essays are competently researched; Garnet is shown to be less the firebrand than his well-known inflammatory speech before the National Colored Convention of 1843 would indicate. The problem with the essays, if there is any, would lie in their effort to stay abreast of some recent historiography (summarized on pages 19-22), an effort that has been more constricted and tendentious than reasonable assessment would recommend. The authors premise a rough-and-ready white society, which is fair enough, but also a Negro community of the highest ardor and direction, which is not fair to its human nature or accurate with respect to its real condition. Cornish thus becomes a lesson in inadequacy, rather than a representative of Negro society as it was.

The authors see Samuel R. Ward as a "vigilante-activist," which he was; but his autobiography should have told them that before Ward disappeared from the American scene he had become disillusioned with many of his

own idealistic prospects. Their account of Garnet's passion and constancy to reform would have gained a dimension by an account of the white hands that helped him advance his career. Their judgment of the Liberty party as "ineffectual" (p. 22) is puzzling and raises questions about the authors' outlook, in view of the party's dramatic effect on the elections of 1844. And the characterization of the party as a "conscience-soothing" operation is reminiscent of the "white guilt" verbiage of recent vintage that was vague enough to mean anything or nothing. "Neither the Emancipation Proclamation, Appomattox, nor even the Thirteenth Amendment quite fulfilled the imperatives of antislavery's broadest obligations" (p. 19). "Imperatives?" President Lincoln saw the matter differently, and much more enduringly, in his Gettysburg Address and elsewhere. Yet these essays are thought provoking. Should they inspire other reviews of significant lives in the area, they can help us to reconsider what our historiography has gained or lost from our radical and reform heritage.

LOUIS FILLER
Antioch College

LEWIS PERRY. *Radical Abolitionism: Anarchy and the Government of God in Antislavery Thought*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1973. Pp. xvi, 328. \$14.50.

Professor Perry is careful to define the anarchistic nature of the radical tendencies in antislavery thought with which he is concerned. Abolitionists did not see themselves as anarchists; rather they regarded slavery an anarchic, for it depended upon force and involved an invasion of divine sovereignty by establishing the total power of one man over another. They sought a harmonious and voluntaristic society free of forceful restraints. Firmly rooted in aspects of the Puritan tradition their vision was millennial and often antinomian. The factionalization of the antislavery movement provided opportunity, moreover, to clarify that vision. In the process many came to embrace nonresistance and to reject all force and all institutions based upon it, including the allegedly proslavery Constitution.

But the essence of Perry's analysis is his demonstration that radical abolitionism had

very real limits. Most abolitionists did not follow the come-outers and no-organizationists in rejecting organized reform. Insisting upon the paramountcy of antislavery they relegated nonresistance to the position of one reform among many rather than seeing it as the father of all. The ambivalence of that position was revealed in the 1850s. Prompted by their antinomianism to emphasize private judgment they were led to a toleration of the private judgment of others even when that judgment endorsed violence. John Brown's pure motivation sanctified his actions. The inability to conceive of a nonresistant role for the slave led to the same position. Belief in the legitimacy of the private judgment of others led ultimately to a willingness to endorse the military actions of the federal government. The demands of practical reform thus stifled the development of both nonresistance and anarchism. The alternative was to follow the example of Adin Ballou and his Hopedale Community; but Ballou's voluntaristic communitarianism was gradualist rather than immediatist, and the purity of its nonresistance necessitated an effective abandonment of the slave.

In an informative and often fascinating account Perry establishes the real limits of active antislavery by reference to the more extreme ideas of come-outerism, no-organizationalism, and spiritualism. His work is largely consistent with and complementary to that of Aileen Kraditor. It does, however, present a not unfamiliar problem. Perry is very good on the implications and logic of the ideas he discusses but is less good about informing his readers of their influence. One is led also to wonder sometimes whether the very coherence of his account is not in itself misleading. Nevertheless, this is a useful addition to the literature on abolition and reform.

DUNCAN J. MACLEOD
*St. Catherine's College,
Oxford*

ARNA BONTEMPS. *Free at Last: The Life of Frederick Douglass*. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company. 1971. Pp. x, 310. \$7.95.

Three quarters of a century after the death of Frederick Douglass, certainly the most remarkable Negro American of the nineteenth cen-

tury, only one scholarly biography—by Benjamin Quarles, published twenty-five years ago—has yet appeared. More is the pity that in the mad rush of the past half-dozen years to publish almost anything relating to black Americans, someone did not bring out a new, scholarly, and interpretative biography of Douglass. *Free at Last*, by Arna Bontemps, does not meet these criteria. The author, who is curator of the James Weldon Johnson Collection and visiting professor at Yale University, is one of the most prolific, living Negro authors in America whose early published works date back to the days of the Harlem Renaissance of the 1920s. What he has written here is a straightforward, chronological biography for the general reader who is probably meeting Douglass for the first time. For that reader, this readable—though sometimes cloying and overly elementary—story of the life of a runaway Maryland slave, famed abolitionist speaker at home and abroad, founder and publisher of the *North Star* (an abolitionist newspaper), recruiter of Negro troops for the Union army, U.S. marshal of the District of Columbia, consul general to Haiti, and author of a classic autobiography, will suffice. The more serious reader will still want to turn to the older study by Quarles, for Bontemps's volume is completely undocumented and contains only one full-page note on sources, in which he mentions only the Douglass autobiographies, the *North Star*, and William Lloyd Garrison's *Liberator* by title. Benjamin Quarles's fine book is not mentioned, although numerous passages reflect the great use that was made of it. Within these limitations it can be said that we now have another biography of Douglass.

CHARLES E. WYNES
University of Georgia

VICTOR ULLMAN. *Martin R. Delany: The Beginnings of Black Nationalism*. Boston: Beacon Press. 1971. Pp. x, 534. \$9.95.

Few men in black history rival the accomplishments and the versatility of Martin R. Delany, a gifted coeditor and founder with Frederick Douglass of the *North Star*; a successful, Harvard-trained physician; a pioneer black novelist; an explorer; an inventor; a notable amateur ethnologist; an important leader in antislavery,

the Negro conventions, and the Canadian black communities; the ranking black officer in the Union Army; an influential Freedman's Bureau official; an architect of Reconstruction in South Carolina; and a capable Charleston judge with the respect even of many white conservatives. For generations the only book on Delany was "Frank A." (Frances) Rollins's hastily prepared memoir, *The Life and Services of Martin R. Delany*, which went out of print a few years after its publication in 1868. Except for brief comments by a few black scholars such as Carter G. Woodson, the largely forgotten Delany received little attention until black-power intellectuals of the 1960s discovered "the first black nationalist" who had announced that "we are a nation within a nation" and made the long voyage home to Africa in quest of a country. In 1969 Howard H. Bell wrote an excellent essay (brief but still the best account) as an introduction to a new edition of the African narratives of Delany and Robert Campbell, *Search For a Place: Black Separatism and Africa, 1860*. The following year Theodore Draper's rather unsympathetic discussion of Delany in *The Rediscovery of Black Nationalism* evoked charges of white condescension and lack of real understanding.

Victor Ullman's very sympathetic study is thoughtful, interesting, well written, and based on extensive primary research, but unfamiliarity with many areas of historical scholarship serves him badly as does the habit of defending all major actions and statements in the long life of a sometimes inconsistent man. Ullman even attempts to rationalize Delany's alliance with Wade Hampton and white supremacy in 1876 and denounces South Carolina radical corruption in rhetoric reminiscent of Claude G. Bowers. The absence of footnotes constitutes an intolerable offense by Ullman and the Beacon Press for many reasons, not the least of which is the existence of notable factual errors and eccentric assertions (about such matters as "the Yankee shippers" who allegedly advocated reopening the African slave trade during the 1850s).

Among Ullman's fundamental assumptions are the beliefs that today "American apartheid can be changed only by black separatism in the U.S. and black unity in the world," that all human beings not white are black, and that

Delany functioned as a pioneer for this political posture in his attempt to build "a black Israel" in Africa. Because the abolitionists failed to embrace Delany's African-American positions they get the same ideological bad marks assigned to integrationists and assimilationists of recent years. In Ullman's mind Frederick Douglass's refusal to accept the Delany policies of emigration and "no compromise with whites" quickly changed him from "the actual and acknowledged spokesman for the black abolitionists" to merely "the Negro spokesman to the whites" and consigned him to the company of Booker T. Washington and other "Uncle Toms." Even more reprehensible were the white radicals for their opposition to Delany's efforts "to change American abolitionism from a sterile debating society to an activist group." Ullman has several good points to make but his rigid categories and gross oversimplifications do considerable violence to the richness and complexity of basic black experiences in the nineteenth century. We will all have to read and use this book, but Delany cries out for a more subtle and sophisticated approach of the kind Louis Harlan brought to his biography of Booker T. Washington. Perhaps Floyd J. Miller, who did a doctoral dissertation on Delany a few years ago, will oblige us.

CHARLES CROWE
University of Georgia

EDWARD WAGENKNECHT. *Ambassadors for Christ: Seven American Preachers*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1972. Pp. 310. \$8.50.

In the last few years there seems to have been a resurgence of interest in nineteenth-century liberal Protestantism. In addition to William G. McLoughlin's fine study of Henry Ward Beecher and the chapters in Sydney Ahlstrom's new survey, the subject is touched upon in Conrad Wright's essays on Unitarianism and Jacob Dorn's analysis of Washington Gladden. The most recent publication in this field is Edward Wagenknecht's *Ambassadors for Christ*.

Wagenknecht has written a collective biography of Lyman Beecher, William Ellery Channing, Henry Ward Beecher, Phillips Brooks, D. L. Moody, Washington Gladden, and Lyman Abbott. In his analysis of each preacher Wagenknecht follows the same pattern. He begins by

portraying the personality of the man. Then comes a biographical summary, a physical description, a discussion of the man's intellectual background, a look at his political views, a commentary on his sermons, and, finally, an evaluation of the preacher's contribution to spreading Christ's Word. In chapter after chapter what comes through most strongly is the sense of each preacher's moral commitment to his work. These men had a faith in God that made them social activists and, at times, critics of the status quo.

Although Wagenknecht's book accomplishes its aim of portraying the idealism and moral commitment of these preachers, it nevertheless falls short of its potential. Like many traditional religious studies, it focuses too exclusively on the contribution of each man to the work of the Church and fails to examine their larger social significance. Why were they so popular? To what extent did they represent the popular values of the time? What were their particular contributions to the changing role of Protestantism in the nineteenth century? Wagenknecht neither answers these questions nor makes any comparisons between the preachers. Instead of a final chapter that might have reached some specific conclusions, Wagenknecht has only an appendix that evaluates the debate over Henry Ward Beecher's famous trial for adultery in 1874. While the appendix provides a good analysis of the shortcomings in the conventional literature on the scandal, his conclusion that "the argument for Beecher's chastity must rest less upon his character than upon his temperament" is less than satisfying for the historian who is interested in the social implications of the trial. Wagenknecht's book, in short, provides a useful general introduction to the major spokesmen for liberal Protestantism, but it adds little that is new to the growing scholarship in that field.

CLIFFORD E. CLARK, JR.
Carleton College

GRADY MCWHINEY. *Southerners and Other Americans*. New York: Basic Books. 1973. Pp. xi, 206. \$7.95.

The implication of the title is that Southerners are at the same time different from but quite like "other Americans." Historians have em-

phasized both the likeness and the difference. In this collection of a dozen essays written over a period of twenty years, Grady McWhiney reprints a collaboration with his teacher, Francis B. Simkins, who insisted on the singularity of Southern culture, and a contribution to a symposium edited by Charles G. Sellers, Jr., who has urged "that the traditional emphasis on the South's differentness . . . is wrong historically." McWhiney's recurrent theme is that antebellum Americans were alike in their belief in progress through the pursuit of democracy and the dollar. Trade was democratic since a country peddler could become a merchant prince; even King Cotton ruled a democratic realm since cotton could be raised on a small scale by a poor farmer at profits that made it possible for him to foresee himself as the owner of a plantation and slaves. And though slavery drew a hard line of demarcation between North and South, it was defended, theory aside, for the best of American reasons: because Southerners "considered it profitable and because they feared its abolition would create more problems that it would solve" (p. 7). As a result, in the years following Jacksonian dominance, American politics was rather fluid. Parties had a following beyond class and region. The South generally went for the winning presidential candidate. (South Carolina, like Massachusetts, was an exception, backing losers five times in eight elections.) In politics as in other areas, both similarity and exception transcended geography, making it difficult to accept the notion of an "irrepressible conflict."

McWhiney supports his position in specialized papers such as "Were the Whigs a Class Party in Alabama?" in which he shows, through a correlation of the Whig vote and the slave population and an analysis of the composition of legislative and congressional delegations, that the Whigs were no more "the party of the wealthier and more cultivated people" (p. 27) than the Democrats were the party of the "common man." For instance, a higher percentage of Democrats than Whigs held college degrees, with a higher percentage of these earned from Northern colleges. McWhiney's balanced study of "The Confederacy's First Shot" weighs the claims of those who hold that Lincoln beguiled the Confederacy into firing on Fort Sumter to save the Republican party and the

Union and those who consider Jefferson Davis the aggressor. Examining events at Fort Pickens for enlightenment on what happened at Fort Sumter, McWhiney concludes that "neither Lincoln nor Davis tried very hard to avoid a collision" and that "war came at Fort Sumter because the Confederates were neither subtle enough nor strong enough to begin it at Fort Pickens" (p. 80). He is likewise evenhanded in his explanation of why Reconstruction did not reconstruct. Both sections and all parties used blacks and discarded them, but Radical Reconstruction failed when Northern economic interests discovered that former Confederates made reliable collaborators in the exploitation of the South. In the end, even General Lee became a railroad president.

McWhiney's more recent subjects include an account of radical political activity in the Louisiana presidential campaign of 1912 in which one out of fourteen ballots were cast for the socialist candidate, Eugene V. Debs, despite the presumed appeal of his Southern, Democratic opponent, Woodrow Wilson. The heaviest vote came from the upland parishes, the scene of unrest in the timber industry—a region of smaller farms and fewer blacks, where the Populist vote had been heavy and Huey Long would receive strong support.

A common viewpoint and usually, but not always, Southern subject matter, gives this volume a modicum of coherence. These are sound, lively revisionist essays, fine for a journal or a learned society, but they do not make a unified book.

HENNIG COHEN

University of Pennsylvania

WILLIAM BARNEY. *The Road to Secession: A New Perspective on the Old South*. Foreword by JAMES P. SHENTON. (New Perspectives in American History.) New York: Praeger Publishers. 1972. Pp. xv, 235. \$8.00.

The author of this book has much to say about "racist egalitarianism." He emphasizes both the containment of slavery in fifteen states and Southerners' desire for slavery's extension. Quoting numerous public men on slavery and race, he devotes a chapter to "The Radical Effort"—focusing on John A. Quitman, William L. Yancey, J. D. B. DeBow, Edmund Ruffin, and Robert Barnwell Rhett. One conclusion: "Southern-

ers mistakenly assumed that the blacks could be controlled and segregated only through slavery; Northerners knew better."

With many of Mr. Barney's statements I am in agreement. His style has much appeal. His "racist egalitarian" term seems valid, perhaps as apt as Pierre L. van den Berghe's "*Herrenvolk* democracy." And it is possible to make a case for the assertion that "the racial, and not the economic, function of slavery . . . ultimately defined the antebellum South." But, in general, Mr. Barney does not introduce strong arguments. His presentation is shaky, his procedure full of flaws. He fails to relate, with any degree of adequacy, the thinking of Southern Whigs to Southern thought and feeling as a whole. In various parts of the volume references to "the South" and "Southerners," without qualifying adjectives, simply are erroneous.

Because *The Road to Secession* is undocumented, one cannot depend on footnotes as guides to the dates of Barney's quotations. Sometimes, but far from consistently, textual comments compensate in part for such omissions. Yet often the reader can only guess when an editor, a governor, or a member of Congress made quoted remarks. Even then, titles are misleading. James Henry Hammond, for instance, is mistakenly labeled "governor" long after his gubernatorial period. John J. Crittenden is "senator" when actually governor. John McHenry is "representative" three years after leaving the House. Know-Nothings are still "Whigs" in 1856, and Constitutional Unionists are "Whigs" in 1860. (Granted, the latter two characterizations are true in a way, but not in all cases; minimally, an explanation is needed.) And when will writers learn that Texas did not receive ten million dollars or that the District of Columbia slave trade was not abolished as the results of the Compromise of 1850?

According to the blurb, *The Road to Secession* is "designed for use in the survey course, in courses organized by period or theme, and for the general history buff as well." My opinion is that it can be read most profitably in connection with graduate seminars, illustrating how a defective book structure may impede the projection of provocative ideas.

HOLMAN HAMILTON
University of Kentucky

MORTON M. ROSENBERG. *Iowa on the Eve of the Civil War: A Decade of Frontier Politics*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1972. Pp. viii, 262. \$8.95.

Professor Rosenberg sets out to "examine and describe the broad spectrum of political activities in Iowa . . . during the exciting years of the last antebellum decade." In the attempt, he ferrets out and displays the ingredients of 1850s politics in the state, leaving the reader to assay the resulting compound. By limiting himself to examination and description, Professor Rosenberg produces a substantial but sterile chronological narrative that ignores promising opportunities for the penetrating interpretation lacking in so many accounts of Iowa's past.

He records without comment the actions of Republican James Grimes who, as governor, violated the state law (p. 140) and who later expressed his willingness to capitalize on the division of the nation for the sake of political success (p. 165). He faithfully reports the strenuous efforts of Iowa's Democrats to dissociate themselves from Buchanan's stands on several questions, but he offers no careful examination of the debilitating effects of high-level misjudgments on an Iowa Democracy far more resilient and influential than he gives it credit for being. The author repeats familiar generalities concerning Iowa's foreign- and southern-born citizens and, as one result, fails to recognize or discern differences among or within stereotyped ethnic "voting blocs." He flatly contends, for example, that the Germans accepted the Republicans' 1856 antislavery stand (p. 134), although he provides evidence insufficient to support such a statement.

Professor Rosenberg does repeatedly make the interesting assertion that railroad legislation played a major role in the ascent of the Republican party in Iowa, yet his own account is unconvincing. He also raises unanswered questions with his suggestion that the Republicans "escaped popular identification with the railroad interests" (p. 237).

The work is worthy for its heavy reliance upon primary sources, including nineteen separate Iowa manuscript collections and more than forty nineteenth-century Iowa newspapers. It is a useful recollection of Iowa political

thought and action during an often oversimplified period of the state's history, and Professor Rosenberg, by projecting Iowa's struggles against the backdrop of national travails, very nearly captures the essence of the Hawkeye State in its puberty.

The author presents a scenario that is appetizing because it emerges from the plane of Iowa's developing political, moral, and social standards. It is this very quality, however, that cries out for the addition of sinew and flesh to the skeleton of narration.

DAVID L. LENDT
Iowa State University

HOWARD P. NASH, JR. *A Naval History of the Civil War*. South Brunswick, N.J.: A. S. Barnes and Company. 1972. Pp. 325. \$9.95.

TOM HENDERSON WELLS. *The Confederate Navy: A Study in Organization*. University: University of Alabama Press. 1971. Pp. ix, 182. \$7.50.

These two works represent the twin poles of Civil War historiography. Each of them reflects a restricted, conventional manner of investigation, and they both fit into the comfortable milieu in which both buffs and scholars of the Civil War have labored for so long. One of the principal reasons for reviewing them may be to question why naval historiography seems to be falling behind its military counterpart in the professional drive to reorient this aspect of the discipline away from solely the heroic or operational side of the story toward a more ecological approach to history or at the very best a more balanced portrayal of men and institutions in crisis.

Nash's *A Naval History of the Civil War* is a sweeping, journalistic account of the major operations on river and ocean. The publisher's comments notwithstanding, most readers are familiar with the navy's role at Vicksburg, Charleston, Fort Fisher, and in chasing elusive raiders at sea. One of the more praiseworthy aspects of the book is the attention devoted to the unsung Potomac flotilla, which helped guard that waterway and the national capital. But most earnest students have long taken seriously the author's injunction to beware eyewitness accounts by commanders on the

scene such as David Dixon Porter, especially singled out for criticism by Nash, and one comes away from the volume with a sense of relief that battles were won despite incredible bungling at all levels of command. Nash appears more anxious to correct minor misconceptions (the spelling of *Merrimack* and its Confederate designation *Virginia*), than to offer many new revelations or to evidence imaginative use of source material. He succeeds in tweaking the reader's credulity when he insists that Fort Donelson was positioned on a bluff (instead of a hill—as any student knows from visiting the battlefield on the Cumberland), and by stating that monitors were kept on active service until 1926 and on the Navy List for another eleven years. The author may be confusing Civil War monitors with a later class of that vessel constructed in the eighties and nineties when most of the Civil War vintage craft had passed to the naval militia. The maps are generally illegible and while the book may be useful for high school students and beginning buffs, advanced scholars will want something more substantial.

Renewed interest in the Confederate navy has brought forth several modern operational histories, accounts of specific ships or ship-types, and biographies of principal participants. The slim volume, *The Confederate Navy*, by Professor Wells adds to the corpus of knowledge on the subject by treating organizational and administrative aspects of the Confederate navy. It delineates successively the main department, the separate bureaus, the Marine Corps. Confederate naval administration in Europe, operational command, shipboard routine, and concludes with the general observation that poor organization and management accounted in large measure for the failure of the Confederate sea arm. One could suggest that the U.S. Navy was hardly better organized or administered for fighting a major modern war, but Wells also feels that it was material inferiority, an unaggressive Confederate naval secretary, poor army-navy coordination of river defense, older officers, and a naval academy pointing to a postwar dream rather than wartime reality—a dream that permitted future generations to view the Confederate navy as averse to fighting. Much of the story is well

known—lack of an industrial base, too much improvisation among men and machines, and the fundamental miscalculation of political leadership about the duration of the war. Still, *The Confederate Navy* won the triennial prize of the United Daughters of the Confederacy. It evidences diligent research in primary and secondary sources, and the book will be a helpful reference tool used in conjunction with other interpretations of Confederate maritime history.

Oh, that these two approaches to Civil War naval history had been integrated into one solid synthesis of the naval institutions, personalities, and operations of both the Union and Confederacy! Such a work of modern scholarship seems long overdue and readers must marvel that no naval scholar has stepped forward to undertake the delicate blending of command and control, technology and logistics, civil and military relations, along with the more heroic exploits of David Farragut, Raphael Semmes, and Jack Tar in blue and gray. We have useful studies of riverine operations by Crandall, Gosnell, Merrill, Milligan, and Pratt, and sea-going activities by Hayes Jones, as well as reminiscences, biographies, and special studies like William Still's story of the Confederate armor-clads. But resting among the untapped resources of the Official Naval Records and unpublished doctoral dissertations lies another Civil War. The very minutiae that Nash eschews in his book—"every pin-prick raid, every destruction of a salt works somewhere in the South, every blockade runner captured or driven ashore"—may well have been what a major part of the war afloat was all about, when placed in the context of the larger panorama of conflict resolution. Similarly, the application of administrative and organizational requirements and transactions of naval operations—something sadly absent from the Wells's work—may provide better understanding of how the real war was conducted over a century ago. The general naval histories of Boynton, Scharf, Porter, and volumes in the Scribners series stand in great need of revision. Obviously the specialized materials are there, but the historical profession in general awaits the advent of a modern Mahan or another

Morison for the capstone history of the naval side of the American Civil War.

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN COOLING
U.S. Army Military History
Research Collection

EUGENE C. MURDOCK. *One Million Men: The Civil War Draft in the North*. Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin. 1971. Pp. xi, 366. \$10.00.

This pioneering inquiry illuminates virtually unexplored Civil War terrain. Professor Murdock may well be the only scholar who could have mapped the dim and gory topography of military manpower recruitment expedients from early 1863 to Appomattox. His earlier publications made him familiar with the vast source materials and endless technical complexities of pre-1863 Northern draft policies, politics, and procedures. Adding tenacity and skill to familiarity, Professor Murdock has produced this firmly based, well-rounded, and commendably clear account of the last two years of Union Army input arrangements.

One Million Men raises the reader to lower bureaucratic levels than the White House-war secretary tip of the iceberg where scholarship has concentrated. Now we see better than ever before the innovative, able, energetic Provost Marshal General James B. Fry and his nationwide field provosts located in every congressional district under Union control. Crisp chapters describe the men and measures that, granting all defects and inadequacies, made a more workable and decent system out of the ill-conceived congeries of manpower arrangements that had let the Union stagger on from Sumter to early 1863.

Professor Murdock plowed through enormous National Archives manuscript holdings and printed primary sources, supplementing them from relevant secondary literature and local sources, especially newspapers. Further, and perhaps more important, Professor Murdock is aware that in the history of nations and of wars, "the [American] Civil War draft broke new ground" (p. 5). More still, he is sensitive to the unending involvements of the numerous levels of the federal system in draft operations, to Lincoln's intercessions from the top (pp.

113-14, 253-54), to the manipulations of the ward-heelers (by no means always selfish or negative) at the bottom, to the manpower demands of field generals, and to the concerns of abolitionists, Negrophiles, and Negrophobes rising from the many-layered politics of democracy and federalism.

Professor Murdock's high accomplishments and broad horizons lead me to complain, ungratefully, about arenas he did not enter. His explicit awareness of the interactions of federalism and democracy with draft operations brought him, *passim*, to inferential references about the nature, sensitivity, and limits of Civil War bureaucratic innovations. I regret that he did not take up in detail these significant synthetic questions, to which, thus far, Allan Nevins has been the primary auditor. My feeling grows that the astonishing capacity of the Union to endure, survive, and win in the face of the Confederacy's enormous initial advantages has answers in the little-explored area of alternative forms and goals of governance.

To balance, I have no quarrel with the level of analysis encapsulated in Professor Murdock's title for his final chapter: "But It Worked." His preceding chapters attest to that workability. But how did amorphous prewar America manage to carry out its war responsibilities and remain federal and democratic; how, despite pessimistic predictions by Engels and others of military coups and centralized despotism, did instant demobilization occur with Appomattox? In particular, what occurred when Fry's PMG men took over from the field armies' provost marshals, as bluecoats occupied rebel real estate? (Wilton Moore's 1959 *Civil War History* article speaks to this concern.) I wonder also at Professor Murdock's lack of attention to the March 2, 1863, habeas corpus statute. Clauses on indemnity and national court jurisdiction, geared to mesh closely with the Enrollment Act, reflect again Congress's sensitivity to individuals' procedural needs, to Northern states' rights, and to the nation's augmented and appropriate responses to the war, federalism, and enlarging democracy.

Perhaps Professor Murdock plans another volume in which he will synthesize the results of his fine research and reconstructions of wartime draft operations. If so, my gratitude for

his present achievements will be transcended by the measure of the conceptual step involved.

HAROLD M. HYMAN
Rice University

MAURY KLEIN. *Edward Porter Alexander*. Athens: University of Georgia Press. 1971. Pp. xii, 279. \$11.00.

ROBERT L. KERBY. *Kirby Smith's Confederacy: The Trans-Mississippi South, 1863-1865*. New York: Columbia University Press. 1972. Pp. viii, 529. \$12.95.

EDWARD G. LONGACRE. *From Union Stars to Top Hat: A Biography of the Extraordinary General James Harrison Wilson*. [Harrisburg, Pa.:] Stackpole Books. 1972. Pp. 320. \$10.00.

JOHN W. ROWELL. *Yankee Cavalrymen: Through the Civil War with the Ninth Pennsylvania Cavalry*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. 1971. Pp. xii, 280. \$7.50.

STEPHEN Z. STARR. *Colonel Grenfell's Wars: The Life of a Soldier of Fortune*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1971. Pp. vii, 352. \$10.95.

Allan Nevins, shortly before he died, told this reviewer that commercial publishers had become reluctant to accept books about Lincoln and the Civil War. He blamed this on the writers rather than on the subject. His remarks came to mind when I studied these five books on the Civil War for this review. Perhaps the first fact to note is that all but one were published by university presses. This should assure a reader that their accuracy is above average. It is also noticeable that three of the five books lack footnotes, and the citations are listed in the back. This may be significant. Are more and more publishers doing this to save printing costs; or do the editors realize that an excess of footnotes may distract a reader's attention from the quality of a narrative? The first two authors of these five books are university professors, the third is a graduate student, the fourth a civil engineer, and the fifth a business executive. Three of the five books are biographies—those by Professor Klein, graduate student Longacre, and business executive Starr. Civil engineer John Rowell's *Yankee Cavalrymen* is a regimental history, and Professor Kerby discusses Confederate military campaigns and civilian administration in the trans-Mis-

Mississippi South during the last two years of the war.

Mr. Starr admits that his biography of Colonel Grenfell was "written for only one reason—I enjoyed doing it," and he transmits that joy to the reader. Colonel Grenfell was an English soldier of fortune in the Confederate army, a cavalry officer whose bravery and heroism are self-evident. Stephen Starr traces Grenfell's youth and irresponsible manhood with meticulous research. The young man was unhappy in the positions of trust given him by well-to-do parents. He tried various occupations in Morocco, Algeria, and Argentina before arriving in Charleston, South Carolina, on a blockade runner in 1862. Carrying a letter from John Slidell, he met Robert E. Lee and served briefly under Beauregard, John Hunt Morgan, Braxton Bragg, and Jeb Stuart. A flamboyant failure with these commanders, Grenfell smuggled himself into Illinois, and two-thirds of the book describes his plots with Copperheads to free Confederate prisoners of war in Camp Douglas, located in what is now the heart of Chicago's South Side. With these men Grenfell hoped to "liberate" Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. The account of his arrest with a hundred and fifty accomplices has been told in other histories, but never better than in this book. Starr writes with a sense of accuracy and clarity that may be envied by professionals whose entire lives have been devoted to writing history.

Professor Klein's biography deals with another Confederate soldier. Many Civil War histories mention Brigadier General Edward Porter Alexander. This one, the first book-length biography of Alexander, adequately portrays his importance as an artillery officer, although half of the book describes his life before and after the war. The author has consulted many manuscripts as well as the general's memoirs. Personal touches give realism to the biography and we learn that Alexander, while a plebe at West Point, was jilted by Robert E. Lee's daughter. In seven chapters, Professor Klein, who has specialized in business history, describes Alexander's postwar activities, which included university teaching, managing Southern railroads, and successful investments in the Sea Islands.

The third biography, *From Union Stars to*

Top Hat, describes the life of General James Harrison Wilson. Edward G. Longacre hopes to renew interest in a boy-general who was "superior to Custer, for he possessed greater tactical and strategic ability. He also attained higher rank . . . and achieved more dramatic victories." The general, of course, was two years older than Custer, and he certainly outranked him, but tactical and strategic ability, as well as the drama in military victories, are difficult to evaluate with exactness. Enthusiastic members of the Little Big Horn Associates are urged to read this book and then acquiesce or argue with the author's conclusions. They must be warned, however, that Edward Longacre marshals his facts, both for and against General Wilson, in a well-researched and well-written book.

Publications like Rowell's *Yankee Cavalrymen* are invaluable for their specialized research, but they often include a quantity of dull details that are apt to bore a casual reader. Fortunately, in this book the author adds life-giving incidents gleaned from the journals of two participants, one of whom was the author's grandfather. The Ninth Pennsylvania Cavalry engaged in most of the conflicts on the Mississippi front, and excellent maps enable the reader to follow this regiment during four years of raids and battles. Short quotations from the journals show that the two writers adjusted quickly to war, liked the soldiers' trade, and gloried in their regiment's morale. Their unit matched horsemanship and steel with the Confederate's best—Forrest, Wheeler, and Morgan. The regiment marched with Sherman to the sea and then north across South Carolina and Virginia, firing the last shots in the war east of the Mississippi. A concluding chapter summarizes the method by which a million soldiers were discharged into the civil population with remarkably few social disturbances. This has been discussed by other writers but the account in this book is excellent.

The fifth of these books, Professor Kerby's *Kirby Smith's Confederacy*, deals in great detail with the last three years of Confederate administration in Arkansas, Indian Territory, and Texas. After the blockade of Eastern seaports this part of the Confederacy became important for shipping cotton to Europe by way of Mexico until the federals controlled the Missis-

issippi River and isolated General Kirby Smith's command. Then he became a virtual military dictator who dared negotiate with foreign countries. Harassed by inflation, a lack of supplies, and an undisciplined frontier community, his problems were complicated by the arrival of Stand Watie, with his Confederate Cherokees, and guerrilla forces under Quantrill, Joe Shelby, and Sterling Price. This reviewer hoped to learn about the occasional herds of cattle destined for the Confederate army that were swum across the Mississippi undetected by federal patrol boats, but everything cannot be included even in the best detailed accounts. Kerby's pages lack footnotes that certainly would interrupt his narrative because many of his citations fill an entire page. They are printed in small type on 50 pages at the back of the book. In addition there is a 22 page bibliography. No conscientious student of this field can disregard Kerby's volume in the future.

Only one of the authors of these five books on the Civil War has written a previously published volume, but all their names deserve being remembered. If, with equally exhaustive research, these men produce additional narratives that keep step with the scenes and situations they are describing here, some of them may become our leading authorities on the Civil War.

JAY MONAGHAN
University of California,
Santa Barbara

DANIEL B. CARROLL. *Henri Mercier and the American Civil War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1971. Pp. xxi, 396. \$12.50.

In recent years scholars such as Lynn M. Case, Warren Spencer, and Henry Blumenthal have focused attention on Franco-American diplomacy during the American Civil War, a much needed corrective to the traditional, indeed almost exclusive emphasis on Anglo-American relations. For example, Case and Spencer have argued persuasively that Foreign Minister Thouvenel's instructions to Henri Mercier, the French ambassador to the United States, played an influential role in determining American strategy during the crisis precipitated by the Trent affair. Moreover, Case has developed the highly suggestive, if not entirely persuasive, thesis that the Trent affair was a carefully

planned Confederate plot designed to bring about war between England and the United States (see Case, "La France et l'affaire du Trent," *Revue historique*, 226 [1961]: 57-86).

Professor Carroll's study of Mercier's years as French ambassador to Washington adds important details to our knowledge of Franco-American relations. Mercier clearly was not pro-Confederate as was sometimes charged; but Carroll's study reveals that he was potentially more aggressive than his superiors, Thouvenel and Drouyn de Lhuys, in considering the possibilities for French intervention. In fact, Mercier wanted discretionary power in 1862 to act in concert with Lord Lyons, the British ambassador, in picking the right moment for Anglo-French intervention. Such discretionary power was denied, of course. Conversely, Carroll's study shows that Mercier foresaw more clearly than his superiors the potential for disaster in Mexico and unsuccessfully urged them to reconsider their decision. Yet, Carroll's study of Mercier does not sufficiently alter or extend our knowledge of Franco-American diplomacy to warrant book-length analysis. Even so, it is a useful supplement to the standard work by Case and Spencer, *The United States and France: Civil War Diplomacy* (1970). In fairness to Carroll one should add that the publication of his book in 1971 was a case of bad timing. Had it appeared in 1969 or even 1970 its impact on the scholarly community would have been far greater.

RICHARD O. CURRY
University of Connecticut

ALLEN W. TRELEASE. *White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and Southern Reconstruction*. (The Urban Affairs Series.) New York: Harper and Row. 1971. Pp. xlviii, 557. \$15.00.

Instead of bearing the subtitle *The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and Southern Reconstruction*, this thick, important, and impressive study might more appropriately have been called "The Democratic Return to Power during Reconstruction." For the main thrust of its story is that Southern Democrats, in the guise of the Klan, intimidated and murdered their way back into political offices after the Radical plan of Reconstruction had shorn them of power. The Republican South, this book argues, was re-

deemed by the Democrats not, as William A. Dunning and his followers said, because of Radical corruption and misrule, and not, as a number of leading historians since the 1930s have maintained, because of the complicated maneuvers of businessmen, especially Northern and Southern railroad builders, but chiefly because of Democratic terror and the Ku Klux Klan conspiracy. What we have here, in effect, is Dunning in reverse, where the Democrats endlessly abuse Republicans, and not the other way around.

Not that Professor Trelease effectively proves his thesis. In his unfailingly interesting pages he repeatedly refutes, apparently without realizing it, his own notion of a Ku Klux Klan conspiracy. More often than not, his Klan consists of isolated groups of terrorists, each not possessing the vaguest idea what the others were doing and how and where the others were doing it. Often the Klan bungled even the simplest acts of terrorism. The lack of evidence of conspiracy, it seems to me, has forced Professor Trelease to present his discussion by locality and by state. If the terror had really been conspiratorial, it would unquestionably have led the author to organize his material chronologically. On several occasions, moreover, Professor Trelease has by his own admission attributed the violence of roaming bands or "prowling vagabonds" to the Klan. And because he neglects the papers of Northern Democrats, he has no way of showing Northern involvement in any conspiracy.

All of which is not to discount the value and power of the story told in this book. Professor Trelease's pages stand as a monument to the heroic minority, those freedmen and white Republicans who resisted the seemingly endless Democratic terror and who often paid for their determination with their lives. It is also a monument to the folly of the majority, the Republicans who sat around while their fellow party members were being attacked and who complacently watched the destruction of the Southern wing of their party.

STANLEY P. HIRSHSON
Queens College,
City University of New York

DAVID J. PIVAR. *Purity Crusade: Sexual Morality and Social Control, 1868-1900*. (Contributions

in American History, number 23.) Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1973. Pp. x, 308. \$10.95.

This book begins as a history of the movement to abolish prostitution in the United States in the mid-nineteenth century. Most of it concerns the running fight between those who wanted to stamp out prostitution altogether and those who had a more accommodating approach to the oldest profession, and simply aimed to bring it under systematic police and medical regulation (which Pivar insists on calling "reglementation," a word that does not appear in the O.E.D. or any other standard English dictionary). The "new abolitionists," as Pivar calls them, nearly always had the best of the argument, and in forum after forum they defeated proposals for the regulation of commercial sex "with almost boring consistency" (p. 97). This portion of Pivar's account unfortunately reflects that characteristic of his subject.

The author moves on to more interesting terrain, however, when he traces the expansion of the social purists' campaign against prostitution to a remarkable variety of other battles. By the end of the century purity reformers had added prize fighting, intercollegiate football, the ballet, and nudity in the arts to their list of threats to the public morals. The range of these concerns may seem ludicrous to the modern observer, but Pivar argues effectively that they indicate a coherent, comprehensive world view that deserves more than derision. His study, accordingly, serves not only as a guide to the many moral reform activities of the late nineteenth century, but also to a significant and little-explored aspect of the history of American thought.

Though they upheld traditional values, especially in the face of what they perceived as the fragmenting influence of the city on an older moral consensus and sexual behavior, the purity crusaders, Pivar insists, were squarely in the reform tradition. They had, first of all, to overcome the opposition of still more traditional moralists who considered any public discussion of sexual matters dangerously provocative. Moreover, they strove not simply to conserve orthodox principles, but to extend them to men as well as women (by doing away with the infamous "double standard"), and it was this emphasis on sexual egalitarianism that drew

many feminists, such as Susan B. Anthony, into the purity movement. Perhaps most interesting, Pivar demonstrates that much of the leadership of the American Purity Alliance, including its president, Aaron Macy Powell, had been active in the struggle for the abolition of Negro slavery. In that earlier abolitionist campaign many of the later crusaders for moral purity had been Garrisonians, and they brought to the purity movement the belief in Christian perfectionism that had so informed Garrison's mind and behavior. But here, as in so many areas of American life, the typically Garrisonian faith in the possibilities of individual moral regeneration gradually gave way to a reliance on institutional controls and force of law to achieve moral purposes.

Pivar treats his reformers sympathetically, though he criticizes their pansexualism and what he calls the totalitarian implications of a movement whose quest for purity led inevitably to the pursuit of enforced moral homogeneity. "They overstressed social order," he concludes, not very originally, "at the expense of liberty." There is much valuable information in this book, but it is presented in such an inchoate, cumbersome way that all but the most determined readers will be repelled. For those who persist, however, Pivar provides some fresh commentary and suggestions for further research in an important area.

DAVID M. KENNEDY
Stanford University

ROBERT T. HANDY. *A Christian America: Protestant Hopes and Historical Realities*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1971. Pp. x, 282. \$7.95.

HENRY WARNER BOWDEN. *Church History in the Age of Science: Historiographical Patterns in the United States, 1876-1918*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1971. Pp. xvi, 269. \$10.00.

The recent historiographical trends that take into account racial and ethnic factors have reached into the stories of the old American majority, that population element now comprehended in the acronym WASP. The White Anglo-Saxon Protestants never thought of themselves as an ethnic group among others but as the norm from which outsiders, intruders,

and late-comers should be distanced and by which they should be measured.

Curiously the "P" in that acronym has been most neglected by historians, yet the Protestant religious outlook of the old majority reveals more about it than does Anglo-Saxonism. Robert T. Handy has written one of the first histories of the "P." He wisely avoids attempts to compete with the many general histories of religion and instead isolates one motif: the attempt to build a Christian civilization in America. He is faithful to the intentions of these fathers and, though he pays less attention to them, mothers. Their desire to be, to believe, to convert, to serve, and to build is recognized.

Handy's importance, however, lies in the success with which he defines the less attractive features, the sometimes overlooked element in their intentions. While they provided clarity, definition, and goals for a younger nation, their program led to persistent racism, was marked by messianism, and issued in a desire to exclude those who were not of their kind. Handy tells the story without the fashionable self-hate that is supposed to motivate WASP muckrakers and re-examiners. Yet he glosses over none of the uglinesses.

The book begins slowly with a conventional canvass of colonial religious establishments and comes into its own in accounting for the Protestant empire (1800-60) and its self-defensive era (1860-1900) as a passage toward its eventual partial disintegration. The story of defensiveness could have been dramatized had Handy chosen to allot more than one page to pre-1860 anti-Catholic nativism. The almost instantaneous character of WASP reaction when "outsiders" began to appear reveals how much sham, bravado, and insecurity were mingled in the fabricated "Christian America." He does justice to the Southern half of the story and pays attention to black America, though he gives black Protestantism less space than one might have expected. His is a reliable account, based on a fresh reading of familiar sources and a first reading of overlooked sources, of the "religiocification"—the term is black leader Albert Cleage's—of America.

Henry Warner Bowden's study of church history has a much narrower focus, but it illustrates some of the traumas of Handy's period which was designated to be one of self-defensiveness

and missionism. While Handy had to carve a path where many had been walked over before, Bowden hacks out new territory. Almost no one writing the history of history in America has paid attention to the historians of the nation's religions (or of earlier Christianity). Thus, as a speaker of a first word, he has more opportunity to form molds and set up stereotypes.

Students of history in general know that the years 1876-1918 include the period when historical writing became professionalized and turned academic. The stress on old concepts of church history during that transformation is Bowden's chief concern. Until this period most church history was confessional and apologetic, written in defense of a particular creed or viewpoint. The demands of "scientific objectivity" led two generations of historians to try to shrug off the creedal commitments. In the process they were not as successful as they thought they had been in becoming free of presuppositions.

After sketching the general academic trend and reviewing the old seminary base of church history, Bowden summarizes trends in Catholic historiography in the least-animated chapter of the book. Then he outlines the "theory of the church as a social institution," particularly as perceived by the optimistic liberals who became the mainline church historians. Church history now came to be used, wittingly and unwittingly, as an instrument of the Social Gospel and served to provide argument for both sides in the controversies that tore churches into Right and Left factions, both theologically and sociopolitically. His appendix on the founding in this period of the American Society of Church History is particularly valuable and should be read by members of professional societies that have little to do with religious history.

Bowden had no small task showing why anyone should bother with largely unread historians like Ephraim Emerton or those remembered for one work each, as is the case with Williston Walker, whose history of the church generations of seminarians were condemned to plow through, or Frank Foster, whose history of New England theology still attracts occasional researchers. Bowden's reminder that "Social Gospeller" Walter Rauschenbusch remained a professional church historian throughout his career is an excellent chapter on the uses of history in social causes. But he is most happy and fortu-

nate when he has two major figures, Philip Schaff and John Gilmary Shea, to dissect and expound. His subjects, with the exception of Shea, were Protestants who shed one set of assumptions but acquired another. The latter set was as confessional as the older "pre-objective" ones had been, but they were less durable and died with an era.

MARTIN E. MARTY
University of Chicago

JOHN F. MARSZALEK, JR. *Court-Martial: A Black Man in America*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1972. Pp. xv, 320. \$8.95.

This absorbing, thoroughly researched, comprehensively documented, and generally restrained story of the life of West Point Cadet Johnson Whittaker vividly portrays not only his ordeal but that of the academy and democracy in the United States. Born a slave in South Carolina, he studied for two years at the University of South Carolina and entered West Point in 1876. Except for his plebe year and a few months the next year, he roomed alone. The ostracism was almost complete; West Point did not have the responsibility of providing social equality, especially for a "white nigger" during the period of reconciliation between the North and the South.

On April 6, 1880, three white cadets found Whittaker's partially mutilated body in his room. He stoutly insisted that three masked men had attacked him and tied him to his bed. "A Friend" had left a note: "You will be fixed. Better keep awake." An obviously prejudiced court of inquiry, before which Whittaker was "practically unrepresented," found him guilty of inflicting the wounds. But President Hayes appointed General O. O. Howard, former president of Howard University, as the new superintendent of the academy to "ensure the fair treatment of black cadets." Impressed by Whittaker's request and Howard's recommendation, Hayes ordered a court-martial.

The court, six of whose ten members were not West Point graduates, considered the questions presented to the court of inquiry. Despite the generally able defense by Daniel H. Chamberlain, former Reconstruction governor of South Carolina, the court found Whittaker guilty of self-mutilation, writing the threatening

note, and lying to the court of inquiry. But the court-martial found him innocent of seeking to discredit the academy's honor, his allegedly principal motive. It ordered him, nevertheless, to be discharged from the academy, fined one dollar, and confined at hard labor for one year in a penitentiary. It recommended, however, that, because of his youth and inexperience, the fine and imprisonment be remitted.

The Judge Advocate General, after a careful review (excellently summarized on pp. 241-46), concluded that the proceedings, findings, and sentence should be disapproved. On March 22, 1882, President Arthur disapproved the findings and sentence because the court-martial had improperly admitted some of Whittaker's letters. The day before, Secretary of War Robert T. Lincoln had ordered Whittaker discharged "by reason of failure to pass [an examination] &c." As Professor Marzalek correctly observed: "West Point had lost the battle but won the war."

RAYFORD W. LOGAN
Howard University

JEREMY BRECHER. *Strike!* [San Francisco:] Straight Arrow Books; distrib. by World Publishing Company, New York. 1972. Pp. xiv, 329. Cloth \$10.00, paper \$3.95.

GEORGE G. SUGGS, JR. *Colorado's War on Militant Unionism: James H. Peabody and the Western Federation of Miners.* Detroit: Wayne State University Press. 1972. Pp. 242. \$12.50.

HAROLD W. AURAND. *From the Molly Maguires to the United Mine Workers: The Social Ecology of an Industrial Union, 1869-1897.* Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 1971. Pp. x, 221. \$10.00.

That the long struggle of American workers for humane treatment by their employers was a difficult and often bloody one is made vividly evident in these three additions to the literature of American labor history. One is a survey of the mass strike in the United States, and the others are monographs dealing with the conflicts between miners and mine owners in Colorado and Pennsylvania.

Jeremy Brecher is a radical, apparently an anarchosyndicalist, who believes that "the fundamental problem we face—and the key to solving the more particular problems—is to transform society so that ordinary people control it" (p. viii). Thus Brecher is a man with a mis-

sion. Because he is displeased with society as it exists, he wants to change it, and he feels that the historian should participate in this change. He believes that the historian "must show what forces might prefigure a movement by the underlying population to assert their will over society" (p. 319). Certainly he makes no attempt to conceal his prejudices.

Brecher belongs to the group of historians that is unhappy with the so-called consensus school of American historiography. He denies the absence of class conflict in the American experience and is indignant because "we have been told anything but the whole truth about American history" (p. vii). His aim is to correct some of this in his book about "repeated, massive, and often violent revolts by ordinary working people in America" (p. vii). His emphasis, therefore, is on the strikes initiated and conducted by the workers themselves rather than unions. He sees union leaders as essentially conservative, all too frequently seeking to contain and stop strikes or settling for less than the workers want.

Basing his book largely on the standard secondary sources, Brecher deals with the major mass strikes in American history from the Great Upheaval of 1877 to the present. But even the casual reader of American labor history will not find much that is new here, in spite of Brecher's contention that his book "gives a picture far different from the usual high school or college history course" (p. vii). It is not his facts but his interpretations that are controversial. Although he gives powerful support to the position that class conflict was a significant factor in these strikes, some will find it more difficult to agree with his view that they were revolutionary processes. He admits that the strikers did not have revolution in mind but points out that "revolutionary movements rarely begin with a revolutionary intention" (p. 240).

In *Colorado's War on Militant Unionism* Suggs presents a workmanlike account of the labor policy of James H. Peabody, governor of Colorado from 1903 to 1905. Strongly antilabor, Peabody frequently intervened on the side of the mine owners in their disputes with the workers. He used the National Guard to break strikes and played a significant role in reducing the power of the Western Federation of Miners

in Colorado. "That he materially affected the industrial history of the trans-Mississippi West is undeniable," Suggs writes; "that he had an important impact upon the entire American labor movement is certain" (p. 12).

Suggs's book is clearly written and amply documented with a useful "Essay on Sources." To say that it is stimulating would be to go too far, but Suggs has done effectively the job that he set out to do—with one exception. As is the case with many writers, in his zeal to establish the significance of his work, he claims too much for it. For although Suggs is successful in showing the destructive effects of Peabody's policy on the WFM, he does not adequately support his contention that the governor "had an important impact upon the entire American labor movement."

Aurand's *From the Molly Maguires to the United Mine Workers* deals with the anthracite miners of Pennsylvania during the late nineteenth century. So that the reader will understand clearly the problems of the miner Aurand devotes more than a quarter of his short book to the physical surroundings, the coal industry, and the community. The major portion of the work is concerned with the frustration, the violence, and the failures that characterized the early attempts of the miners to deal with low wages and high accident rates through organization. Mine owners were hostile, but it is Aurand's contention that even more significant was the regional and ethnic diversity of the area. Success did not come until the 1890s when the United Mine Workers set up separate locals for each immigrant group and organized the area into three districts corresponding to the three economic regions that had developed.

The faults of this book lie not in Aurand's treatment of the labor history of the anthracite fields but stem from an apparent fear on the part of the author that he will not be understood. This has led him to attempt to do too much, and the result is more of an outline than a completed work. Although he needed to explain enough about the region and the industry to make clear the problems of the miners and the difficulties of organization, much that he does is not necessary. The reader interested in labor history does not have to be told how coal was originally formed. Aurand also insists on explaining the obvious and tends to be repetitious.

If the reader is not fully aware that the major problem of the anthracite industry was overinvestment, it is not because the author has failed to say so many times.

Although all of these books are of interest to the student of American labor history, none overwhelms the reader with its significance or its brilliance. What does come through powerfully in all three is hardly new, yet is too often forgotten: the incredible sufferings and dauntless courage of the worker during the early industrial era. It is becoming more difficult to deny that class conflict has been a part of America's history. Although neither Aurand nor Suggs seem to be grinding the same ax as Brecher, their books support much that he claims.

HAROLD W. CURRIE

Michigan State University

ROGER L. GRINDLE. *Quarry and Kiln: The Story of Maine's Lime Industry*. Rockland, Me.: Courier-Gazette. 1971. Pp. 331. \$12.50.

DAVID C. SMITH. *A History of Lumbering in Maine, 1861-1960*. (University of Maine Studies, number 93.) Orono: University of Maine Press. 1972. Pp. xvi, 468. \$9.00.

These two books deal with important aspects of the natural-resource-based economic development of a relatively poor state. Both authors focus narrowly upon events in Maine, but each has done a quite creditable job within the limits he sets for himself.

Quarry and Kiln describes the evolution of the production, transport, and marketing of lime, an economic mainstay of the coastal region of Maine in the nineteenth century. Unfolding a detailed narrative based primarily on newspaper evidence, Roger Grindle traces the history of a typical manufacturing industry characterized by personal management and relatively small firms. Though the author seldom refers to wider economic developments, his story fits comfortably into the prevailing general patterns outlined by other historians: small businessmen combined local resources and produced a bulky, low value-added commodity that went to market via coastal shipping and was distributed by commission merchants in major port cities (primarily New York). Declining fortunes led to increasing cooperation between producers, ultimately capped by consolidation

into somewhat larger firms at the end of the century. The story focuses on the 1880-1900 period and ends abruptly with the decline of personal enterprises at the turn of the century. Although Grindle offers few generalizations, the book will prove useful to others more inclined to synthesis.

David C. Smith's lengthy, exhaustively researched, and heavily detailed book might well have been called *A History of the Maine Forests*, for he conceives of lumbering very broadly and properly includes such related topics as transportation, labor conditions, the disposition of public lands, conservation, scientific forestry, control of water power, and the political ramifications of Maine's leading industry. Throughout most of the nineteenth century Maine's lumbering industry resembled the picture of the lime business sketched above. The closing decades of the century, however, brought a revolution to the woods—the market shifted from sawn lumber and finished items to pulp as rag paper gave way to woodpulp paper. This destroyed the prevailing idyllic times and gave birth to the villains in Smith's piece, the large, capital-intensive paper companies, to which he usually refers as “the pulp grinders.” The spectacular growth of that industry brought outside capital and influence to a state which often resented them as imperialist intrusions. When consolidation and “big business” arrived in the late 1890s in the form of such pulp grinders as the Great Northern Paper Company, the battle lines were drawn between “the people as opposed to the companies” (p. 309).

The companies steamrolled all before them, “ending finally with ownership of the land, control of the rivers, and domination of the politics and economics of the state” (p. 173). Despite that, through some strange amalgam of enlightened self-interest by the pulp grinders, political pressure by their opponents, and the work of conservationists, the ultimate result was the triumph of scientific forestry management and the resurgence of Maine's woods to the point that “today Maine looks more as it did in 1660 than it did in 1860” (p. 374).

Smith misses a real opportunity to make a good book better when he fails to compare analytically Maine's apparent success in achieving sound forest use with what he describes as the failure of other lumbering states. Like the

inhabitants of other relatively unindustrialized areas (and to some extent of the entire country), Downeasters historically faced the cruel dilemma of both wanting and fearing modern industry. If their success in overcoming that dilemma in lumbering was all that Smith indicates, more analysis and explanation is needed.

GLENN PORTER

Harvard University

DONALD HOFFMANN. *The Architecture of John Wellborn Root*. (The Johns Hopkins Studies in Nineteenth-Century Architecture.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1973. Pp. xviii, 263. \$13.50.

For many years one of the major deficiencies in American architectural history has been a full scale, objective biography of John Wellborn Root. It is almost unbelievable that the last book on this architect was published in 1896 by the poet and editor, Harriet Monroe. While Miss Monroe's volume contained much valuable information, she was Root's sister-in-law, and her attitude was overly worshipful. In addition she lacked the necessary technical equipment to handle her subject. The picture has been further complicated by the slighting references to Root in the writings of Louis Sullivan and Frank Lloyd Wright. It is a pleasure to report that the gap has now been filled by this excellent volume from the hand of Donald Hoffmann, art critic of the *Kansas City Star* and for many years a close student of Root's buildings.

Mr. Hoffmann is both a severe and sympathetic critic, and he makes it perfectly clear that Root's design method resulted in a number of failures. Understandably he concentrates on the grand successes such as the Rookery and the Monadnock in Chicago and the Board of Trade in Kansas City; it would be hard to fault his analyses of these great structures on technical, social, or esthetic grounds. For each he outlines the program given to the architect by the businessmen for whom he worked, the intricacies of foundation problems, and Root's mastery of space, light, proportion, and detail. Nor does he slight the iconographic aspect; from Root's own writings he quotes the memorable remark that the Burlington headquarters was intended to be a “suitable architectural expression of a great and stable railway corporation.” No one could have put it better.

Hoffmann has consulted all the relevant archives and secondary materials and has obviously made an effort to visit the existing buildings wherever possible. These, it is sad to note, grow less in number every year, though some of the best, such as the Kansas City Board of Trade, have been preserved in the photographs of the late lamented Richard Nickel. Of these superb pictures the author properly makes extensive use. As a consequence of Hoffmann's book architectural historians are going to have to make some interesting revisions in their evaluations of Sullivan and Root. It is my guess that Root may well emerge as the more inventive of the two. His solutions to spatial problems were much more inventive than those of Sullivan, possibly because he was interested in the possibilities of tall buildings as hollow squares, whereas Sullivan was not.

My only quibble with Hoffmann is a small one. He quotes Sullivan as recalling that the men most responsible for the development of the modern office building were a pair of Chicago businessmen, Owen Aldis and William Hale. It seems to me that Hoffman might have told us a bit more about these two enormously important patrons. Both were important in the financial life of the city, and it is unfortunate that they remain shadowy figures in the background. This, however, is a minor point. It only remains to note that the book contains an exemplary bibliographical note and a comprehensive index. It is a thoroughly satisfying work.

LEONARD K. EATON
*University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor*

MARTIN BLUMENSON. *The Patton Papers*. Volume 1, 1885-1940. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1972. Pp. xx, 996. \$15.00.

Martin Blumenson, as usual, has done a superb job. He and George S. Patton, Jr. have produced a deeply moving account of a high-ranking military personality. As a human document it exceeds all others in military literature known to me, except for the warm biography, which is based upon papers as intimate as those in this book, of William Tecumseh Sherman by James M. Merrill.

You will not like many of the ideas upon

which George Patton based his conduct. Some readers will resent his conviction that he was a patrician, a gentleman by reason of his ancestors. They will not be able to deny that he could live like one. Great wealth, inherited and married, enabled him to wear, for example, custom-made silk khaki shirts in combat during World War I. One large group, we hope, will deplore his racism, founded on the belief that God created the white race to be dominant. Recoil, if you will, from his ideas about war. He believed that it could never be eradicated and that attempts at disarmament weakened not only the power but the moral fiber of a nation. He referred to Woodrow Wilson as "that unspeakable ass" (p. 346) when Wilson tried to keep the United States out of the First World War. When the president said that a great nation might be too proud to fight, Patton believed him a coward. Intermittently throughout his life he hoped war would come, and he flatly admitted that through it alone could he obtain full personal fulfillment. Neither he nor any true soldier, he believed, would stir up a fight; that was the province of businessmen and politicians. But he was in sympathy with the latter and was glad of the opportunity to finish what they had started. After World War I he wrote wistfully to General Pershing that "war is the only place where a man really [*sic*] lives" (p. 700).

Few readers, it is hoped, will approve the autocrat in him. In 1909, when twenty-four, he wrote his father that he wanted to be president or dictator (p. 161). Maturity did not change this goal. Seventeen years later he wrote, this time to his wife, that "I have always hoped that as the result of a great war I would secure supreme command and such fame that after the war I would be able to become President or dictator by the ballot or by force" (p. 804). The patrician basis for this position he stated as follows: "The few must run the many for the latter's good. To Hell with the people" (p. 368). He was an enthusiastic director of the suppression of the bonus marchers in Washington in 1932 for he believed, as did President Hoover and General MacArthur, that the marchers were true revolutionaries infected with communism. I am grateful that he never clawed his way to the very top.

All the while that you disapprove of Patton,

he draws you to him. You cheer in spite of yourself as he dauntlessly tried to realize what he believed was his destiny. You are warmed by the lifelong love affair between him and his wife, which began when they first met, she sixteen years old and he seventeen. His unflagging devotion to his father will touch you. So will his disinterested admiration for General Pershing, after whom he patterned himself as well as he could. Other grand qualities will attract you to him: unswerving loyalty to his superiors, whatever he thought of them, courage, determination never to quit, humor, devotion to duty, and thorough dedication to the profession of arms and constant study of it.

Patton led the tanks in the battles of Saint-Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne and was wounded in the latter. At the end of World War I he virtually personified the armored service to Americans. Then in 1920 the tank corps was abolished, and he requested transfer back to the cavalry. Some tanks remained in the infantry and cavalry and some devotees with them, but Patton argued for two decades that the cavalry would be indispensable in future wars. Of course he could hardly expect to knock the branch and at the same time rise in it. But in addition he believed that the next conflict would be fought in almost roadless areas where only footmen and horsemen could go. Also, because he loved horses and "horsey" people, he remained blind to the vulnerability of the cavalry to attack from the air and from tanks. This was his worst error in judgment, and we grieve for him over it. But when in 1940 he returned to the tanks we can applaud again, for, since we know how the story ended, we see that he has at last found his road to fame.

JOHN K. MAHON
University of Florida

JACOB ADLER and GWYNN BARRETT, edited with introduction and notes by. *The Diaries of Walter Murray Gibson, 1886, 1887*. [Honolulu:] University Press of Hawaii. 1973. Pp. xvii, 199. \$10.00.

All the six diaries of Walter Murray Gibson (presumably for the years 1882-87, during which he was premier under King David Kalakaua) are not extant. Only the two now published repose in the library of Brigham Young Uni-

versity. The editors performed their assignment admirably. Jacob Adler, a professor of accounting and finance at the University of Hawaii, intrigued by the history and economic development of the country, has turned to history as a hobby. Gwynn Barrett, six years on the faculty of Church College of Hawaii and now professor of history at Boise State College, is especially interested in the preparation of diaries for publication. Their attractive volume is not a mere verbatim reproduction of a personal record of two years in the life of a dynamic man, who for five years wielded tremendous power in the Hawaiian kingdom, captivating Hawaiians with his slogan of "Hawaii for the Hawaiians" and his program "primacy in the Pacific."

The historical value of the diaries is enhanced by a twelve-page biography of Gibson; a running documented commentary on many entries; a five-page "Last Days" covering Gibson's exile and death in San Francisco and the return of his remains to Honolulu; a three-page appendix devoted to Mother Marianne, of the Third Order of St. Francis, who dedicated thirty-five years to the lepers of Hawaii, and was adored by Gibson; and a thirteen-page index.

This annotated treatment of only two of Gibson's diaries by no means settles the dispute over one of the most controversial characters in Hawaiian history. Perhaps Professor Adler in his forthcoming biography of Walter Murray Gibson will place the often maligned man in the proper historical perspective, as he did another supposedly malevolent character, also objurgated and frightened from the Islands, in his *Claus Spreckles: The Sugar King in Hawaii*.

MERZE TATE
Howard University

BRUCE KUKLICK. *Josiah Royce: An Intellectual Biography*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company. 1972. Pp. ix, 270. \$12.50.

Whether or not Alfred North Whitehead was correct in suggesting that the entire course of Western philosophy may be considered as a series of footnotes to Plato, it is certainly the case that the entire course of Western philosophy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is a series of footnotes to Kant. Among the philosophers in America who grappled

with the problems bequeathed by Kant, Josiah Royce (1855–1916) was by no means the least.

Bruce Kuklick, who teaches philosophy and American Studies at Yale, has written a careful and authoritative intellectual biography of Royce. Such a study has long been a desideratum, delayed by Royce's immediate descendants at the philosopher's express wish.

Mr. Kuklick describes his own work as "an exercise in the logic of the history of ideas." He tries to avoid both the attempt of current philosophers to uncover what is still living in Royce and the nonphilosophic approach that he finds characteristic of intellectual historians of assimilating philosophic terms to those of historians. Kuklick is concerned to show that Royce's philosophic development from an early (and technical) pragmatism, through absolute idealism and a reformulated voluntarism, to a profound attempt to present a system allowing full reality both to the Absolute and to discrete individuals, was "part of a major philosophical movement" of neo-Kantianism and not merely an intellectual form of loose-jointed American practicalism.

Essential to Royce's Kantianism at all stages of his development was a dialectical resolution of the question of the connection between the Absolute (Reality, Kant's "noumenon") and the world of human experience (Appearance, Kant's "phenomenon"). Kuklick is especially clear in his presentation of the various forms that this dialectical argument took at different periods in Royce's life. Kuklick clarifies in particular Royce's renewed concern with the study of modern logic as evidence of the philosopher's growing dissatisfaction with the line of argument followed in the earlier writings.

In the course of his treatment Kuklick discusses all aspects of Royce's philosophy and gives a more thorough insight than any previous writer into the changes that took place in it. I have no doubt that Kuklick's book will be held in high regard for many years to come.

JOSEPH L. BLAU
Columbia University

THOMAS C. COCHRAN. *American Business in the Twentieth Century*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1972. Pp. vi, 259. \$11.95.

During the past fifteen years much has happened in American history and in the history

of American history as well. A wave of internal strife has swept through America's cities and centers of higher education, leaving behind a population subdued and somewhat less certain about the future although apparently still not inclined to abandon any of its major institutions or values. The history of modern America has experienced a somewhat similar (although less traumatic) pattern of development: while most scholars have stayed in the familiar grooves of liberal history, gentle revisionism, and counter-revisionism, the majority position has been sharply challenged by New Left scholars and by historians employing behavioral theories and quantitative techniques. Most historians today seem to be still clinging to established norms but doing so with less confidence than they had a decade ago.

The impact of these dual changes in our history and historiography can be seen in Thomas C. Cochran's volume on *American Business in the Twentieth Century*. The book was originally published in 1957 as *The American Business System: A Historical Perspective, 1900–1955*. Now, it reappears with a new publisher and a new style of organization, substantially rewritten and sporting much additional material. In its current incarnation Cochran's study is a strong addition to our slim bibliography of syntheses in modern economic and business history.

The author has significantly improved the volume, in part by sharpening his analysis. While the first edition emphasized the role of technology in shaping the economy, Cochran today gives even greater stress to the technological factor as an agent of change. He heightens for the reader the distinction between new and old industries, between those that are technologically advanced and those that are not. He clarifies the role of small and medium-sized businesses. This is a subject that many of us (myself included) ignore as we rush to study the corporate giants which dominate the front pages of the financial papers—and lately the daily papers as well. To those who see the so-called center firms—the modern, technologically advanced corporations—setting the pace for the rest of the economy, Cochran issues a firm note of caution: most business activity is still carried on by small and medium-sized firms; the managers of these businesses

may not make the headlines in New York, but they do much to set the tone of our business society; they make decisions that have a significant cumulative impact upon the economy. Finally, the Cochran of the seventies accepts and applies Keynesian analysis much more than did the Cochran of the fifties. This is particularly evident in his treatment of the Great Depression; where he was hesitant before he is firm today in using a Keynesian approach to this, the nation's most serious economic crisis.

The author has also broadened his synthesis. He has always been a scholar of impressive range, and that quality is evident in this book. He blends material from Reinhard Bendix with the viewpoints of Matthew Josephson; he is attentive to John Maynard Keynes, but also to Peter Drucker. Drawing on recent scholarship, Cochran has changed his interpretation of the 1900–30 period. He has absorbed that brand of revisionist scholarship which has fractured the monolithic contestants (the business community, for instance) of progressive history. Similarly, he has made good use of New Left history, including the work of Gabriel Kolko. The new ideas flowing from recent research can be seen in his treatment of World War I, but they are most apparent in his study of the Second World War and postwar years. Here he offers a far more complete picture of the problems of wartime controls and of the new developments in business-government relations that characterize the cold-war economy. Historians who use the book as a text will, I trust, be particularly grateful for this contemporary material.

Cochran's synthesis of American business history not only highlights a few leading forces of change but also gives considerable emphasis to the continuity and the complexities of our history. The author pictures a system that has changed—particularly insofar as the government's role is concerned—but which remains in many regards much like the economy of 1900. He concludes that from the calm perspective of the 1970s, we are not so far removed from 1900 as we seemed to be when the cities were burning and the campuses filled with riots.

While Cochran does not give us a powerful, dynamic analysis of the growth process, he has written a book that effectively pulls together the varied strands of business development in

our recent past. The volume's strength rests in its breadth and in its restrained judgment of the role of business in shaping the main contours of our society.

LOUIS GALAMBOS

Johns Hopkins University

RUSSELL LYNES. *Good Old Modern: An Intimate Portrait of the Museum of Modern Art*. New York: Atheneum. 1973. Pp. xvi, 490. \$13.95.

During the early twentieth century an increasing number of art collectors, mostly from the East and New York, were captivated by the artistic movements emanating from Paris and began to acquire works by the Post-Impressionists, Cubists, and Fauvists. Despite their patronage, however, and despite the increase in the number of American artists influenced by the new European styles, which later came to include German Expressionism and Italian Futurism, the new art received short shrift from the American public. The Armory Show of 1913 publicized the new ideas as did the art journals and commercial galleries devoted to contemporary art that sprung up in its wake. But something more forceful—the imprimatur of a respectable institution—was required to bring about acceptance of the new ways of seeing that underlay the Modern expression. The founding of the Museum of Modern Art in New York months before the Crash of 1929 provided that force.

As a longtime friend of the museum and its staff, Russell Lynes has written what he calls an “unofficial, unsubsidized, and unauthorized” history of the institution from its inception in the minds of three “daring” (and wealthy) ladies to the present. Lynes is particularly interested in the individuals most responsible for the growth and direction of the museum—and these unquestionably were its first director, Alfred H. Barr, and the various members of its board of trustees. As a result, there is little about modern art here, but a great deal of chitchat about people, events, buildings. When the frivolous is separated from the serious, however, an amazingly clear picture emerges of how elite groups, through control of private institutions founded with a public purpose, exercise their influence on tastes and culture.

Barr wished to have the museum reflect the

variety of the arts of the time. He sought experimentation in posters, kitchen designs, and architecture, as well as in paintings and sculpture. His catholicity, however, collided with the less elastic definition of art by his trustees, and in such contests they, of course, won since, in the long run, the trustees paid the bills.

The influence of the trustees on the museum accounts in some measure for the institution's difficulties. Designed to encourage the contemporary art of the 1920s, the museum gave its approval to what was at the time considered daring and innovative. As the term "Modern" came to describe an artistic mode or period rather than the contemporary, the museum's thrust as an innovative force in the art world was blunted. Its permanent collection of modern art, reflecting the trustees' special tastes, gave it the characteristics of a repository museum dedicated to European art of the mid-twentieth century. Soon it took on the semblance of the establishment and began to lose the "prophetic . . . fresh, and outrageous" character that earlier had justified its bold program. Modern became chic, but it also became—as Lynes points out—"Yesterday." Demands for exhibitions of the works of artists who did not fit into the Modern prescription went unfulfilled, since the trustees' taste ran primarily to the earlier European expression. As a result, dissatisfied artists and members of minority groups are now questioning the museum's elitism and demanding changes in its administration, programs, and functions.

The very success of the Museum of Modern Art has made it an expensive institution to maintain and has forced it to meet challenges of contemporary society that it was unprepared to do. The intellectual features of its earlier programs have to contend with business considerations. Also at question is the museum's conception of itself—is it to be a great educational institution or a "deep freeze" for its trustees' treasures? Is it to be a force for the innovative or for the conservative?

Lynes leaves little question that as a result of its willingness in the past to risk experimentation the museum has exercised a large influence on art, tastes, the cultural life of the American people, and the artist. His book raises questions about the museum's future influence even

while it provides a fascinating guide through the areas of its earlier effectiveness.

LILLIAN B. MILLER

National Portrait Gallery

ROBERT E. BURTON. *Democrats of Oregon: The Pattern of Minority Politics, 1900-1956*. Eugene: University of Oregon Press. 1970. Pp. x, 158. \$7.50.

The history of a losing party in a small state deserves attention only if the author can move beyond ephemeral rhetoric and local personalities to probe the political culture of an era, the values and behavior of the people, the genius of the party, or the truths of forgotten prophets. Robert E. Burton is aware of these responsibilities and has done some reading in political science. He presents us with a narrative of dismal losses and unexpected wins, together with a cursory sketch of gross voting patterns, party organization, and newspaper rhetoric, fleshed out a bit with quotations culled from manuscript collections and four interviews. With William U'Ren, Charles McNary, Richard Neuberger, Wayne Morse, Al Ullman, Mark Hatfield, and Edith Green, Oregon can boast enough national leaders to demand a study with either narrative skill or theoretical insights, or even both. It is unfortunate that this brief doctoral dissertation lacks either.

RICHARD JENSEN

*University of Illinois,
Chicago Circle*

ARTHUR J. LINK *et al.*, editors. *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*. Volume 15, 1903-1905. (Sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson Foundation and Princeton University.) Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1973. Pp. xx, 608. \$20.00.

As reviews of earlier volumes have agreed, this series is a model of exquisite bookmaking by the publisher and a triumph of clarification by the editors. The one long editorial note in this volume, on the new course of study introduced at Princeton early in Wilson's presidency there, gives a balanced, informed appraisal of a highly complex matter. This Princeton effort to preserve a tradition of general culture while requiring students to concentrate in a single field was a landmark in the search for alternatives to the free elective system.

The new plan of study, Wilson wrote his wife, "is not . . . exactly the scheme I at the outset proposed, but it is much better" (p. 296). There is such evidence of an open-minded willingness to consult and compromise, but Wilson was tending toward autocratic self-certainty. In a dispute over the salary due a departing professor, an appropriate case for arbitration, trustee Moses Taylor Pyne admitted that the document involved "was possibly drawn a little carelessly," whereas Wilson insisted that the matter was "clearly recorded" (pp. 107, 113-14). Reports reached Wilson that some alumni were branding him "high-handed" and "obstinate" (p. 432). In this first full volume on the years after his father's death Wilson appears as a brilliant, ambitious man, suffering from tensions that he only partially recognized.

These documents potentially enrich a wide range of scholarship, revealing such matters as hopes that Grover Cleveland would become a presidential nominee in 1904, table talk of guests in an Italian pension (in Mrs. Wilson's lively reports of her travels), and a faculty promotion at Princeton unsullied by any salary increase. But these volumes should not be thought of simply as a repository for researchers. Many of Wilson's essays and addresses have survived the years without losing their freshness. "The Variety and Unity of History," for instance, speaks wisely to the legitimacy of interpretation in history. Despite its inclusiveness, the material collected here moves in a way that stirs interest, even suspense. It is easy to imagine that devotees of *The Children of Pride* could be caught up in the foreboding story of the central figures in these *Papers*.

HUGH HAWKINS
Amherst College

PAOLO E. COLETTA. *The Presidency of William Howard Taft*. (American Presidency Series.) Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 1973. Pp. ix, 306. \$10.00.

Professor Coletta's narrative, part of a new American Presidency Series, offers a gently critical interpretation of William Howard Taft. The president, the author says, "tried to be a harmonizer when the people wanted a fighter against bosses. . . . Challenged by the New Nationalism on one side and New Freedom on

the other, he had retreated to a defense of conservative constitutionalism." Taft, he adds, "was not a bad president but a rather good one." He was honest, "high-minded, just-minded, and clean-minded . . . in no way devious." But he was "slow-moving, easy-going if not lazy," he was "no renovator or innovator," and he procrastinated. Worse, he had a "kind of grocer-intellect that operated like a weighing machine that was apt for business-like administration but showed little of fire or imagination." "Rather than seeing the presidency as the center to which the people turned for inspired directions for conducting their lives, he acted as a book-keeper engaged in making purely mechanical arrangements and computations." Taft, concludes Coletta, "should have been a judge rather than president."

Coletta, a diligent worker, has looked at several manuscript collections and at works that have appeared since the engaging volumes on Taft by Henry Pringle written more than thirty years ago. Coletta's debt to Samuel Hays and to James Penick on the conservation issue is especially clear. The author also tells more about Taft's military policies than most other works. Canadian reciprocity, the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, the elections of 1910 and 1912, dollar diplomacy in the Caribbean and Asia, and Taft's relations with Theodore Roosevelt, also receive extended treatment. Coletta has done a workmanlike job of compressing the many issues of the Taft administration into only 266 pages of narrative.

Despite these virtues, the book is unlikely to appeal either to scholars, students, or general readers. Aside from the sections on the Ballinger-Pinchot controversy and Taft as commander-in-chief, specialists in the realm of progressive politics will find little that moves beyond Pringle. Many scholars may also find Coletta's interpretations simply uninteresting, for he is too often content to rest by saying that Taft failed, or half-failed, or succeeded, without exploring the alternative courses, if any, the president might have pursued. Coletta seems to assume that more enlightened presidential leadership (occasionally but not persuasively defined) would have brought Taft greater success. While this is a tenable point of view, it appears to underestimate the formidable party

and congressional divisions that confronted Taft. One wonders if another president could have done much better and wishes that the author had asked that question more often and more systematically.

Students and general readers will probably be even more disappointed. Coletta does not organize chapters well, and he writes with little flair. Sections on congressional issues in 1910 and 1912, for instance, follow chapters on campaigns and elections later in the same years. Congressional battles get detailed attention, but patterns—sectional, ideological, factional—often get lost in the welter of facts. Electoral trends are hardly treated at all. Frequently, Coletta simply repeats himself, and his concluding remarks merely recapitulate the “Taft failed, Taft succeeded” interpretations of earlier chapters. Finally, Taft the man seldom emerges.

It was a sound idea to attempt this book, for the Taft years merit a brief, well-written, interpretive analysis. But Coletta's interpretations are too bland, his writing too uninspired, to fill the gap.

JAMES T. PATTERSON
Brown University

LEWIS L. GOULD. *Progressives and Prohibitionists: Texas Democrats in the Wilson Era*. Austin: University of Texas Press. 1973. Pp. xvi, 339. \$10.00.

In the 1890s, under Governor James S. Hogg, Texas effectively regulated its railroads and imposed restrictions on non-Texas industrial competition. These actions were followed in 1907 by the passage of the Robertson Insurance Law, which required insurance companies to invest at least seventy-five per cent of their policy reserves in Texas real estate and securities. Following these victories, Progressive forces in Texas emphasized prohibition as their major objective. Historians have long questioned the extent of Texas Progressivism, doubting that the reforms and objectives were of the same caliber as those associated with La Follette in Wisconsin, Wilson in New Jersey, and liberal leaders elsewhere. Professor Gould's work confirms this view, demonstrating the limited goals sought by Texas reformers. A detailed study of the political history of the state from 1912 to 1920, its major value lies not in the abundance

of material reviewed but in the author's ability to synthesize and to find rational explanations for what often appear irrational actions.

Following the disastrous national experience with prohibition, Progressive concern with the issue has often been interpreted as a serious diversion from worthwhile endeavors. Gould demonstrates that the liquor interests' involvement in politics merited much of the attention liberals bestowed on their destruction, but, more subtly, he contends that in advocating prohibition the Progressives were fighting a force which was undercutting the values most prized by a simpler, agrarian America.

Gould is most effective in untangling the skeins of personality that, at times contrary to stated principle, shaped developments in Texas. He presents Governor Hogg as a chauvinistic Texas capitalist and Colonel Edward M. House as an opportunist and manipulator primarily loyal to himself. More lengthy and satisfactory analysis is given the remarkable careers of Joseph Welden Bailey, who served in the U.S. House of Representatives for a decade before beginning two terms as a U.S. senator in 1901, and James E. Ferguson, who was elected governor in 1914, was impeached and removed in 1917 after he refused to reveal that the brewery interests were the source of a personal loan of over \$150,000, obtained his wife's election as governor on an anti-Ku Klux Klan platform in 1924, and was driven from power by scandals in 1926 but returned with the aid of the depression in 1932. Gould contends that after 1908 Bailey, who had been an excellent orator and champion of national railroad regulation, was motivated by an increasing fear of federal power, a phenomenon that afflicted other Southern congressmen. Bailey opposed Wilson's nomination and attacked his administration as socialistic. Ferguson, whose indefensible attacks on the faculty at the University of Texas have earned him wide condemnation, is presented as “more than a demagogue but less than a statesman” who encompassed “both the good and bad of Texas politics.” Seeing the need for reform in the system of tenant farming, he rode into office emphasizing antilandlord legislation but dropped the issue in his first term. Though not defending Ferguson's university policies, Gould holds that his initial motivation was to correct an imbalance in the dis-

tribution of education funds and that he did improve the quality of public schools.

Both Bailey and Ferguson consistently opposed statewide prohibition, which was not passed until early 1918 (after Ferguson's embarrassing removal from office) and under wartime pressure to protect the morals of the troops and conserve grain. The frequent division and bickering among the dries (including varying attitudes toward national prohibition), fear of "political preachers," and sectional and cultural factors were in part responsible for the delay. South Texas, where Mexican, Catholic influence was strong, and the German counties around Austin were opponents whose wet stand had to be weakened by patriotic considerations and overcome by majorities in north and west Texas.

Gould's study could have made more extensive use of the denominational press and papers of church leaders. Some will question his contention (p. 144) that boredom caused many voters to turn to Ferguson in 1914. The almost complete absence of comparisons of the Texas prohibition movements with those in other states is a weakness, attributable in part to a lack of adequate studies elsewhere. Gould's work, however, is a scholarly one with many insights that help explain the prohibition-Progressive union and the significant role of Texas in Wilson's election and administration.

HUGH C. BAILEY
Samford University

BEATRICE BISHOP BERLE and TRAVIS BEAL JACOBS, editors. *Navigating the Rapids, 1918-1971: From the Papers of Adolf A. Berle*. Introduction by MAX ASCOLI. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 1973. Pp. xxxvi, 859. \$18.50.

Of the "service intellectuals" helping to shape modern American government, Adolf A. Berle, Jr. (1895-1971) was one of the most brilliant, versatile, and influential. Through his writing and speaking, he became a leading articulator and shaper of what later scholars would label "corporate liberalism." And operating from a variety of governmental and advisory positions, he helped to shape policy in such diverse areas as corporate taxation, railroad reorganization, trade relations, Latin-American affairs, international aviation, and urban planning.

In this book Beatrice Berle and Travis Jacobs offer the "general reader" a collection of documents and papers intended to illuminate and epitomize the "ideas and spirit of Adolf Berle." For the years prior to 1937 (the first 120 pages of the book), the items range from letters, articles, and memorandums to diary entries and excerpts from a later oral history interview. For the post-1937 period they are drawn almost exclusively from a "diary file" which Berle began keeping that year and continued, except for brief intervals, to maintain until his death. Of these latter entries nearly one-half relate to the years 1939-46, and for this period the editors depart from their standard chronological arrangement to pull together two special sections, one pertaining to the International Civil Aviation Conference in 1944, the other covering Berle's activities as ambassador to Brazil in 1945-46.

In the selections offered, the reader will find a pattern of ideas generally familiar to those who have followed Berle's career and read his books. In the pre-New Deal era, as a student of economic institutions and coauthor of the now classic *Modern Corporation and Private Property*, he hailed the rise of a managerial elite and set forth the possibility of its becoming a "neutral technocracy" imbued with an overriding sense of public trusteeship. As a New Dealer, he attempted to fuse the semisocialism of the Left with the Christian and managerial corporatism of the Right, arguing that the best approach to economic reform and direction lay through an enlightened and moralized "partnership" of business and government. As a subsequent defender of the "American system," he developed the notion of a "revolutionary" corporate capitalism, balancing collective organization with individual creativity and gathering energy from a "transcendental" service ethic. And in connection with his championship of pan-Americanism, he worked out a similar vision of how national autonomy, regional collaboration, international organization, and freedom of trade might be brought into creative balance. What some readers may find surprising is the extent to which this "liberalism" was blended with deep veins of rural romanticism and exaggerated fears of the Communist menace. Pitching hay on his farm or visiting rural Iowa in 1940, Berle was "prepared to

think that the industrial revolution was one of the greatest mistakes the human mind ever committed," and having convinced himself that wartime accommodation of the Communists had been a tragic error, he became an early and persistent cold-war warrior, consistently adopting "hard-line" positions and arguing that the peace movement of the 1960s was "conceived in sin." In all likelihood, some of the items published here will become grist for neo-radical critiques of the "liberal mind."

Scattered through the entries are also a number of interesting historical tidbits. One learns, for example, how General Motors tried to block publication of *The Modern Corporation*, how Roosevelt yearned to revive the NRA, how plans developed for American mediation of the Spanish War, how resistance from Berle in Brazil thwarted the schemes of the oil interests, and how strong an antagonism Berle felt for Felix Frankfurter, Tom Corcoran, and Dean Acheson. That these revelations will change broader contours seems doubtful, but they should help to fill in details and illuminate little-understood episodes and policies.

On the whole, the editors have been successful in achieving the goals that they set for themselves. They have put together a readable collection of materials that provide a well-rounded picture of Berle's ideas and activities, have illuminated and ordered these materials with well-conceived notes, and have introduced them with a brief but perceptive commentary by Max Ascoli. One wonders, however, about the usefulness of their project. It seems doubtful that any large number of "general readers" will spend \$18.50 or read through 839 pages of tightly packed print in order to acquire an understanding of Berle. And while scholars will find the collection useful, they will still need to consult the other four-fifths of Berle's "diary file." It would seem that either a shorter work or a printing of the complete diary might have served more useful purposes.

ELLIS W. HAWLEY
University of Iowa

WILLIAM HENRY CHAFE. *The American Woman: Her Changing Social, Economic, and Political Roles, 1920-1970*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1972. Pp. xiii, 351. \$7.95.

Just as in the case of black history earlier,

women's history is experiencing a blizzard of quickie, fast-buck anthologies. What is needed are studies of the kind and quality of this monograph. When Professor Chafe began his work, little of a scholarly, historical nature had been written on women's history for the period after 1920. Except for a few unpublished doctoral dissertations and a couple of surveys of feminism, he had to make his own way. The result is a solid contribution and an arresting thesis.

Chafe's basic premise is that the prevailing attitudes about woman's "place" have been a consequence of the division of spheres of responsibility. As long as they were separate and different in actual practice, no amount of rhetoric or ideology would substantially change attitudes or woman's place. Furthermore, attitudes rarely change except under compulsion. Suffrage, perceived by friend and foe to be a fundamental issue, did not substantially alter the separate spheres and did not greatly advance women's struggle for equality. Since ideology was divorced from reality, what resulted was the fading of feminism as a movement, a serious split in feminist ranks, and a bitter forty-year fight among women over the Equal Rights Amendment. Very little progress was made anywhere in the 1920s and 1930s. Chafe found that social attitudes and values were nearly the same as twenty years earlier, and women's economic and political positions had barely changed. Then came World War II. Chafe sees the war as crucially important because it compelled changes in behavior by fracturing the traditional concept of roles.

Before World War II the great majority of working women were young, unmarried, impermanent, and from lower classes. "In the years prior to 1940 employment of married women had been frowned upon as unseemly, a violation of woman's place" (p. 246). Now their employment became a patriotic act. In the war the number of women working surged upward, seven million entered the work force for the first time, and three-quarters were married. Most wanted to remain at work after the war. The trend continued in the 1950s when women were supposedly retiring to breed. The result was a growing army of married, middle-class women with children so that by 1970 "the labor force contained 60 per cent of all wives

from homes with an annual income of more than \$10,000, and more than half the mothers of children from six to seventeen years of age" (p. 247). This transformation in the number, nature, and purpose of female employment was a necessary precondition for the revival of feminism in the 1960s. The new ideology required the behavioral changes resulting from World War II to permit it to flourish.

This brief survey does violence to the sophisticated argument and proofs presented by the author. The book is well grounded in manuscript collections, government publications, literature of the social sciences, and the popular and polemical magazine material. Occasionally one is blasted by a clutch of figures, percentages, and statistics, but these are important to the argument. The economic and social aspects are thoroughly surveyed, but the political dimension is rather skimpy. A single chapter races from 1920 to 1940, and that is nearly the last one hears of women and politics. Considering Chafe's contribution in other areas, however, my complaint is only a quibble.

J. STANLEY LEMONS
Rhode Island College

ROBERT K. MURRAY. *The Politics of Normalcy: Governmental Theory and Practice in the Harding-Coolidge Era*. (The Norton Essays in American History.) New York: W. W. Norton and Company. 1973. Pp. xii, 162. \$6.95.

Professor Robert K. Murray's *The Harding Era: Warren G. Harding and His Administration* (1969) offered a convincing corrective to a long tradition of debunking the ill-fated president. Where others, as late as the 1950s and 1960s, were often content to repeat the glib delineations of Frederick Lewis Allen and Samuel Hopkins Adams, Murray undertook a vast multi-archival research. Exploiting, especially, the rich field of historical materials made available by the opening of the Harding and Hoover Papers in the mid-sixties, he produced a strikingly fresh and valid view of the Harding years. In this book, *The Politics of Normalcy: Governmental Theory and Practice in the Harding-Coolidge Era*, he integrates the conclusions that emerged from his large study of four years ago.

The familiar characterization of Harding—

incompetent, manipulable, equivocating—dissolves in the acid of Murray's sound scholarship and judgment. Actually, the Ohioan was a skilled politician who, relying primarily on his own shrewd political intuition, secured his nomination, earned his election, and, with two devastating exceptions, hand-picked an able and effective cabinet. To be sure, the disaster of the final Wilson years had prepared the country for a change. But Murray insists that the record Republican vote of 1920 was also a positive response to Harding's refreshing humanity, humility, and, with the sole exception of the League question, his straightforwardness on the issues.

The author observes that as president, Harding was molded by the pressures of office into becoming an active defender of his campaign proposals. Accustomed to viewing Harding as invariably "weak," we are reminded that he did have the boldness to call Congress into special session and, on another occasion, to take the "precedent-shattering" step of going to the Senate floor to urge that cantankerous body to action on tax legislation. Again, on the eve of the 1922 elections, he vetoed the popularly regarded soldier's bonus bill as economically unwise. In all these actions, he was compelled to move away from his 1920 view of the presidential role as largely ceremonial and conciliatory.

Devoting a full chapter to the scandals, Murray does not minimize obvious defects in Harding's character and political style. He is more concerned, however, with drawing attention to the positive side of the record. Considering the economic and psychological disarray of the country and the factional anarchy and intransigence of Congress in March 1921, the administration registered some solid achievements, most notably, the quelling of the Red Scare mood and, under the direction of secretaries Charles Evans Hughes and Herbert Hoover, the placing of unsettled foreign and economic policies on a firm footing. If Hughes and Hoover were dominant in the formulation of policies, the author rightly gives Harding credit for "selling" them to the public and Congress. More in touch with Main Street than Wall Street, Harding also attempted to make his administration truly representative of the farmer and, to a lesser extent, the workingman. These achieve-

ments, not the overemphasized scandals, constitute the real significance of the "normalcy program," as Murray calls it. Campaigning on the positive side of the Harding legacy, Calvin Coolidge, a political lightweight, won easily in 1924. Ironically, because of the stable peace and prosperity that Harding's policies had helped fashion, Coolidge could enjoy the ceremonial presidency that Harding had originally sought for himself.

The title of this book is somewhat of a misnomer in that the Coolidge administration, 1925-29, much more pronouncedly pro-big business than its predecessor, is not given any extended analysis. Like its master study, *The Politics of Normalcy* deals with the "Harding Era" rather than the "Harding-Coolidge Era." But the essay is highly recommended as an antidote for teachers and students who may still view the politics of the early 1920s as little more than a carnival of corruption.

CRAIG LLOYD
Columbus College

CRAIG LLOYD. *Aggressive Introvert: A Study of Herbert Hoover and Public Relations Management, 1912-1932*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 1972. Pp. xiv, 206. \$10.75.

Although the Hoover Presidential Library opened in May 1966, there has been a delay in scholarly writings appearing in print based on its many riches. Recently we have begun to see a few, one of which is this interesting study on Hoover's use of publicity and public relations.

Professor Lloyd introduces the subject by briefly describing Hoover's rise from waif to multimillionaire, relating Hoover's shyness and social awkwardness to his desire for personal privacy. At the same time, Lloyd recognizes Hoover's hunger for recognition and his need to find challenges for his repressed ego, culminating in Hoover's 1914 decision to enter the arena of public service. When he did so, says Lloyd, Hoover brought with him a "unique administrative style" that employed publicity and public relations as connecting links between the "centralized ideas" of his Washington office and the "decentralized execution" of those ideas at the state and local levels. "Publicity" to Hoover usually meant "education"—educating

the masses to their proper civic responsibilities as well as to the drawbacks of noncooperation. In brief, Hoover used publicity and resultant favorable public reaction as weapons throughout his public career, while voluntary public compliance and cooperation with his programs were his goals.

Beginning in 1914 when he was appointed chairman of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, then later as food administrator, and finally as secretary of commerce, Hoover regarded the press and public relations as crucial to his various operations. At all times he maintained good relations with the press and "managed" the news wherever possible with the help of such astute publicity aides as Christian A. Herter (later secretary of state). Press releases, the creation of publicity committees, the "planting" of favorable stories, and the hiring of public relations firms were all used by Hoover and were blended skillfully.

More interested in pushing his policies than in enhancing his own political fortunes, Hoover preferred to operate "behind the scenes," but received nonetheless much publicity and public acceptance himself. As a result, by 1927-28 Hoover was the most heralded public official in the country. He was ultimately alluring to the public precisely because he did not appear too eager, was a "retiring" success, a "practical idealist," or, as Lloyd shrewdly observes, an "aggressive introvert." Significantly, beginning in 1927-28 Hoover did subvert this publicity machinery to help him gain the presidency.

Against the background of the Great Depression, Hoover's previously successful administrative and publicity techniques began to cause press hostility and popular resentment. By 1930 his demands for "decentralized execution" at the local level were unable to be met and "educating the public to its responsibilities" was impossible under the circumstances. Now his personal defects rose to haunt him—his shyness, his awkwardness, his lack of emotion—none of which was suited for favorable publicity purposes in the midst of an economic crisis. The country was finally left with only the "real" Hoover, and they didn't like him.

Professor Lloyd develops this thesis persuasively and tells it spritely. His book is, of course, no biography, and the author admits to its narrow scope. Some reviewers will possibly argue

that this limited aspect of Hoover's career could have been treated in a long scholarly article, thus saving the reader the outrageous price of \$10.75 for such a small book. But considering the paucity of scholarly works on any aspect of Hoover's career, Lloyd's effort is legitimate. One can only hope that more such excellent studies will follow—and finally, someday, a first-rate Hoover biography will emerge.

ROBERT K. MURRAY

Pennsylvania State University

ALBERT B. CHRISTMAN. *Sailors, Scientists, and Rockets: Origins of the Navy Rocket Program and of the Naval Ordnance Test Station, Inyokern*. With an introduction by EDWIN B. HOOPER. (History of the Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, California, volume 1.) Washington: Naval History Division. 1971. Pp. xxiii, 303. \$4.75.

The Naval Weapons Center (NWC) at China Lake, California, is one of several projects that originated when World War II united the talents of scientists, technicians, and military officers. The resulting cooperation continued for twenty years before American intervention in Vietnam caused scientists second thoughts about their role in government-sponsored weapons projects.

For those favoring weapons research this volume is a case study in the advantages of close scientific-military cooperation. The study first describes the years from 1914 to 1939 as an era of traditional friction between the scientist and the military; friction that was eased during World War I but revived after 1918. As World War II approached professors and military experts renewed contacts and ultimately established harmonious relations. At this point, Christman's study narrows to the partnership developed in rocketry between scientists from the California Institute of Technology and officers of the Navy's Bureau of Ordnance. Their cooperation brought remarkable developments in rockets and the establishment of the Naval Ordnance Test Station (NOTS) in 1943. It is with the creation of NOTS that Christman concludes his study. A second volume will cover the evolution of NWC in the postwar years.

Typical of many official "histories," this work contains lengthy quotes from official documents and taped interviews with participants in the

events. Although scholars investigating aerospace history or weapons development may find the citations useful, such techniques limit the study to history in the narrowest sense. Christman gives little attention to the broader aspects of his topic. He ignores questions of financial and scientific costs raised recently by Jerome Wiesner, Adam Yarmolinsky, and Ralph Lapp. Moreover, some particulars about the establishment of NOTS are inconclusive despite the author's access to official materials. For example, there is uncertainty about the exact date of the first test at NOTS in 1943 (p. 214).

Perhaps forthcoming volumes will better substantiate the author's assumption that the nation requires expensive research projects and the type of intensive scientific concentration on weapons development that characterized the post-1945 era.

LESTER H. BRUNE

Bradley University

JOSEPH L. ARNOLD. *The New Deal in the Suburbs: A History of the Greenbelt Town Program, 1935-1954*. [Columbus:] Ohio State University Press. 1971. Pp. xiii, 272. \$10.00.

A historical study in depth of the Greenbelt towns is long overdue, and Professor Arnold, by placing the program in its proper New Deal and town planning setting, has made a considerable contribution to such a study. He has done an excellent job in canvassing the literature, both local and national, and searching the documents for pertinent evidence on the origin, construction, and organization of the separate Greenbelt towns. Arnold has uncovered a number of unpublished historical and sociological studies of each of these communities and has made use of the papers and taped interviews preserved by some of the principals. Further, he has drawn some interesting comparisons between these towns.

Professor Arnold, however, has only made a start at one of his major objectives, which was to describe and appraise this program as an alternative on the one hand to suburban sprawl and on the other hand to urban housing projects. He alludes frequently to the transitory character of the populations of these towns but develops no statistical measure of their mobility as a basis for a comparison with the mobility of

the residents, either of home-owning suburbs or of public-housing projects or private Levittowns. He quite properly emphasizes the importance of the cooperative movements and social organizations developed in these towns but only vaguely suggests how these experiences differed from those of residents of rival suburban or housing projects. He recounts the hostilities engendered by real estate and other interest groups opposed to this innovative experiment, but he does not explore the possible relationships between Greendale and socialist Milwaukee, or between Greenhills and the reform administration in Cincinnati. He frequently notes the fact that none of these towns achieved the full size originally planned and comments on the inefficiencies this produced, but he supplies little data for a rigorous consideration of the question of the optimum size.

It will someday be interesting to learn how the transfer of these properties to private ownership affected the life of these communities. But that was not Professor Arnold's subject, and if his book imperfectly answers some of these other topics it does supply the fullest and most suggestive account yet produced of the New Deal's abortive experiment with the Greenbelt towns.

BLAKE MCKELVEY
Rochester, New York

BRUCE M. RUSSETT. *No Clear and Present Danger: A Skeptical View of the United States Entry into World War II*. New York: Harper and Row. 1972. Pp. 111. Cloth \$6.00, paper \$1.95.

JEROME E. EDWARDS. *The Foreign Policy of Col. McCormick's Tribune, 1929-1941*. Reno: University of Nevada Press. 1971. Pp. 232. \$7.00.

The ashes of pre-Pearl Harbor isolationism are here raked again by two scholars, neither of whom comes up with anything significantly new. Russett's effort is that of a political scientist who manages to expand a speculative essay, based primarily on secondaries, into a slender book of second-guess history. He postulates that there were better alternatives for America than fighting the Axis, notably gambling on a stalemate in Europe. His case for not provoking Japan is more persuasive than that for not provoking Germany: indeed he gives away the game when he concedes that he fa-

vored Lend-Lease, which was a *de facto* declaration of war on Nazi Germany. He argues rather unconvincingly that a stalemate was virtually assured when Hitler's frostbitten divisions halted at the gates of Moscow in December 1941 rather than at Stalingrad more than a year later. At the end Russett presents some relevant lessons. They add up to the sound but self-evident advice that statesmen, with the aid of "predictive power," should always choose the correct alternatives.

If Russett's title admirably encapsules his message, Edwards's does not. Sovereign entities can have foreign policies; the *Chicago Tribune* can only express opinions on foreign policies. A large part of the book deals somewhat irrelevantly with domestic politics and the history of journalism; even major European developments are reflected only spottily. The author was denied access to Colonel McCormick's private papers, which may one day reveal how and why the editor arrived at his incredible bundle of prejudices. But the self-styled "World's Greatest Newspaper" unleashed a flood of editorial words, on which the author relies heavily, and these no doubt were the effusions of the manager-editor-owner. He was a Beardian Continentalist rather than a pure isolationist, largely because of his Anglophobia. While willing to interfere in the Americas, he passionately favored letting Europe stew in its own juice. He preferred Hitler to Stalin, while detesting both and hating Roosevelt even more. Unlike Russett, Colonel McCormick not only opposed Lend-Lease but would have given the "lordly" British only what they deserved—nothing. Something of a loner, the choleric colonel was not deeply involved in the America First movement, though he actively supported it. Edwards, who is mildly critical, commendably makes an attempt to assess the newspaper's influence on public opinion in the *Tribune's* four or five state "Chicagoland," but here the reasoning shades into guesswork. Certainly many of McCormick's countless readers were more interested in the funnies and sports than in the editor's fulminations on foreign affairs. Yet such public opinion as he did whip up no doubt exercised some restraint on Roosevelt—a theme that could have been pursued profitably.

Edwards's account ends rather abruptly with Pearl Harbor, probably because of doctoral

exigencies. Yet the voluble editor continued to sound off on foreign affairs for many years. Although a drum-beating patriot who had served in World War I, he shamelessly published Washington's secret contingency war plans three days before Pearl Harbor, thereby intensifying the crisis with Germany. The day after the crucial American victory at Midway, the *Tribune* irresponsibly printed reports revealing that the navy had cracked the top Japanese secret code. Many Americans felt that with "patriots" like the colonel around, the nation did not need traitors.

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LELAND V. BELL. *In Hitler's Shadow: The Anatomy of American Nazism*. (National University Publications, Series in American Studies.) Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press. 1973. Pp. 135. \$7.95.

In surveying the structure, ideology, and policies of American Nazism from its fragmentary beginnings in the 1920s through the Neo-Nazis of the 1960s Professor Bell has uncovered useful information by concentrating heavily on the German-American Bund between 1936 and 1941. The Bund aimed at the nazification of German-Americans as a first step toward enlisting support across American society. But, despite an intricate and hierarchical national organization that included dozens of local units and Nazi camps and youth groups, Bund membership by 1938 reached only 8,500, of which twenty-five per cent were aliens and a majority recently naturalized German-Americans. By 1939 frequent demonstrations of its Nazi racism and anti-Semitism had isolated the Bund from most Americans of German ancestry, from the American public at large, and, ironically, from the Nazi regime itself. German diplomats in the United States, warning Berlin that the fumbling Bund could only damage relations between the Reich and the United States, brought about a virtual cessation of support from the Hitler government. By 1940-41 the Bund faced congressional probes, a series of court suits, and violent counterdemonstrations. Immediately following the declaration of war against Germany its records were seized and its leaders arrested.

Despite ample treatment of the organization of the Bund, based largely on the material

seized by the federal government, this book slights some critical dimensions of American Nazism. There is virtually no socioeconomic or psychological exploration of Bund membership. By loosely categorizing the Bund rank-and-file as alienated misfits or fanatics, the author fails to establish whether a sociological similarity existed between the Bund and the American Nazi party some thirty years later. More enigmatic is the organization's leadership, particularly Bundesführer Fritz Kuhn, whose vitriolic attacks on Franklin Roosevelt and public adoration of Adolf Hitler served mainly to galvanize anti-Bund activists between 1936 and 1939. "The more intensely he promoted Nazism," Professor Bell suggests, "the more virulent became the public's repulsion" and the more marked became Kuhn's aggressive paranoia. Despite appeals to white racism and the substitution of the salute "Free America" for the traditional "Sieg Heil," Kuhn could not free himself from identification with an alien government and failed to establish an effective alliance with native American fascist and rightist groups. The reader is left searching for the internal dynamic of Fritz Kuhn's leadership, which seemed less intent upon success within American politics than upon isolation within a self-defeating ideology. Perhaps this trait, more than the compulsive imitation of Nazi forms and rituals, is the most significant link between Fritz Kuhn in the 1930s and George Lincoln Rockwell in the 1960s.

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JOSEPH PATRICK HOBBS. *Dear General: Eisenhower's Wartime Letters to Marshall*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1971. Pp. viii, 255. \$10.00.

JAY LUVAAAS, editor. *Dear Miss Em: General Eichelberger's War in the Pacific, 1942-1945*. (Contributions in Military History, number 2.) Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1972. Pp. xvi, 322. \$12.50.

JAMES NELSON, editor. *General Eisenhower on the Military Churchill: A Conversation with Alistair Cooke*. New York: W. W. Norton and Company. 1970. Pp. 94. \$4.95.

As collections of primary sources these volumes offer little that is new or significant. Except for

Eisenhower's informal estimate of Churchill, telecast after the latter's death in 1965, their chief value lies in the editorial contributions of Joseph P. Hobbs and Jay Luvaas.

Dear General reprints 75 of the 108 letters to George C. Marshall that appeared in 1970 in the five volumes of *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower* covering the war years. Hobbs was then assistant editor of the project serving under Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. and Stephen E. Ambrose. Of the 232 pages of text in the present work, the letters occupy 134. The remainder are given to an essay entitled "Training for Command," a brief conclusion, and introductions to the four time periods in which the letters are arranged. For each of these periods—June–November 1942, November 1942–December 1943, January–June 1944, and June 1944–May 1945—Hobbs analyzes command organization, strategy and tactics, diplomatic problems, visits to the troops, and Eisenhower's personal relations with Marshall. The volume also contains a glossary of code names and abbreviations, a list of letters to Marshall not printed, a six-page bibliography of books and articles, and a good index. It does not include the numerous cables and other dispatches that Eisenhower sent to Marshall, and the annotations often fail to clarify or explain. Save for its focus on Eisenhower's growth in confidence and leadership, this endeavor constitutes, at best, a convenient short cut for those who do not have time to examine the Chandler edition of Eisenhower's wartime papers, the magisterial biography of Marshall by Forrest C. Pogue, or the relevant installments in the multivolume official history, the *United States Army in World War II*.

Dear Miss Em makes available documents of a different type—the hurried, cryptic, personal, almost daily letters of a field commander in the Southwest Pacific to his wife. Conscious of security and the censor, Robert L. Eichelberger could not, like Eisenhower, discuss future plans or evaluate fellow officers; indeed he was most circumspect when alluding to individuals within Douglas MacArthur's theater of operations. Only the most knowledgeable specialist will learn very much more of importance from these letters than can be found in the general's *Our Jungle Road to Tokyo* (1950). On the other hand, through an eight-page preface,

a twenty-three-page introduction, informative passages connecting the letters, and full annotations of the text, Luvaas provides a splendid portrait of Eichelberger as a soldier and a perceptive appraisal of his contributions to the campaigns in New Guinea and the Philippines. So outstanding is Luvaas's part of the book that the reader must regret his decision not to attempt a biography. The scholarly world certainly has today a greater need of studies of military professionals in peacetime than of additional accounts of their role in the Second World War.

The principal item in the third volume is the unabridged text of Eisenhower's televised conversation with Alistair Cooke after Churchill's death. It also contains Cooke's brief description of the former general and president in retirement at Gettysburg, Eisenhower's unusually eloquent tribute to Churchill over the BBC on January 30, 1965, and a four-paragraph extract from the oral history records at the George C. Marshall Research Library in which the wartime chief of staff comments on the alleged consequences of the failure to occupy Berlin in 1945 before the Russians. There are also over thirty striking illustrations, many of which were not familiar to me.

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RAYMOND G. O'CONNOR. *Diplomacy for Victory: FDR and Unconditional Surrender*. (The Norton Essays in American History.) New York: W. W. Norton and Company. 1971. Pp. xiii, 143. \$6.50.

This volume is part of the Norton series of brief ventilations of important historic decisions. The focus is upon the unconditional surrender formula, but the narrative is enriched by ample background material. Since Professor O'Connor's findings rest upon familiar sources, specialists will find few new facts. But the interpretations are provocative, for the author is partial to FDR at a time when this has become unfashionable.

O'Connor's analysis of Roosevelt's thinking in the realm of foreign policy is perceptive. He rightly emphasizes FDR's determination to profit from Wilson's 1918 mistake by, in this war, teaching the Germans the lesson of utter

defeat. The author upholds the wisdom of the Casablanca demand for unconditional surrender. The formula, he argues, provided a cover up for the Darlan deal, helped reconcile Stalin to delay in invading France, and established a least common denominator goal for the grand coalition. That rigid surrender terms unduly prolonged Nazi resistance is countered by noting that Hitler could only have been overthrown by a military dictatorship that would not have yielded on terms acceptable to the Allies. Moreover, Roosevelt's dogged adherence to the Casablanca pronouncement helped avert a perilous break between the Western powers and Moscow.

O'Connor is thoroughly familiar with revisionist literature but is seldom convinced by its arguments. He upholds Roosevelt's major decisions at Yalta and brushes aside Alperovitz's hypothesis on the dropping of the a-bombs. Yet the argument here is cloudy, for after proving military justification for Truman's decision, the author makes a moral case against it.

If the author is "soft" on Roosevelt, he bears down too heavily on Churchill, laying most of the president's admitted errors to the wiles of the prime minister. No doubt Churchill tried to pollute Allied war aims by territorial deals with the Soviets, and he probably delayed the fall of nazidom by insisting upon the nugatory Mediterranean diversions. Nonetheless his decision to stand up to Hitler when his country fought alone in 1940 entitles Churchill to be remembered as the chief architect of the Allied triumph.

SELIG ADLER

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W. A. SWANBERG. *Luce and His Empire*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1972. Pp. xiii, 529. \$12.50.

ROBERT T. ELSON. *The World of Time, Inc.: The Intimate History of a Publishing Enterprise*. Volume 2, 1941-1960. Edited by DUNCAN NORTON-TAYLOR. New York: Atheneum. 1973. Pp. xiv, 505. \$10.00.

To call Swanberg's book a hatchet job and Elson's a whitewash is too simple a judgment. For the record, both books are about Henry R. Luce, whose peripatetic shadow covered all the

vicissitudes of *Time* from its conception in 1922 until his death forty-five years later.

The point of Elson's study is that *Time* seemed to fit the requirements of America's middle-class businessmen and housewives who set aside a couple of hours each week to keep informed. The success of *Time*—Luce's success—was to avoid giving the readers objective news and instead to create a journalistic style that was half entertainment, half information, and always subjective. Luce's prejudices were dominant in nearly all copy. His concern for Chiang Kai-shek's government and his loathing of "godless Communism" were the hallmarks of *Time*, *Life*, and *Fortune*.

Elson's earlier volume described Luce's (that is, *Time*'s) rise and financial success when the rest of the country was mired in the depression. Swanberg describes this as a paradoxical development. Briton Hadden's innovation and acumen produced profit, but Luce's partner died in 1929 to leave Luce sitting alone at the managerial desk—rich, powerful, and ready to begin a life-and-death struggle with the "monolithic world conspiracy" directed by the Kremlin. Luce's birth and upbringing in a Chinese missionary compound, his fierce competitiveness as a schoolboy, and the cravings of the literary dilettante take up less than ninety pages in Swanberg's work, leaving over four-hundred more to chronicle Luce's pursuit of truth and power.

Elson more narrowly views Luce as the Time-Life boss; nearly everything going on in the Rockefeller Plaza offices was under Luce's scrutiny. But Elson (whom Swanberg alludes to as "the tactful Elson") sees Luce's touch as light, well intentioned, and benign. Thus in Elson's company history Luce is viewed as a master business executive with forgivable prejudices, while in Swanberg's biography Luce emerges as a paranoid millionaire. Swanberg indicates that Luce's Presbyterian background was a dominant factor in his life, so that his journalistic and business successes were a mere façade to the really important mission of converting the world to his WASPish view of "the American way of life."

In retrospect, Swanberg sees many of America's anxieties in world affairs attributable to Luce's slanted news stories about the Soviet Union, beginning with diplomatic recognition

in 1933 and continuing even during World War II by planting notions of a gigantic, inevitable World War III to rid the globe of communism forever. Indeed, much of Swanberg's focus is on the cold war, which he indicates was a Luce-contrived endeavor to impose a *Pax Americana* on the world. The trouble with this argument is that it assumes that a single but powerful propaganda instrument (in the hands of the political opposition, incidentally) was able to direct American foreign policy and sway public opinion throughout the postwar generation.

Of course it could be argued that Luce was the epitome of America's intellectual problem from the outset in 1776—a feeling of mission that constantly collides with realities and expediencies, causing anguish because we know we are not what we profess to be. Depending on the viewpoint, the result may be an anxiety-ridden man or nation, full of guilt and a sense of having sinned simply by not being always full-tilt in the war against Evil.

Luce's wife, Clare Boothe Luce, is seen in Elson's book as *Time* staffers apparently saw her—the boss's wife who was a newsmaker in her own right—and thus always a problem. Swanberg views Mrs. Luce as an ambitious and talented lady who in any case would have attained those reaches of power (a seat in Congress, an ambassadorship) to which her husband aspired but never possessed.

Neither book has the trappings of a scholarly work, for Elson's footnotes are additives rather than supportives, while many of Swanberg's paginated citations are of "private source" or "as told to author" vagueness. Elson's numerous interoffice memorandums offer instruction on big business thinking, but both works are marred by allusions to unidentified sources, and many of Swanberg's quotations are repetitive and tedious. Judicious editorial excisions would have benefited both books considerably.

Elson's book is certainly a cut above the conventional company history, and, given the circumstances, he has been forthright (although not as much as in his first volume). Swanberg's work, while more readable and comprehensive, leaves a suspicion that his Luce is a neurotic True Believer who flagrantly misused his power. As a follow up to his biographies of Hearst and Pulitzer it stands midway in merit; his subject

was an intellectual giant compared to Hearst, but not the peer of Pulitzer, the dedicated newsman with democratic instincts. These two books will contribute toward what is still needed—a fair assessment of Luce's role in the shaping of American attitudes and foreign policy during the critical generation that began with the New Deal euphoria and lost its dream on a Dallas thoroughfare.

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DONALD R. MCCOY and RICHARD T. RUETTEN.
Quest and Response: Minority Rights and the Truman Administration. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1973. Pp. ix, 427. \$12.00.

Donald R. McCoy and Richard T. Ruetten have written a useful and well-researched survey of the civil rights policies of the Truman administration. The focus of the book is Truman and his political and personal commitment to civil rights from 1945 to 1953, which the authors contrast sharply with the indifference to race issues of liberal idols Roosevelt and Stevenson and with the inaction of Eisenhower. Even the numerous recent critics of the Truman years concede his creditable position on civil rights. McCoy and Ruetten include new material on Jews, American Indians, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, and Orientals in their consideration of minority civil rights, but they exclude women although Truman condemned sex discrimination in his 1947 Economic Report (p. 70).

World War II and the impact on minorities of high wartime wages, geographical mobility, and service in the military provided the catalyst for change. These forces produced new support for an urban coalition of civil rights groups led by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the Urban League. The middle-class professional leadership of these groups spoke through the Negro press and used its contacts in the federal bureaucracy and the political parties to push for racial justice. They found Truman personally responsive to civil rights arguments and in the context of the 1948 election eager to secure urban votes.

Truman's major contributions to the civil rights cause were the well-known executive

orders to end segregation in the military and in the federal bureaucracy, his public advocacy of civil rights, and the *amicus curiae* briefs filed by the Justice Department in support of major NAACP cases.

The authors agree that the achievements of the Truman years were, however, limited. As Truman's political fortunes rose and fell again after 1948, so did those of civil rights. Even the president regularly subordinated civil rights legislation to foreign policy and economic issues. The major black demand for a permanent Fair Employment Practices Commission was never met. A reactionary Congress made it more difficult to vote cloture on filibusters, the army dragged its feet on integration until the chaos of retreat in Korea, and executive orders and court decisions were ignored or circumvented.

An examination of race issues in the mass media explores the postwar public mood, but no effort is made in this study to assess the impact of the social changes of World War II on white racism. It is hard to accept the authors' conclusion that significant gains for civil rights during the Truman years and within the established political system encouraged a generation of activists after 1954. Success within the system does not stimulate civil disobedience.

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Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, volume 8, *The Far East*; 1947, volume 6, *The Far East*. (Department of State Publication 8554; 8606.) Washington: Government Printing Office. 1971; 1972. Pp. viii, 1137; ix, 1159. \$5.75; \$6.00.

The magnitude of America's global involvement in the post-World War II period has necessitated the expansion of the official record of U.S. foreign policy. The Foreign Relations series for the years 1946 and 1947 comprise a total of nineteen volumes—eleven for 1946, and because of a new attempt to shorten the time lag for the appearance of each set, eight for 1947. Volumes 8 for 1946 and 6 for 1947 deal with a segment of United States Far Eastern policy, and both contain documents relative to Burma, French Indochina, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines, and Siam. Both have the standard lists of ab-

brevisions as part of the frontal material, rather complete indexes, and contain intradepartmental records as well as items originating in other executive agencies.

To say that these materials are vital in the assessment of United States Far Eastern policy is to understate their value, though obviously some sections treat topics already rather fully documented. Those segments of each volume dealing with Japan, while not telling a different story, provide additional detail on such topics as occupation and control, apprehension and prosecution of war criminals, war claims and reparations. They also shed more light on General MacArthur's relationship with the Far Eastern Commission and on American policy toward the Soviet Union's interest in Japan. The Japanese topic consists of 519 pages in the volume for 1946 and 439 pages in the one for 1947.

The Korean materials focus on the problem of Soviet-American differences and the difficulty in arriving at a satisfactory provisional government and an end to the occupation. Interestingly, the volume for 1947 contains considerable State and Defense department discussion on the relative military unimportance of Korea to the security of United States interests in the Pacific. Because of problems with Korean rightists and because Syngman Rhee was already in bad odor in Washington, many U.S. policymakers wanted to conclude an early withdrawal of American troops, if they could do so "with a minimum of bad effects."

The Southeast Asian sections of the volumes, reflecting the diplomatic activity in each area, contain relatively few documents on Burma, the Philippines, and Siam and a great many on the Netherlands East Indies and Indochina. American concern for Burma in 1946 related mainly to the issue of Burmese independence and the desire on the part of the United States to see Great Britain foster a peaceful transition to self-government. In 1947 the topic was the establishment of Burmese-American diplomatic relations. The Philippine items deal with the granting of political independence and the multitude of economic questions attending the severance of formal Philippine-American ties. Aside from the boundary question, which also involves Indochina, these documents on Siamese-American relations pertain largely to the

tidying-up of wartime disputes. In the case of the Netherlands East Indies, the documents make clear that the United States wanted the Dutch to satisfy Indonesian nationalist demands in such a way as to perpetuate a measure of Western influence.

In view of the importance it was later to assume, French Indochina is easily the most interesting Southeast Asia item treated in these volumes. Within this subject, most materials concern the U.S. interest in Sino-French negotiations for Chinese withdrawal from Northern Indochina, the French-Vietnamese agreement of March 1946, and American apprehension about the failure of the latter. The documents demonstrate that the United States favored a full and rapid implementation of the March 6 accord and considered a pro-Soviet Communist regime an unsatisfactory alternative in Indochina. But it was not just to prevent Communist advance that the United States wished to see French influence preserved. In a policy statement of 1946, most significant because of its geopolitical thrust, Secretary of State James Byrnes revealed the basic American position: "French influence is important not only as an antidote to Soviet influence but to protect Vietnam and S.E.A. from future Chinese imperialism." At the same time, the volume for 1947 tells the story of American exasperation with the French and of the U.S. desire for a liberal settlement. Those who study the Vietnam issue will find plenty to suggest how the United States became involved in the absence of venal, sinister, or, except peripherally, even material motives.

In summary, these volumes contain the basic documents on American policy toward Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia for 1946 and 1947. They are the raw materials of history that no student of this aspect of American foreign policy should overlook.

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Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946. Volume 1, General; The United Nations. (Department of State Publication 8573.) Washington: Government Printing Office. 1972. Pp. xiii, 1544. \$7.25.

This volume of *Foreign Relations of the United States* provides abundant material, ex-

pertly compiled and annotated, on U.S. policy in 1946 toward the United Nations, international trusteeship, the control of atomic energy and other arms regulation problems, and national security concerns such as U.S. base-rights and arms supplies to other countries. A variety of other issues are also covered, many of them documenting the importance of ecological issues to world politics: U.S. policy on foreign oil resources; international whaling treaties; famine relief; and Antarctica.

A major theme running through these documents is the tension between internationalist idealism and the imperatives of self-reliance. The State Department urged that Washington withhold arms from the Netherlands, Portugal, and France so that these countries could not suppress national liberation movements around the world. Alas, this desideratum came immediately into conflict with the U.S. desire for bases in areas controlled by these same countries (Casablanca, the Azores, etc.).

American idealism, as we know, often tends toward acute self-righteousness. If we cannot persuade the USSR to cooperate within the UN framework, then—Under Secretary of State Acheson is reported to have said—we should "plan to lick the hell out of them in 10 or 15 years" (p. 985). Major General Leslie Groves deliberated international control of atomic energy, but he thought a realistic policy would be to plan to destroy the capability of any hostile power to threaten the U.S. with atomic weapons (p. 1198). The State Department's H. Freeman Matthews informed a State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee that the USSR was not really worried about the "capitalist encirclement" (p. 1167). And few who read George Kennan's Reith Lectures of 1957 could hope to find a more Manichean interpretation of the USSR and disarmament than the National War College pundit put forward in a 1946 letter to Dean Acheson (p. 861). Alger Hiss also performs consistently throughout this volume to conform to cold war canons rather than those of a covert Communist sympathizer. (He cautioned, for example, that we not declare our military attachés abroad in any statement of stationed forces.)

Much of the material provides grist for analysis in terms of a rational actor versus organizational-process model of decision making.

The U.S. delegates at the United Nations, especially those with Bernard Baruch's team negotiating on atomic energy control, felt that various authorities and bureaucracies in Washington were either too soft or too unbending on the issues of the day; too distant or too commanding in their direction of day-to-day operations at the UN. One sees also the heavy stamp of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (among them General Eisenhower)—mouthing slogans about international cooperation, but fearful of any concessions to the other side. More important than these factors, however, are differences of personality and perspective. Bernard Baruch warned President Truman that he wanted a rather free hand; Truman and Secretary of State Byrnes played up to the great man; in the end it was Acheson vs. Baruch over and over again (the latter usually "winning").

Though most of the materials presented are American, there is enough to suggest the vast amount of misperception taking place between U.S. and Soviet negotiators. Direct quotes or paraphrases of statements by the Soviet representatives (e.g., Boris Shtein, A. A. Sobolev, or even V. M. Molotov) make them appear like reasonable men negotiating to protect national interests amid what can only be termed a capitalist encirclement at Turtle Bay. The interpretations that U.S. negotiators then reported to Washington are generally in the 1946 Manichean style of Mr. Kennan.

Joseph Liberman's *Scorpion and the Tarentula* (1970) on this same period speaks of "a failure of statecraft," rather than of inevitable conflict between the superpowers. Given the mental sets of the day, the forces conducive to cold war conflict were at least likely to prevail for years. One of the sanest voices of the time, however, was that of Charles Bohlen (p. 1104).

One disappointment in this volume is the persistent deletion of views on Japanese Mandated Islands and Central Pacific Islands detached from Japan (e.g., p. 1114).

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Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947. Volume 4, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union. (Department of State Publication 8532.) Washington: Government Printing Office. 1972. Pp. x, 887. \$5.25.

In 1973 this collection of documents reads as though it were the story of a remote age. We have witnessed friendly reciprocal visits by President Nixon and Secretary General Brezhnev, while 1947 was the second year of cold war. We are aware of the existence of centers of power other than Washington and Moscow and of the rise of the Third World. In 1947 only the United States and the Soviet Union really counted, the other great powers having been either greatly weakened by the Second World War or defeated. The process of disintegration of colonial empires had hardly begun at that time. The world looked truly bipolar.

If one overlooks the ideological factor, the cold war was in essence a struggle between the two giant states for influence in Europe and the Near East. The year 1947 was the year of the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, of the Cominform and the Soviet theory of two hostile camps. The United States was extending its protection to Western Europe, Turkey, and Greece, and formulated the doctrine of containment with its worldwide implications. It took over Britain's former role of opposing Russian influence in the Near East and the Mediterranean Sea. The Soviet Union was rapidly consolidating its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.

The present collection mainly tells the story of Eastern Europe. The United States was fighting there a losing battle to retain some semblance of influence, while the Soviet Union and the East European Communists were crushing the non-Communist opposition with its pro-Western sympathies and eliminating the last vestiges of American influence. The reports by the American diplomatic missions depict correctly the process of "Sovietization," which was to be completed only in 1948. They tell about the Communist terror; rigged elections (except in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, where free elections produced non-Communist parliamentary majorities); the uneven struggle of non-Communist parties for survival; the vain hopes of opposition leaders for some American assistance in counterbalancing the ominous presence of Soviet troops; and the helplessness of American diplomats whose only weapons were protesting and ineffective notes. The intimidated and discouraged opposition politi-

cians were eventually arrested and imprisoned, like Juliu Maniu and other non-Communist leaders in Romania or the many deputies of the Smallholders' party in Hungary. Others, like the popular Bulgarian peasant leader, Nikola Petkov, were executed. Still other leading figures were allowed to flee abroad, like the Hungarian prime minister, Ferenc Nagy, and the president of the Hungarian National Assembly, Bela Varga. Romania's King Michael could peacefully depart after abdication. The dramatic story of the American rescue of the Polish opposition leader, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk (pp. 460-64) leaves the reader with a question: How could the officials of the American Embassy—probably closely watched by the Polish and Soviet security police—and Mikolajczyk—presumably also under police surveillance—manage to carry out the plan smoothly and escape attention? Did the security police perhaps close their eyes to get rid of Mikolajczyk, as the Hungarian Communists did in the cases of Nagy and Varga?

The only East European country where the mood was more optimistic was Czechoslovakia. The parliamentary majority was non-Communist, as was the composition of the government. The non-Communist politicians imagined that their country would play the role of a bridge between the West and the East, although Moscow gave a warning in 1947 by forcing the Czechoslovak government to renounce its former intention to take part in the Marshall Plan. The politically naive but sympathetic foreign minister, Jan Masaryk, assured the State Department on October 29, 1947, that his people would not succumb to the fate of the rest of Eastern Europe because "they are a different type of Slav, have a more advanced culture, and cherish their independence" (p. 238). Did he seriously mean that allegedly "less culturally advanced" Poles, Hungarians, Yugoslavs, Romanians, and Bulgarians did not care about remaining independent? Other non-Communist Czech leaders hoped more realistically that President Beneš would prevent the Communist seizure of power by calling new elections in case of emergency (p. 241). This is what he failed to do in 1948. The American Embassy mentioned his poor condition of health in 1947 (pp. 231 and 248), a factor that

was to play an important role in the success of the Communist coup.

The cold war brought about a change in the American attitude regarding the Polish western frontier as traced at the Potsdam Conference. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes formulated this new stand in his Stuttgart speech of September 6, 1946. His successor, George Marshall, reaffirmed the same position on April 9, 1947. Both suggested the desirability of a revision of the frontier in favor of Germany, although General Marshall conceded in a private talk with the former ambassador to Poland, Arthur Bliss Lane, that "our chances for changing the Polish frontier were very slender" (p. 428). One can conclude that the new attitude was motivated by reasons other than American relations with Poland. The cold-war reasons were rather obvious: the animosity toward the Soviet Union, which had already included Poland within its sphere of influence, and the desire to enlist German sympathies for the American policy of European balance of power. The American ambassadors in Warsaw looked at the problem from their local point of view and were unhappy. Ambassador Bliss Lane told General Marshall that the American stand "would cause . . . a lasting resentment on the part of the Polish people" (p. 426). His successor in Warsaw, Stanton Griffis, also favored "the final settlement . . . in favor of the Poles," because, as he said, "the one subject on which all Poles . . . are united is the question of the Western borders" (p. 445). The British government supported the new American view and also favored the revision of the frontier in favor of Germany (p. 538). This American-British policy had been a factor in the West German claim for the return to the 1937 frontiers. In 1970 the end of the cold war eventually brought the Moscow and Warsaw treaties, with their West German recognition of the validity of the Oder-Neisse frontier. Both Washington and London approved the conclusion of those treaties.

The mutually hostile American-Soviet relations were reflected in 1947 in the inauguration of the Voice of America broadcasts in Russian, an answer to the Soviet anti-American propaganda; the dispute over repayment of the So-

viet Union's wartime lend-lease debt; the non-recognition of Soviet annexation of the Baltic countries; and the quarrel over the right of American citizens' Soviet wives to leave Russia and the fate of American citizens arrested by the Soviet authorities.

It is interesting that the American Embassy in Moscow reported as early as 1947 on the Soviet anti-Jewish policy (the numerous restrictions in admission to higher educational institutions, exclusion from the diplomatic service, the military academies, higher party and state positions, and so on; see pp. 584 and 629). The effect of this policy was a greater consciousness among Soviet Jews of belonging to a distinct national group and a tendency for them to close ranks. Was the discrimination against the Jews due to the expectation that a Jewish state would soon be created in the Near East?

There is no explanation why Washington did not seriously examine the worthwhile suggestion of Vasily A. Tarasenko, the counsellor at the Soviet Embassy and himself a Ukrainian, to establish separate diplomatic relations with the Soviet Ukrainian Republic (pp. 536-37).

Relations with Yugoslavia were as bad as those with other Communist-controlled East European countries, partly because of the unfriendly American attitude toward Yugoslav territorial claims (Trieste and Austrian Carinthia) and the American reluctance to extradite Yugoslav war criminals, such as the Ustashe. However, the American representatives in Belgrade, John M. Cabot and Ambassador Cavenish W. Cannon, prophetically predicted that independent-minded Yugoslav Communists might eventually end by discovering the conflict of national interests between their country and the Soviet Union, and that they might be irked by Russian tutelage (pp. 763, 807, 821, 824-26, and 842).

The present volume will be useful to anyone with a scholarly interest in the history of 1947, but it does not offer any startling revelations.

W. W. KULSKI
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NEIL R. MCMILLEN, *The Citizens' Council: Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruc-*

tion, 1954-64. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1971. Pp. xii, 397. \$10.95.

In the decade following the *Brown* decision by the Supreme Court, newspapers and magazines reported the rise of the Citizens' Councils and their militant opposition to school desegregation. Derisively referring to the councilors as "button-down bigots" or "the country club Klan," journalists contended that they were upper-middle and upper-class whites who, abhorring the violence of the Ku Klux Klan, used "legal" means to prevent the integration of Southern public schools. The Councils, or Council-like organizations, employed massive resistance to block the "second reconstruction," but federal power overwhelmed them, or so readers were told.

Neil McMillen, professor of history at the University of Southern Mississippi, exposes the superficiality of that interpretation in this splendidly researched and highly readable study. Yankee-born, but an adopted Southerner, McMillen eschews invective and moral indignation; he does not find the members of the Councils to be depraved, evil, or neurotic. The study rests on a thorough utilization of Council publications, interviews of the Council leadership, newspaper accounts, and the collections of the Southern Education Reporting Service and the Anti-Defamation League.

The author's analysis of this grass roots movement is divided into three parts. The first section describes the rise of the Council and its leadership. Despite claims of mass membership, the Councils had little success in attracting a large, continuing body of supporters. Membership was drawn from the business and professional elite of the Deep South, and the political and economic pressure that they exerted was far more powerful than liberals in the North and South realized. In the second part of the book McMillen probes the ideology of massive resistance that was based upon a belief in black biological inferiority. Many of the leaders of the Council were college graduates, and several had degrees from Ivy League schools, but they universally believed in the subhumaneness of their black neighbors. In the last portion McMillen reveals how the Council thwarted integration by economic pressure, political solidarity, and other "legal" means.

The strategy of the Council was more sophisticated than its opponents were willing to concede, though there is also evidence that individual councilors rejected nonviolent tactics and turned to the shotgun and the firebrand.

This masterful study provides new insights into the methods and ideology of the opponents of integration. However, McMillen does not present a systematic analysis of the Council's membership, nor does he explain the continuing support for the Council in Mississippi. Northern, urban liberals, unable to understand the opposition to busing by their neighbors, should be required to read this book.

KEITH L. BRYANT, JR.
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Milwaukee

RICHARD J. BARNET. *Roots of War*. New York: Atheneum. 1972. Pp. 350. \$10.00.

"America's permanent war can be explained primarily by looking at American society, and . . . America's wars will cease only if that society is changed." So states Richard Barnet, formerly a State Department official and a Department of Defense consultant and now codirector of the Institute of Policy Studies, in this important Left-liberal analysis of the structure and institutions of American foreign policy since World War II. He uses historical studies, social theory, and personal impressions, but not archival materials, to analyze the style of the national security managers, the quest for economic expansion by big business, and the manipulation of the electorate. Rejecting theories of class domination and of the Leninist-style American imperialism, Barnet's formulation ultimately relies upon elite theory, portions of William A. Williams's conception of *Open Door* expansionism, and notions of growing splits between the leaders of big business and the national security managers. Unlike C. Wright Mills, to whom Barnet is heavily indebted, he usually views the military as subservient to these managers and seldom as members of the policy-making elite.

At the center of Barnet's analysis are the national security managers, the high-level appointed members of the administration who have dominated foreign policy. He maintains that they love to exercise power and com-

fortably commit what he calls "bureaucratic homicide"—impersonal killing by technology deployed through the division of labor. Drawn primarily from the upper class, they have a distinctive style: they have firm notions of bureaucratic loyalty, do not voice their dissent publicly, maintain ardent respect for tough-mindedness, and display a marked capacity to survive under different presidents. They regard themselves as reasonable men, as anti-communists who avoid the excesses of Joseph McCarthy or Curtis LeMay, but act with resolution and intelligence to stop communism. Often, as in the cases of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, he concludes that they acted for economic reasons, but such considerations were neither exclusive nor even always primary in the course of their shaping foreign policies. "Glory, honor, fear, or the sheer fun of winning" may dominate. These managers could and often did maintain their autonomy, and their effort to expand the nation's influence and power was part of their quest for self-aggrandizement, which they easily wedded to the national interest. Big business did not have ultimate power, but the business creed, which both groups shared, promoted a coalescence of interest on most important issues.

Big businessmen, according to Barnet, usually supported the aggressive foreign policy of intervention ("counterrevolution") during the cold war in order to protect the conditions for economic expansion abroad. They wanted access to raw materials, markets, and investment opportunities. Unlike the national security managers, according to Barnet, big businessmen were not interested in extending the nation's influence and power for their own sake, and sometimes their quest for profits led them to undermine or circumvent particular foreign policies. In turn, he also contends that the national security managers saw economic opportunity abroad more clearly than did business leaders, and he argues that an expansionist government pushed timid investors into markets in the third world. Since the mid-sixties, he asserts, more serious conflicts have emerged between the self-defined economic interests of the state and those of the major corporations: "The costs of maintaining the imperial system began to outweigh the benefits as far as the

major corporations were concerned, particularly since these costs were in large measure shifted to the corporations themselves." The Vietnam War, for Barnet, is a major case in point. Directly rejecting Leninist and Luxemburgian theories about the inevitability of war under capitalism, Barnet borrows heavily from Karl Kautsky and argues that the multinational corporations, like Kautsky's cartels of "ultraimperialism," lead to international cooperation and peace. Barnet, like Robert Tucker and Barrington Moore, also denies that the American economy requires economic expansion in the third world and must preserve access to raw materials through "informal empire" or other very exploitive techniques. Even communist countries, he contends, will sell the United States needed materials, and at only slightly higher prices. Barnet is unclear on whether the American economy requires economic expansion abroad, but he thinks that the methods of expansion can be more friendly and that this modification of imperialism is a political, not an economic, problem.

Barnet's volume, admittedly often a synthesis of others' thought, is a telling critique of conventional theories about pluralism and the cold war and an oblique rejoinder to the Richard Neustadt-Graham Allison mode of bureaucratic analysis. The book is also a challenging critique of radical theories about the cold war, economic imperatives, and the ideological conception of the Open Door. Too often, unfortunately, Barnet does not acknowledge the suppleness of these radical theories, criticizes them on narrow and unconvincing grounds, and presents instead a loose, seemingly *ad hoc*, often unsatisfactory set of formulations. He is probably most successful, and certainly least theoretical, in surveying the ways that the national security managers manipulated public opinion and thereby greatly contributed to the shaping of the cold war consensus. His analysis of this process is rich in insights and sharply rebuts claims that Roosevelt and Truman acted within the narrow constraints of public opinion and partisan politics and therefore were unable to follow policies that might have avoided the cold war. This committed and passionate, but not angry, book should justifiably command the attention of a profession that has too long avoided issues of imperialism, class or elite

domination, ideology, and the manipulation of the electorate in the study of United States history.

BARTON J. BERNSTEIN
Stanford University

JACK V. BUERKLE and DANNY BARKER. *Bourbon Street Black: The New Orleans Black Jazzman*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. Pp. xi, 244. \$7.95.

Well, we can scratch blowing the blues in New Orleans from our dwindling list of Walter Mitty fantasies. The life of the jazzman in New Orleans sounds about as exotic as that of the historian in Carbondale.

The authors describe *Bourbon Street Black* as a scientific study of a social-psychological-status community. (Sociologist Buerkle does, anyway. Sexagenarian-jazzman Barker's surprise at finding himself a lifelong member of such a thing may be comparable to M. Jourdain's discovery that he had been talking prose for forty years.) This semicomunity is composed of a core of some four hundred jazzmen, their families, their music teachers, and a periphery of perhaps two thousand persons who are supportive of the core. A significant commitment to music is the distinguishing characteristic of this community.

Something like *Bourbon Street Black* undoubtedly does exist. It resulted from the musical interaction of the once privileged "creoles of color" and the "uptown blacks." The prestigious music teachers were vital to its continuation generation after generation. Black children grew up surrounded by "the music" and any who showed talent were welcomed into the community.

The unique contribution of *Bourbon Street Black* consists of a statistical study of the lives and attitudes of fifty-one jazzmen who represent about one-eighth of the membership of the black musicians union. They emerge as a stable and tolerant group contentedly practicing their craft. They are on the oldish side—the average age is almost fifty—mostly because the white customers expect to see old, black jazzmen playing the traditional music. (The young musicians play outside the Quarter or go on the road and replace the old men when the time comes.) Marriages are secure, 90 per cent of the families are intact, 61 per cent own their homes, 88 per cent are church members. After

work they go home to their families—not to wild jam sessions. (Public jam sessions are prohibited by the union!) To partake of drugs is to blot one's copybook good and proper. There is very little Crow Jim. Over one-half of them see no difference between white and black music and four-fifths say that neither is better.

Although limited in scope and significance this is an informative and entertaining book. Bourbon Street Black must be doubly proud of coauthor Barker. (They always knew that Danny was the greatest on rhythm guitar.)

GEORGE A. BOECK
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LATIN AMERICA

STEPHEN CLISSOLD. *Latin America: New World, Third World*. New York: Praeger Publishers. 1972. Pp. vii, 394. \$13.50.

A useful book on Latin America today might try to put that region into current perspective, to show how Indian and late medieval Spanish heritages collide with the strictures of modern technology to plunge the continent into an anguish that is and will be, essentially, our own. Such a book might view Latin America as a laboratory of the future, an immense caveat to the West, providing lessons all the more chilling for their intensity. Unfortunately this is not that book.

Scorning preface or introduction Clissold offers no guide as to where his book intends to go, nor does the book bear a significant relationship to the title. How Latin America is new or third is not explicated. What we have then is a rather amorphous product; some history, some nineteenth-century politics, some naive observations on the social structure, and some inaccurate comments on culture and inter-American relations. There are also some tables at the back, though the author himself admits that Latin American statistics are about as reliable as any other body count and presidents outdated more quickly than you can say "al paredón." Because the tone is late 1950s, "the lesser breeds without the Law," the book might be recommended to graduate students as an exercise in historiography.

If historians live in the past, Clissold lives there more than most. Speaking of the discrepancy between United States and Latin American technology he says that "Caliban has grown up into a computerized colossus. No comforting myth of Latin America's superior concern for spiritual values can explain away the grave disparity in technological levels. In an age of communication satellites and space travel even Ariel may find himself obsolete." Clissold fails to understand that when Ariel is obsolete, we are all obsolete.

ALICIA BETSY EDWARDS
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ROBERT KERN, editor, with the assistance of RONALD DOLKART. *The Caciques: Oligarchical Politics and the System of Caciquismo in the Luso-Hispanic World*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 1973. Pp. 202. \$10.00.

This book presents a collection of essays on the subject of caciquismo, the local-level political bossism commonly found in the Iberian and Latin American world (the word cacique comes from a Caribbean Indian term, *tlatoque*, meaning local governor or chief). Some of the chapters have a general focus: Charles Gibson and Karl H. Schwerin describe the pre-Colombian and colonial characteristics of caciquismo; in a three-part essay Marshall R. Nason traces its origin, appearances, and implications in fictional writing; William J. Brisk postulates the emergence of a "new" caciquismo in modern Latin America. The other essays deal with concrete, empirical problems: Robert Kern writes on Spain, Howard L. Karno on Peru, Eul-Soo Pang on Brazil, and Antonio Ugalde and Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr. on differing facets of contemporary Mexico.

One virtue of the volume lies in the importance of the subject. The cacique has been a ubiquitous figure in Latin American society, widely discussed but rarely studied. The book, especially in its historical dimension, begins to fill a major gap. A second merit is the generally high quality of the individual papers. Limitations on space do not permit full discussion of each essay here; for historians, however, it seems to me that the contributions by Gibson, Pang, Ugalde, and Cornelius deserve

special mention because they focus, in one way or another, upon the adaptation of political leadership to changing social environments. Analytical as well as descriptive, these pieces are sensitive, thoughtful, and original. A third positive feature of the book is the cumulative breadth of treatment. The essays represent a number of fields—anthropology, history, literature, sociology, political science—and the contributors adopt a variety of approaches to the matter at hand. By covering diverse chronological and geographical situations they also satisfy some basic preconditions for fruitful comparative analysis.

But in this same connection I think the volume suffers from an excess of virtue, for it lacks rigorous conceptual coherence. The editors attempt to define *caciquismo* as “an oligarchical system of politics run by a diffuse and heterogeneous elite whose common denominator is local power used for national purposes” (pp. 1–2). The definition is not entirely clear, resting as it does upon unqualified abstractions: “oligarchy,” “elite,” “power,” “national purposes.” Moreover some of the contributors give definitions of their own (see, for example, pp. 76, 121–24, 137–38). Consequently it seems doubtful that all the authors are discussing the same phenomenon. Thus the book comes off as being more multidisciplinary in approach than interdisciplinary.

Several authors also disagree on crucial points, such as the socioeconomic conditions that give rise to *caciquismo*. Pang, Karno, and the editors appear to believe that urbanization, industrialization, role differentiation, and other concomitants of societal development are bringing an end to *caciquismo*; Cornelius explicitly (and convincingly) rejects this view, and Brisk emphasizes the adaptation of *caciquismo* to modern situations. One can argue, of course, that scholarly contention offers the most productive path to knowledge; but it is unfortunate that the editors did not take up such questions in an extended introduction or in a concluding chapter. As a result the whole of *The Caciques* amounts to something less than the sum of its parts.

PETER H. SMITH
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Madison

RAYMOND PROCTOR. *Agonia de un neutral (Las relaciones hispanoalemanas durante la segunda guerra mundial y la División Azul)*. Madrid: Editora Nacional. 1972. Pp. 354. 300 ptas.

In the summer of 1941, shortly after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, Spain sent a division of about seventeen thousand men to fight with the German army on the northern front near Novgorod between October 1941 and November 1943. Some were volunteers enrolled by the Falange; hence the name Blue Division from the color of the Falange shirts. The majority were regular army soldiers, and all officers above the grade of lieutenant were professionals. The division was commanded by one of Franco's most trusted collaborators, General Agustín Muñoz Grandes. The project was always controversial within Spain. Franco's brother-in-law, Ramón Serrano Suñer, was one of its most ardent proponents, and the division was formed during the time of Serrano's greatest influence. It was never liked by the minister of the army, General Varela, nor by General Jordana, who succeeded Serrano Suñer as foreign minister in September 1942. On the Russian front the central army command refused to accept the division, but several generals on the Leningrad front later decorated a number of Spaniards and praised the conduct of the division as a whole. The subject, when not entirely neglected, has been controversial among journalists, diplomats, and historians. For the liberals and the Left, the very existence of the division was proof of Franco's virtual alliance with the fascist powers. Many Anglo-American conservatives who generally supported Franco nevertheless felt righteous indignation at the spectacle of his direct aid to Germany while England and the United States were at war with Hitler. General Franco himself took the position that there were two wars going on, a war between Germany and the Anglo-Saxon powers, toward which he claimed to be completely neutral, and a war against communism, in which his sympathy and a modicum of direct support were engaged on the German side.

Professor Proctor's book is the first scholarly treatment of the Blue Division. In regard to the surrounding diplomacy, he synthesizes clearly and draws together the information available from such historians as Herbert Feis

and Chester Wilmot, from several ambassadorial memoirs, and from the *Documents on German Foreign Policy*. His military account is not quite as detailed, but it is much better documented than that of Emilio Esteban-Infantes, *La División Azul* (1956). Proctor's main contribution comes from his access to the Spanish military archives and his interviews with surviving members of the division. His inter-

pretation is candidly sympathetic to the Blue Division, seen as heroic in action and maligned as a result of two factors: political intrigues within Spain and Germany and the pro-Allied war passions of most English and American commentators.

GABRIEL JACKSON
*University of California,
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Communications

A communication will be considered only if it relates to an article or review published in this journal; publication of such a communication or of any part of it is solely at the editors' discretion. Limitations of space require that a communication concerning a review be no longer than the review to which it refers and in no case longer than 500 words. Communications concerning articles or review articles may be no more than 1,000 words, and the editors reserve the right to impose a lower limit. The schedule of publication and the time needed to send a communication to the author of the article or review in question for such reply as he may care to make virtually preclude the possibility of publication in the issue following that in which the original article or review appeared. Unless, in the editors' judgment, some major scholarly purpose is served, rejoinders will not be published.

TO THE EDITOR:

Three communications in the October 1973 *AHR* commented on Stephen H. Haliczer's article on "The Castilian Urban Patriciate and the Jewish Expulsions of 1480-92" (*AHR*, 78[1973]:35-62); also, a paragraph in J. Lee Shneidman's review of *The Sephardic Heritage* (p. 1036) refers to the same essay. In various degrees these writers doubt the soundness of Dr. Haliczer's thesis, which holds the converted Jews rather than the Catholic sovereigns responsible for the expulsion. But Haliczer's thesis calls for further observations. To start, his facts are unreliably researched; for example, he calls Friar Alonso de Espina, author of *Fortalitium fidei contra judaeos*, an Old Christian, although this individual has always been known as a

converso (cf. José Amador de los Rios, Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, Julio Caro Baroja, and others). Albert A. Sicoff expresses some doubt about Espina's Jewish descent, but Haliczer, not even phrasing his own opinion as tentative, calls Espina's tract "the most important Old Christian document." On the other hand, Alonso de Oropesa turns up under Haliczer's pen as a "typical *converso*," but no one ever disputed that Oropesa was one of the true Old Christians; Oropesa's own words, often reported (see, for example, Amador and Sicoff), leave no doubt of that. Further, Haliczer's footnotes 45, 59, and 60 refer respectively to pages 373, 287, and 147 of Luis Suárez Fernández's *Documentos acerca de la expulsión de los judíos* (1964), but these pages contain nothing of the matter they are supposed to be the source of in Haliczer's text. Also, he "traces" the segregation of Jews from the Christian community "at least as far back as 1477," when in fact—as far as concerns the fifteenth century—an order segregating Jews (as well as Moors, always similarly oppressed, although Haliczer never mentions them) was issued in Valladolid as early as January 2, 1412 (see Amador, *Historia social, política y religiosa de los judíos de España y Portugal*, p. 532).

Just as fallible is Haliczer's documentation for the so-called alliance of Isabella and Ferdinand with "the Castilian towns and their urban oligarchies," based, in his argument, on the supposed fact that the monarchs derived from the municipalities the greatest contribution to the war of Granada. If Haliczer had consulted the latest published research on his subject—Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada's *Castilla y la conquista del reino de Granada* (1967)—he would have seen that, although the municipali-

ties had to make great sacrifices in the war (just like the entire population, regardless of class, caste, race, or creed, town- or feudal-lord-status), theirs was not the "key military and economic role" in the war effort. The greater part of the finances, according to Ladero (p. 212), was obtained from the *cruzada*, raised in nationwide campaigns by preachers for the crusade against the Moors, and from the *décima*, a tenth of all rents levied on property owners six times during the war. Haliczzer himself, unwittingly, reveals the true character of the economic "alliance between the Crown and the urban oligarchies." He quotes specific amounts of contributions from a few minor towns to which, he continues, were added "forced loans"—"borrowed by the Crown from cities and wealthy private persons from 1489 to 1491." The fact of royally enforced loans ought to have alerted Haliczzer about who, in Castile, was "pressuring" whom.

But let us for a moment concede Haliczzer's claim that the cities contributed the bulk of the war effort (no matter whether or not the *conversos* ruled them—there is simply no way to establish the exact proportion of *conversos* in the population). How would this lead to the towns' "pressuring" the monarchs to expel the Jews against their own will, making them "bow," "yield," and "capitulate" to their subjects? Which magistrate would dare dictate to the Catholic sovereigns in March 1492, the date of the edict, when (and the timing is the cardinal point) the war of Granada was triumphantly won? Or does Haliczzer think that the victorious monarchs were now suddenly seized by gratitude to their humble subjects? Surely he must know that the gratitude felt by Isabella and Ferdinand belonged to and was expressed to God. Their edict to eliminate Spanish Judaism at the moment of the completion of Spain's *reconquista* might have been the fulfillment of a secret religious vow. Royal gratitude to mere humans is a different matter, however, subject to caprice and pragmatism. Plainly, Haliczzer's claim that the expulsion was forced on the monarchs by whatever reason is absurd.

Yet in his endeavor to sustain his thesis, he makes much of the apparent suddenness of the decision that he considers "poorly timed from the viewpoint of the interests of the Crown. . . . If the expulsion had really been a planned

carefully prepared action," Haliczzer conjectures, "the Crown would surely have terminated tax-farming contracts running from 1490 to 1494." This speculation is meaningless for various reasons. In the first place, there would have been nothing "carefully planned" about the portentous decision, which, if secretly considered and hoped for, could be acted upon only after victory over the Muslim kingdom. The royal couple, although confident of ultimate victory, was not entirely sure of it even as late as December 15, 1491, on concluding their famous peace treaty with Boabdil when they promised toleration of the Jews of Granada. Only after their troops actually occupied Granada on January 2, 1492 (and even that feat could be carried out only by stealth, through the back door), was Catholic victory assured. On contracts with tax-farmers drawn in 1490 or 1491, the sovereigns could not, of course, foresee the date of the end of the war.

Second, the monarchs expected their important Jewish officials to choose baptism in preference to exile, and many of them (as well as uncounted numbers of humbler Jews) did just that. After their conversion many former Jews were to continue the tax-farming and other often Jewish professions indefinitely. Third, the financial loss to Spain through the expulsion has been vastly exaggerated, as has the supposed wealth of the Spanish Jews. In the century following the series of pogroms in 1391, which wiped out many Jewish communities through murder, massacre, and conversions, surviving Jews and their descendants were finding their means of livelihood, their numbers, and their assets continually shrinking. Pressure against them intensified under the strong united regime of Isabella and Ferdinand—not "because of the influx of *conversos* into the ranks of the Castilian urban elite" (see Haliczzer's communication in *AHR*, 78[1973]:1166), but because during the last spurt of the *reconquista* the medieval crusading spirit was being revived. In those few years the Inquisition was introduced in Castile and reactivated in Aragon. Centuries-old discrimination laws were revived, such as the narrowing of ghettos, imposition of the Jews' (and Moors') badge, and other demeaning measures. At that late stage little potential financial loss was to be expected from a group that had become expendable to the economy,

even if some of the few wealthy Jews still existing, like Don Isaac Abarbanel, joined the exiles: a trivial loss compared to the magnificent wealth of their trophy, the kingdom of Granada, which the sovereigns had just gained. Consequently, the edict of expulsion does not signify a "sudden reversal" of the Catholic sovereigns' policy but rather the final attainment of their true goal.

If anyone still doubts that the monarchs of their free will seized that moment to rid Spain of this non-Christian sect whose religion they abhorred, remember the immediate aftermath: in 1496–97 Isabella, Ferdinand, and their widowed daughter Isabel prevailed on the Portuguese King Manoel, Isabel's intended, to carry out the same Jewish persecution in Portugal, or there would be no marriage. And to round out their Catholic victory: in 1502 the monarchs considered the time ripe to put before their larger religious minority, the Spanish Muslims, the same alternative of baptism or expulsion or death.

ERIKA SPIVAKOVSKY
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PROFESSOR HALICZER REPLIES:

At last the supporters of traditional beliefs about the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella have found their champion in the person of Dr. Erika Spivakovsky. In resounding phrases she reaffirms traditional ideas about the virtual omnipotence of the Catholic sovereigns ("which magistrate would dare dictate to the Catholic sovereigns in March 1492 . . . when the war of Granada was triumphantly won") and their absolute dedication to the triumph of the Catholic faith. She even goes so far as to speculate that the Jewish expulsion may have resulted from "the fulfillment of a secret religious vow."

If her assertions are carefully examined, however, they will be found to be illogical and unfounded—she is a poor champion indeed for such venerable ideas. A good example of this is Spivakovsky's position on the origins of Alonso de Oropesa. She tells us that his "own words" reveal him to be an Old Christian. Her assertion here is contradicted by his anti-Semitic tract, *Lumen ad revelationem gentium*, which presents us with virtually the same arguments as those put forward in the *Defensorium*

Unitatis Christianae, written by that undoubted *converso* Alonso de Cartagena, son of the famous Rabbi Solomon Ha-Levi (D. Pablo de Santa Maria). The only major difference between the two tracts is that Alonso de Oropesa placed greater emphasis on the dangers posed to all Christians by free social intercourse with Jews (see Albert A. Sicroff, *Les controverses des statuts de 'pureté de sang' en Espagne du XV au XVII siècles* [1960], p. 73).

Another significant fact that should have alerted Spivakovsky to the real origins of Alonso de Oropesa was his reaction to the Franciscans' call for the establishment of an inquisition whose purpose would be to hunt out New Christian heretics and eliminate the danger that their presence posed for the faithful Old Christian. Instead of enthusiastically supporting this proposal, as we would have expected from an Old Christian, he led a delegation to court and declared that the cause of all the trouble was the accusations that were being made against *conversos* by Old Christians. For him, an inquisition would be useful because it would not only separate the sheep from the goats in the ranks of the *conversos* but also because it would identify the false charges brought against *conversos* by Old Christians and bring those responsible to secular authority for punishment (see Sicroff, p. 69). Alonso de Oropesa's own writings, his strong support for *conversos*, and his attitude toward the Franciscans' proposals all point clearly to his *converso* origin.

Spivakovsky also criticizes me for calling the Franciscan friar Alonso de Espina an Old Christian. According to her, "this individual has always been known as a *converso*." However, in his tract *Fortalitium Fidei* he accuses the *conversos* of crimes more heinous than those committed by Jews (see Sicroff, p. 75). The nature of his tract caused Albert A. Sicroff to seriously doubt the supposed New Christian origins of Alonso de Espina: "If this were the case could Fray Alonso have brought such a categorical condemnation against the New Christians?" (Sicroff, p. 75).

Spivakovsky then proceeds to attack one of my principle arguments—the alliance between the Crown and the great Castilian cities—by denying the key role that these cities played during the Granada war. If she had carefully

consulted the latest published research on the subject—Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada's *Castilla y la conquista del reino de Granada*—she would have found that my assertions were amply supported. Ladero's book is filled with references to urban contributions to the war in the areas of transportation (see Ladero, pp. 137–38, 170), food supply (pp. 184–98), and troops (pp. 135, 138–39). Ladero tells us that the urban "militias provided great quantities of footsoldiers who were indispensable in most of the actions of their war of sieges and raids that were carried out in lands that were frequently mountainous and little suited to cavalry" (Ladero, p. 136). The financial contribution of cities was essential and not confined to loans, but included such items as the *Hermandad* special subsidy (some forty-eight million *maravedis* in 1491) as well as the salaries of most of the footsoldiers in the army.

She should also be very careful about dealing with the complicated matter of Castilian finances. She incorrectly identifies the *décima* as "a tenth of all rents levied on property owners six times during the war." In point of fact the *décima* was actually a levy of one-tenth of the revenues derived from ecclesiastical property that was authorized by the pope in 1482. The tax was immediately commuted into a subsidy of between 100,000 and 115,000 *florins* (see Ladero, p. 209).

Next, Spivakovsky proceeds to tell us that there could have been nothing "carefully planned" about the expulsion since the Catholic sovereigns were not sure of victory over the kingdom of Granada even as late as December 15, 1491. However, this seeming caution that Spivakovsky discerns in Ferdinand and Isa-

bella's attitude toward expulsion contradicts her later assertion that there was "little potential financial loss" to be expected from it. If the expulsion was really of such small financial importance why was it necessary to wait for the fall of Granada in order to accomplish it? Clearly the expulsion of the Jews had nothing to do with the actual fall of the city of Granada. The treaty of December 15, 1491, which promised toleration of the Granada Jews (as well as Isabella's authorization on June 6, 1489, to the captive Jews of Malaga to live anywhere in Castile [see Suárez Fernández, pp. 327–29]) illustrates the royal attitude: complete support for the continued existence of the Jewish community.

The possible long-range economic consequences of the expulsion still await adequate study. I, however, deal with the serious short-range dislocation in the machinery of royal tax collection as attested by documentary evidence, not mere speculation.

As far as the Portuguese expulsion is concerned that, too, awaits proper treatment. The affairs of a great nation, however, usually depend on forces more powerful than the clauses of a marriage contract.

What I think that the controversy over my article has shown is the need for much research into not only the circumstances of the expulsion but also into the social, economic, and institutional history of Castile. Historians investigating these phenomena will get nowhere if they, like Erika Spivakovsky, continue to affirm the hoary myths of Spanish historiography.

STEPHEN HALICZER
Northern Illinois University

Recent Deaths

DONALD DREW EGBERT (May 12, 1902–January 3, 1973), a long-time member of the AHA, taught all his life at Princeton University. He joined the Princeton faculty in 1929 and retired as Butler Professor of the History of Architecture, a chair he held since 1968.

At the beginning of his scholarly career Donald Egbert was influenced by Princeton's great medievalist Charles Rufus Morey, and his first publications were in that field. For his study of *Tickhill Psalter and Related Manuscripts* (1939) Egbert won the Haskins Medal of the Medieval Academy of America; he remained a life-long member of the Medieval Academy, as well as of the Société Française de Archéologie. From the early 1940s, however, his interests began to move toward the American field. He took a leading part in founding Princeton's renowned American Civilization Program in 1942, and for the next twenty years this was his major area of scholarship and interest. He spent much time building up American holdings in the university's Museum of Historic Arts, then as now a part of the department of art and archeology's operations. He contributed "Foreign Influences in American Art" to *Foreign Influences in American Life* (ed. David F. Bowers [1944]); "The Architecture and the Setting" (one of his most remarkable essays in cultural interpretation of historic buildings) to *The Modern Princeton* (1947); "The Idea of Organic Expression and American Architecture" to *Evolutionary Thought in America* (ed. Stow Persons [1950]); and "Religious Expression in American Architecture" to *Religion in American Life* (1961). With Stow Persons he coauthored *Socialism and American Life* (1952; 2d ed. entitled *Socialism and American Art in the Light of*

European Utopianism, Marxism and Anarchism [1967]).

By the early 1960s Donald Egbert's interest had begun to shift again, this time to social radicalism, as a hitherto neglected or at least vastly underestimated factor in the history of art and architectural criticism. By the mid-1960s he was wholly engaged in this study. His major work in this field was *Social Radicalism and the Arts in Western Europe* (1970). This important study was preceded by a number of articles—the most significant, perhaps, being "The Idea of 'Avant-Garde' in Art and Politics" (*AHR*, 73[1967–68]:339–66). In these later studies Egbert explored more extensively than anyone else how radicalism in political thought and social action related to the "avant-garde" movement in visual arts. He established statistically what had previously been only a vague allegation (like Babbitt's description of modern artists being "a bunch of bums living on booze and spaghetti")—that a taste of *modernismus* was closely associated with, if not a direct product of, a belief in utopian schemes for perfecting society.

Such a theme, of course, could hardly be popular in the academic world at large. Nor is it yet. Nonetheless, Donald Egbert is more and more being recognized as a pioneer who dared to explore truly new areas of scholarship. His unique dedication to his discipline manifested itself not only in scholarly publication but also in superb teaching, especially at the graduate level. In 1970, on the occasion of Mr. Egbert's retirement from Princeton University, his graduate students presented him with a *Festschrift* on *Arts in Society: Selections from the Periodical Writings of Donald Drew Egbert*.

In 1946 Professor Egbert married Virginia Grace Wylie, a scholar in the medieval field. She contributed the following to the program of the memorial service for him in Princeton Chapel on January 14, 1973: "Donald's life is perhaps best summed up in that verse from Proverbs: 'Take fast hold of instruction; let her not go: keep her; for she is thy life.' Teaching and learning were indeed his life, and he would have said, 'Hear! Hear!' to Rose Macaulay who once wrote to a friend, 'Why *do* we pray that they [the faithful departed] may have rest? Rest is not what we shall want, surely, but more scope for work and new knowledge.'"

ALAN GOWANS

University of Victoria

OTAKAR ODLOZILIK, emeritus professor of history at the University of Pennsylvania, died at the age of seventy-four on July 14, 1973, while vacationing in Bohyne, Yugoslavia. Following the Nazi occupation of his native Czechoslovakia in 1939 Odlozilik, who had been professor of history at the Charles University, Prague, since 1934, emigrated to the United States and taught at several universities before accepting a position with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile in London. In 1948 he returned to the United States, and the following year he was appointed T. G.

Masaryk Professor of History at Columbia University, a position he held until he came to the University of Pennsylvania in 1955.

Odlozilik was a prolific scholar whose publications spanned three decades and reflected a catholic interest in the medieval history of Central Europe and Czechoslovakia. In 1936 he published a biography of the Moravian nobleman, Charles the Elder of Zerotin. The following year Odlozilik brought out his *Wyclif and Bohemia*, and in 1965 he culminated his lifetime interest in Hussite history with the publication of *The Hussite King: Bohemia in European Affairs, 1440-1471*. In 1970, upon his retirement from active teaching, Odlozilik was honored by his former students with a *Festschrift*, *The Czech Renaissance of the Nineteenth Century* (edited by P. Brock and H. G. Shilling [University of Toronto, 1970]).

For Otakar Odlozilik scholarship and teaching was not a profession or career, but a vocation. He never married; but to those fortunate enough to have known him he was a loving man whose passion for the ideals of democracy and humane scholarship guided his life and inspired ours.

JOHN RUMBARGER

Prologue: The Journal of the National Archives

Other Books Received

Books listed were received by the *AHR* between October 1 and December 1, 1973. Books that will be reviewed are not listed, but listing does not preclude subsequent review.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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